Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Dusan C.,
Petitioner,
v.
Pamela Bondi, Attorney General; Kristi
Noem, Secretary of Homeland Security
Todd M. Lyons, Acting Director of U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement;
Marcos Charles; Acting Executive
Associate Director for Enforcement and
Removal Operations; Peter Berg, Field
Office Director for Enforcement and
Removal Operations; U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement; U.S. Department
of Homeland Security; Eric Tollefson;
Kandiyohi County Sheriff,
Respondents.
Case No. 26-cv-00620 (JRT/ECW)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Dusan C.’s1 Emergency Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Dkt. 1). This case has been referred to the
undersigned for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local
1 	This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial of
any nongovernmental parties in orders and report and recommendations in immigration
matters.
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Rule 72.1. For the following reasons, this Court recommends that the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 1) be granted.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a noncitizen who entered the United States at some point in the late
1980s or 1990s. (See Dkt. 1 ¶ 4, Dkt. 6 ¶ 5.) The parties dispute Petitioner’s citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that he was a citizen of Yugoslavia, which ceased to exist in 1992,
rendering him stateless. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 2-3.) Respondents assert that Petitioner is a citizen
and national of Poland. (Dkt. 6 ¶ 4.)
On January 4, 1999, Petitioner was ordered deported to Poland. (Dkt. 10-2 at 1.)
Following that order, Petitioner was detained by ICE from October 8, 1999 until January
19, 2000. (Dkt. 10 ¶ 5.) On January 19, 2000, Petitioner was released on an Order of
Supervision. (Id. ¶ 6.) The order granting Petitioner’s release states that “[t]o date, the
INS has been unable to remove you from the United States as ordered on 01/04/99.”
(Dkt. 10-3 at 1.) The order also stated that:
We will continue to make efforts to obtain your travel document that will
allow the United States government to carry out your removal pursuant to
your order of deportation, exclusion, or removal. You are required by law to
cooperate in that effort. If we are successful in obtaining those documents,
you will be required to surrender to the INS for removal. You will, at that
time, be given an opportunity to prepare for an orderly departure.
(Id.)
Petitioner alleges, and Respondents do not dispute, the following facts. Petitioner
has complied with all conditions of his Order for Supervision. (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 8, 12.)
Petitioner’s conduct since his release in 2000 “demonstrates that he has managed to
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adjust to life in a community, avoid engaging in acts of violence or criminal activity, does
not pose a danger to the safety of anyone, and is unlikely to violate the conditions of his
release from custody pending removal.” (Id. ¶ 71(e).) However, on January 23, 2026,
ICE officers appeared at Petitioner’s home, walked around the property, and peered into
windows. (Id. ¶ 8.) ICE did not have a judicial warrant to enter Petitioner’s home. (Id.
¶ 11.) “The armed and masked ICE agents intimidated Petitioner’s wife into calling
Petitioner and asking him to come home to be ‘interviewed’ (per the instructions of the
ICE officers.)” (Id. ¶ 8.) When Petitioner returned home, he was not interviewed. (Id.
¶ 9.) Instead, he was “arrested within less than a minute of arriving on scene.” (Id.)
Since being detained, Petitioner has not received any Notice of Revocation of Release,
Notice of Custody Determination, or any other written notice justifying his re-detention.
(Id. ¶ 19.)
Petitioner filed this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on January 24, 2026.
(Dkt. 1.) Later that day, United States District Judge John Tunheim issued an Order
requiring Respondents to answer the Petition by no later than 5:00 P.M. on January 27,
2026. (Dkt. 3 at 2.) The Order required Respondents’ answer to include, among other
things, “[s]uch affidavits and exhibits as are needed to establish the lawfulness and
correct duration of Petitioner’s detention in light of the issues raised in the habeas
petition,” and “[w]hether the absence of a warrant preceding Petitioner’s arrest
necessitates Petitioner’s immediate release. See e.g., Ahmed M. v. Bondi, No. 25-4711,
2026 WL 25627, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2026).” (Id. at 3.) The Order also enjoined
Respondents from removing Petitioner from the District of Minnesota while the Petition
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is pending. (Id. at 2.) Petitioner was permitted to file a reply to Respondent’s answer by
no later than 5:00 P.M. on January 28, 2026. (Id. at 3.)
