Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
U.H.A., K.A., M. DOE, H.D., D. DOE, on
behalf of themselves and others similarly
situated; and
THE ADVOCATES FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
Petitioner-Plaintiff
and Plaintiffs,
v.
PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the
United States;
KRISTI NOEM, 	Secretary of the United
States Department of Homeland Security;
TODD M. LYONS, Acting Director of the
United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement;
DAVID EASTERWOOD, Acting Director, St.
Paul Field Office, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement;
JOSEPH 	B. 	EDLOW, 	Director, 	U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services,
Defendants-
Respondents.
Civil No. 26-417 (JRT/DLM)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
E. Michelle Drake, John G. Albanese, Joseph C. Hashmall, Hans W. Lodge,
Marika K. O’Connor Grant, Ariana Kiener, Bryan Plaster, Katherine Raths,
Jordan C. Hughes, Soledad Slowing-Romero, BERGER MONTAGUE PC, 1229
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Tyler Street Northeast, Suite 205, Minneapolis, MN 55413, for Petitioner-
Plaintiff and Plaintiffs.
Ana H. Voss, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 300 South Fourth Street,
Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55415; Jesus Cruz Rodriquez, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, 7510 Northwest Tango Road, Suite D7, Lawton, OK 73503, for
Defendants-Respondents.
This case squarely presents the issue of whether the United States Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) has violated provisions of federal statute and longstanding
agency practice by implementing a policy that involves arresting and detaining individuals
who are lawful refugees in Minnesota. These individuals were admitted to the country,
have followed the rules, and are waiting to have their status adjusted to lawful permanent
residents of the United States.
In early January 2026, DHS and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
launched Operation Post-Admission Refugee Reverification and Integrity Strengthening
(“Operation PARRIS”). The stated purpose of the program is to target and reexamine the
legal status of Minnesota’s 5,600 refugees who have not yet secured permanent resident
status. 	Plaintiffs 	allege 	that 	since 	Operation 	PARRIS 	began, 	Defendants 	have
implemented 	a 	practice 	of 	arresting 	and 	detaining—without 	notice 	or
warrant—individuals previously screened and admitted into the United States as
refugees. These refugees have undergone rigorous background checks and vetting, been
approved by multiple federal agencies for entry, been given permission to work, received
support from the government, and been resettled in the United States. 	Because of
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conditions in their home countries, they have been deemed of special humanitarian
concern to the United States. None have been deemed a danger to the community or a
flight risk. None have been charged with any ground for removal.
Plaintiffs initiated this putative class action on behalf of Minnesota residents with
refugee status who have been subjected to arrest and detention or fear that their arrest
and detention is imminent. Plaintiffs now move for a temporary restraining order (Docket
No. 16.) Because the Dataphase factors all weigh in favor of granting relief, the Court will
issue a temporary restraining order: (1) enjoining Defendants from arresting or detaining
any member of the putative class in Minnesota on the basis that they are a refugee who
has not yet adjusted to lawful permanent resident status; and (2) ordering the immediate
return and release of the members of a putative subclass consisting of those refugees
who are presently detained under the policy. 	The Court has ordered briefing and
scheduled a preliminary injunction hearing to occur soon. This Order is temporary and
will remain in effect until the Court considers and rules on a preliminary injunction.
BACKGROUND
I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 9, 2026, DHS and USCIS announced “Operation PARRIS.” (Class Action
Compl. & Am. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Am. Pet.”) ¶ 1, Jan. 24, 2026, Docket No.
12.) 	According to USCIS’s press release announcing the program, it is a “sweeping
initiative” intended to reevaluate “thousands of refugee cases through new background
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checks and intensive verification of refugee claims.” 1 	(Declaration of E. Michelle Drake
(“Drake Decl.”) ¶ 17, Ex. 15, Jan. 24, 2026, Docket No. 16-19.) 	The press release
emphasizes that the “initial focus [of Operation PARRIS] is on Minnesota’s 5,600 refugees
who have not yet been given lawful permanent resident status (Green Cards).” (Id.)
The Named Plaintiffs2 are refugees who were lawfully admitted to the United
States through the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) after completing the
rigorous vetting process. 	(Am. Pet. ¶ 9.) They are originally from Africa, Asia, or Latin
America and reside in Minnesota. 	(Id. ¶ 9.) 	The Named Plaintiffs have not yet been
adjusted to lawful permanent resident status and have not been charged with any ground
for removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act. (Id. ¶ 11.) Nor have any of them
been declared a danger or a flight risk. (Id. ¶ 9.)
The facts provided by the Named Plaintiffs are illustrative of the effects of
Defendants’ new program. 	Petitioner-Plaintiff U.H.A. is a refugee, admitted into the
United States in 2024, who was arrested by ICE while driving to work on January 18, 2026.
(Id. ¶ 15.) He was pulled over, ordered out of his car, handcuffed, and detained, without
a warrant or apparent justification. (Id.) U.H.A., who lives with his parents and siblings,
1 DHS Launches Landmark USCIS Fraud Investigation in Minnesota, U.S. C ITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGR. S ERVS . (Jan. 9, 2026), https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/news-releases/dhs-launches-
landmark-uscis-fraud-investigation-in-minnesota. (Filed at Docket No. 16-19.)
2 For clarity, the Named Plaintiffs include Petitioner-Plaintiff U.H.A, but the Named
Plaintiffs do not include Plaintiff the Advocates for Human Rights.
