Butcher v. Clay County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
JOSEPH BUTCHER,
Petitioner,
v.
CLAY COUNTY,
Respondent.
Case No. 26-CV-0801 (LMP/JFD)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case is before the Court on Petitioner Joseph Butcher’s Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. No. 1 (“Petition”)) and Application to Pro-
ceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. No. 3 (“IFP Application”)). For the following reasons, the
Court recommends denying the Petition and denying the IFP Application as moot.
Butcher is presently confined as a pretrial detainee at the Clay County Correctional
Facility in Moorhead, Minnesota. (See Pet. 1.) The Petition challenges his ongoing deten-
tion and his (apparently) pending prosecution for failing to register as a predatory offender.
(See id. at 1, 7–8.1) The Petition does not specify the relevant statute, but the Court assumes
the prosecution is based on Minn. Stat. § 243.166.
The Petition raises three grounds. (See id. at 7.) First, Ground 1 argues that changes
to § 243.166 effective in July 2024 relieved Butcher of his registration duty. (See id.)
1 The Court says “apparently” because the Petition does not indicate the case number of
Butcher’s pending prosecution, and the Court has been unable to find the case in the State
of Minnesota’s Minnesota Court Records Online database.
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Second, Ground 2 argues (based on Ground 1) that Butcher’s current pretrial confinement
constitutes “false imprisonment”—again, because the registration requirement no longer
applies to him. (See id.) Finally, Ground 3 argues that because of the “law change,” Butcher
“shouldn’t even be on probation.” (Id.) The idea here seems to be that the legal changes to
§ 243.166 in 2024 mean Butcher should no longer be on probation arising from some ear-
lier criminal conviction.2
For relief, Butcher asks the Court to dismiss the “new failing to register charges”
currently pending against him, to discharge him from probation,3 and to reinstate his “pa-
rental rights.” (Id. at 8.4)
The Court addresses Grounds 1 and 2 together. In both, Butcher contends that he
faces prosecution for failing to register as a predatory offender despite a state-law change
that (he believes) exempts him from reporting. Because the relief he seeks would interrupt
an ongoing state prosecution, the Court must consider the so-called Younger abstention
doctrine. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).5
2 The Petition does not specify the relevant prior criminal conviction.
3 The context here is confusing. The Petition asks that Butcher be “discharged from proba-
tion for this failing to register,” which sounds like Butcher wants to be discharged from
probation arising from his current failure-to-register charges. But he cannot be on probation
for that charge, given that the prosecution is still pending. The Court assumes that Butcher
here means that he wants to be discharged from probation for some other, earlier prosecu-
tion, but any such earlier prosecution is left unspecified.
4 These parental rights were presumably terminated or suspended in a separate state pro-
ceeding, but that proceeding also goes unspecified.
5 A district court may consider Younger abstention issues sua sponte. 	See, e.g., Geier v.
Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 715 F.3d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 2013).
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Federal courts have consistently recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 gives state pre-
trial detainees a basis to challenge their confinement as unconstitutional. See, e.g., Palmer
v. Clarke, 961 F.2d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing cases); Terry v. Ryals, No. 25-CV-1152
(BSM/ERE), 2026 WL 546489, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 10, 2026) (citing Braden v. 30th Jud.
Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973)). But the U.S. Supreme Court has specifically noted
that federal courts are not meant to serve as a “‘pretrial-motion forum for state prisoners.’”
Braden, 410 U.S. at 493 (quoting id. at 508 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
The Younger doctrine requires federal courts to abstain from interfering in certain
ongoing state proceedings. See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72
(2013) (citing cases). The Eighth Circuit uses “a three-part inquiry” to determine when
Younger abstention applies:
First, does the underlying state proceeding fall within one of
the three “exceptional circumstances” where Younger absten-
tion is appropriate? Second, if the underlying proceeding fits
within a Younger category, does the state proceeding satisfy
what are known as the “Middlesex” factors? [6] And third, even
if the underlying state proceeding satisfies the first two inquir-
ies, is abstention nevertheless inappropriate because an excep-
tion to abstention applies?
Wassef v. Tibben, 68 F.4th 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting 375 Slane Chapel Rd., LLC
v. Stone Cnty., 53 F.4th 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2022)); see also, e.g., Tietz v. Hennepin Cnty.
Hum. Servs., No. 26-CV-0053 (ECT/DTS), 2026 WL 353111, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 9, 2026)
(quoting Wassef).
6 Cf. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
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Under this inquiry, Younger abstention plainly blocks consideration of Grounds 1
and 2. Among the three “exceptional circumstances” referred to in Wassef are ongoing state
criminal proceedings, so the first inquiry is met here. 	68 F.4th at 1087 (quoting Sprint
Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 78).