On January 27, 2026, Respondents filed their answer. (Dkt. 5.) Respondents
alleged that Petitioner is a citizen of Poland and argued that Petitioner’s detention
pending his deportation to Poland is lawful. (Dkt. 6 ¶ 4; see also Dkt. 5 at 2.) Petitioner
did not file a reply. On February 3, 2026, the Court issued an Order requiring
Respondents to file supplemental information with the Court, including:
1. 	Documents supporting Respondents’ assertion that Petitioner “has
claimed to have been born in Poland in all of his pending and
approved 	applications 	with 	US 	Citizenship 	and 	Immigration
Services” and that “the claimed mother was also reportedly born in
Poland”;
2. 	Petitioner’s January 04, 1999 Order of Removal;
3. 	Petitioner’s January 19, 2000 Order of Supervision; and
4. 	A Declaration setting forth:
a. 	the length of time, if any, that Petitioner was detained prior to
his 2000 release;
b. 	what circumstances have changed following that release that
prompted Petitioner’s arrest by ICE on January 23, 2026; and
c. 	what steps have been taken to remove Petitioner since his
January 23, 2026 arrest, including whether a travel document
has been requested or obtained.
(Dkt. 7 at 3.)
On February 10, 2026, Respondents filed a supplemental response including a
Declaration of Deportation Officer James L. Van Der Vaart (“the Supplemental Van Der
Vaart Declaration”). (Dkt. 10.) The Declaration states that Petitioner “has claimed to
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have been born in Warsaw Poland in all of his pending and approved applications with
US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).” (Id. ¶ 4.) Attached to the
Declaration was a copy of a Form G-325A (a “Biographical Information” form)
completed by Petitioner on May 2, 1997. (Dkt. 10-1.) In that form, Petitioner listed his
nationality as “Poland,” listed his city and country of birth as “Warsaw, Poland,” and
indicated that both of his parents were born in Poland. (Id.) The application did not state
whether Petitioner was a citizen of Poland at the time of his application. (Id.) The
Supplemental Van Der Vaard Declaration also stated that “DHS has two (2) original
Yugoslavian passports for CIRLIC. Both documents state a birthplace of Warsaw,
Poland,” and attached scans of these passports to the Declaration. (Dkt. 10 ¶ 4, Dkt. 10-
4, Dkt. 10-5.)2
In response to the Order’s direction that Respondents set forth “what steps have
been taken to remove Petitioner since his January 23, 2026 arrest, including whether a
travel document has been requested or obtained,” the Supplemental Van Der Vaard
Declaration stated that “[t]he Attache for the Polish Embassy has been contacted
regarding a travel document and the possibility of Significant Likelihood of Removability
in the Foreseeable Future (SLRFF). We are currently awaiting a response.” (Dkt. 10
¶ 7.) Respondents did not provide any additional information in response to the Order to
2 	The Court makes no finding as to Petitioner’s citizenship, as the analysis of his
Petition does not turn on this question.
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identify “what circumstances have changed following [Petitioner’s release in 2000] that
prompted Petitioner’s arrest by ICE on January 23, 2026.” (See Dkt. 7 at 3.)
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. 1 at
10.) Under this provision, a writ of habeas corpus may be granted to any person who
demonstrates he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(concluding that the Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available
to every individual detained within the United States”) (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl.
2)). The right to challenge the legality of a person’s confinement through a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus extends to immigration-related detention after a detention order
becomes final. Faysal N. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-04641 (JMB/DLM), 2026 WL 36066, at
*2 (D. Minn. Jan. 6, 2026).