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has no criminal history and has never been placed in removal proceedings. (Id.) Plaintiff
K.A., U.H.A.’s younger brother, is also a refugee. (Id. ¶ 16.) K.A. was driving behind U.H.A.
on their way to work on January 18 and witnessed his brother’s arrest. (Id.) K.A. now
fears that he, too, will be arrested by ICE under Operation PARRIS. 	(Id.) 	He has not
returned home since that day, “[n]or has he ventured out to attend his college classes or
to buy groceries.” (Id.) K.A., like his brother, has no criminal history. (Id. ¶ 111.) U.H.A.
remains in detention. (Id. ¶ 110.)
Plaintiff H.D. is a refugee who applied to become a lawful resident in 2025 and also
fears leaving her home as a result of Operation PARRIS. (Id. ¶ 17.) ICE officers “came to
[H.D.’s] family home twice within a week and attempted to get her family to open the
door; fearful, they did not.” (Id. ¶ 112.) H.D. received a letter “instructing her to report
to an appointment at an ICE office for a case review interview”—but H.D. has a friend,
also a refugee, who “had applied for a green card,” and was arrested by ICE at a case
review appointment. (Id. ¶ 112.) Fearful for her own liberty, H.D. did not attend. (Id.)
“She secured a lawyer who attended on her behalf, but the ICE officer refused to
communicate with her lawyer.” (Id.) H.D.’s “experience has caused her to relive similar
experiences of armed men knocking on her door in the country she fled.” (Id.)
D. Doe, a refugee, was at home with his family on January 11, 2026, when a man
in plain clothes knocked on the door. (Id. ¶ 18.) D. Doe answered the door, and the man
told him that he had hit D. Doe’s car—but his description did not match D. Doe’s car. (Id.)
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The man left, and returned a few minutes later, this time describing the correct car. (Id.)
D. Doe went outside to check the damage, when he was surrounded by armed men and
arrested. (Id.) After being taken to a detention center in Minnesota, he was immediately
flown to Texas, where he was interrogated about his refugee status. (Id.) He was kept in
“shackles and handcuffs” for 16 hours. (Id. ¶ 113.) D. Doe was ultimately released on the
streets of Texas, left to find his way back to Minnesota. (Id. ¶ 18.) After seeing her spouse
arrested, Plaintiff M. Doe fears that she may be arrested and detained by ICE, and that
both parents may be separated from their three-year-old son. (Id. ¶ 19.)
Plaintiff the Advocates for Human Rights is a 501(c)(3) legal services nonprofit. (Id.
¶ 115.) They allege that their “core business activities have been significantly impacted”
by Defendants’ new policy, and that they have “been unable to assist clients that it would
have ordinarily served” due to the need to “divert significant resources to representing
refugees in habeas proceedings.” (Id.)
II. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case began on January 18, 2026, when Petitioner-Plaintiff U.H.A. filed a
Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus following his arrest and detention under
Operation PARRIS. (Docket No. 1.) Defendants timely filed their answer on January 21,
(Docket No. 5), and U.H.A. replied (Docket No. 11).
On January 24, 2026, U.H.A, K.A., H.D., D. Doe., M. Doe., and The Advocates for
Human Rights (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed a Class Action Complaint and Amended
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Docket No. 12), alleging that Defendants’ policy of
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arresting and detaining unadjusted refugees through the implementation of Operation
PARRIS violates the Administrative Procedure Act, the Accardi Doctrine, and the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments of United States Constitution. 3
At the same time as the Amended Petition, Plaintiffs filed several additional
motions.4 	Two require discussion in this Order. 	First, Plaintiffs seek a temporary
restraining order. They ask the Court to: (1) postpone the effective date of the “Refugee
Detention Policy” Defendants have employed in furtherance of Operation PARRIS;5 (2)
enjoin Defendants from arresting or detaining any member of the putative Class on the
basis that they are an unadjusted refugee; and (3) order that a subgroup of putative class
3 Under 28 U.S.C. § 2242, an application for a writ of habeas corpus “may be amended or
supplemented as provided in the rules of procedure applicable to civil actions.” 	Under Rule
15(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a
matter of course [within] . . . 21 days after serving it, or if the pleading is one to which a responsive
pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading . . . whichever is earlier.”
Regardless of whether Defendants’ response is considered a responsive pleading, Plaintiffs filed
their Amended Petition within the deadline set forth in Rule 15. Therefore, the Court concludes
that the Amended Petition may be considered.
4 (1) Motion for Entry of Preliminary Protective Order (Docket No. 13); (2) Motion for
Leave to Proceed Under Pseudonyms and to Seal (Docket No. 14); (3) Motion for Rule 23(b)(2)
Class Certification (Docket No. 15); and (4) Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Immediate Postponement of Agency Action (Docket No. 16).
5 Plaintiffs define the “Refugee Detention Policy” as Defendants’ policy “that would
subject all lawfully present refugees who have not yet obtained lawful permanent resident status
(“LPR”) status to arrest and mandatory detention after being present in the United States for one
year—even though refugees cannot adjust to LPR status until the one-year mark[.]” (Pls.’ Mem.
Supp. Mot. for TRO at 10, Jan. 24, 2026, Docket No. 16-2.) For ease and consistency, the Court
will refer to DHS’s new policy as the “Refugee Detention Policy.”
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plaintiffs who are presently detained under Operation PARRIS be immediately released
from custody. (Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. for TRO at 50, Jan. 24, 2026, Docket No. 16-2.)
