Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Rosa T.,
Petitioner,
v.
David Easterwood, in his official capacity as
Field Office Director, Fort Snelling (St Paul)
Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Todd M. Lyons, in his official
capacity as Acting Director, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; Kristi Noem, in
her official capacity as Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; and
Pamela Jo Bondi, in her official capacity as
Attorney General of the United States,
Respondents.
File No. 26-cv-888 (ECT/ECW)
OPINION AND ORDER
Mai Neng Moua, Mai N. Moua Law Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Petitioner Rosa T.
Ana H. Voss and Julie T. Le, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for
Respondents David Easterwood, Todd M. Lyons, Kristi Noem, and Pamela Jo Bondi.
Petitioner Rosa T. is an Ecuadorian citizen who entered the United States without
inspection on or about October 23, 2023, near Lukeville, Arizona. Pet. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 1,
22, 43–44. On October 23, 2023, Rosa was issued a Notice of Appear, which stated that
Rosa was “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.”
ECF No. 1-1 at 1. It did not check the box for “arriving alien.” Id. Rosa “then filed Form
I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal with USCIS.” Pet. ¶ 45;
accord id. ¶¶ 1, 16. 	The date on which Rosa filed her asylum application has not been
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provided by Rosa or Respondents, but a copy of Rosa’s Form I-589 Application for Asylum
and for Withholding of Removal filed with the Petition is stamped as received by the
Department of Justice on October 18, 2024. 	See ECF No. 1-1 at 5. 	Rosa’s asylum
application remains pending. Pet. ¶¶ 1, 16, 45. 	Rosa “has not been ordered removed” and
she “has no criminal history.” Id. ¶¶ 1, 48. Rosa has an employment authorization valid
from May 14, 2025, through May 13, 2030. 	Id. ¶ 1; ECF No. 1-1 at 4. 	On January 30,
2026, Department of Homeland Security or Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) agents detained Rosa “while she attended her ISAP (Intensive Supervision
Appearance Program)1 appointment.” Pet. ¶¶ 2, 46. Rosa “remained continuously enrolled
in ISAP and fully compliant with all program requirements at the time of her arrest,” and
“ICE never issued a notice of revocation, never identified any violation of ISAP conditions,
and never afforded 	[Rosa] the 	procedural 	safeguards 	required 	before converting a
supervised release into custodial detention.” Id. ¶ 7. As of the Petition’s filing, Rosa was
“being processed and detained by ICE at the St. Paul Field Office in Fort Snelling, Whipple
Federal Building in Bloomington, Minnesota.” Id. ¶ 47. Respondents do not dispute the
Petition’s facts. See ECF No. 5.
Rosa challenges her detention under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Pet. ¶ 11. She claims she
has been wrongly classified as a § 1225(b)(2) detainee (whose detention is mandatory)
rather than a § 1226(a) detainee (whose detention is discretionary and who is entitled to a
bond hearing). 	Pet. ¶¶ 24–30; see Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 961–62
1 	According to the Petition, ISAP “constitutes a form of conditional release that
authorizes supervision in the community rather than physical detention.” Pet. ¶ 6 (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); and then citing 8 C.F.R. 236.1(c)).
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(D. Minn. 2025) (explaining legal framework). According to Rosa, that misclassification
and denial of a bond hearing violate her right to due process under the Fifth Amendment,
the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Accardi
doctrine, and the Suspension Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, ¶ 9, cl. 2. 	See Pet. ¶¶ 50–70. Rosa
seeks issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ordering her immediate release from immigration
detention, or alternatively, that she “be provided a prompt, individualized custody hearing
before a neutral Immigration Judge under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)”; a declaration that her
detention despite her pending asylum petition and without revocation of her ISAP release
violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Immigration and Nationality Act,
the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Suspension Clause; issuance of an order
enjoining Respondents from continuing to detain her absent lawful statutory authority, or
from moving her outside of Minnesota during the pendency of her Petition; issuance of an
order directing the return of her personal property and belongings taken from her in
connection with detention; issuance of an order that if she has been transferred outside of
Minnesota, she be provided “prompt transportation at government expense to the Federal
Whipple Building in Minneapolis, Minnesota”; and “such other further relief as the Court
deems just and proper.” Pet. at 17–18.
Acknowledging that Rosa’s Petition “raises legal and factual issues similar to those
in prior habeas petitions this Court has decided,” Respondents argue that the Petition fails
on the merits for the same reasons set forth in the appeal of Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741
(JRT/SGE), 2025 WL 2976539 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-3248
(8th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025). 	See ECF No. 5 at 1. 	This raises an issue of statutory
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interpretation2 that courts in this District have repeatedly considered and rejected, and it
will be rejected here as well.
