Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Luis I.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Department of
Homeland Security; Todd M. Lyons,
Acting Director of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; Sirce Owen, Acting
Director for Executive Office for
Immigration Review; Executive Office for
Immigration Review; and Samuel Olson,
Acting Director, St. Paul Field Office
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Respondents.
File No. 26-cv-1134 (ECT/DLM)
OPINION AND ORDER
Iris Ramos Nieves, The Law Office of Iris Ramos LLC, Minneapolis, MN, for Petitioner
Luis I.
Anthony Barrows and David W. Fuller, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN,
for Respondents Pamela Bondi, Kristi Noem, Department of Homeland Security, Todd M.
Lyons, 	Immigration 	and 	Customs 	Enforcement, 	Sirce 	Owen, 	Executive 	Office 	for
Immigration Review, and Samuel Olson.
Petitioner Luis I. is an Ecuadorian citizen who “entered the United States without
inspection on or around 2009.” 	Pet. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 33–34. 	Luis “did not have contact
with immigration authorities upon entering the United States.” 	Id. ¶ 35. 	“Respondents
took [Luis] into custody on or around February 5, 2026,” and as of the Petition’s filing, he
CASE 0:26-cv-01134-ECT-DLM Doc. 7 Filed 02/11/26 Page 1 of 6

2
was “in custody at the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (‘ICE’) detention facility
inside of the Bishop Henry Whipple Federal Building in Fort Snelling, Minnesota.” Id. ¶¶
16, 36. The Petition alleges, “[u]pon information and belief,” that Luis “does not have a
criminal record.” Id. ¶ 36. Respondents do not dispute the Petition’s facts. See ECF No. 5.
Luis challenges his detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pet. ¶ 8. He claims he has
been wrongly classified as a § 1225(b)(2) detainee (whose detention is mandatory) rather
than a § 1226(a) detainee (whose detention is discretionary and who is entitled to a bond
hearing). Pet. ¶¶ 38–64; see Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 961–62 (D. Minn.
2025) (explaining legal framework). According to Luis, that misclassification and denial
of a bond hearing violate his right to due process under the Fifth Amendment, the
Immigration and Nationality Act and its implementing regulations, and the Administrative
Procedure Act. 	See Pet. ¶¶ 76–95. 	Luis seeks his “immediate release to the extent that
Respondents justify his detention [under] 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)”; a declaration that he is
not subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), but rather detained pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1) and thus eligible to seek a bond redetermination hearing; a
declaration that his detention absent a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth 	Amendment; 	issuance 	of 	an 	order 	directing 	Respondents 	to 	provide 	a 	bond
redetermination hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226; issuance of an order directing the
Fort Snelling immigration court “grant individuals who entered without inspection a bond
redetermination hearing consistent with 8 U.S.C. § 1226”; issuance of an order finding
Respondents’ 	administrative 	decision 	is 	arbitrary 	and 	capricious 	violation 	of 	the
Administrative Procedure Act; issuance of an order enjoining Respondents from moving
CASE 0:26-cv-01134-ECT-DLM Doc. 7 Filed 02/11/26 Page 2 of 6

3
Luis from Minnesota during the pendency of his Petition; attorneys’ fees and costs; and
“all further relief this Court deems just and proper.” Pet. ¶¶ 67, 72–75 & at 26–27.
Recognizing that “this case presents legal and factual issues similar to those in prior
habeas petitions this Court has decided,” Respondents argue that Luis’s Petition fails on
the merits for the same reasons set forth in the appeal of Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741
(JRT/SGE), 2025 WL 2976539 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-3248
(8th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025). See ECF No. 5. This raises an issue of statutory interpretation1
that courts in this District have repeatedly considered and rejected, and it will be rejected
here as well.
Luis has shown he has been misclassified under § 1225(b)(2) rather than § 1226(a).
As courts have explained, the former statute applies to applicants “seeking admission,” and
the latter to “aliens already in the country.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A); Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and (c)); see
Francisco T. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 970, 974–76 (D. Minn. 2025); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi,
--- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *6–7 (D. Minn.
Oct. 1, 2025); Eliseo A.A. v. Olson, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3381 (JWB/DJF), 2025
WL 2886729, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741 (JRT/SGE),
2025 WL 2976539, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-3248 (8th Cir.
1 	To the extent Respondents challenge this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider Luis’s Petition, consistent with previous rulings on this issue, I find that the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g) do not apply to “the narrow
question whether a noncitizen is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226
or mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” 	Fernando F.P.D. v. Brott, No. 25-cv-4455
(ECT/ECW), 2025 WL 3675151, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2025) (citing cases).
CASE 0:26-cv-01134-ECT-DLM Doc. 7 Filed 02/11/26 Page 3 of 6