Second, Plaintiffs seek to certify a class and a subclass under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 23(b)(2). Plaintiffs request certification of a “Class” of “[a]ll individuals
with refugee status who are residing in the state of Minnesota who have not yet adjusted
to lawful permanent resident status and have not been charged with any ground for
removal under the [Immigration and Nationality Act].” (Pls.’ Mot. for Rule 23(b)(2) Class
Cert. at 2, Jan. 24, 2026, Docket No. 15.) Plaintiffs also request certification of a “Detained
Subclass,” which would consist of “[a]ll members of the Class who are or will be detained
by DHS pursuant to the Refugee Detention Policy.” (Id.)
DISCUSSION
I. 	MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
A. 	Standard of Review
The purpose of a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunctive relief is to
maintain the status quo. 	Tumey v. Mycroft AI, Inc., 27 F.4th 657, 664 (8th Cir. 2022).
Courts in the Eighth Circuit evaluate a motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction under
the four Dataphase factors: (1) the movant’s likelihood of success on the merits; (2) the
threat of irreparable harm to the movant in the absence of relief; (3) the balance between
that harm and the harm injunctive relief would cause to the other litigants; and (4) the
public interest. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en
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banc). The party seeking temporary injunctive relief has the burden of proving all four
Dataphase factors. Watkins Inc. v. Lewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8 th Cir. 2003).
When applying these factors, “a court should flexibly weigh the case’s particular
circumstances to determine whether the balance of equities so favors the movant that
justice requires the court to intervene.” Hubbard Feeds, Inc. v. Animal Feed Supplement,
Inc., 182 F.3d 598, 601 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d
1175, 1179 (8th Cir. 1998)). That said, injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy, and the
moving party has the burden of establishing the propriety of an injunction. Watkins Inc.,
346 F.3d at 845.
B. 	Likelihood of Success on the Merits
For temporary relief to be warranted here, Plaintiffs must show that they are likely
to succeed on the merits of their claim. Mid-Am. Real Est. Co. v. Iowa Realty Co., 406 F.3d
969, 972 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n injunction cannot issue if there is no chance of success on
the merits.”). However, the question is not whether the movant has “prove[d] a greater
than fifty per cent likelihood that [they] will prevail,” PCTV Gold, Inc. v. SpeedNet, LLC, 508
F.3d 1137, 1143 (8 th Cir. 2007), but whether any of their claims provide a “fair ground for
litigation,” Watkins, 346 F.3d at 844. 	“In considering the likelihood of the movant
prevailing on the merits, a court does not decide whether the movant will ultimately
win.” PCTV Gold, 508 F.3d at 1143. Rather, the movant must show that they have a “fair
chance of prevailing” on their claims. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds,
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530 F.3d 724, 732 (8th Cir. 2008). While no single factor is determinative, likelihood of
success 	on 	the 	merits 	is 	often 	considered 	the 	most 	significant 	of
the Dataphase factors. Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 721 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 2013).
1. 	Statutory and Regulatory Backdrop
This case involves a stark shift in Defendants’ treatment of individuals who have
been admitted to the United States as “refugees,” replacing prior agency policy with
abrupt 	arrest 	and 	detention—often 	without 	a 	warrant 	or 	notice. 	Preliminary
consideration of the lawfulness of this practice requires the Court to consider the unique
legal status refugees hold within the United States immigration system.
A refugee is an individual “who is unable or unwilling to return to . . . [their country
of origin] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, 	religion, 	nationality, 	membership 	in 	a 	particular 	social 	group, 	or 	political
opinion . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Refugees may be admitted to the United States only
after rigorous screening and vetting procedures. See 8 U.S.C. § 1157.6 To be considered
for refugee resettlement in the United States, an individual must be referred to the
USRAP, an interagency initiative involving multiple governmental and nongovernmental
entities, including the Department of State, the Department of Homeland Security, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Department of Health and Human
6 USCIS, Refugees, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/refugees
(last visited Jan. 25, 2026).
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Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement, Resettlement Support Centers, and the
International Organization for Migration.7 After a refugee applicant is referred, they must
undergo extensive security screening conducted by multiple federal agencies, including
the National Counterterrorism Center, the FBI’s Terrorist Screening Center, the Drug
Enforcement Agency, the Department of Defense, and others.8 An applicant’s biometric
and biographic information is screened against numerous databases, including the
Consular Lookout and Support System and other intelligence community systems. 9 After
conducting the biometric and biographic checks, USCIS conducts an interview to gather
information 	about 	whether 	the 	individual 	is 	eligible 	for 	refugee 	status.10 	Once
conditionally approved, applicants must complete a medical examination and complete a
cultural orientation program.11
7 USCIS, The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) Consultation and
Worldwide 	Processing 	Priorities, 	https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-
asylum/usrap (last visited Jan. 26, 2026).
8 	USCIS, 	Refugee 	Processing 	and 	Security 	Screening,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/refugees/refugee-processing-and-
security-screening (last visited Jan. 26, 2026).
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 	USCIS, 	United 	States 	Refugee 	Admissions 	Program 	(USRAP),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/charts/USRAP_FlowChart.pdf (last visited
Jan. 26, 2026).
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Applicants are then matched with a local resettlement agency in the United
States.12 	Before traveling to the United States, applicants are subject to additional
security screening.13 Upon arrival, applicants are inspected by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, and if eligible, admitted into the United States.14
Once 	admitted, 	refugees 	are 	automatically 	authorized 	to 	work. 	8 	C.F.R.
§ 274a.12(a)(3). 	They are also eligible for resettlement assistance, which provides
refugees access to housing, food, clothing, orientation programs, English-language
instruction, employment training, and medical and social services. 15 The stated purpose
of providing this assistance is to help refugees “become effectively resettled as quickly as
possible.” 8 U.S.C. § 1522(a).
