Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Pedro O.,1
Petitioner, 	Case No. 26-cv-361 (ECT/LIB)
v.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kristi Noem, et al.,
Respondents.
Pursuant to a general referral made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636, this matter comes
before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge upon Petitioner Pedro O.’s Petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. [Docket No. 1]. Finding no hearing necessary, the Court issues the present Report
and Recommendation.2
For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned recommends that Petitioner Pedro O.’s
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, [Docket No. 1], be GRANTED, as set forth herein; that
Respondents be ordered to immediately release Petitioner in Minnesota upon the issuance of any
Order adopting the present Report and Recommendation with confirmation of Petitioner’s release to
be filed with the Court within forty-eight hours of said Order; and that Respondents be required to
release Petitioner with all his personal effects seized during his arrest, as well as, all identification
documents and immigration documentation.
1 This District has adopted the policy of using only the first name and last initial of any nongovernmental parties in
immigration opinions such as the present Report and Recommendation. See, e.g., Yee S. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-2782
(JMB/DLM), 2025 WL 2879479, at *1 n.1 (D. Minn. Oct. 9, 2025); Sarail A. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-2144 (ECT/JFD),
2025 WL 2533673, at *1 n.1 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2025). Accordingly, where the Court refers to Petitioner by his name,
only his first name and last initial are provided.
2 Upon review of the present record, the Court finds that a hearing is unnecessary in this action because the relevant
facts are not in dispute and because a hearing on the Petitioner’s claim would not aid the Court in its consideration of
the present Petition. See Wallace v. Lockhart, 701 F.2d 719, 730 (8th Cir. 1983).
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I. 	Background3
Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico. (See Petition [Docket No. 1] ¶ 33). Petitioner first entered
the United States without inspection in 1996 or 1997 when he was three or four years of age. (Id. ¶
34). Petitioner did not encounter any law enforcement officials upon entering the United States.
(See Id.).
On May 24, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings
against Petitioner. (Id. ¶ 35). During those proceedings, Petitioner filed an Application for Asylum
and for Withholding of Removal in which he sought protection under the Convention Against
Torture Act. (Id. ¶ 36). On September 24, 2020, an immigration judge order Petitioner removed
from the United States, however, the immigration judge also granted Petitioner’s request for
deferral of removal to Mexico pursuant to the Convention Against Torture Act. (Id. ¶ 38). The
Department of Homeland Security appealed the immigration judge’s decision to grant Petitioner’s
request for deferral of removal, but the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration
judge’s decision on July 30, 2021. (Id. ¶ 39).
Petitioner was detained in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
during some of the time his removal proceedings were ongoing, but he was released from custody
under an Order of Supervision on October 28, 2021. (Id. ¶ 40–42).4 Until his recent arrest,
Petitioner has remained on supervise release and compliant with the conditions of his release. (Id.).
3 “Because Respondents did not contest any of the factual allegations in the Petition, these allegations are deemed
admitted.” Jose A. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-480 (JMB/ECW), 2026 WL 172524, at *1 n.2 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2026) (citing
Bland v. California Dep’t of Corr., 20 F.3d 1469, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v. Witek,
218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000)).
4 The Order of Supervision containing the conditions of Petitioner’s release is not in the record. When discussing the
background and administrative history in an action such as the present case, the Court would typically provide citations
to the operative habeas petition; the documentational evidence underlying the petitioner’s arrest, detention, release, and
redetention; and any documents from the immigration-related proceedings. Additionally, in a case where the Petitioner
was released subject to certain conditions as imposed through an order from an immigration judge, the Court would cite
to that order to discuss its contents. This, however, is not possible in the present case because Respondents failed to
provide any such evidence. Respondents were ordered to file an answer to Petitioner’s present Petition to include a
reasoned memorandum of law and “[s]uch affidavits and exhibits as are needed to establish the lawfulness and correct
duration of Petitioner’s detention in light of the issues raised” in the present Petition. (Order [Docket No. 4]).