Rosa 	has 	shown 	she 	has 	been 	misclassified 	under 	§ 1225(b)(2) 	rather 	than
§ 1226(a). 	As courts have explained, the former statute applies to applicants “seeking
admission,” and the latter to “aliens already in the country.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A);
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and (c));
see Francisco T. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 970, 974–76 (D. Minn. 2025); Belsai D.S. v.
Bondi, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *6–7 (D.
Minn. Oct. 1, 2025); Eliseo A.A. v. Olson, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-3381 (JWB/DJF),
2025 WL 2886729, at *2–4 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025); Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3741
(JRT/SGE), 2025 WL 2976539, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal filed, No. 25-
3248 (8th Cir. Nov. 10, 2025); Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025
WL 3146312, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025); E.M. v. Noem, 25-cv-3975 (SRN/DTS),
2025 WL 3157839, at *4–8 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025); Santos M.C. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-
4264 (PJS/DJF), 2025 WL 3281787, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Nov. 25, 2025). As of this writing,
only one federal court of appeals has ruled on the question, and it reached the same
conclusion. See Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, (7th Cir.
2 	To the extent Respondents challenge this Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider Rosa’s Petition, consistent with previous rulings on this issue, I find that the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252(a)(5), (b)(9), and (g) do not apply to “the narrow
question whether a noncitizen is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226
or mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).” 	Fernando F.P.D. v. Brott, No. 25-cv-4455
(ECT/ECW), 2025 WL 3675151, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 17, 2025) (citing cases).
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2025). 	Rosa has lived in the United States for more than two years. 	See Pet. ¶ 1. 	Her
detention falls under § 1226(a) and not § 1225(b)(2).3
The final issue is the appropriate remedy. 	Section 1226 provides that “[o]n a
warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained.”
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added). 	“Issuance of a warrant is a necessary condition to
justify 	discretionary 	detention 	under 	section 	1226(a).” 	Chogllo 	Chafla 	v. 	Scott,
--- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 2:25-cv-00437, 2025 WL 2688541, at *11 (D. Me. Sep. 21, 2025),
appeal filed (Nov. 7, 2025). 	“[I]t follows that absent a warrant a noncitizen may not be
arrested 	and 	detained 	under 	section 	1226(a).” 	Id. 	(emphasis 	in 	original); 	accord
Chiliquinga Yumbillo v. Stamper, No. 2:25-cv-00479, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (D. Me.
Sep. 30, 2025); J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01354, 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 27, 2025); see also Florida v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1276 (N.D.
Fla. 2023) (stating § 1226 “is not even triggered unless an arrest warrant is issued” and that
“[i]f [an] alien has not been arrested on a warrant, then the subsequent provisions giving
the Attorney General discretion to detain or release ‘the arrested alien’ are likewise not
triggered”), appeal dismissed, 2023 WL 5212561 (11th Cir. July 11, 2023). 	Here,
Respondents were ordered to include in their answer “[w]hether the absence of a warrant
preceding [Rosa’s] arrest necessitates [Rosa’s] immediate release.” 	See ECF No. 3 at 2.
Respondents have not produced a warrant, nor have they advanced any specific argument
that Rosa’s release is an unwarranted remedy. See ECF No. 5.
3 	Respondents do not argue that Rosa is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c), or that any other statutory scheme other than that raised in the Petition
would apply to Rosa’s detention. See ECF No. 5.
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“[R]elease is an available and appropriate remedy” for “detention that lacks a lawful
predicate.” 	Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 6, Vedat C. v. Bondi, No.
25-cv-4642 (JWB/DTS) (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025), ECF No. 9 (citing Munaf v. Geren,
553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)). 	“Where the record shows Respondents have not identified a
valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the remedy is not to supply one through
further proceedings.” 	Id.; see Chogllo Chafla, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 2688541, at
*11 (“Since the Government did not comply with the plain language of section 1226(a),
[petitioners’] immediate release is justified.”); J.A.C.P., 2025 WL 3013328, at *8 (same);
Chiliquinga Yumbillo, 2025 WL 2783642, at *5 (reaching same conclusion); see also
Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693 (“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.
The typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” (citation modified)).4
ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT Petitioner Rosa T.’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus [ECF No. 1] is GRANTED as follows:
1. 	Petitioner is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
2. 	Respondents shall release Petitioner from custody as follows:
a. 	If Petitioner remains detained in Minnesota, Respondents shall release
Petitioner from custody as soon as practicable, but not later than 48 hours after entry of this
Order.
4 	The resolution of this statutory-interpretation question in Rosa’s favor makes it
unnecessary to address the Petition’s remaining grounds.
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b. 	If Petitioner has been moved outside of Minnesota, as soon as
practicable, but not later than 72 hours after entry of this Order, Respondents shall return
Petitioner to Minnesota and then release Petitioner from custody.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 2, 2026, at 5:40 p.m. 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
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