Hussen et al v. Mullin et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Mubashir Khalif Hussen, Mahamed
Eydarus, and Javier Doe, on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement; Todd M. Lyons, in
his official capacity as Acting Director of
U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; David Easterwood, in his
official capacity as U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Field Office Director
for St. Paul, Minnesota; U.S. Customs and
Border Protection; Rodney S. Scott, in his
official capacity as Commissioner of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection; U.S.
Border Patrol; Michael W. Banks, in his
official capacity as Chief of U.S. Border
Patrol; and Gregory Bovino, in his official
capacity as Commander-at-Large of U.S.
Border Patrol,
Defendants.
File No. 26-cv-324 (ECT/ECW)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Kathryn 	Huddleston 	and 	Lucia 	Goin, 	American 	Civil 	Liberties 	Union 	Foundation
Immigrants’ Rights Project, Washington, DC; Spencer Elijah Wittmann Amdur and Oscar
Sarabia Roman, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Immigrants’ Rights Project,
San Francisco, CA; Omar Jadwat, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Immigrants’
Rights Project, New York, NY; Teresa J. Nelson, Catherine H. Ahlin-Halverson, Alicia
Lynn Granse, and Benjamin Casper, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, MN; Ian Bratlie, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, Mankato,
MN; X. Kevin Zhao, Aaron P. Knoll, Amran Farah, Benjamin L. Larson, Kshithij Shrinath,
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Michelle Erickson Morrow, and Nicholas Scheiner, Greene Espel PLLP, Minneapolis,
MN; Robert Fram, Covington & Burling, LLP, San Francisco, CA; Gregg H. Levy and
Paul Killebrew, Covington & Burling, LLP, Washington, DC; Bree Peilen, Covington &
Burling, New York, NY; and Raoul Shah, Bahram Samie, Ellen Levish, and Stacey P.
Slaughter, Robins Kaplan, LLP, Minneapolis, MN; for Plaintiffs Mubashir Khalif Hussen
and Javier Doe.
Kathryn 	Huddleston 	and 	Lucia 	Goin, 	American 	Civil 	Liberties 	Union 	Foundation
Immigrants’ Rights Project, Washington, DC; Spencer Elijah Wittmann Amdur and Oscar
Sarabia Roman, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Immigrants’ Rights Project,
San Francisco, CA; Omar Jadwat, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Immigrants’
Rights Project, New York, NY; Teresa J. Nelson, Catherine H. Ahlin-Halverson, Alicia
Lynn Granse and Benjamin Casper, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, MN; Ian Bratlie, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, Mankato,
MN; X. Kevin Zhao, Aaron P. Knoll, Amran Farah, Benjamin L. Larson, Kshithij Shrinath,
Michelle Erickson Morrow and Nicholas Scheiner, Greene Espel PLLP, Minneapolis, MN;
Robert Fram, Covington & Burling, LLP, San Francisco, CA; Gregg H. Levy and Paul
Killebrew, Covington & Burling, LLP, Washington, DC; and Bree Peilen, Covington &
Burling, New York, NY, for Plaintiff Mahamed Eydarus.
Sean Skedzielewski, Shane Alan Young, James Walker, and Lori MacKenzie, Department
of Justice, Civil Division, Washington DC; and Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s
Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants Kristi Noem, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 	U.S. 	Immigration 	and 	Customs 	Enforcement, 	Todd 	M. 	Lyons, 	David
Easterwood, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Rodney S. Scott, U.S. Border Patrol,
Michael W. Banks, and Gregory Bovino.
In December 2025, the Department of Homeland Security increased the number of
immigration law enforcement officers in Minnesota as part of a deployment labeled
“Operation Metro Surge.” 	Plaintiffs are three American citizens who were stopped or
arrested as part of the operation. 	They claim the officers who stopped or arrested them
acted unlawfully. 	The alleged unlawful activities include racial profiling, detaining
Plaintiffs without reasonable suspicion of immigration law violations, and arresting them
without probable cause of immigration law violations. 	Plaintiffs claim these violations
occurred pursuant to governmental policy.
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Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction forbidding Defendants from continuing to
implement their allegedly unlawful policies. To enable the requested injunction’s broader
enforcement, Plaintiffs also seek provisional certification of one or more classes of
individuals who “have been or will be stopped for immigration purposes” in Minnesota.
I held two hearings on these motions. 	In a four-hour evidentiary hearing on
February 	17, 	two 	Plaintiffs 	and 	four 	non-party 	witnesses 	testified 	regarding 	their
encounters with Defendants’ agents. 	In addition to these witnesses’ live testimony,
Plaintiffs submitted many declarations of individuals who encountered ICE agents or who
have personal knowledge regarding ICE agents’ activities as part of Operation Metro
Surge. Defendants cross-examined Plaintiffs’ witnesses but offered no witness testimony
of their own. The next day, the parties presented oral argument regarding disputed factual
and legal questions relevant to Plaintiffs’ motions. 	The parties submitted supplemental
materials on February 23.
Plaintiffs’ motions will be denied. The short version of a much longer story is this:
A plaintiff lacks Article III standing to seek forward-looking injunctive relief unless he can
show that he faces a “certainly impending” future injury (of the sort he seeks to have
enjoined). Judged by the standards governing a preliminary-injunction motion, Plaintiffs
have not made this showing. If that weren’t correct, the result would not change. Though
Plaintiffs 	have 	shown 	that 	Defendants 	likely 	maintained 	unconstitutional 	policies,
Plaintiffs have not shown that irreparable injury is likely to befall them in the immediate
future. 	This is largely owing to a significant reduction in the scope of Defendants’
Minnesota-based operations.
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Because the preliminary-injunction motion was the subject of extensive evidentiary
submissions and an evidentiary hearing, and because I believe it will be more helpful to
the parties and in connection with any appeal of this decision, I’ve chosen to issue findings
of fact and conclusions of law in the manner described in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a). I note that other courts have taken this approach. See, e.g., FTC v. Sanford Health,
No. 1:17-cv-133, 2017 WL 10810016, at *1 (D.N.D. Dec. 15, 2017); Uncle B’s Bakery,
Inc. v. O’Rourke, 920 F. Supp. 1405, 1411 (N.D. Iowa 1996). Of course, in this posture,
the findings and conclusions “are not binding at trial on the merits.” 	Univ. of Tex. v.
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981).
FINDINGS OF FACT 1
Operation Metro Surge
1. 	Defendants in this case are the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”); its component agencies U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”),
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), and U.S. Border Patrol; and officials in
leadership roles in those agencies. Compl. [ECF No. 2] ¶¶ 20–29. These agencies enforce
federal immigration law. ECF No. 83 ¶ 1; ECF No. 82 ¶ 5.
2. 	ICE, 	the 	largest 	investigative 	branch 	of 	DHS, 	comprises 	“three 	core
operational directorates”: (1) Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO); (2) Homeland
1 	Citations to a document’s page numbers are to pagination assigned by the Court’s
CM/ECF system, appearing in a document’s upper right corner, not to a document’s
original pagination.
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Security Investigations (HSI); and (3) the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (OPLA).
See ECF No. 82 ¶ 5.
