Cox v. Commissioner Department Of Human Services

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Samuel Cox,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner Department of Human
Services, Jane/John Doe/Unknown
Names,
Defendant.
Case No. 26-cv-0932 (LMP/SGE)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Samuel Cox, an involuntary client of the Minnesota Sex Offender Program
(“MSOP”), brings this action alleging that his civil rights have been violated during his
civil detention at MSOP. Cox did not pay the filing fee for this matter, instead applying for
in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status. See Dkt. 7. That IFP application is now before the Court
and must be considered before any other action may be taken in this matter.
After review of the IFP application, this Court concludes that Cox qualifies
financially for IFP status. That said, an IFP application will be denied, and an action will
be dismissed, when an IFP applicant has filed a complaint that fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d
1127, 1128 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). In reviewing whether a complaint states a claim
on which relief may be granted, the Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations
in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Aten v.
Scottsdale Ins. Co., 511 F.3d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 2008). Although the factual allegations in
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the complaint need not be detailed, they must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above
the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The
complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. In assessing
the sufficiency of the complaint, the court may disregard legal conclusions that are couched
as factual allegations. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). Pro se complaints
are to be construed liberally, but they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims
advanced. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).
There are two substantial problems with the complaint in this matter. The first
problem is that Cox’s factual allegations are entirely vague regarding what, specifically,
he is suing about. The complaint is laden with conclusory allegations that, for example,
Cox has been subjected to “excessive punishment” and “harassment,” (Compl., Dkt. 1,
at 2); that Cox has been “denied access to the court” and “stripped of [his] property,” (id.);
that MSOP officials have implemented “unconstitutional policies,” (id.); and so on. None
of these conclusory factual allegations are sufficient to put the Court or any defendant on
notice of why Cox is bringing this lawsuit.1
The second problem is the relief that Cox requests in this action—that an
“investigation be conducted” by the Department of Justice and that the Court appoint a
“Special Magistrate . . . to oversee and maintain control” of MSOP, (Compl. at 3). This is
1 This Court notes, by way of contrast, that Cox filed another lawsuit at the same time that
this lawsuit was filed, and that the complaint in that other matter sets forth particularized
factual allegations regarding specific acts of alleged wrongdoing that Cox believes to have
taken place. See Cox v. Comm’r Dep’t of Human Services, No. 26-CV-0931 (PJS/EMB),
ECF No. 1 (Complaint) (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 2026).
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not within the power of the Court to grant. Private parties lack standing to bring claims
requiring the federal government to conduct an investigation, see Kunzer v. Magill, 667 F.
Supp. 2d 1058, 1061 (D. Minn. 2009), and no provision of federal law permits the Court
to assume operational responsibilities for an entity of the state such as MSOP. Insofar as
Cox seeks injunctive relief, never does he make clear the contents of the injunction that he
is seeking.
Because Cox has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted, it is
recommended that this matter be dismissed without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and that Cox’s application to proceed IFP be denied. Finally, because this
Court does not believe that appointment of counsel on behalf of Cox is likely to
substantially benefit either Cox or the Court in this matter, it is further recommended that
Cox’s motion for appointment of counsel be denied.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	This matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);
2. 	The application to proceed in forma pauperis of plaintiff Samuel Cox (Dkt.
7) be DENIED; and
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3. 	Cox’s motion for appointment of counsel (Dkt. 4) be DENIED.
Dated: February 20, 2026 	s/ Shannon G. Elkins
SHANNON G. ELKINS
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local
Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits
set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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