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On December 20, 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers arrested Petitioner
in Minnesota as part of Operation Metro Surge. (Id. ¶ 5). Since that time, Petitioner has remained in
ICE’s custody, and he is presently detained in Minnesota. (Id.).
Petitioner initiated this action on January 16, 2026. (See Petition [Docket No. 1]). As relief,
Petitioner seeks his immediate release from detention. (See Id. ¶ 7).
On January 20, 2026, the undersigned issued an Order establishing a schedule for the parties
to submit briefs on the present Petition. (Order [Docket No. 4]). Respondents were permitted
fourteen days in which to respond to the present Petition.
Respondents filed their memorandum on February 3, 2026. (Mem. [Docket No. 5]).
Respondents’ memorandum, however, ignores large swath of the present Petition and Petitioner’s
argument in support thereof. (See Id.). For example, Respondents mischaracterize Petitioner’s
challenge here as a challenge to only the length of his detention. (See Id.) (discussing Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)). Respondents’ memorandum goes on to proffer arguments on that basis
and only on that basis. The problem, however, is that Petitioner’s argument is not so limited as
characterized by Respondents. (See Petition [Docket No. 1]). The present Petition explicitly and in
no uncertain terms challenges the constitutionality of Petitioner’s arrest and his redetention arguing
that Respondents have no statutory basis for either his arrest or redetention while he remained
compliant 	with 	his 	conditions 	of 	supervision. 	(See 	Id. 	¶¶ 	42–46, 	56, 	59–62, 	83–89, 	91).
Respondents simply fail to provide any substantive response to the core of Petitioner’s arguments.
II. 	Discussion
“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S.
674, 693 (2008). To ensure that remedy remains available, district courts have been vested with the
Respondents failed to comply with the Court’s direction. Respondent did not file any documentational evidence or
affidavit providing any information regarding Petitioner’s detention, his release in 2021, his recent rearrest, his present
detention, or even an affidavit acknowledging the facts of this case. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the present record
is sufficient to resolve the issues raised in the present Petition.
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authority to grant writs of habeas corpus to any individual who demonstrates that they are being
subjected to custodial confinement in violation of the Constitution, federal law, or a treaty of the
United States. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), 2241(c)(3).
The district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes the authority to adjudicate habeas challenges to a
noncitizen individual’s immigration-related detention. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
687–88 (2001). “Petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his
detention is unlawful.” Abel Jimenez Jimenez v. Samuel J. Olson, No. 25-cv-189 (CJW/KEM),
2025 WL 3633609, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 15, 2025) (citing Aditya W. H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp.
3d 691, 702 (D. Minn. 2025); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286 (1941)).
In the United States, immigration law permits “authorized immigration officials to detain
some classes of [noncitizens] during the course of certain immigration proceedings” 	Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 286 (2018). For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1231 provides that after an
individual is ordered removed from the United States, immigration officials “shall detain the”
individual “[d]uring the removal period[.]” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). The removal period is a
“period of 90 days” and under circumstances like the present case, the removal period “begins on . .
. [t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1).
When an individual becomes subject to a final order of removal and the removal period
expires without the individual being removed, specific regulations 	and statutes control the
government’s ability to detain, release, and revoke the release of the individual. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §
1231; 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4, 241.13. Once such an individual is released from custody pursuant to
conditions of supervision, ICE’s ability to redetain that individual is constrained by ICE’s own
regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and 241.13. If ICE previously determined that there was no significant
likelihood of removal of said individual in the reasonably foreseeable future, then § 241.13 applies;
otherwise, § 241.4 applies. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 241.13(a), (b)(1), (g).