An 	individual 	with 	conditional 	refugee 	status 	is 	considered 	to 	have 	been
“admitted.” 	Matter of D-K-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 761, 769 (B.I.A. 2012) (concluding that “an
alien admitted to the United States as a refugee has been ‘admitted’ for the purposes of
[8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)] of the Act”). 	However, under the statutory framework, a
refugee’s conditional admission may ultimately result in two “admissions.” 	Id. at 768.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 	USCIS, 	United 	States 	Refugee 	Admissions 	Program 	(USRAP),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/charts/USRAP_FlowChart.pdf (last visited
Jan. 26, 2026); 8 U.S.C. § 1522.
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The first is the initial conditional admission; the second occurs when the refugee is
adjusted to lawful permanent resident (“LPR”) status. 	Id. (noting “that a refugee who
ultimately becomes a lawful permanent resident will have been ‘admitted’ twice—first,
upon conditional admission [under 8 U.S.C. § 1157] and second, upon reinspection and
adjustment to permanent resident status under [8 U.S.C. § 1159.]”).
After 	either 	of 	these 	admissions, 	Congress 	has 	imposed 	restraints 	on 	the
government’s authority to commence removal proceedings. That is, a refugee may only
be removed based on the grounds of deportability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 but may not be
removed under grounds of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Matter of D-K-, 25 I. &
N. Dec. at 768 (acknowledging that, once conditionally admitted or adjusted to LPR status,
the individual is “subject to charges under only the deportability grounds, and not the
grounds of inadmissibility.”). A refugee may also be removed after committing serious
crimes. See, e.g., Xiong v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 530, 533–34 (8th Cir. 2007). However, ICE’s
longstanding agency guidance has been that failure to obtain LPR status, by itself, is not
grounds for removal nor is it a “proper basis for detaining them.” U.S. Immigr. & Customs
Enf’t, Memorandum on Detention of Refugees Admitted Under INA § 207 Who Have Failed
to Adjust to Lawful Permanent Resident Status at 2 (May 10, 2010) (“2010 ICE
Guidance”) 16
; see also Liban G. v. Noem, Civ. No. 26-301, 2026 WL 125689, at *2 (D. Minn.
Jan. 16, 2026). Indeed, this guidance states that if “an unadjusted refugee [is arrested]
16 (Drake Decl. ¶ 18, Ex. 16, Docket No. 16-20.)
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upon reasonable belief of removability,” the government must decide within 48 hours of
the arrest, whether to release the refugee or to commence removal proceedings by
issuing a Notice to Appear. (2010 Ice Guidance at 2.) But “[i]f it becomes apparent earlier
that no removability ground applies, the individual must be released promptly.” (Id.)
An individual designated as a refugee may also be subject to removal if the
individual is later found not to meet the definition of a “refugee” under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42) . See 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4). If USCIS determines that the noncitizen was not
a “refugee,” regulations require USCIS to provide the noncitizen written notice of its
intent to terminate the noncitizen’s refugee status. 8 C.F.R. § 207.9. The noncitizen then
has 30 days to respond. Id.
Once an individual has been admitted as a refugee under § 1157, has been
physically present in the United States for over a year, but has not been adjusted to LPR
status, they must “at the end of such year, return or be returned to the custody of the
Department of Homeland Security for inspection and examination for admission to the
United States as an immigrant in accordance with the provisions of sections 1225, 1229a,
and 1231 of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1). DHS guidance provides a 48-hour timeline
for inspection and examination.17
17 See 2010 ICE Guidance at 3 (“If a determination to place an unadjusted refugee in
removal proceedings has not been made within the initial 48-hour period . . . the [Detention and
Removal Operations] Field Office should release the alien with a reminder that the INA imposes
an obligation upon him or her to apply for adjustment of status under section 209(A) and to
provide DHS with updated address information[.]”).
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Three aspects of § 1159 warrant emphasis before the Court returns to the facts of
the present case.
First, the statute requires refugees who have resided in the United States for more
than one year to submit to DHS for inspection and examination. However, as this Court
has noted, § 1159 “permits custody for a specific and limited function: to allow DHS to
conduct the inspection necessary to adjudicate adjustment of status under § 1159(a)(2).”
E.E. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 26-314, at 7 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2026). Federal regulations governing
the adjustment of status of refugees indicate that § 1159’s “inspection and examination”
requirement contemplates a limited encounter, not prolonged detention. See 8 C.F.R §
209.1(b), (d) (requiring refugees to submit an application for adjustment to LPR status
one year after entry with biometric information and providing that USCIS will decide on a
case-by-case basis whether an interview with an immigration officer is required to
determine eligibility for LPR status).
Second, detention of a refugee after “inspection and examination” is subject to
§§ 1225, 1229a, and 1231. 	Section 1225 provides for mandatory detention for certain
inadmissible “arriving aliens,” § 1225(b)(1), and noncitizens deemed “applicants for
admission” that are “seeking admission,” § 1225(b)(2). Section 1229a governs removal
proceedings. Under § 1231, an alien subject to a final order of removal must be detained
during the 90-day removal period, which generally starts when the order becomes
administratively final. Id. § 1231(a)(1)(A)–(B), (a)(2)(A). After the 90-day removal period
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ends, the noncitizen may be detained if determined “to be a risk to the community or
unlikely to comply with the order of removal.” Id. § 1231(a)(6).
Third, refugees who meet the statutory requirements to obtain lawful permanent
resident status are entitled to that status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(2) (“Any [individual] who
is found upon inspection and examination by an immigration officer . . . to be
admissible . . . shall, notwithstanding any numerical limitation . . . be regarded as lawfully
admitted to the United States for permanent residence”).
