Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Edita M.S.C.,
Petitioner,
v.
Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security; Department of
Homeland Security, in her official
capacity; Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in
his official capacity; David Easterwood,
Field Office Director of Enforcement and
Removal Operations, Minneapolis - St.
Paul Field Office, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, in his official
capacity; Mary De Anda Ybarra, Field
Office Director of Enforcement and
Removal Operations, El Paso Field
Office, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, in her official capacity; and
Warden of El Paso Camp East Montana
Detention Center, custodian of detainees
at the El Paso Camp East Montana
Detention Center, in their official
capacity,
Respondents.
Civil No. 26-650 (DWF/DJF)
MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND ORDER
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Edita M.S.C.’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus (the “Petition”). (Doc. No. 1.) Respondents filed a response seeking
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dismissal. (Doc. No. 5.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the motion to
dismiss and grants the Petition.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Honduras and has lived in Minnesota since June 2021.
(Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 3, 24.) Upon her arrival in the United States, Petitioner was issued a
Notice to Appear, then released from custody under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Id. ¶ 24; Doc.
Nos. 1-2, 1-3.) She applied for asylum in 2023. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 25.) An immigration judge
denied her application in July 2024. (Id. ¶ 26.) Petitioner timely appealed that
determination and the appeal is pending. (Id.) Petitioner was arrested on January 7,
2026, while on her way home from work. (Id. ¶ 27.) She was originally detained in
Minnesota, then transferred to El Paso, Texas, and then transferred again back to
Minnesota. (Id. ¶ 28; Doc. No. 5 at 1.)
Petitioner filed the Petition on January 26, 2026. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner asserts
that her detention violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the
Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. (Id. ¶¶ 50-63.)
She asks the Court to order her release, or alternatively, order the immigration court to
hold a bond hearing. (Id. at 18-19.) Respondents filed a response asking the Court to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and alternatively, asserting authority to detain Petitioner
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. No. 5.)
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Motion to Dismiss
As a threshold matter, Respondents challenge the Court’s jurisdiction over this
case. (Doc. No. 5.) Generally, jurisdiction over a habeas petition lies only in the district
of confinement. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443 (2004). Respondents argue that
even though this District is the district of confinement, the Court should dismiss the
Petition because Petitioner was not in this District at the time of filing. (Doc. No. 5
at 2-5.) Respondents assert that after dismissal, Petitioner could then file a new petition
in this District. (Id. at 2.) Respondents do not cite any binding authority that mandates
this process. (See id. at 3-4.)
The Court denies Respondents’ motion. Minnesota is the district of confinement,
so the Court has jurisdiction. Moreover, following their suggestion would be a waste of
judicial resources. Respondents have had the opportunity to respond and have also
submitted an alternative argument on the basis for Petitioner’s detention. There is no
reason to delay determination on the Petition.
II. 	Merits of the Petition
A district court may provide habeas relief to a person who is being detained in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). That
authority includes jurisdiction to hear habeas challenges to immigration-related detention.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); Deng Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896,
900-01 (D. Minn. 2020). The burden is on the petitioner to prove illegal detention by a
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preponderance of the evidence. See Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149,
1154 (D. Minn. 2025).
Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) and point the Court to their arguments in a pending Eighth Circuit case:
Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248. (Doc. No. 5 at 5-6.) As this Court has explained on
multiple occasions, Respondents’ interpretation of § 1225 contradicts the plain language
of the statute. See Jose L.M.S. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-474, 2026 WL 185066, at *2
(D. Minn. Jan. 25, 2026); Omar E.F.G. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-451, 2026 WL 184571, at *2
(D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2026); Victor S.M. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-400, 2026 WL 161445, at *2
(D. Minn. Jan. 21, 2026). Section 1225 applies to “applicants for admission”—
noncitizens who are either “present in the United States who ha[ve] not been admitted or
who arrive[] in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). Section 1226 applies where
§ 1225 is inapplicable and provides immigration judges with the discretion to grant
release on bond to noncitizens subject to removal proceedings. See id. § 1226(a).
Here, Petitioner is not an arriving noncitizen because she has been in the United
States for five years, has a pending asylum application, and was previously released on
bond under § 1226(a). See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) (noting that
§ 1226(a) applies to “certain aliens already in the country”). Petitioner is therefore
subject to the discretionary bond provisions of § 1226(a), not the mandatory bond
provisions of § 1225(b)(2).
Having found that Petitioner is being detained unlawfully, the question becomes
the correct remedy. A detainee being held pursuant to § 1226(a) must have been served
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an arrest warrant prior to detention. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); see also Ahmed M. v. Bondi,
No. 25-cv-4711, 2026 WL 25627, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026) (collecting cases). There
is no evidence that Respondents had a warrant to arrest Petitioner. And after being given
the opportunity to explain the true cause of Petitioner’s detention and provide documents
of such (see Doc. No. 3), Respondents did not do so, (see Doc. No. 5). The Court
therefore concludes that Petitioner was arrested without a warrant. The remedy for a
warrantless arrest is immediate release. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008)
(“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention. The typical remedy for
such detention is, of course, release.” (citation omitted)). Further, Petitioner was already
released on bond under § 1226(a). Respondents do not cite any authority that allows this
determination to be revisited years later. This is an independent basis for release.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing and the record in this case, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that:
1. 	Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. No. [1]) is
GRANTED.
2. 	The Court DECLARES that Petitioner’s current detention is unlawful
under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
3. 	Respondents are ORDERED to release Petitioner from custody
immediately.
4. 	Within three (3) days of the date of this Order, the Government shall
provide the Court with a status update confirming Petitioner’s release.
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5. 	Respondents are directed to release Petitioner: (1) in Minnesota; (2) with
all personal documents and belongings, such as her driver’s license, passport, other
immigration documents, and cell phone; (3) without conditions such as ankle monitors or
tracking devices; and (4) with all clothing and outerwear she was wearing at the time of
detention, or other proper winter attire. In addition, Respondents shall provide
reasonable advance notice to counsel to arrange for a safe release of Petitioner or
otherwise provide notice immediately after release.
6. 	Respondents are ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner under this same
statutory theory, absent materially changed circumstances.
7. 	Respondents’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. [5]) is DENIED.
8. 	Within thirty (30) days of final judgment in this action, Petitioner may
move to recover attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 30, 2026 	s/Donovan W. Frank
DONOVAN W. FRANK
United States District Judge
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