The second inquiry is met as well. The Middlesex factors are that there must be “(1)
an ongoing state judicial proceeding that (2) implicates important state interests and (3)
provides the federal plaintiff adequate opportunity to raise federal challenges.” Id. (citing
Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm’n, 457 U.S. at 432–35); Tietz, 2026 WL 353111, at *3
(same). The Petition provides no reason to suggest that Butcher cannot raise his arguments
in state-court proceedings.
Nor does any exception to abstention apply here. The main exceptions are when a
state action was brought in bad faith or to harass someone, or when other “extraordinary
circumstances” apply. See, e.g., Plouffe v. Ligon, 606 F.3d 890, 893 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Middlesex Cnty., 457 U.S. at 435); Tietz, 2026 WL 353111, at *4 (quoting Trainor v. Her-
nandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446–47 (1977)). Nothing in the Petition suggests that any of these
situations exist here.
The Younger abstention doctrine therefore applies and blocks the Court’s consider-
ation of Grounds 1 and 2 of the Petition. The Court therefore recommends denying those
grounds.7
7 Even if Younger abstention did not apply, the Court would still recommend denying
Grounds 1 and 2 because Butcher plainly has not exhausted his state-court remedies bear-
ing on those grounds. See Olson v. Washington Cnty., No. 12-CV-2807 (MJD/AJB), 2013
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This leaves Ground 3, which does not challenge Butcher’s present detention or on-
going state proceedings; instead, it challenges the underlying conviction triggering his reg-
istration duty. When a prisoner challenges a state-court conviction’s validity, the habeas
petition is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (governing habeas
petitions for those “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court” (emphasis added)).
But § 2254 petitions face the statutory exhaustion requirement of § 2254(b)(1)(A), under
which “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursu-
ant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that . . . the appli-
cant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”
The exhaustion requirement ensures that state courts have a “full and fair oppor-
tunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the fed-
eral courts.” 	O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see also, e.g., Brende v.
Young, 907 F.3d 1080, 1084 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing O’Sullivan). A petitioner must “fairly
present” each federal claim to every appropriate state court, including the state’s highest
court if it offers discretionary review. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (quoting
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam)); see also, e.g., Deck v. Jennings,
WL 1871523, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 24, 2013) (“Although § 2241 does not include a statutory
exhaustion requirement comparable to that found at § 2254(b), federal courts have consist-
ently recognized that the principles of comity and federalism require state pre-trial detain-
ees to present their constitutional claims in state court before seeking federal habeas corpus
relief under § 2241.” (citing cases)), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL
1867571 (D. Minn. May 3, 2013), aff’d, No. 13-2264 (8th Cir. Aug. 16, 2013); see also,
e.g., Palmer v. Minnesota, No. 25-CV-1148 (PAM/SGE), 2025 WL 1426815, at *1 (D.
Minn. Apr. 16, 2025) (quoting Olson), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL
1426499 (D. Minn. May 16, 2025).
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978 F.3d 578, 581 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Morris v. Norris, 83 F.3d 268, 270 (8th Cir.
1996)). In Minnesota, a § 2254 applicant must fairly present each claim to the Minnesota
Supreme Court before seeking federal relief. See, e.g., Turnage v. Fabian, 606 F.3d 933,
936 (8th Cir. 2010); Bell v. Stenseth, No. 23-CV-3881 (JWB/ECW), 2024 WL 4839826, at
*4 (D. Minn. July 29, 2024) (citing Fraction v. Minnesota, 678 F. Supp. 2d 908, 916 (D.
Minn. 2008)), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4839157 (D. Minn. Nov. 20,
2024).
From the Petition it does not appear that Butcher presented his Ground 3 argument
to Minnesota’s state courts. Butcher checks a box stating he “presented Ground [3] in all
appeals that were available to [him].” (Pet. 7.) But the Petition, prepared on a form tem-
plate, has a full section titled “Your Earlier Challenges of the Decision or Action,” which
Butcher left blank. (See id. at 3–6.) The Court also notes that there is no record of any
appellate activity by Butcher, in any state-court matters, in Minnesota’s appellate courts.8
Exhaustion has not occurred. The Court therefore recommends denying Ground 3 based
on failure to exhaust.
The Court thus recommends denying all grounds of the Petition and dismissing this
action. Given this recommendation, the Court also recommends denying the IFP Applica-
tion as moot.
8 The Court searched for Butcher on the Minnesota Appellate Courts’ online Case Man-
agement System, available at https://macsnc.courts.state.mn.us.
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RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing analysis and all the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Petitioner Joseph Butcher’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. No. 1) be DENIED in its entirety.
2. 	This action be DISMISSED.
3. 	Butcher’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt. No. 3) be
DENIED as moot.
Dated: March 4, 2026 	_s/ John F. Docherty________
JOHN F. DOCHERTY
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objec-
tions within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2).
All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local
Rule 72.2(c).
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