2. 	Lawfulness of Defendants’ Refugee Detention Policy
After careful review of the limited record before the Court, the Court concludes
that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim. The Court concludes that
federal statutes governing refugees and immigrant detention do not permit prolonged
detention of unadjusted refugees who have not been charged with any ground of
removability. 18 Plaintiffs are therefore likely to prevail on their claim that they are entitled
to a judgment that their arrest and detention, and the policy that purports to justify them,
are unlawful.
Here, the Named Plaintiffs are refugees who have not yet adjusted to lawful
permanent resident status and who have not been charged with any ground of
18 Before Plaintiffs filed their Amended Petition, Defendants responded to U.H.A.’s
petition for habeas corpus and asserted that because U.H.A. was a refugee and had resided in
the United States for over a year, Petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1159(a)(1)(C). (Resp. Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, at 2, Jan. 21, 2026, Docket No. 5). The
Defendants also argued that U.H.A. was subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2).
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removability under the INA; nor has any Named Plaintiff been determined to pose a
danger to the community or a risk of flight. 	(Am. Pet. ¶¶ 9, 11.)19 	Although § 1159
contemplates that a refugee may be returned to DHS “custody” on a limited basis solely
to enable inspection and examination for admission by the government, any continued
detention must be based on §§ 1225, 1229a, or 1231. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1); see Jama A.O.
v. Bondi, Civ. No. 26-420, at 7 (D. Minn. Jan. 23, 2026). 	On the plain reading of these
statutes, the Court concludes that none of these provisions authorize the prolonged
detention of the Named Plaintiffs—or, as discussed below, the putative Class or Detained
Subclass—because neither §§ 1225, 1229a, nor 1231 provide any basis for their
detention. 	Section 1225 does not apply because the Plaintiffs were conditionally
admitted as a refugee, and therefore, they are neither “arriving aliens” nor “applicants
for admission.” Section 1229a does not apply because these individuals have not been
placed in removal proceedings. Section 1231 does not apply because these individuals
have not been ordered removed.20
19 Plaintiffs also request certification of a “Class” of “[a]ll individuals with refugee status
who are residing in the state of Minnesota who have not yet adjusted to lawful permanent
resident status and have not been charged with any ground for removal under the INA.” (Pls.’
Mot. for Rule 23(b)(2) Class Cert. at 2.) 	Plaintiffs also request certification of a “Detained
Subclass,” which would consist of “[a]ll members of the Class who are or will be detained by DHS
pursuant to the Refugee Detention Policy.” (Id.) Although the Court will not certify the putative
class at this stage of the proceedings, the Court will address the scope of the relief granted here
below.
20 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) imposes mandatory detention on a defined group of noncitizens,
comprising of noncitizens who fall within “enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and
terrorist activities.” 	Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018). 	Because the Named
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To the extent Defendants’ Refugee Detention Policy is premised on § 1159(a)’s
language directing that unadjusted refugees who have resided in the country longer than
one year “be returned to the custody of the Department of Homeland Security for
inspection and examination,” the Court finds that Defendants’ interpretation of the word
“custody” is unlikely to prevail for at least four reasons.
First, the phrase “custody” in the statute is limited to a simple, narrow purpose:
conducting “inspection and examination for admission to the United States as an
immigrant[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1)(C); see Amin A. v. Trump, Civ. No. 26-251, Docket No.
11, at 4 (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2026). In the context of that limited purpose, “custody” is best
read to mean “responsibility” or “control,” rather than prolonged detention. See Custody,
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining custody as, among other things,
“responsibility for taking care of” and “[t]he care and control of a thing”). That is, § 1159
contemplates that a refugee be returned, temporarily, to the control of DHS because they
have the responsibility to inspect and examine the refugee for admission.
Second, ICE’s own prior guidance interpreting these provisions has instructed
officers that individuals who have not yet applied for adjustment to LPR status cannot be
detained on that basis alone. 	(2010 ICE Guidance at 2.)
Plaintiffs, putative Class, and putative Detained Subclass have not committed any of the
enumerated crimes, mandatory detention under § 1226(c) is not appropriate.
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Third, the Supreme Court has interpreted 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)—which contains
nearly identical “be returned to custody” language—to not authorize detention. See Clark
v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005) (interpreting the phrase “be returned to the
custody” under § 1182(d)(5)(A) and concluding that “nothing in this text . . . affirmatively
authorizes detention, much less indefinite detention”).
Fourth, interpreting the phrase “be returned to the custody” in § 1159(a) as
mandating detention would lead to an illogical result. Because § 1159(a) makes refugees
ineligible for adjustment until one year after entry, Defendants’ interpretation would
subject 	every 	refugee 	to 	detention, 	unless 	USCIS 	conducted 	the 	inspection 	and
examination precisely at the one-year mark. 	That outcome is nonsensical and would
cause many unadjusted refugees to celebrate their one-year anniversary in this country
in a jail cell. 	For these reasons, the argument that § 1159(a) mandates detention for
unadjusted refugees is unlikely to prevail.