3. 	ERO primarily enforces immigration law in the country’s interior. 	See id.
¶ 7. 	“ERO manages all logistical aspects of the removal process by identifying,
apprehending, and, when appropriate, detaining removable aliens during the course of
immigration proceedings and pending physical removal from the United States.” Id. “This
includes locating and taking into custody fugitive aliens and at-large criminal aliens, as
well as identifying aliens in federal, state, and local prisons and jails and working with
those authorities to transfer them to ICE custody without releasing them into the
community.” Id.
4. 	ERO has a field office in Saint Paul, Minnesota. See id. ¶ 9. Ordinarily, that
office is “staffed with approximately 190 officers covering the five states of Minnesota,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Iowa,” and about 80 officers are assigned to
the Twin Cities of Saint Paul and Minneapolis. Id.
5. 	In December 2025, DHS launched Operation Metro Surge to “significantly
increase ‘at-large’ arrests of illegal aliens in the Twin Cities metropolitan area.” Id. ¶¶ 8–
10; Compl. ¶¶ 4–5; ECF No. 81 at 16. 	DHS detailed an additional 2,000 officers to the
Saint Paul Field Office. 	ECF No. 82 ¶ 9. 	In early January 2026, CBP personnel began
deploying in Minneapolis to assist ICE officers in carrying out Operation Metro Surge.
ECF No. 83 ¶ 6. 	By February 3, 2026, there were approximately 1,029 CBP employees
assigned to the Operation. 	ECF No. 169-1 ¶ 7. 	At its peak, Operation Metro Surge
included more than 3,000 federal immigration officers or agents, acting primarily in the
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Twin Cities. 	See ECF No. 169-2 ¶¶ 3–4, 8 (noting that ICE officers also had conducted
arrests in Greater Minnesota, including in the cities of Worthington, Austin, and Willmar).
Minnesota’s Somali and Hispanic Populations
6. 	Minnesota is home to more than 76,000 people of Somali descent. ECF No.
48-9 at 3 (showing 2024 U.S. Census Bureau statistics). Of those, almost 40,000 were born
in America and have American citizenship, while another 32,000 were born outside the
country and are naturalized citizens. Id. at 7. Roughly 4,000 Somalis present in Minnesota
lack U.S. citizenship. 	Id. 	According to Census Bureau figures, around 94 percent of
Somalis in Minnesota are U.S. citizens. See id. at 3, 7.
7. 	Minnesota’s Hispanic 2 population is larger, at around 388,000 people. ECF
No. 48-10 at 3. About 76 percent are U.S. citizens. See id.
8. 	The record does not show how many noncitizen Somali and Hispanic
Minnesotans are unlawfully present in the United States. 	ICE believes that, “[b]ased on
available data,” there are about 66,000 noncitizens in Minnesota who “may be subject to
enforcement actions under the Immigration and Nationality Act.” 	ECF No. 82 ¶ 11.
However, the data underlying this assertion, if any, are not provided. On this record, it is
not possible to make a factual finding of the number of Somali and Hispanic noncitizens
who are in Minnesota and present in the United States unlawfully.
2 	The U.S. Census Bureau treats “Hispanic” and “Latino” as one category, and the
Declarants and parties appear not to distinguish the terms. For these reasons, the terms will
be used interchangeably here.
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The Disputed Policy-Related Fact Questions
9. 	The parties dispute Defendants’ policies and practices regarding carrying out
immigration stops and arrests.
10. 	Plaintiffs’ evidence consists of witness testimony regarding several dozen
immigration-related encounters in the Twin Cites metropolitan area (and in a few cases,
Greater Minnesota) that occurred between December 9, 2025, and late January 2026. ECF
No. 27 at 6–11; ECF No. 138 at 5–11. Plaintiffs also rely on several statements made by
DHS officials. ECF No. 27 at 11–12.
11. 	The testimony and declarations offer, for the most part, a one-side picture.
Plaintiffs provided detailed accounts of several dozen stops and arrests, alongside video
and photograph evidence, and six witnesses testified for Plaintiffs at the evidentiary
hearing.
12. 	Defendants submitted declarations disputing four accounts, but only one—
the Berry Declaration—offers a narrative of an at-issue immigration detention. 	See ECF
No. 84 (disputing account of Plaintiff Mubashir Hussen). 	ERO Assistant Field Office
Director Michael Bottjen provides brief accounts of the stops of Santiago Doe, Julio Doe,
and Luisa Doe. ECF No. 82 ¶¶ 18–20. Assistant Field Office Director Bottjen does not
say whether he was present on the scene of these encounters. 	See id. 	Defendants also
produced Form I-213 records for Declarants Santiago Doe, Julio Doe, and Luisa Doe. ECF
No. 136 at 2; ECF No. 136-3; ECF No. 137-2; ECF No. 137-1. Defendants cross-examined
Plaintiffs’ six witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. Defendants’ approach leaves almost all
of Plaintiffs’ declaration testimony undisputed.
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Evidence of Specific Immigration Encounters
Plaintiff and In-Court Witness Mubashir Hussen
13. 	Plaintiff Mubashir Hussen is Somali and a U.S. citizen who lives with his
family in Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	ECF No. 34 ¶ 1. 	Mr. Hussen arrived in the United
States as a refugee when he was six or seven years old, and in 2019 he became a naturalized
U.S. citizen. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. He maintains a valid U.S. passport and, at the time of the events,
possessed a valid U.S. passport card. 3 Id. ¶ 2.
14. 	On December 9, 2025, 4 Mr. Hussen was detained by ICE agents, including
William A. Berry, a Detention and Deportation Officer with ICE ERO. 	Id. ¶¶ 3–4; ECF
No. 84 ¶¶ 1, 5–6. Evidence for this encounter comes from Mr. Hussen, Officer Berry, and
several videos and still images that Mr. Hussen produced and authenticated at the
evidentiary hearing. ECF No. 34; ECF No. 84; Hussen Ex. 1 (surveillance camera footage
from back of restaurant); Hussen Ex. 2 (still photograph of the street); Hussen Ex. 3 (still
photograph of restaurant); Hussen Ex. 4 (surveillance footage from stairwell); Hussen Ex.
5 (bystander footage of Mr. Hussen being put into ICE vehicle). Mr. Hussen testified at
3 	In a declaration, Mr. Hussen testified that his passport card was scheduled to expire
on January 18, 2026, after the events in question and after his declaration was filed. ECF
No. 34 ¶ 2. There is no dispute his passport card was valid on December 9, 2025.
4 	In his declaration, Mr. Hussen testified that the event occurred on December 10.
ECF No. 34 ¶ 4. At the evidentiary hearing, he corrected that statement and testified the
correct date is December 9. 	Evidentiary Tr. [ECF No. 162] 87:6–10. 	Though it doesn’t
matter, the parties dispute the time of day of the encounter. Mr. Hussen testified it happened
around 1:30 p.m., id. ¶ 5, while Officer Berry testified it happened around 8:00 a.m., ECF
No. 84 ¶ 6. Two video exhibits show time stamps placing the encounter in the afternoon,
Hussen Ex. 1; Hussen Ex. 4, but Mr. Hussen testified he did not know if the time stamps
were accurate. Evidentiary Tr. 89:17–22, 97:23–25.
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the evidentiary hearing; Officer Berry did not. At times the evidence from the declarations,
videos, images, and witness testimony conflict.