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When an individual is released pursuant to conditions under § 241.13, that release can be
revoked on two grounds: violation of supervised release or changed circumstances. 8 C.F.R. §
241.13(i). Under the latter, ICE “may revoke an [individual’s] release . . . and return the [individual]
to custody if, on account of changed circumstances,” ICE “determines that there is a significant
likelihood that the [individual] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R. §
241.13(i)(2). In either scenario—violation of supervised release or changed circumstances—the
regulations require ICE to notify the individual “of the reasons for revocation of his or her release”
and to
conduct an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to [ICE’s]
custody to afford the [individual] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for
revocation stated in the notification. The [individual] may submit any evidence or
information that he or she believes shows there is no significant likelihood he or she
[sic] be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that he or she has not
violated the order of supervision. The revocation custody review will include an
evaluation of any contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination
whether the facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial of release.
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). It is ICE’s burden to demonstrate that “changed circumstances” justify the
revocation of release. See, e.g., Roble v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 766, 772–73 (D. Minn. 2025);
Escalante v. Noem, No. 25-cv-182 (MJT), 2025 WL 2206113, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2025);
Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 150–51 (D. Mass. 2025).
“The procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13 are intended to provide noncitizens with
fundamental due process protections that courts have found to be constitutionally required.” Bulle v.
Wesling, No. 26-cv-19 (JJM/AEM), 2026 WL 183840, at *2 (D.R.I. Jan. 23, 2026) (citing Jimenez
v. Cronen, 317 F. Supp. 3d 626, 655 (D. Mass. 2018)). Noncitizens released pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §
241.13 under conditions of supervision maintain a protected liberty interest in their continued
release. See Bulle, 2026 WL 183840, at *2; Villanueva v. Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689, 704 (S.D. Tex.
2025) (discussing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143 (1997);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)). Accordingly, any attempt to redetain an individual who
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has been released under § 241.13 necessarily implicates the individual’s constitutionally protected
liberty interests. See Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 704. Consequently, “ICE violates a noncitizen’s
due process rights when the agency re-detains them and fails to comply with these revocation
procedures.” Bulle, 2026 WL 183840, at *2.
In the present case, the first requirement of § 241.13—that the removal period has expired—
is clearly met. As Respondents acknowledge, Petitioner is subject to a removal order dated
September 24, 2020. (See Order [Docket No. 2-1]). That removal order became final 	on October
24, 2020, when Petitioner’s time to appeal the removal order expired without Petitioner filing any
such appeal. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.38, 1241.1, 1252(a)(1), 1252 (b)(1).5 Petitioner’s removal period
thus began on that date, and the removal period expired ninety days later on January 22, 2021. That
date has long since passed.
Because 	the 	removal 	period 	has 	expired, 	Petitioner’s 	redetention 	is 	subject 	to 	the
requirements of either § 241.4 or § 241.13. If ICE previously determined that there was no
significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, then § 241.13
applies. But if ICE has not previously made such a determination, then § 241.4 applies.
The record in the present case demonstrates that ICE previously determined that there was
no significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, and therefore,
§ 241.13 governs Petitioner’s redetention. Neither party provides the Court with a copy of the
Petitioner’s Order of Supervision. Respondents do not specify or allege the basis on which that
order was issued. However, the relevant statutory provisions provide that “[b]efore making any
recommendation or decision to release a detainee,” immigration officials “must conclude,” among
5 As noted above, the government appealed the immigrations judge’s order to the extent it granted Petitioner’s request
for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture Act, but Petitioner did not appeal the immigration judge’s
order that Petitioner was removable. The government’s appeal of the withholding-only decision of the immigration
judge does not alter the date on which the removal order becomes final. Moreover, even if the Court were to use the
date the BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s decision as the date Petitioner’s removal order became final, the removal
period expired on October 28, 2021, and that date has also long since passed as well.
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other things that “[t]ravel documents for the [individual] are not available or, in the opinion of
[ICE], immediate removal, while proper, is otherwise not practicable or not in the public interest.” 8
C.F.R. § 241.4(e); see 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(h)(1). This appears to indicate that Petitioner’s release was
based on a decision that there was no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably
foreseeable 	future.6 Under 	these 	circumstances, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	“that 	ICE 	must 	have
[necessarily] made a determination that ‘there was no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future’” prior to issuing the Petitioner’s Order of Supervision. See Pham v.