Because 8 U.S.C. § 1159 does not authorize prolonged detention of unadjusted
refugees, and because the Named Plaintiffs, the putative Class, and the putative Detained
Subclass are not subject to detention under §§ 1225, 1229a, or 1231, Plaintiffs have
shown a likelihood of success on their claim that Defendants lack lawful authority to
detain them. 	Section 1159 permits the inspection and examination necessary to
adjudicate refugees’ adjustment of status applications—nothing more. 	Plaintiffs are
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therefore likely entitled to a judgment that Defendants’ Refugee Detention Policy under
“Operation PARRIS” violates federal law. 21
C. 	Threat of Irreparable Harm
The Court next must consider the threat of irreparable harm. “Irreparable harm
occurs when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically because its injuries cannot
be fully compensated through an award of damages.” 	Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry
Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009). “To succeed in demonstrating a threat of
irreparable harm, a party must show that the harm is certain and great and of such
imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.” Roudachevski v.
All-Am. Care Ctrs., Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
The Court finds that the threat of irreparable harm favors immediate relief in this
case. The stories of terror and trauma recounted by Named Plaintiffs in their Amended
Petition make this harm impossible to ignore. Plaintiffs U.H.A. and D. Doe were arrested
and detained by ICE despite their refugee status—a status they obtained due to a well-
founded fear of persecution in the country from which they came. Plaintiffs allege that
“more than a hundred refugees who fled persecution in their home countries,” have been
21 In the alternative, while the Court will not engage in a robust analysis of these issues
here, the Court also finds Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims—specifically, that the sudden,
warrantless arrests of individuals under Operation PARRIS violate Plaintiffs’ liberties guaranteed
by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments—to be weighty and persuasive.
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arrested and detained, without notice or warrants, including being “handcuffed and
shackled in chains for prolonged periods, causing unnecessary physical pain.” (Am. Pet.
¶ 108.) 	Once detained, they have been “provided no information about why they are
being detained or when they will be released.” (Id.)
The loss of liberty is “perhaps the best example of irreparable harm.” See Matacua
v. Frank, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1019, 1025 (D. Minn. 2018); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
531 (2004) (describing the right to be “free from physical detention by one’s own
government,” as “the most elemental of liberty interests.”). And the threat of harm here
does not stop with the deprivation of liberty. Defendants have also hurriedly transported
detained refugees (alongside many other individuals detained by federal officials in
Minnesota in recent months) to distant states, often without the ability to communicate
with counsel, family, or the community. In addition, the federal government, including
the Department of Justice, has repeatedly “failed to comply” with “dozens of court
orders,” from judges in this District, including orders requiring the immediate release and
return to Minnesota of unlawfully detained individuals; indeed, “the extent of ICE’s
violation of court orders” has been “extraordinary.” Juan T.R. v. Noem, Civil No. 26-107,
Docket No. 7 at 2–3 (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2026) (emphasis added). The threat of prolonged,
unauthorized, and seemingly unaccountable detention has caused additional “significant
hardship” to those subject to these actions. Id.
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Named Plaintiffs who have not—yet—been arrested under Defendants’ policy
have also demonstrated an imminent threat of irreparable harm because Operation
PARRIS was specifically crafted by Defendants with the purpose of targeting “Minnesota
5,600 refugees who have not yet been given lawful permanent resident status (Green
Cards).” 	(Drake Decl. ¶ 17, Ex. 15, Docket No. 16-19.) 	Even refugees who have been
detained and released, or who hold the legal status targeted by Defendants but have not
yet been arrested, face a legitimate threat of irreparable harm absent immediate relief,
and possess a rational and completely understandable fear that they may be arrested or
re-arrested. Because Plaintiffs have demonstrated a threat of irreparable harm, the Court
finds that this Dataphase factor strongly favors Plaintiffs.
D. 	Balance of Harms and Public Interest
The third and fourth factors that consider harm to the opposing party and the
public interest merge when the Government is a party. Morehouse Enters., LLC v. Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 78 F.4th 1011, 1019 (8th Cir. 2023) (citing Nken
v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009)). 	“When applying this factor, the key question is
whether 	the 	movant’s 	likely 	harm 	without 	a 	preliminary 	injunction 	exceeds 	the
nonmovant’s likely harm with a preliminary injunction in place.” Cigna Corp. v. Bricker,
103 F.4th 1336, 1347 (8th Cir. 2024).
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This 	factor 	likewise 	favors 	Plaintiffs. 	The 	Court 	clearly 	recognizes 	the
Government’s significant and strong interest in enforcing its immigration laws. 22 But, at
the same time, the Government has “no public interest in perpetuating unlawful agency
action.” Missouri v. Trump, 128 F.4th 979, 997 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting League of Women
Voters of U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.D.C. Cir. 2016). To the extent the Government
has an interest in carrying out Operation PARRIS, these interests clearly do not outweigh
Plaintiffs’ interests in being free from unlawful detention. See Francisco T. Bondi, 797 F.
Supp. 3d 970, 776 (D. Minn. 2025) (“[P]reventing unlawful detention is a compelling issue
of public importance.”). 23 	Indeed, the Government’s need to enforce a resource-
intensive Refugee Detention Policy by arresting refugees likely interferes with the lawful
need to enforce serious violations of immigration laws.
In sum, the Court finds that the Dataphase factors weigh in favor of granting
Plaintiffs’ motion for temporary restraining order.24 Plaintiffs have shown that they are
22 United States v. Arango, No. 09-178, 2015 WL 11120855, at *2 (D. Ariz. Jan. 7, 2015)
(finding that the “Government’s interest in enforcing immigration laws is enormous”).
23 On January 20, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order, titled “Realigning the
United States Refugee Admission Program.” See Exec. Order No. 14163, 90 Fed. Reg. 8459 (Jan.
20, 2025). The order indefinitely suspended both “entry into the United States of refugees under
USRAP” and “decisions on applications for refugee status.” Id. The Court’s conclusions regarding
the lawfulness of Defendants’ Refugee Detention Policy in Minnesota have no bearing
whatsoever on the question of the lawfulness of President Trump’s refugee suspension.