15. 	On December 9, 2025, Mr. Hussen was in the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood
of Minneapolis, where he worked at a mental health services provider in a second-floor
office above two restaurants that serve Somali and East African food. ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 3–
4; ECF No. 84 ¶¶ 5–6. 	He saw ICE agents outside, whom he identified by their law
enforcement gear and masks, and because bystanders were honking car horns and blowing
whistles. ECF No. 34 ¶ 4. After the sounds died down, Mr. Hussen went outside for lunch
and “noticed an unmarked, tan SUV approaching.” Id. ¶¶ 4–5.
16. 	In the SUV was Officer Berry, who was “assigned to an ERO Team that was
conducting an investigation in the Cedar Avenue area,” a location which, he claimed, “was
known for housing and concealing illegal aliens and for criminal activity.” 	ECF No. 84
¶ 5.
17. 	Officer Berry exited the SUV about 10–15 feet away from Mr. Hussen, and
Mr. Hussen ran away from the officer toward a restaurant. ECF No. 84 ¶ 6; ECF No. 34
¶ 6; Hussen Ex. 1 at 0:35–0:40.5 	Mr. Hussen ran about 20 to 30 feet toward a stairwell
connected to the restaurant before Officer Berry caught up with him at the stairwell. ECF
5 	In his declaration, Mr. Hussen testified that he did not run away. ECF No. 34 ¶ 6.
At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Hussen admitted he ran. Evidentiary Tr. 87:11–16.
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No. 34 ¶ 6; ECF No. 84 ¶ 8; Hussen Ex. 3 (showing distance from sidewalk to stairwell);
Hussen Ex. 4 at 0:00–0:22 (showing video inside stairwell).6
18. 	Officer Berry pursued Mr. Hussen because Officer Berry “suspected him of
being a possible illegal alien after noticing my ICE badges and deciding to flee.” ECF No.
84 ¶ 7.
19. 	Once inside the stairwell, Officer Berry pushed Mr. Hussen against a wall.
Hussen Ex. 4 at 0:09–0:11. 	Surveillance footage from the stairwell captured audio from
the encounter, and though much of their language is indiscernible, Officer Berry can be
heard to yell, “Why are you running? 	Why are you running?” Id. at 0:10–0:14. 	Mr.
Hussen’s response is not clear. Another ERO officer arrived at the stairwell, and the two
officers restrained Mr. Hussen against a wall, pinning his arms behind his back and
handcuffing him. Id. at 0:17–0:56. Mr. Hussen’s undisputed testimony is that the officers
“squeez[ed] [his] hand really hard.” Evidentiary Tr. 98:10–12. Mr. Hussen can be heard
saying, “I’m legal,” and “I’m a citizen.” 	Id. at 0:40–0:48. 	He testified that an officer
responded to him, “That don’t matter. 	That don’t matter.” 	Evidentiary Tr. 95:24–96:3.
The footage supports Mr. Hussen’s assertion that the officers “did not stop or ask to see
my identification.” ECF No. 34 ¶ 8; Hussen Ex. 4 at 0:40–0:48.
20. 	The parties dispute whether Mr. Hussen resisted the officers in the stairwell.
Officer Berry stated that Mr. Hussen “actively resist[ed] by aggressively pulling his arms
and hands away in an attempt to avoid restraint,” and that it took “several minutes to gain
6 	In his declaration, Officer Berry testified that he “pursued Hussen on foot for 100–
150 yards.” ECF No. 84 ¶ 8. The video evidence shows the distance was much shorter.
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control of him” because of his “violent obstruction and physical resistance.” ECF No. 84
¶ 8. At the hearing, Mr. Hussen testified that he did not resist and that he offered his hands
to be cuffed. Evidentiary Tr. 129:24–130:22. I find that, based on the video evidence, Mr.
Hussen resisted for about 30 seconds until officers restrained him, and he remained still
while being handcuffed. Hussen Ex. 4 at 0:18–1:01.
21. 	After the officers removed Mr. Hussen from the stairwell, they put him in the
SUV. 	ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 10–12. 	Officer Berry testified that Mr. Hussen was “struggling
aggressively the entire time” and “yelling extremely loud with an apparent attempt to incite
the crowd” that had gathered around them. ECF No. 84 ¶ 9. A bystander’s video shows
officers walking Mr. Hussen to the car, and while Mr. Hussen apparently resists being
taken to the car, it does not show him “struggling aggressively.” See Hussen Ex. 5 at 0:00–
0:24. Mr. Hussen shouts that he is a citizen and that he is handcuffed before being put into
the SUV. Id.
22. 	The officers attempted to scan Mr. Hussen’s face, but Mr. Hussen did not
allow them to do so. ECF No. 34 ¶ 13; ECF No. 84 ¶ 13.
23. 	The parties dispute whether Mr. Hussen offered to provide identification, and
whether the officers sought additional means to identify him. Mr. Hussen testified that he
asked to show the officers a copy of his passport card on his phone or his driver’s license,
which was in his workplace, but they would not allow him to do either. ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 13–
14. Officer Berry testified that, though they asked Mr. Hussen for his name, date of birth,
and identification, “[h]e refused to answer and he ignored our questions,” and he did not
ask to show them anything on his phone. ECF No. 84 ¶¶ 13–14. Mr. Hussen testified that
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his employer grabbed a copy of Mr. Hussen’s passport card from an employee file,
approached the vehicle, and “showed the copy of [the] passport card through the
windshield, but the ICE officers ignored him and refused to take the document[] into
account.” ECF No. 34 ¶ 15. Officer Berry testified he “did not observe anyone attempting
to present us with Hussen’s passport card as our vehicle was attempting to leave the scene.”
ECF No. 84 ¶ 11. The bystander’s video shows a man chase down the SUV after it left the
scene and present a document through the windshield, leaning over the hood of the SUV,
while others around him shout, “he’s a U.S. citizen.” Hussen Ex. 5 at 0:48–1:06.
24. 	I find Mr. Hussen’s account to be credible. His testimony at the evidentiary
hearing was clear and direct on these questions. It was consistent with the declaration he
provided, and it was supported by the video and audio evidence showing he asserted he
was a citizen many times. Officer Berry, on the other hand, did not testify at the evidentiary
hearing, making it more difficult to assess the veracity of his account. 	Regardless, his
statement that he did not observe anyone present documentation through the windshield
makes his account less credible; it would have been impossible for someone in the SUV
not to notice the man standing at the front of the vehicle, obstructing the vehicle’s path,
showing the passport card copy.
25. 	While in the car, Mr. Hussen asked the officers if they would loosen his
handcuffs. 	ECF No. 34 ¶ 20. 	The officers instead “squeezed them tighter.” 	Id.; see
Evidentiary Tr. 140:12–18.
26. 	The officers took Mr. Hussen to the ICE office near Fort Snelling, where they
forced him to undergo a facial scan. ECF No. 34 ¶ 25. They uncuffed him and shackled
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his feet. 	Id. ¶ 26. 	They did not provide Mr. Hussen with water or medical assistance,
despite telling him earlier that medical assistance would be available. Id. ¶ 26. Mr. Hussen
received his phone back and showed the photo of his passport card to a woman who worked
at the ICE office, and he was fingerprinted. Id. ¶ 27. Despite Mr. Hussen’s request, ICE
did not give him a ride back to the site of his arrest; ICE officers told him to walk back,
though the temperatures were freezing and the arrest site was roughly seven miles away.
