Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Henry A. V. P.,
Petitioner,
v. 	ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Civil File No. 26-01121 (MJD/JFD)
Pamela Bondi, et al.,
Defendants.
Kira Aakre Kelley, Climate Defense Project, Counsel for Petitioner.
David W. Fuller, Friedrich A. P. Siekert, Trevor Brown, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Counsel for Respondents.
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court upon the Report and
Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty filed
February 11, 2026. (Doc. 8.) Respondents have filed objections to the Report and
Recommendation. Pursuant to statute, the Court has conducted a de novo
review upon the record. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b). Based upon
that review, the Court will adopt the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate
Judge Docherty.
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I. 	Objections
A. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents object to the Report and Recommendation’s (“R&R”)
recommendation that this Court has jurisdiction over this case. (Doc. 9 at 1-4.)
Respondents do not dispute that Petitioner Henry V. P. (“Petitioner”) was
arrested and detained on February 3, 2026 in Minnesota. (Docs. 8 at 2; 9 at 2.)
Petitioner was in ICE custody in Minnesota for 2 days before Respondents state
that he was transferred to El Paso, Texas on February 5 and to Karnes, Texas on
February 6. (Doc. 9 at 2.) On February 6, DHS “commenced removal
proceedings” against Petitioner. (Id.) The petition (“Pet.”) in this case was filed
on February 6, 2026.
Despite Respondents’ insistence that “it can be assumed the Immigration
Court is handling [Petitioner’s removal] proceedings correctly,” Respondents
also state that ICE is working to return Petitioner to Minnesota “as soon as
practicable.” (Doc. 9 at 4.)
While the Court does not question Respondents’ timeline, this does not
save Respondents. Petitioner’s counsel stated that at the time the petition was
filed, Petitioner was being held in the Whipple Federal Building in Minneapolis
“upon information and belief” and that venue was appropriate in this Court
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because Petitioner was detained “and is presumed to remain within the District
of Minnesota.” (Pet. ¶¶ 5, 7.) Petitioner’s counsel searched the ICE Detainee
Locator using Petitioner’s A number and country of origin on February 6, 2026,
three days after Petitioner was taken into custody. (Id. ¶ 19.) The Locator
returned “0” results. (Id.) Petitioner argues that the unknown custodian rule
allows this Court to retain jurisdiction over this case. (Doc. 7 at 5-7 (citing, inter
alia, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 450 n.18 (2004) (“When . . . a prisoner is
held in an undisclosed location by an unknown custodian, it is impossible to
apply the immediate custodian and district of confinement rules.”).)
Under the “district of confinement” rule, a district court generally has
jurisdiction to consider a habeas petition only in the district where the detainee is
confined. Manuel N.M. v. Noem, No. 26-CV-224 (MJD/DJF), 2026 WL 242318, at
*2 (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2026) (citing Padilla, 542 U.S. at 443 (2004)), R&R adopted,
2026 WL 246840 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2026).
However, in their concurrence in Padilla, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor
reasoned that “if there is an indication that the Government’s purpose in
removing a prisoner were to make it difficult for his lawyer to know where the
habeas petition should be filed, or where the Government was not forthcoming
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with respect to the identity of the custodian and the place of detention . . . habeas
jurisdiction would be in the district court from whose territory the petitioner had
been removed.” 542 U.S. at 454 (Kennedy, J. concurring). Although the Supreme
Court has not formally adopted this exception, it has been applied nationwide.
Aleksander B. v. Trump, No. 26-CV-170 (KMM/DJF), 2026 WL 172435, at *2 (D.
Minn. Jan. 22, 2026) (gathering cases).
Thus, “an exception to this rule applies when a habeas petitioner is
initially arrested and detained in this District, ICE moves him without notice, the
government has not been forthcoming about his location, and his whereabouts
are unknown despite counsel’s diligent attempts to locate him.” Manuel N.M.,
2026 WL 242318, at *2 (citing Aleksander B., 2026 WL 172435, at *5-8); Marcia
R.Q., v. Bondi, et al., No. 26-CV-881 (KMM/EMB), 2026 WL 296502, at *2 (D.
Minn. Feb. 4, 2026) (recognizing an exception to the rule when “the petitioner’s
location is unknown at the time of filing—such as when the petitioner is in
transit—or where immigration authorities have not disclosed where the
petitioner is being detained or by whom, and circumstances have prevented or
precluded contact with counsel”).