Bondi, No. 25-cv-1157, 2025 WL 3477023, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 30, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3243870 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 20, 2025); Hamidi v. Bondi, No.
25-cv-1205, 2025 WL 4034263, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 14, 2025), report and recommendation
adopted, 2025 WL 3452454 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 1, 2025); Claudio A.A. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-742
(KMM/LIB), 2026 WL 468232, at *5 (D. Minn. Feb. 12, 2026), report and recommendation
adopted, 2026 WL 478347 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2026).
Because ICE previously determined that there was no significant likelihood of Petitioner’s
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future and because the removal period has expired, ICE was
required to satisfy the requirements of § 241.13(i) before revoking Petitioner’s release. The question
before the Court then is whether ICE complied with § 241.13(i).
Here, the record demonstrates that Respondents unequivocally failed to comply with any of
§ 241.13(i)’s requirements. As an initial matter, there is no indication that any authorized official
actually revoked Petitioner’s release. Although Petitioner was arrested and has certainly been
detained, Respondents do not offer any evidence, or even allege, that Petitioner’s arrest was made
6 Moreover, the facts of the present case also demonstrate that there is no significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future. The only country to which Petitioner has been ordered removed is Mexico, but
Petitioner cannot be removed to Mexico. Moreover, Petitioner specifically asserts, and Respondents do not refute, that
the government has not identified any other country to which it intends to remove Petitioner. (See Petition [Docket No.
1] ¶ 43). There is simply no indication that the government has made any effort to even locate a country to which it may
remove Petitioner. There is simply no basis in the present record upon which it could be reasonably concluded that there
is a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
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pursuant to a revocation of his release. In the absence of any evidence that an authorized
immigration official “lawfully revoked” Petitioner’s release, ICE’s arrest and redetention of
Petitioner without any other asserted basis for arresting and detaining Petitioner represents a patent
violation of Petitioner’s due process rights entitling him to habeas relief. See, e.g., Claudio A.A.,
2026 WL 468232, at *5 (citing Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 699–700).
Furthermore, assuming solely for the sake of argument that Petitioner’s arrest was the result
of an authorized official revoking Petitioner’s release under § 241.13(i), Respondents have wholly
failed to demonstrate the existence of any proper grounds for revocation. As noted above, when an
individual is released pursuant to §241.13(i), like Petitioner, ICE can revoke that release on only
two grounds: violation of supervised release or changed circumstances. Neither is present here.
Respondents do not challenge Petitioner’s assertion that he was in compliance with all conditions of
release prior to his December 20, 2025, arrest. Respondents also fail to identify any “changed
circumstance” to support the conclusion that there is now a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.7
Respondents’ failure to demonstrate a proper basis to revoke Petitioner’s release under §
241.13(i) is a violation of Petitioner’s due process rights, and Respondents’ failure here represents a
sufficient, independent basis to grant habeas relief to Petitioner. See, e.g., Claudio A.A., 2026 WL
468232, at *6 (citing Zhang Haixiang v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-cv-1890, 2025 WL
3683126, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025), report and recommendation, 2025 WL 3679184 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 18, 2025); Bulle v. Wesling, No. 26-cv-19 (JJM/AEM), 2026 WL 183840, at *8 (D.R.I. Jan.
23, 2026); Faysal N. v. Noem, No. 25-cv-4641 (JMB/DLM), 2026 WL 36066, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan.
6, 2026); Sarail A. v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 775, 784–85 (D. Minn. 2025)).
7 Indeed, Respondents do not even allege that any circumstances have changed or that there is a significant likelihood of
Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See fn. 6.