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition, which does not challenge the
removal order but instead challenges the revocation of Petitioner’s supervised release and
the lawfulness of his re-detention. See Garrison G. v. Bondi, No. 26-CV-172
(JMB/DJF), 2026 WL 157677, at *2 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2026) (“Because Garrison G.
does not challenge the removal order but instead challenges the revocation of his
supervised release and his continued detention, the Court has jurisdiction to decide the
questions raised about the lawfulness of his current re-detention.”); see also Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2001) (“We conclude that § 2241 habeas corpus proceedings
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remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-
period detention.”).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Petitioner seeks relief on a number of grounds, including Respondents’ alleged
violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act and 8 C.F.R. § 241.013(i)(2)-(3) (Dkt. 1
¶¶ 105-09), violation of the Fifth Amendment (id. ¶¶ 110-13), and violation of the
Administrative Procedures Act (id. ¶¶ 114-19). Because the Court finds ICE has violated
8 C.F.R. § 241.013 in re-detaining Petitioner, it does not reach the alternative grounds.
See Faysal N., 2026 WL 36066, at *3 n.3 (“Faysal N. also asserts that his re-detention
violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Because the Court finds that ICE has violated its own regulations in re-
detaining Faysal N., such that his current detention is unlawful, the Court does not reach
these alternative arguments.”) (citation omitted).
As to his regulatory challenge, Petitioner argues ICE did not comply with the
requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, which governs the revocation of an order for
supervised release. (See Dkt. 1 at 7-8.) This regulation provides, in relevant part, that
ICE “may revoke an alien’s release under this section and return the alien to custody if,
on account of changed circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant
likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(2). This regulation also sets forth factors to consider in determining whether
removal is significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, including: the
noncitizen’s efforts to comply with the removal order; the history of ICE’s efforts to
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remove individuals to the destination country or to third countries; the ongoing nature of
ICE’s efforts to remove the particular noncitizen and his assistance with those efforts; the
reasonably foreseeable results of those efforts; and the views of the Department of State
regarding the prospects for removal to the countries in question. 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f).
The regulation further provides that:
Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the reasons for revocation of
his or her release. The Service will conduct an initial informal interview
promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford the alien an
opportunity 	to 	respond 	to 	the 	reasons 	for 	revocation 	stated 	in 	the
notification. The alien may submit any evidence or information that he or she
believes shows there is no significant likelihood he or she be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future, or that he or she has not violated the order of
supervision. The revocation custody review will include an evaluation of any
contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the
facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).
In general, a habeas petitioner bears the burden of showing that their detention
violates the law. See Copenhaver v. Bennett, 355 F.2d 417, 422 (8th Cir. 1966).
However, courts in this jurisdiction have concluded that 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) places
the burden on the government to establish that changed circumstances justify a non-
citizen’s re-detention. E.g., Garrison G. v. Bondi., 2026 WL 157677, at *3; Yee S. v.
Bondi, No. 25-CV-02782 (JMB/DLM), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025 WL 2879479, at *4 (D.
Minn. Oct. 9, 2025); Roble v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 766, 772 (D. Minn. 2025); Ban S. v.
Bondi, No. 25-CV-4750 (PJS/ECW) (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2026), R. & R. adopted, 25-CV-
4750 (PJS/ECW) (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2026). The Court finds the reasoning in those cases
persuasive and concludes that 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2) requires ICE to show changed
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circumstances that justify revocation of supervised release. As one court has explained,
this requirement is consistent with the default rule that the burden falls on the party who
“generally seeks to change the present state of affairs and who therefore naturally should
be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion.” See Roble, 803 F. Supp.
3d at 772 (quoting Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (quoting
McCormick on Evidence § 337 (5th ed. 1999))). As it is the government who seeks to
change the state of affairs by re-detaining Petitioner, it is the government who bear the
burden to establish the changed circumstances that justify re-detention. See id.
It is plain that Respondents have not met their burden to establish changed
circumstances under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2). Regardless of whether Petitioner is a
citizen of Poland, it is uncontested that the government attempted to remove Petitioner to
Poland in 1999 and was unable to do so. (See Dkt. 10-3.) Respondents have not
provided any reason to believe that they can now remove Petitioner to Poland.
Respondents were explicitly ordered to identify what changed circumstances justify
Petitioner’s re-detention 26 years later but failed to do so. (See Dkts. 7, 8.) Respondents
have not obtained a travel document for Petitioner and have not provided any information
suggesting that a travel document is likely to be issued in the foreseeable future. (See
Dkt. 10 ¶ 7 (stating only that “[t]he Attache for the Polish Embassy has been contacted
regarding a travel document and the possibility of Significant Likelihood of Removability
in the Foreseeable Future (SLRFF). We are currently awaiting a response.”).