4
Nov. 10, 2025); Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL 3146312,
at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025); E.M. v. Noem, 25-cv-3975 (SRN/DTS), 2025 WL
3157839, at *4–8 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025); Santos M.C. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-4264
(PJS/DJF), 2025 WL 3281787, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2025). As of this writing, two
federal courts of appeals have ruled on the question, one reaching and one rejecting this
conclusion. 	See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1062
(7th Cir. 2025) (concluding that respondent was not likely to prevail on the merits that
petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)); Buenrostro-Mendez v.
Bondi, --- F.4th ---, Nos. 25-20496, 25-40701, 2026 WL 323330, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 6,
2026) (finding petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)). 	Luis
has lived in the United States for approximately sixteen years, Pet. ¶ 34, and I find his
detention falls under § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2).2
The final issue is the appropriate remedy. 	Section 1226 provides that “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained.”
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). 	“Issuance of a warrant is a necessary condition to
justify 	discretionary 	detention 	under 	section 	1226(a).” 	Chogllo 	Chafla 	v. 	Scott,
--- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 2:25-cv-00437, 2025 WL 2688541, at *11 (D. Me. Sep. 21, 2025),
appeal filed (Nov. 7, 2025). 	“[I]t follows that absent a warrant a noncitizen may not be
arrested 	and 	detained 	under 	section 	1226(a).” 	Id. 	(emphasis 	in 	original); 	accord
2 	Respondents do not argue that Luis is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), or that any other statutory scheme other than that raised in the Petition
would apply to Luis’s detention. See ECF No. 5.
CASE 0:26-cv-01134-ECT-DLM Doc. 7 Filed 02/11/26 Page 4 of 6

5
Chiliquinga Yumbillo v. Stamper, No. 2:25-cv-00479, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (D. Me.
Sep. 30, 2025); J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354, 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); see also Florida v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1276 (N.D.
Fla. 2023) (stating § 1226 “is not even triggered unless an arrest warrant is issued” and that
“[i]f [an] alien has not been arrested on a warrant, then the subsequent provisions giving
the Attorney General discretion to detain or release ‘the arrested alien’ are likewise not
triggered”), appeal dismissed, 2023 WL 5212561 (11th Cir. July 11, 2023). Respondents
were ordered to include in their answer “[w]hether the absence of a warrant preceding
[Luis’s] arrest necessitates [Luis’s] immediate release.” ECF No. 3 at 2. Respondents have
not produced any warrant, nor have they advanced any specific argument that Luis’s
release is an unwarranted remedy. See ECF No. 5.
“[R]elease is an available and appropriate remedy” for “detention that lacks a lawful
predicate.” 	Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6, Vedat C. v. Bondi, No.
25-cv-4642 (JWB/DTS) (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025), ECF No. 9 (citing Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)). 	“Where the record shows Respondents have not identified a
valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the remedy is not to supply one through
further proceedings.” 	Id.; see Chogllo Chafla, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2688541, at
*11 (“Since the Government did not comply with the plain language of section 1226(a),
[petitioners’] immediate release is justified.”); J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (same);
Chiliquinga Yumbillo, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (reaching same conclusion); see also
CASE 0:26-cv-01134-ECT-DLM Doc. 7 Filed 02/11/26 Page 5 of 6

6
Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693 (“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.
The typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” (citation modified)).3
ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT Petitioner Luis I.’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus [ECF No. 1] is GRANTED as follows:
1. 	The Court DECLARES Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), and is instead subject to detention, if at all, pursuant to the
discretionary provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
2. 	Respondents shall release Petitioner from custody as follows:
a. 	If Petitioner remains detained in Minnesota, Respondents shall release
Petitioner from custody as soon as practicable, but not later than 48 hours after entry of this
Order.
b. 	If Petitioner has been moved outside of Minnesota, as soon as
practicable, but not later than 72 hours after entry of this Order, Respondents shall return
Petitioner to Minnesota and then release Petitioner from custody.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 11, 2026, at 12:10 p.m. 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
3 	The resolution of this statutory-interpretation question in Luis’s favor makes it
unnecessary to address the Petition’s remaining grounds.
CASE 0:26-cv-01134-ECT-DLM Doc. 7 Filed 02/11/26 Page 6 of 6