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Respondents’ lack of compliance with their own regulations does not end there. Even if
Respondents possessed a good faith basis to believe grounds for revocation existed under §
241.13(i), Respondents still failed to comply with § 241.13(i)’s requirement that Petitioner be
provided with prior notice of revocation and the basis for that revocation. There is simply no
indication in the record that Respondents provided Petitioner, at the time of his arrest, with notice of
the revocation or the basis for that revocation as required by § 241.13(i)(3). Petitioner also
specifically alleges, and Respondents do not refute, that he has not received any such notice. (See
Petition [Docket No. 1] ¶ 42). Respondents do not even allege that they had provided Petitioner or
his counsel with notice that Petitioner’s release was being revoked by the time Respondents filed
their memorandum—forty-five days after Petitioner was redetained. The complete lack of the notice
as required by § 241.13(i)(3) represents a violation of Petitioner’s due process rights and another
sufficient, independent basis upon which to grant habeas relief to Petitioner. See Roble v. Bondi,
803 F. Supp. 3d 766, 772 (D. Minn. 2025); Claudio A.A., 2026 WL 468232, at *7; see also
Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at 699–700; Bulle, 2026 WL 183840, at *6, 8–9; Faysal N., 2026 WL
36066, at *5; Sarail A., 803 F. Supp. 3d at 784.
Still yet, that does not end Respondents’ failures to comply with ICE’s own regulations.
Respondents have also failed to comply with the other requirements of § 241.13(i)(3) which provide
that upon revocation of an individual’s release under an Order of Supervision, ICE “will conduct an
initial informal interview promptly after” the individual’s return to ICE custody “to afford [the
individual] an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification” of
revocation. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3). At the informal interview, the individual is permitted to
submit evidence to show that there is no significant likelihood that the individual will be removed in
the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. Following that interview, ICE officials are required to
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determine whether the facts then support revocation of release. Id. In the present case, none of these
requirements have been satisfied.
There is no indication on the record that an informal interview was conducted with
Petitioner to provide him with an opportunity to respond to the hypothetical basis for the revocation
of his release. Likewise, the record lacks any indication that Petitioner was permitted an opportunity
to submit evidence to show there is no basis for revocation under § 241.13(i), and there is certainly
no indication, or even assertion, that any ICE official has undertaken any process whatsoever to
determine whether Petitioner’s circumstance warrant revocation of release. Respondents’ complete
failure to comply with their own requirements represents a violation of Petitioner’s due process
rights, and Respondents’ failure here too represents a sufficient, independent basis to grant
Petitioner habeas relief. See, e.g., Claudio A.A., 2026 WL 468232, at *7; Bulle, 2026 WL 183840,
at *6–7; Zhang Haixiang, 2025 WL 3683126, at *3; Faysal N., 2026 WL 36066, at *5.8
In summation, Petitioner has shown that ICE’s redetention of him on December 20, 2025,
violated Petitioner’s due process rights because ICE wholly failed to comply with its own
regulations under § 241.13(i). Agencies such as ICE are required to follow their own federal
regulations; the constitutional protections of due process require agencies to do so when detaining
or redetaining an individual. See, e.g., Sarail A., 803 F. Supp. 3d at 779; Faysal N., 2026 WL
36066, at *3; Zhang Haixiang, 2025 WL 3683126, at *3; Bulle, 2026 WL 183840, at *9; Rondan
Jarrett v. Raycraft, No. 26-cv-244, 2026 WL 319044, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2026). When ICE
8 For all the reasons discussed herein, § 241.13(i) controls the revocation of Petitioner’s release, and Respondents have
wholly failed to comply with the requirements of § 241.13(i) which therefore entitles Petitioner to habeas relief. The
Court notes, however, that even assuming solely for the sake of argument that the revocation of Petitioner’s release was
governed by § 241.4, Petitioner would still be entitled to the same habeas relief because Respondents have also wholly
failed to comply with the due process requirements of § 241.4. For example, § 241.4(l)(2) requires the revoking official
to make an individualized determination as to revocation including the consideration of certain factors before revoking
an individual’s release, and there is no indication, or even allegation, in the present case that an immigration official has
made such a finding. Similarly, there is no indication that Respondents have complied with § 241.4(l)’s requirement
that, upon revocation of release, ICE must initiate a review process with notification to the individual of the process,
schedule an interview with the individual, and make a determination as to whether revocation is warranted. In short,
Respondents have arrested and redetained Petitioner with a complete lack of due process, and thus, Petitioner is entitled
to habeas relief whether his circumstances are analyzed under § 241.4 or § 241.13(i).