Several courts in this District have concluded that the government does not meet
its burden when it makes a bare assertion of likelihood of removal without alleging
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specific relevant changed circumstances. E.g., Roble, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 773 (concluding
that the government did not meet its burden when it “provided ‘scant information’ about
what ‘assistance’ it has requested from ICE headquarters for a third country removal, and
it has provided no information about the anticipated outcome of requesting that
assistance.”); Yee S., 2025 WL 2879479, at *4 (“in the Revocation Notice, ICE claimed
summarily that the agency had made a ‘determination that there are changed
circumstances in your case,’ and the only factual explanation provided was the assertion
that ‘ICE is in the process of obtaining a travel document’ . . . The Revocation Notice
does not explain what the travel document is or how long it will take to obtain. Nor does
it specify from which country ICE was attempting to obtain a travel document or describe
what steps ICE had taken in this ‘process.’”); Faysal, 2026 WL 36066, at *4 (“The
Notice of Revocation of Release does not identify any ‘changed circumstances’ or
provide any explanation to support the conclusion that [the petitioner] is significantly
likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future. In this notice, ICE claims
summarily that the agency had made a ‘determination that there are changed
circumstances in your case,’ but it includes no factual statements or explanation.”); Ban
S., No. 25-CV-4750, at *7 (concluding that the government had not met its burden where
“the only evidence of changed circumstances offered by Respondents is Robinson’s
statement that ‘ICE Headquarters and Removal Operations is actively working with the
Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security on removal logistics for
[Petitioner]’). In this case, Respondents have likewise failed to meet their burden.
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Consequently, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s detention is unlawful and
recommends his immediate release on this basis.3
While the Court does not address every additional basis for relief that Petitioner
raises, the Court also notes that Respondents have also failed to comply with 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(3), which requires that:
Upon revocation, the alien will be notified of the reasons for revocation of
his or her release. The Service will conduct an initial informal interview
promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford the alien an
opportunity 	to 	respond 	to 	the 	reasons 	for 	revocation 	stated 	in 	the
notification. The alien may submit any evidence or information that he or she
believes shows there is no significant likelihood he or she be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future, or that he or she has not violated the order of
supervision. The revocation custody review will include an evaluation of any
contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the
facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). Respondents did not contest Petitioner’s allegation that he was
never provided the notice and interview required by this regulation. (See Dkt. 1 ¶ 19.)
Respondents acknowledge this requirement in their Response, but do not assert that they
complied. (See Dkt. 5 at 7.) Rather, Respondent suggests that “[i]f the Court concludes
that ICE’s re-detention procedures were deficient, then the solution is for the agency to
redo the process and correct any deficiencies—not release Petitioner from detention
outright.” (Dkt. 5 at 11.) Respondents cite no authority for this argument, and the Court
declines to accept Respondents’ proposed “solution” in view of the fact that the deficient
3 	The Court does not reach the question of whether aggregation of Petitioner’s prior
detention by ICE and his current detention for purposes of the 6-month requirement
under Zadvydas is appropriate, as ICE violated the law when it re-detained Petitioner in
violation of its own regulations and that is sufficient basis to grant the Petition.
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procedures include the failure to show changed circumstances, as well as the failure to
provide notice and an interview. Indeed, courts in this District have granted release when
ICE violated its own regulations regarding notice and an opportunity to respond even
where it was possible that a petitioner could be re-detained after the government
complied with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). See Sarail A. v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 775, 787-
89 (D. Minn. 2025) (overruling objections to recommendation for release because ICE
did not comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3); Respondents also failed to show removal
was significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future); see also Roble, 803 F.
Supp. 3d at 771-72 (“Because ICE violated its own regulations when it detained Roble
without notifying him of the reasons why he was being detained, Roble is entitled to
habeas relief.”) (ordering release due to ICE’s failure to comply with 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(3); also ordering release because Respondents also failed to show removal
was significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.) The Court likewise
concludes that Respondents’ failure to comply with 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) in this case is
a basis for habeas relief, namely, release.