Id. ¶ 29.
27. 	Throughout the encounter, ICE officers never asked Mr. Hussen about his
citizenship, immigration status, ties to the community, time he had lived in the Twin Cities,
or family in Minnesota. Id. ¶¶ 22, 28. Officers did not present a warrant, explain why he
was stopped or arrested, or seem to know who he was (until he displayed his passport card
at the Fort Snelling ICE office). Id. ¶ 37.
28. 	Mr. Hussen was detained by ICE for about an hour and a half to two hours.
Id. ¶ 30; Evidentiary Tr. 105:10–13.
29. 	The event terrified Mr. Hussen and his family, and he has had trouble
sleeping ever since. 	ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 34–35, 43–44. 	His hands had marks from the cuffs
for several days, and he continues to experience back pain because of the incident. 	Id.
¶¶ 35, 43.
30. 	Mr. Hussen sees federal immigration agents every day in his Lake Street
neighborhood, and he has avoided walking to grocery stores because immigration officials
arrest people there. Id. ¶ 38. He has continued to participate in ordinary community life,
like going to work, going to the gym, playing basketball, spending time with friends and
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family, and attending Friday prayers at the mosque. Id. ¶ 40; see Evidentiary Tr. 110:15–
21. 	Mr. Hussen now avoids walking to Karmel Mall—a Minneapolis mall with many
Somali shops—a place he used to visit almost every day. Evidentiary Tr. 111:3–21. For
this Ramadan, his family is not breaking fast with other families, but has decided to stay
inside and break their fast indoors. 	Id. 112:14–23. 	Mr. Hussen has not been stopped or
detained 	by 	immigration 	officers 	since 	December 	9, 	2025, 	though 	he 	voluntarily
confronted an ICE officer on January 6, 2026. Id. 128:12–129:23.
Plaintiff and In-Court Witness Mahamed Eydarus
31. 	Plaintiff Mahamed Eydarus is Somali and a U.S. citizen. ECF No. 42 ¶ 3.
He was born in the United States, and he has lived in Minnesota since 2001. 	Id. 	Mr.
Eydarus lives in Fridley, Minnesota, as do his parents. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. He graduated from the
University of Minnesota in 2023, and works both as a full-time recovery coordinator and
part-time as a personal care assistant. Id. ¶ 5.
32. 	On the morning of December 10, 2025, Mr. Eydarus and his mother were
traveling to the Cedar-Riverside neighborhood to provide care for a client. 	Id. ¶¶ 6–7.
Parking was limited due to a recent snowfall, so Mr. Eydarus and his mother got out of
their car and began to shovel snow to clear a parking space. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10. While they were
shoveling, six to eight men from three unmarked vehicles approached without identifying
themselves. 	Id. ¶¶ 10–11. 	Mr. Eydarus now understands these men to be ICE agents,
though at the time he wasn’t certain, as they were wearing different colored vests. 	Id.
¶¶ 12–13. The men were armed with “guns, tasers, and pepper spray.” Id. ¶ 12. Two other
individuals also got out of the unmarked vehicles and appeared to be livestreaming the
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encounter, holding a camera about a foot away from Mr. Eydarus’s face. 	Id. ¶ 14;
Evidentiary Tr. 30:20–31:1. 	The agents stood a couple of feet away from Mr. Eydarus,
surrounded him, and blocked his movement, so Mr. Eydarus assumed he was not allowed
to walk away. Evidentiary Tr. 11:4–21.
33. 	The ICE officers asked Mr. Eydarus for his identification to see if he was, in
the officers’ words, “not illegal.” ECF No. 42 ¶ 16. The officers did not produce a warrant
or indicate that they knew Mr. Eydarus’s name or his mother’s name. Id. ¶¶ 17–18. Mr.
Eydarus did not hand over any identification for fear that the livestreamers would expose
his personal information on the Internet, id. ¶ 16, but his mother handed over her driver’s
license, id. ¶ 24.
34. 	The ICE officers determined Mr. Eydarus was a U.S. citizen and told him he
was free to go, but they did not find his mother’s license to be “federally acceptable” and
continued to detain her, asking her when she was naturalized and telling her to remove her
niqab. Id. ¶¶ 25–26. The officers did not allow Mr. Eydarus to stand near his mother, id.
¶ 26, and they questioned him about speaking to her in Somali, id. ¶ 27. Mr. Eydarus does
not know how the officers determined he was a citizen; he never gave them his name or
identification, and they asked no questions about his ties to the community. Id. ¶¶ 26, 38.
The officers told Mr. Eydarus he was free to go after about 20 minutes, and they allowed
his mother to leave about 10 minutes later. Evidentiary Tr. 16:6–10, 35:7–18. After about
half an hour, the agents suddenly left the area without any explanation. ECF No. 42 ¶ 31.
35. 	The officers did not seem to know who Mr. Eydarus or his mother were,
never accused them of a crime, and never produced a warrant. 	ECF No. 42 ¶ 37. 	Mr.
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Eydarus has no criminal record, other than parking tickets, and he timely paid the fines
associated with these citations. Id. ¶ 39. The officers’ comments about speaking Somali
“also make [Mr. Eydarus] believe that [the officers] were stopping [him and his mother]
just because” the two of them “looked like [they] could be ‘foreign.’” Id. ¶ 38. I find that
Mr. Eydarus and his mother were stopped and detained based solely on their race or
ethnicity.
36. 	Mr. Eydarus fears he will be stopped again and “physically harmed or even
arrested.” 	Id. ¶ 40. 	He lives in the metro area and is frequently in Minneapolis and the
Cedar-Riverside neighborhood “for work and other community events.” Id. Mr. Eydarus
has shifted his daily activities—he has stopped going to most places other than work.
Evidentiary Tr. 19:5–20. As an example, he used to go to the gym four times a week, but
he has only gone twice since December 10. Id. 19:12–17. He has avoided “hotspots” of
increased ICE presence, like South Minneapolis, and he has seen ICE officers a couple of
times since the December 10 encounter. Evidentiary Tr. 20:6–23. For the last two months,
he has heard about immigration officers questioning Somali people on the street or
detaining them almost every day. 	Id. 20:24–21:10. 	He has not been stopped by
immigration officers since the December 10 incident. Id. 29:18–24.
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Plaintiff Jonathan Aguilar Garcia7
37. 	Plaintiff Jonathan Aguilar Garcia is Hispanic and a U.S. citizen. 	ECF No.
30 ¶ 1; ECF No. 18 ¶ 1. Mr. Aguilar Garcia lives in the Twin Cities area and works at a
Target in Richfield, Minnesota, a city where many Hispanic people live and work. 	ECF
No. 30 ¶¶ 1, 4.
38. 	On the morning of January 8, 2026, Mr. Aguilar Garcia and his friend Andres
(a pseudonym), who is also Hispanic and a U.S. citizen, were delivering drive-up orders to
Target customers when unmarked vehicles arrived in the parking lot. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. Border
Patrol agents, including former Border Patrol Commander-at-Large Gregory Bovino,
approached Mr. Aguilar Garcia and Andres, who “were both keeping [their] distance and
videoing them.” 	Id. ¶ 4. 	Mr. Bovino asked the two men if they were U.S. citizens, and
Mr. Aguilar Garcia responded, “fuck you,” and refused to answer. 	Id. 	Mr. Aguilar
Garcia’s video of the event shows Mr. Bovino and masked DHS agents walking toward
Mr. Aguilar Garcia, while Mr. Aguilar Garcia walked backward toward the Target
entrance, filming the agents and uttering profanities. ECF No. 31 at 0:00–0:30. Another
agent began walking quickly toward Mr. Aguilar Garcia and asked repeatedly if Mr.