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fails to meet the requirements of § 241.13(i) in revoking an individual’s release, the appropriate
remedy is the individual’s immediate release subject to no conditions beyond those previously
imposed in the order effectuating the individual’s initial release from ICE custody. See, e.g., Sarail
A., 803 F. Supp. 3d at 785; Faysal N., 2026 WL 36066, at *3–6; Zhang Haixiang, 2025 WL
3683126, at *3–4; Bulle, 2026 WL 183840, at *8–9; Rondan Jarrett, 2026 WL 319044, at *9–11;
Claudio A.A., 2026 WL 468232, at *8.
On that basis, the undersigned recommends that Pedro O.’s Petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, [Docket No. 1], be GRANTED, as set forth herein. More specifically, the undersigned
recommends that Respondents be ordered to immediately release Petitioner in Minnesota following
the issuance of any Order adopting the present Report and Recommendation.9 The undersigned
further recommends that Respondents be required to confirm Petitioner’s release within forty-eight
hours of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation.
III. 	Objection Period
The undersigned notes that one last issue merits discussion—the time in which the parties
are 	permitted 	to 	object 	to 	the 	present Report and Recommendation, 	if 	they 	so 	choose.
This Report and Recommendation is not an Order or judgment of the District Court, and it is,
therefore, not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Instead, Local Rule
72.2(b)(1) provides that “[a] party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate
judge’s” Report and Recommendation, such as the present Report and Recommendation, “within 14
days after being served with a copy of the” Report and Recommendation, “unless the court sets a
different deadline.” LR 72.2(b)(1). A party may then respond to those objections within fourteen
days after being served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). Thus, under normal circumstances a
party 	would 	be 	permitted 	fourteen 	(14) 	days 	in 	which 	to 	file 	its 	objections 	to 	the
9 It is further recommended that upon Petitioner’s release Respondents be ordered to return all of Petitioner’s personal
property and documentation he had with him at the time he was detained on December 20, 2025.
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present Report and Recommendation, if it chooses to object, and then the opposing party would be
permitted an additional fourteen (14) days in which to file its response to said object, if it so
chooses.
In the present case, however, Petitioner’s unlawful detention would be unnecessarily further
prolonged by this objection period to the point that the time limit in which the undersigned
recommends Petitioner be released would be doubled fourteen times over by the end of the standard
objection period. Put differently, if the parties were permitted the full objection period, comprised
of twenty-eight days, then the relief recommended by the undersigned would be materially
diminished.
Therefore, the Court, in its inherent power to manage pending litigation, reduces the time in
which any party is permitted to object to the present Report and Recommendation to two (2) days,
and correspondingly, the Court reduces to one (1) day the time in which any party is permitted to
respond to any objection. An objection period of any longer duration would materially and
unnecessarily undermine the recommended relief.
IV. 	Conclusion
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Pedro O.’s Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, [Docket No. 1], be GRANTED, as set forth
herein;
2. 	Respondents be required to immediately release Petitioner in Minnesota without subjecting
him to conditions greater than those specifically imposed in his October 28, 2021, Order of
Supervision;
3. 	Respondents be required to release Petitioner with all his personal effects seized during his
arrest, as well as, all identification documents and immigration documentation;
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4. 	Respondents be required to confirm Petitioner’s release in Minnesota from custody within
forty-eight (48) hours from the date of any Order adopting the present Report and
Recommendation; and
5. 	Respondents be precluded from redetaining Petitioner under a statutory theory this Court has
rejected in this proceeding absent materially changed circumstances.
Dated: February 27, 2026 	s/Leo I. Brisbois
Hon. Leo I. Brisbois
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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