Finally, the Court considers Petitioner’s request that it “[p]ermanently enjoin
Respondents from redetaining Petitioner under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(2)-(3) unless and
until Respondents have obtained a travel document allowing for Respondent’s removal
from the United States.” (Dkt. 1 at 31.) Courts in this District have granted similar
prospective relief enjoining the government from re-detaining individuals under the same
unlawful circumstances that gave rise to their habeas petitions. See Garrison G., 2026
WL 157677, at *4 (prohibiting respondents from “arresting or re-detaining Garrison G.
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related to any immigration proceedings without first complying with all regulations that,
as set forth above, apply to a decision to revoke orders of supervision”); Alfredo R.I. v.
Bondi, No. 26-619 (DWF/DLM), 2026 WL 252469, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 30, 2026)
(“Respondents are ENJOINED from re-detaining Petitioner under this same statutory
theory, absent materially changed circumstances.”). Courts in other Districts have
applied this principle to enjoin detention until travel documents have been obtained. See,
e.g., Sun v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2433-CAB-MMP, 2025 WL 2917160, at *1 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 14, 2025) (“Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) may not re-detain
Petitioner unless his removal to Cambodia becomes immediately feasible with a valid
travel document, he violates one or more terms of the conditions of his release, or another
lawful basis for his detention arises.”). As discussed above, the government’s request for
a travel document does not show changed circumstances that make it significantly likely
that Petitioner may be removed in the reasonable foreseeable future. The government did
not offer any other evidence or argument as to changed circumstances. Accordingly, the
Court recommends that Respondents be enjoined from re-detaining Petitioner unless
Poland actually issues a travel document for Petitioner, Petitioner violates a condition of
his Order of Supervision, or another lawful basis for his detention arises.
In view of the Court’s finding that Respondents have unlawfully detained
Petitioner since January 23, 2026, the Court sets an expedited deadline for objections to
this Report and Recommendation. See D. Minn. LR 72.2(a)(1) (“A party may file and
serve objections to the order within 14 days after being served with a copy, unless the
court sets a different deadline.”) (emphasis added)). Any objections to this Report and
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Recommendation are due February 15, 2026. Responses to objections are due
February 17, 2026.
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	The Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Petitioner Dusan C. (Dkt.
1) be GRANTED such that
a. 	If Petitioner is being detained outside of Minnesota, Respondents be
ordered to transport Petitioner to Minnesota and release Petitioner from
custody immediately, where Petitioner’s release in Minnesota must occur
no later than 48 hours after the filing of this Order.
b. 	If Petitioner is being detained in Minnesota, Respondents be ordered to
release Petitioner from custody as soon as practicable, and no later than 48
hours from the filing of this Order.
c. 	Given the severe weather conditions in Minnesota, Respondents be ordered
to coordinate with Petitioner’s counsel to ensure that upon Petitioner’s
release, they are not left outside in dangerous cold. It is preferable to
release Petitioner to counsel to ensure humane treatment.
d. 	Respondents be ordered to release Petitioner with all personal effects, such
as driver’s license, passports, or immigration documents.
e. 	Respondents be enjoined from imposing any conditions on Petitioner’s
release other than the conditions in his preexisting Order of Supervision
dated January 19, 2000; and
f. 	Respondents be enjoined from re-detaining Petitioner under 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13 unless Poland issues a travel document for Petitioner, or Petitioner
violates a condition of his Order of Supervision, or another lawful basis for
his detention arises.
2. 	Petitioner Dusan C. be permitted to move separately within 30 days of final
judgment in this action to recover attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
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Dated: February 13, 2026 s/Elizabeth Cowan Wright
Elizabeth Cowan Wright
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. The Court modifies this deadline
such that objections are due on or before February 15, 2026. See D. Minn. LR
72.2(a)(1) (“A party may file and serve objections to the order within 14 days after being
served with a copy, unless the court sets a different deadline.”). Responses to objections
are due on or before February 17, 2026. All objections and responses must comply
with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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