Aguilar Garcia was a citizen. Id. at 1:00–1:30.
39. 	Mr. Aguilar Garcia moved to enter the Target. ECF No. 31-1 at 1:40–1:51
(showing second video account). Though Mr. Aguilar Garcia’s movement was sudden, he
7 	Jonathan Aguilar Garcia initially moved to proceed under the pseudonym Javier
Doe. ECF No. 15. He later withdrew that motion and elected to proceed under his name.
ECF No. 175 at 2 n.1.
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did not flee; he jumped inside the sliding doors and stopped to continue filming the agent.
Id. 	The agent grabbed Mr. Aguilar Garcia and tackled him to the ground in between the
two sets of sliding doors. ECF No. 30 ¶ 5. Other agents piled on top of him. Id. ¶ 6. One
pressed a knee on Mr. Aguilar Garcia’s neck, an officer handcuffed him, and several
officers dragged him to the SUV. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Officers also arrested Andres and put both
men into the third row of the SUV. Id. ¶ 10. A third video confirms this account; in it, Mr.
Aguilar Garcia can be heard shouting that he is a U.S. citizen and has a passport on him.
ECF No. 31-2 at 1:38–2:10.
40. 	With Mr. Aguilar Garcia and Andres in the back seat, the officers drove off
and asked for identification. ECF No. 30 ¶ 11. The agents drove over the speed limit and
played Mexican music loudly; Mr. Aguilar Garcia believed the agents played the music
“because we were Hispanic.” Id. ¶ 11. Mr. Aguilar Garcia told officers his passport was
in his pocket and that officers could examine it; the officers then removed it and examined
it. Id. Andres did not have a passport on him, but he did have a Minnesota identification
card. 	Id. ¶ 12. The officers dropped Mr. Aguilar Garcia off in a Walmart parking lot in
Bloomington, but they continued to detain Andres. 	Id. ¶¶ 14–17. 	Mr. Aguilar Garcia
learned from social media that Andres was later released. Id. ¶ 21.
41. 	Mr. Aguilar Garcia sustained injuries to his arm, shoulder, neck, and head
from the encounter. Id. ¶ 20. Ever since, he has experienced pain in his ribs and chest and
has had difficulty sleeping. Id. ¶ 22.
42. 	There were many white people at Target the day Mr. Aguilar Garcia was
arrested; they also yelled at the agents, but they were not questioned, photographed,
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harassed, followed, tackled, or arrested—only Mr. Aguilar Garcia and Andres were. 	Id.
¶ 26.
43. 	I find that Mr. Aguilar Garcia was stopped and detained based solely on his
race or ethnicity.
44. 	From the time Mr. Aguilar Garcia first encountered the officers until they
released him at the Walmart parking lot in Bloomington, about two hours elapsed. Id. ¶¶ 3,
19 (starting at 11:00 a.m. and ending sometime before 1:00 p.m.).
45. 	Mr. Aguilar Garcia fears a future encounter with ICE agents. 	He testified
that “Richfield has been relentlessly targeted by federal immigration enforcement agents
since Thanksgiving, [presumably] because there is a significant Hispanic population living
there.” Id. ¶ 27. As of mid-January 2026, he observed immigration officers “in Richfield
neighborhoods, outside churches, and in and around businesses.” Id. He regularly drives
in Richfield to go to work, see family and friends, and go to the gym, and as of January 14,
2026, he regularly hears people whistling to signal ICE’s presence. Id.
Declarant Ali Dahir
46. 	Declarant Ali Dahir is Somali and a U.S. citizen who lives on Lake Street in
Minneapolis, Minnesota. ECF No. 32 ¶ 1. Mr. Dahir immigrated to the United States in
2001 and naturalized in 2006. Id.
47. 	On December 2, 2025, Mr. Dahir was leaving his apartment building to get
food at Karmel Mall, a “major hub[] for Somali people in Minneapolis.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 4. He
saw five or six ICE officers in the elevator of his apartment building, and after he exited
the elevator in the main lobby, one officer approached Mr. Dahir and said he needed to talk
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to him. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. Four other officers gathered and surrounded Mr. Dahir. Id. ¶ 6. One
ICE officer “said they were looking for somebody who looked like [him],” and asked to
see identification, so Mr. Dahir produced his Minnesota driver’s license. Id. ¶¶ 7, 9. The
officer asked Mr. Dahir if he was a U.S. citizen, and another officer took a picture of Mr.
Dahir’s face. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. The first officer asked for proof of citizenship, and Mr. Dahir
handed over his passport card. Id. ¶ 12. ICE agents did not let Mr. Dahir leave, however,
until they had “more information from their headquarters.” Id. ¶¶ 12, 15–16.
48. 	The encounter lasted about twenty-five or thirty minutes, after which a media
cameraperson and other neighborhood people arrived on scene. Id. ¶ 20. The ICE officers
returned Mr. Dahir’s passport and driver’s license, gave no further information about why
he was stopped, and left. 	Id. ¶ 21. The officers gave no indication they knew who Mr.
Dahir was, and they only said that they were looking for someone who resembled Mr.
Dahir, but without providing any specific description. 	Id. ¶¶ 7, 19. Without information
regarding who the officers were looking for who assertedly resembled Mr. Dahir, this
justification is not credible. I find therefore that Mr. Dahir was stopped and detained based
solely on his race or ethnicity.
49. 	Mr. Dahir is concerned ICE will seize him again. Id. ¶ 27. He tries not to go
outside unless necessary because, as of January 10, 2026, “ICE officers are all over the
city, in restaurants, supermarkets, shopping malls, gas stations, and schools.” 	Id. ¶¶ 24,
27.
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Declarant Santiago Doe8
50. 	Declarant Santiago Doe is a Latino man from Honduras who has lived in the
United States since 1995 and currently resides in New Hope, Minnesota. See ECF No. 46
¶ 1. Santiago has applied to be a lawful permanent resident, but his application has yet to
be approved. Id. ¶ 2.
51. 	Santiago is a maintenance worker, and on December 12, 2025, he was driving
a work truck away from a Home Depot and Culver’s parking lot in Chaska, Minnesota.
See id. ¶¶ 3–5. 	According to the Form I-213 Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien,
ERO officers conducted a record check on Santiago’s vehicle that day, and the search
revealed that the vehicle was registered to someone unlawfully present in the United States.
ECF No. 136 at 2; ECF No. 136-3 at 2. The officers pulled Santiago’s vehicle over. Id.;
ECF No. 46 ¶¶ 6–7.
52. 	Six ICE officers exited their vehicles, called Santiago by name, and told him
to get out of the car. 	ECF No. 46 ¶¶ 8–9. 	Officers handcuffed Santiago, shackled his
ankles, and drove him to a nearby hospital parking lot. Id. ¶¶ 11–12. The officers asked
for identification, and he produced his driver’s license and explained his pending
application. 	Id. ¶ 13. 	The officers responded that, since Santiago’s lawful-permanent-
residency application had not been approved, the application was not valid. Id.