24 The Court will waive the bond requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c)
because TRO seeks to prevent constitutional violations and the Defendants would not incur
monetary damages due to a wrongfully issued TRO. See Liban G. v. Noem, Civ. No. 26-301, 2026
WL 125689, at *3 n.1 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2026). 	This matter also implicates significant public
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likely to succeed on their claim that Defendants’ Refugee Detention Policy—which is
effectuated 	in 	furtherance 	of 	Operation 	PARRIS—violates 	the 	Immigration 	and
Nationality Act; have shown a significant threat of irreparable harm; and have shown that
the balance of harms as between the Plaintiffs and Defendants favors Plaintiffs. The Court
will therefore grant temporary injunctive relief.
II. 	SCOPE OF RELIEF
The Named Plaintiffs assert claims not only on behalf of themselves as individuals,
but they also seek to represent a class (and one subclass) of similarly situated individuals
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(2). 	Plaintiffs seek to certify a “Class”
defined as “[a]ll individuals with refugee status who are residing in the state of Minnesota
who have not yet adjusted to lawful permanent resident status and have not been
charged with any ground for removal under the INA.” (Pls.’ Mot. for Rule 23(b)(2) Class
Cert. at 2.) And Plaintiffs move to certify a “Detained Subclass,” which consists of “[a]ll
members of the Class who are or will be detained by DHS pursuant to the Refugee
Detention Policy.” (Id.)
Although Plaintiffs move for class certification (Docket No. 15), the Court will defer
ruling on Plaintiffs’ motion until the motion has been fully briefed and heard. The Court
interests. See, e.g., Richland/Wilken Joint Powers Auth. V. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 826 F.3d
1030, 1043 (8th Cir. 2016).
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will, however, consider whether temporary injunctive relief on a putative class-wide basis
is appropriate by evaluating the issue through the lens of Rule 23.
A. 	Standard of Review
“[C]ourts may issue temporary relief to a putative class.” Tincher v. Noem, No. 26-
1105, 2026 WL 194768, at *1 (8 th Cir. Jan. 26, 2026) (quoting A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S.
91, 98 (2025). In other words, the Court need not certify a class before issuing temporary
injunctive relief that applies beyond the named parties to the present case. Id. (“[W]e
need not decide whether a class should be certified as to the detainees’ due process
claims in order to temporarily enjoin the Government from removing putative class
members while the question of what notice is due is adjudicated.”). Nevertheless, the
Court will explain why temporary relief on a putative class-wide basis is appropriate
through an analysis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
To certify a class, Plaintiffs must demonstrate compliance with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.25 Rule 23 sets forth more than “a mere pleading standard.” Comcast Corp.
v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013). Rather, Plaintiffs must provide evidentiary proof of
each of Rule 23’s elements. Id. It is the Court’s duty to conduct a rigorous analysis before
certifying a class, which necessarily requires that the Court consider some issues that bear
on the merits of a claim. Id. at 33–34. But courts considering class certification are not
25 Class actions in habeas cases are permitted in the Eighth Circuit. 	See Williams v.
Richardson, 481 F.2d 358, 361 (8th Cir. 1973).
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expected to resolve questions regarding the merits. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans and
Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 459–60 (2013). 	First, Plaintiffs must show that they meet the
requirements of Rule 23(a). Then, they must satisfy one of the three 23(b) categories.
B. 	Rule 23(a)
A Court considering whether to certify a class first assesses whether the class
satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a). In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1119
(8th Cir. 2005). These requirements are: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impractical (“numerosity”); (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class (“commonality”); (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class (“typicality”); and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class (“adequacy”). Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a). The Court will address each prong in turn.
First, Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be “so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). A putative class size of forty or more will
generally support a finding of numerosity, but the Eighth Circuit has occasionally certified
classes with less than forty members. Portz v. St. Cloud State Univ., 297 F. Supp. 3d 929,
944 (D. Minn. 2018). 	This element is easily satisfied as Operation PARRIS targets
thousands of unadjusted refugees in Minnesota.
Second, Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be questions of law or fact that are
common to the class. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). 	To establish commonality under Rule
23(a)(2), class claims “must depend upon a common contention” that is “capable of
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classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve
an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). The “commonality” element is clearly met
here because the question of whether Defendants’ policy of arresting and detaining
refugees who have not yet obtained lawful permanent resident status is unlawful is a
narrow, clear, common question of law or fact that applies equally to the Named
Plaintiffs, putative Class, and putative Detained Subclass. 	Therefore, the legal issues
presented are especially suited to class-wide resolution.
Third, Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement requires the Court to consider if the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). 	To establish typicality, the Court must determine
“whether the named plaintiff’s claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the
interests 	of 	the 	class 	members 	will 	be fairly 	and adequately 	protected 	in 	their
absence.” Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982). Here, the same
Refugee Detention Policy that appears to likely to violate Named Plaintiffs’ rights is—for
the simple reason that they fit the express criteria put forth in Defendants’ rationale for
the policy—almost certain to violate the other class members’ rights. Like other members
of the Class, Plaintiffs K.A., H.D., D. Doe, and M. Doe, are all at risk of arrest and detention
under the Refugee Detention Policy. And like the Detained Subclass members, Plaintiff
U.H.A. is being detained as a result of the Refugee Detention Policy.
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Fourth, the Court must decide whether the proposed representatives and counsel
will “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). The
adequacy inquiry “serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the
class they seek to represent.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625, 117
S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). After considering the limited record at this stage, the
Court finds that this element is met as the Court is unaware of any conflicts of interest.