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The situation here is similar to the situation outlined in Marcia R. Q.: ICE
transferred Petitioner from Minnesota to Texas without notice and despite
Counsel’s efforts given the tools immigration authorities provided, the best
Counsel could do was state that Petitioner was at Whipple “on information and
belief.” It actually appears that Respondents were even confused as to
Petitioner’s exact whereabouts in the state of Texas when they filed their
response to the petition. (Doc. 9 (Resp. obj. to R&R) at 3.)
Here, Petitioner’s counsel attempted in good faith to locate him. Three
days after he was violently taken from his vehicle by masked agents in the
District of Minnesota, his whereabouts were still unknown. Now, given the
opportunity to explain why Petitioner was transferred from this District to Texas
and then moved again once he was over 1,000 miles from home, Respondents
have not done so. This Court maintains jurisdiction just as the Court said in its
Order to Show Cause. See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 454 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
B. 	Merits
Respondents argue that this case is “different from the typical . . .
1225/1226 cases filed recently in this district” where the petitioners entered the
country without inspection, admission, or parole. (Doc. 9 at 4.) Respondents
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argue that Petitioner was admitted on a visa, overstayed the visa, was
apprehended, detained, transferred, and placed in removal proceedings on the
charge of being a visa overstay. They say Petitioner’s removal proceedings were
initiated in and are being conducted in Texas, that he appears to be “bond
eligible,” and that there is no evidence in the record whether the immigration
court has conducted a bond hearing. (Id.) Accordingly, Respondents argue that
it cannot be presumed that they have refused to provide Petitioner a bond
hearing. (Id. (citing R&R at 2).) However, Respondents state that “it can be
assumed the Immigration Court is handling those proceedings correctly.” (Id.)
Thus, Respondents assert that the Court should deny the habeas petition.
Respondents ignore an important fact: Petitioner has a pending derivative
U visa application. This Court has already held that the habeas corpus
application of a noncitizen who is “already present within the country” when he
applies for U nonimmigrant status is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226. Walter L. v.
Bondi, No. 26-CV-607 (MJD/EMB), 2026 WL 266553, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2026)
(citing Mayamu K. v. Bondi, 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819, at *8 (D. Minn.
Oct. 20, 2025)), R&R adopted, 2026 WL 269375 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2026); see also
Victor F.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-4778 (ECT/SGE), 2026 WL 25968, at *2 (D. Minn.
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Jan. 5, 2026) (holding that a noncitizen who enters the country without
authorization and years later pursues a U visa “falls within § 1226’s discretionary
detention procedures”) (gathering cases).
While the Court acknowledges that the noncitizens in the precedent cases
entered the country illegally before applying for U visas, and Petitioner entered
the country legally and overstayed his visa before applying for his derivative U
visa application, that seems to be somewhat of a distinction without a difference
at this point. Although neither party has cited a case with facts on all fours with
this case, and the Court’s own research has not unearthed one, it is not difficult
to draw an analogy here. Once Petitioner overstayed his visa, he was in the
country illegally just like the noncitizens who entered the country without
permission. At that point, both Petitioner and the other noncitizens were subject
to being put into removal proceedings. However, none of them were “seeking
admission” because they had been here for years before they applied for their U
visas and therefore, § 1226 controls. See Victor F.M., 2026 WL 25968, at *2.
This objection is overruled.
II. 	Order
Based upon the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED:
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1. 	The Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation of United States
Magistrate Judge John F. Docherty filed February 11, 2026 [Doc. 8].
2. 	Petitioner Henry A. V. P.’s Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
[Doc. 1] is GRANTED.
a. 	Respondents are ordered to immediately arrange for release of
Petitioner into Minnesota at a safe time and in a safe place that is
communicated at least two (2) hours in advance to Petitioner’s
counsel;
b. Respondents are ordered to release Petitioner on his own
recognizance and without conditions; and
c. 	Respondents are ordered to immediately return all Petitioner’s
personal items that were taken from him when he was detained in
substantially the same condition as when the items were taken, such
as his driver’s license, immigration papers, passport, cell phone, and
keys.
3. 	Within 48 hours of the date of the filing of this Order, Respondents are
ordered to file a status update with the Court reporting on their
compliance with this Order.
4. 	Any motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to
Justice Act must be filed within 21 days of entry of judgment in this
matter, along with a well-reasoned memorandum of authorities explaining
why an award of fees and costs is warranted.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 20, 2026 	s/Michael J. Davis
Michael J. Davis
United States District Court
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