53. 	After a few hours waiting in a parking lot “to pick up more people,” the
officers transported Santiago to the ICE office near Bloomington, Minnesota, and then
8 	Santiago Doe is proceeding under a pseudonym, as are all other declarants identified
by either the last name “Doe” or initials.
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transported him to Freeborn County Jail, where, as of January 12, 2026, Santiago remains
detained. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17–19.
54. 	If he is released, Santiago fears being again detained by ICE. Id. ¶ 25.
55. 	The parties dispute whether the officers informed Santiago why he was
detained. See ECF No. 136-3 at 2 (“ERO officers took custody of [Santiago] and informed
him that he was under arrest for being unlawfully present in the United States.”); ECF No.
46 ¶ 19 (“I have still not received explanation as to why I was arrested and remain
detained.”). 	I find that ICE officers detained Santiago because, after running his license
plate, they possessed evidence indicating that the vehicle was registered to someone
unlawfully present in the United States.
Declarant Luisa Doe
56. 	Declarant Luisa Doe is Latina from Honduras, and she has lived in Minnesota
since 2019. ECF No. 41 ¶ 1. Luisa has a pending asylum application and is scheduled to
appear in immigration court on May 5, 2026. Id.
57. 	On December 12, 2025, Luisa was driving in Saint Paul, Minnesota, when
ICE agents pulled her over. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. One agent asked her name; Luisa answered, and
the agent arrested her, handcuffed her, and put her in an ICE vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 4–6. The agent
scanned Luisa’s face with a phone, and then spoke to another agent in English; Luisa did
not understand that conversation. Id. ¶ 6. The agents never presented a warrant, explained
why they arrested her, or asked about her ties to the community. Id. ¶ 9. The agents took
her first to an unspecified detention facility where staff at the facility asked for her full
name and passport and ran her fingerprints. 	Id. ¶ 10. 	Then they transferred her to the
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Douglas County Jail in Wisconsin, where, as of January 12, 2026, she remains detained.
Id. ¶¶ 10–12.
58. 	The parties dispute why Luisa was stopped and arrested. Luisa believes she
was stopped solely because of her skin color and appearance, as the arresting officer did
not know who she was or present a warrant. Id. ¶ 17. I find this is true; Defendants have
presented no other reason to explain why the agents pulled Luisa over. I do not reach this
same conclusion regarding the arrest, however. Luisa testified that she was arrested after
the ICE agent learned her name. 	Id. ¶ 4. 	Defendants state that “Immigration Officers
determined that [Luisa] was unlawfully present and placed her under arrest for an
immigration violation.” ECF No. 82 ¶ 20; accord ECF No. 137-1 at 2 (Form I-213).
Declarant Julio Doe
59. 	Declarant Julio Doe is Latino and from El Salvador, and he has lived in
Minnesota since June 2024. ECF No. 40 ¶ 1. Julio has a pending asylum application with
USCIS. Id.
60. 	On December 24, 2025, Julio and three co-workers, all of whom were Latino,
were working at a construction site in Rosemount, Minnesota. 	Id. ¶¶ 4–5. 	Julio’s I-213
Form describes a vehicle on site as a red Chevrolet Silverado registered to a noncitizen
with a pending U visa application. ECF No. 137-2 at 2. The vehicle’s owner was Julio’s
employer. ECF No. 40 ¶ 5.
61. 	ICE 	officers 	were 	surveilling 	nearby 	Lakeville, 	Minnesota, 	because
“multiple arrests had previously occurred” there. ECF No. 137-2 at 2 (Form I-213). The
officers observed a Dodge Ram with markings of a construction company circling the
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officers’ vehicles, and the Dodge Ram’s driver slowed down to look inside the officers’
vehicle. Id. “Moments later,” another officer “monitoring a nearby residence” saw “four
Hispanic males quickly exit a worksite” and drive away in the Chevrolet Silverado. Id.
62. 	The parties dispute how the Silverado was driving: Julio testified that the
driver was “obeying all traffic laws” and was “not speeding.” ECF No. 40 ¶ 5. Defendants
asserted that the Silverado was driving “at an extremely high rate of speed.” ECF No. 82
¶ 19; accord ECF No. 137-2 at 2.
63. 	Four ICE officers in two cars pulled the Silverado over, and one of them
aimed his firearm in the direction of the truck’s windows. ECF No. 40 ¶¶ 7–8. The officers
directed Julio and the truck’s other occupants to exit the vehicle and provide their
documents, and one officer asked the group why they left the job site so quickly. Id. ¶ 9.
64. 	After reviewing Julio’s papers, the officers determined he was not lawfully
present in the United States, arrested and handcuffed him, and took him first to an ICE
office and then to Freeborn County Jail, where Julio is currently detained. 	Id. ¶¶ 10–17;
see ECF No. 137-2 at 2.
65. 	Julio believes he was detained solely because of his skin color, appearance,
and presence near a construction site. ECF No. 40 ¶ 20. The officers did not know Julio’s
name, tell him why he was stopped or arrested, or present a warrant. Id. The Form I-213
reports that Julio was stopped because his proximity to locations of arrests the previous
day, because “the operator of the Dodge Ram seemingly notifying the four males, who then
immediately left the scene,” and because the Silverado was registered to a noncitizen with
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a pending U visa. ECF No. 137-2 at 2. I find that the officers relied on those factors, not
merely Julio’s skin color and ethnicity, in stopping and arresting him.
Declarant Crisareli Castillo
66. 	Declarant Crisareli Castillo is of Mexican descent and a U.S. citizen. ECF
No. 38 ¶ 1. 	Ms. Castillo lives in Minneapolis’s Powderhorn neighborhood and works in
its Longfellow neighborhood as a support teacher at a Spanish-immersion daycare, caring
for infants and toddlers. 	Id. ¶ 2. 	One of Ms. Castillo’s co-workers is Rosa, 9 the aunt of
Ms. Castillo’s boyfriend. Id. ¶ 3. Rosa is from Ecuador, has a valid work permit, and is
currently seeking asylum in the United States. Id. ¶ 3.
67. 	On the morning of January 7, 2026, Ms. Castillo and Rosa were arriving at
the daycare when they were confronted by several masked ICE officers who boxed in Ms.
Castillo’s car. Id. ¶¶ 4–6. The officers instructed Ms. Castillo and Rosa not to move and
asked for identification. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. Ms. Castillo handed over her passport, and one officer
showed Ms. Castillo a picture of a Latina woman, and asked if Ms. Castillo recognized her;
she did not. Id. ¶ 8. Though Rosa did not say she was in the country without authorization,
the officers nevertheless handcuffed her, put her in one of the vehicles, and drove off. Id.
¶ 11. 	ICE flew Rosa to Texas a day or two afterward, but Ms. Castillo does not know
where Rosa is currently detained. Id. ¶ 16.
68. 	Ms. Castillo does not know why she and Rosa were stopped. Id. ¶ 12. The
ICE officers never presented a warrant, nor did they indicate they knew either woman’s
9 	Rosa is a pseudonym. ECF No. 38 ¶ 3.
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name before the encounter. Id. Ms. Castillo and Rosa do not resemble the Latina woman
in the photograph. Id. ¶ 13. About ten white bystanders were nearby, and the officers did
not ask any of the bystanders for identification, nor did they ask if they bystanders
recognized the woman in the photograph. Id. ¶ 14. I find that Ms. Castillo and Rosa were
stopped based solely on their race or ethnicity. Rosa’s subsequent arrest was based on her
immigration status.