Accordingly, based on the limited record before the Court at this stage of the
proceeding, 	it 	appears 	likely 	that 	Plaintiffs 	will 	ultimately 	satisfy 	Rule 	23(a)’s
requirements.
C. 	Rule 23(b)
The Court must also decide whether the proposed class falls within one of the
three categories of Rule 23(b). Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied if a party shows that “the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class,
so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting
the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). “Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single
injunction or declaratory judgment would provide relief to each member of the
class.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011). The rule is particularly
appropriate in civil rights actions. See Coley v. Clinton, 635 F.2d 1364, 1378 (8th Cir. 1980).
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have acted on grounds that apply generally to the
putative Class and the Detained Subclass by adopting a policy of targeting Minnesota’s
5,600 unadjusted refugees for arrest and detention. See Mercado v. Noem, 800 F. Supp.
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3d 526, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (provisionally certifying Rule 23(b)(2) class of immigrants
detained by ICE, explaining that “defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable
to the class—subjecting them to the same set of policies governing their confinement and
access to attorneys—thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect to
the class as a whole”).
D. 	Application of this Order
The Court will not rule on Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification at this time.
However, under the Supreme Court’s decision in A.A.R.P., the Court need not certify a
class in order to grant temporary relief to a putative class. See A.A.R.P., 605 U.S. at 98.
The Court merely analyzed this case through the lens of Rule 23 above to show the
appropriateness of granting temporary relief at this time.
In sum, the Court finds that temporary relief on a class-wide basis is justified based
on the Dataphase factors and its brief review of Rule 23’s requirements. The Court will
incorporate Plaintiffs’ proposed class definitions and grant Plaintiffs’ motion for a
temporary restraining order, as set forth below. 26
26 After Plaintiffs filed their TRO motion, they submitted a supplemental memorandum
and a supplemental proposed order addressing Defendants’ alleged misconduct during the
“inspection and examination” interview conducted under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a)(1)(C). (Pls.’ Supp.
Mem., Jan. 25, 2026, Docket No 19.) At this stage in the proceedings, the Court declines to adopt
Plaintiffs’ proposed order language because it merely directs Defendants to “obey the law,”
which is impermissible. Tincher v. Noem, No. 26-1105, 2026 WL 194768, at *1 (8th Cir. Jan. 26,
2026).
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CONCLUSION
It is important to note that this Order does not affect USCIS’s responsibility to
conduct reinspections to adjust refugees’ status to lawful permanent resident. 	In
Minnesota, USCIS may continue this statutory process but without arresting and
detaining refugees. 	The Order also does not impact DHS’s lawful enforcement of
immigration laws. 	This Order is temporary until the Court has had the opportunity to
have full briefing and argument on a motion for a preliminary injunction.
It is also essential to emphasize that the refugees impacted by this Order are
carefully and thoroughly vetted individuals who have been invited into the United States
because of persecution in the countries from which they have come. 	They are not
committing crimes on our streets, nor did they illegally cross the border. Refugees have
a legal right to be in the United States, a right to work, a right to live peacefully—and
importantly, a right not to be subjected to the terror of being arrested and detained
without warrants or cause in their homes or on their way to religious services or to buy
groceries. At its best, America serves as a haven of individual liberties in a world too often
full of tyranny and cruelty. We abandon that ideal when we subject our neighbors to fear
and chaos.
The Court expects that this Order will be complied with in all respects.
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ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Docket No.
[16]) is GRANTED as follows:
1. 	For the purposes of this Order, temporary relief is granted to a putative “Class”
which encompasses: “All individuals with refugee status who are residing in the
state of Minnesota, who have not yet adjusted to lawful permanent resident
status, and have not been charged with any ground for removal under the
Immigration and Nationality Act.”
2. 	Defendants are ENJOINED from arresting or detaining any member of the Class on
the basis that they are a refugee who has not been adjusted to lawful permanent
resident status.
3. 	For the purposes of this Order, relief is granted to a putative “Detained Subclass”
which encompasses: “All members of the Class who are or will be detained by DHS
pursuant to the Refugee Detention Policy.”
4. 	Defendants are ORDERED to immediately release all members of the Detained
Subclass.
5. 	If a member of the Detained Subclass has been transferred out of the District of
Minnesota, Defendants shall immediately TRANSPORT such member to Minnesota
and then RELEASE such member from custody within 5 days of the date of this
Order. They shall not be released at the out-of-District location of detention.
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6. 	Given the severe weather conditions in Minnesota, Defendants are ORDERED
coordinate with Plaintiffs’ counsel to ensure that upon such members’ release,
they are not left outside in dangerous cold. In order to ensure humane treatment,
Detained Subclass members must be released to counsel or to individuals
specifically authorized by counsel.
7. 	Within 7 days of this Order, Defendants shall file on the docket a status update
concerning the status of the Detained Subclass members’ release.
8. 	Within 48 hours of this Order, Defendants shall produce and file under seal a list
of individuals in detention that satisfy that definition of the putative Detained
Subclass, as set forth in Paragraph 3 of this Order. 	The list must disclose the
individuals’ identities and their location of detention.
9. 	Plaintiffs are not required to provide security under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65(c).
10. Defendants’ Response concerning a preliminary injunction is due February 9, 2026;
Plaintiffs’ Reply is due February 13, 2026. The hearing on the motion for a
preliminary injunction will be scheduled on February 19, 2026 at 2:00 p.m. in
Courtroom 14E.
DATED: January 28, 2026
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
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