69. 	Ms. Castillo is concerned that ICE will again detain her, and that they will
target the daycare and Powderhorn neighborhood, which has a large Latino population. Id.
¶ 19.
Declarant E.M.
70. 	Declarant 	E.M. 	is 	Mexican, 	Latina, 	and 	a 	U.S. 	citizen 	who 	lives 	in
Maplewood, Minnesota. ECF No. 92-8 ¶ 1.
71. 	On January 7, 2026, E.M. was driving near her neighborhood when
immigration agents boxed in her car and approached her. 	Id. ¶¶ 2, 4, 6–7. 	The agents’
clothing did not identify their agency. Id. ¶ 9. E.M. handed the agents her driver’s license
and passport, which they checked and returned, and they allowed her to depart. Id. ¶ 10.
72. 	E.M. was angry, believing the agents had racially profiled her, as she could
see no legitimate reason to stop her. Id. ¶ 11. She yelled at them and honked, and an agent
yelled back, “You need to stop! If you don’t I am going to detain you whether you are a
citizen or not for reckless driving.” Id. ¶¶ 11–12. The agents then drove away. Id. ¶ 12.
I find that E.M. was stopped based solely on her race or ethnicity.
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73. 	As 	of 	January 	31, 	2026, 	E.M. 	observed 	immigration 	agents 	in 	her
neighborhood several times, and she has avoided intersections where she has seen them to
avoid being stopped again. Id. ¶ 15.
Declarant Said Osman
74. 	Declarant Said Osman was born in Somalia and arrived in the United States
as a refugee in 2015. ECF No. 29 ¶ 1. Mr. Osman has had a green card since 2017, but he
is not a naturalized U.S. citizen. 	Id. ¶ 2. 	Mr. Osman lives in Louisville, Kentucky, and
traveled to Minneapolis in January 2026 to visit his family, who had recently moved there.
Id. ¶¶ 1, 4.
75. 	On January 8, 2026, Mr. Osman was on his way to a mosque, walking on
31st Street or Lake Street—a neighborhood where “many Somali Americans live, worship,
shop, and work”—when a black SUV pulled up next to him. Id. ¶¶ 5–7. Two agents exited
the SUV and asked Mr. Osman if he was a citizen; Mr. Osman responded that he was in
the country legally. Id. ¶¶ 8–9.
76. 	The agents did not answer or ask for Mr. Osman’s identification but instead
grabbed him by the arm and tried to put him in the SUV. Id. ¶¶ 9–10. Mr. Osman refused
to enter the vehicle, not knowing if the agents were legitimate law enforcement,10 and the
agents pinned Mr. Osman to the ground, saying they would use additional force if he did
10 	Mr. Osman does not identify the organization that employed these agents, or say
when he learned that they were federal agents. Defendants do not dispute that the men who
detained Mr. Osman were federal agents carrying out immigration enforcement.
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not get in the SUV. Id. ¶¶ 10–11, 14. An onlooker’s video shows Mr. Osman’s encounter
with these agents that is consistent with Mr. Osman’s account. ECF No. 29-1.
77. 	Mr. Osman was willing to show the agents his ID, but they would not let him
present it. ECF No. 29 ¶ 12. The agents “shoved” Mr. Osman into the SUV and drove off
with him. 	Id. ¶¶ 13–15. When Mr. Osman pointed out that agents didn’t ask for his ID,
the agents responded, “we are trying to implement the law of the land; if you are good, and
you are okay, we will let you go.” Id. ¶¶ 15–16.
78. 	Eventually, the agents examined Mr. Osman’s identification, took a photo of
his face, and “seemed to check [his] immigration status” on a phone. Id. ¶ 18. The agents
drove back to the spot where they apprehended Mr. Osman and released him. Id. ¶ 21. Mr.
Osman was in the car for about fifteen minutes. Id.
79. 	The agents did not know Mr. Osman’s name, they presented no warrants, and
they did not say why Mr. Osman was stopped or detained. Id. ¶ 24. Mr. Osman believes
he was “targeted” because he appears to be Somali American, and he was wearing
traditional Muslim clothing. 	Id. ¶¶ 24–25. 	Mr. Osman saw at least one other person on
the street who was white, and the agents did not stop or detain that person. Id. ¶ 26. The
agents never asked Mr. Osman about his ties to the community, where he lived, how long
he had lived there, or about his family. Id. ¶ 23. I find that Mr. Osman was stopped and
detained based solely on his race or ethnicity.
Declarant Lindsay Vogt
80. 	Declarant Lindsay Vogt is a resident of Minnetonka, Minnesota. 	ECF No.
35 ¶ 1. On January 8, 2026, two Latino construction workers were working on the siding
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of her house. Id. ¶ 5. When one of the workers went to the front of Ms. Vogt’s house to
get supplies, two or three unmarked cars pulled up, and six ICE officers exited the vehicles
and approached the worker. Id. ¶ 6. Ms. Vogt began recording the officers and told them
to “get out of here,” but the officers continued to approach the worker, handcuff him, and
leave, all within fifteen to thirty seconds. 	Id. ¶¶ 7–10. 	The officers did not ask for the
worker’s identification, show him any paperwork, or ask about his community ties. 	Id.
¶ 10.
81. 	Ms. Vogt believes the officers were not looking for anyone in particular; in
her view, “they just found a Hispanic or Latino man doing construction work, and took
him away.” Id. ¶ 11. Ms. Vogt’s testimony does not permit me to make a finding regarding
the reasons officers stopped and detained the worker.
Declarant Mark Castillo
82. 	Declarant Mark Castillo is Hispanic and a U.S. citizen who was born in Texas
and now lives in Saint Paul, Minnesota. ECF No. 43 ¶¶ 1, 6 (noting he “looks like he is
from Mexico”).
83. 	On January 9, 2026, Mr. Castillo was taking the trash out of his apartment
building when four ICE vehicles “cornered” him, and ICE agents asked him if he had a
birth certificate. Id. ¶¶ 2, 5, 7. Mr. Castillo said he was born in Texas. Id. ¶ 7. The agents
asked for identification, and Mr. Castillo provided his Minnesota driver’s license. Id. ¶¶ 8–
9. 	The agents reviewed Mr. Castillo’s license for twenty to thirty minutes, making Mr.
Castillo stand in the cold without winter clothes before the agents returned the license. Id.
¶¶ 2, 11. One agent told Mr. Castillo he should go back to Texas. Id. ¶ 11.
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84. 	Mr. Castillo believes the stop was discriminatory: “[The agents] saw a man
who looked Mexican and pounced on him,” and they “had no reason to think [Mr. Castillo]
was in violation of any immigration law.” 	Id. ¶¶ 12– 13. 	Defendants have provided no
contrary evidence. I agree with Mr. Castillo.
Declarant Julio Cesar Martinez Garcia
85. 	Declarant Julio Cesar Martinez Garcia is Hispanic11 and a U.S. citizen. ECF
No. 39 ¶¶ 1, 12. 	Mr. Martinez Garcia has a valid U.S. passport and Minnesota driver’s
license; he has applied for a REAL ID and is waiting for it to be mailed to him. Id. ¶¶ 3–
4. 	Mr. Martinez Garcia lives in Bloomington, Minnesota, and he works in cleaning and
property removal. Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
86. 	On January 9, 2026, Mr. Martinez Garcia was working at a house in Brooklyn
Center, Minnesota. 	See id. ¶ 5.12 	Two immigration agents with “border patrol” on their
vests drove past the house, made a U-turn, and approached Mr. Martinez Garcia. Id. ¶ 7.
The agents asked Mr. Martinez Garcia where he was born, and Mr. Martinez Garcia replied
that he was a U.S. citizen. 	Id. ¶ 8. 	Mr. Martinez Garcia showed the agents his driver’s
license and REAL ID paperwork, but the agents asserted that the REAL ID papers were
11 	Mr. Martinez Garcia does not directly testify as to his race or ethnicity, but there is
no other sensible inference. 	He believes he was stopped because of his skin color and
appearance. 	ECF No. 39 ¶ 16. 	One of the agents who stopped him conducted a facial
recognition scan and told Mr. Martinez Garcia that Mr. Martinez Garcia was born in
Mexico City. Id. ¶ 12. At least one agent, then, believed that Mr. Martinez Garcia appeared
to be of Mexican descent.
12 	The declaration gives the date of “January 9, 2025.” ECF No. 39 ¶ 5. I understand
“2025” to be a typographical error.
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fake and that the driver’s license proved nothing, and they handcuffed him. 	Id. ¶¶ 9–12.
Mr. Martinez Garcia tried to show the officers pictures of his passport on his phone, but
the agents did not allow it and confiscated his phone. Id. ¶ 13.
87. 	After driving Mr. Martinez Garcia around for about thirty minutes, the agents
met up with a different agent, who used a facial recognition scan to determine that Mr.
Martinez Garcia was a U.S. citizen. Id. ¶ 14. After that, the officers released Mr. Martinez
Garcia. Id. ¶ 15.
88. 	I find that Mr. Martinez Garcia was stopped and detained based solely on his
race or ethnicity. 	Without more, the assertions that Mr. Martinez Garcia’s papers were
“fake” or “proved nothing” are unsupported, pretextual justifications for prolonging the
detention.
Declarant A.A.
89. 	Declarant A.A. is Somali and a lawful permanent resident of the United
States. ECF No. 37 ¶ 1. A.A. lives with his wife and children in Burnsville, Minnesota.
Id.
90. 	On January 9, 2026, A.A. was in the Burnsville Walmart parking lot putting
groceries in his car, when two masked ICE officers came up, grabbed him, and reached
into his pants pocket, asking if he had a knife. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. A.A. denied having a knife, but
the officers continued to search his pockets. Id. ¶ 3. The officers removed A.A.’s wallet,
which contained his driver’s license and green card. 	Id. 	The officers did not ask A.A.
questions about his identity or request documents. Id.
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91. 	The officers handcuffed A.A., put him in the back of their sedan, and drove
him for about half an hour to a police station, where two more ICE officers began searching
A.A.’s pockets and asking where his documents were. Id. ¶¶ 4–6. A.A. explained that the
other ICE officers had his documents. Id. ¶ 6. One of the officers began asking A.A. if he
was Somali, how long he lived in the United States, and what his name was, and A.A.
truthfully answered these questions. Id. ¶ 7.
92. 	A.A. requested a translator, and the officers called a translator on the phone,
who told A.A. that A.A. “had the same first and last name as someone [the officers] were
looking for,” and the translator apologized to A.A. 	Id. 	After getting off the phone with
the translator, the ICE officers asked A.A. if they should release him at the police station
or return him to the Burnsville Walmart. Id. ¶ 9. A.A. chose the Walmart, so the officers
returned him to that parking lot, but did not remove his handcuffs until they arrived. 	Id.
¶ 9.
93. 	A.A. was handcuffed for about an hour and a half. 	Id. ¶ 10. 	The officers
never identified themselves, presented a warrant, indicated that they knew A.A. before
arresting him, or asked about his ties to the community or family. Id. ¶ 12. A.A. believes
he was detained solely because of his skin color and because he is Somali. 	Id. ¶ 19. He
had never been stopped by law enforcement before, and has never been convicted of any
crimes or offenses. 	Id. ¶ 14. 	Though the officers’ translator said they were looking for
someone with A.A.’s first and last name, the officers did not attempt to identify A.A. until
they arrived at the police station. Id. ¶ 19. Defendants submitted no information that might
identify the subject of their search or show that A.A. shared the subject’s name. On this
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record, I find that A.A. was stopped and detained based solely on his race or ethnicity and
that the explanation that officers were looking for an individual who shared A.A.’s name
is pretextual.
94. 	A.A. fears that he will be subject to a similar arrest in the future. 	Id. ¶ 18.
The Burnsville Walmart is his grocery store, and, as of January 13, 2026, A.A. knew that
ICE officers are present in Twin Cities “restaurants, supermarkets, shopping malls, and gas
stations.” 	Id. 	A.A.’s wife and eleven-year-old daughter worry about his safety too. 	Id.
¶ 17.
Declarant R.J.
95. 	Declarant R.J. is Hispanic and a U.S. citizen who lives in Brooklyn Park,
Minnesota. ECF No. 92-9 ¶ 1.
96. 	On January 10, 2026, R.J. was driving in Brooklyn Park when two cars boxed
him in on a busy road. Id. ¶¶ 3–4, 10. Immigration agents approached his car, banged on
the windows, and aimed a firearm at him. Id. ¶ 6. The agents did not ask R.J. any questions
or present a warrant. Id. ¶ 7. R.J. repeatedly stated he was a citizen. Id. ¶ 9. The agents
handcuffed him and put him in their car. Id. ¶¶ 9–10.
97. 	R.J. filmed a video that partially shows this encounter up to this point; it
appears that his phone or camera was propped facing forward on his dash. 	Id. ¶ 5; ECF
No. 94-1. R.J. and the arresting officer do not appear in the frame, but the audio supports
R.J.’s account. A bystander also filmed a video of the encounter; it shows three ICE agents
pull R.J. out of his car and restrain him on the ground while four other ICE agents surround
him. ECF No. 92-9 ¶ 25; ECF No. 94-2.
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98. 	After arresting R.J., the agents drove him around for about 20 minutes. ECF
No. 92-9 ¶ 11. 	The only question the agents asked R.J. was his name, and R.J. gave it. Id.
They never asked for or looked at his identification. Id. ¶ 9. The agents eventually verified
R.J.’s name and said he was free to go, explaining that they were searching for another
person with the same name and birth date who was present in the country illegally. 	Id.
¶ 12.
99. 	Though R.J. believes agents targeted him based on his ethnicity and because
he has a Mexican flag and other Mexico-connected stickers on his car, id. ¶¶ 23–24, it is
not possible to determine why agents stopped R.J. on this record. R.J.’s declaration omits
testimony regarding whether agents were able to observe R.J.’s race or ethnicity prior to
stopping him. It does not eliminate the plausible explanation that agents determined based
on the vehicle’s license plate that R.J. owned the vehicle, and the agents were looking for
an individual with the same name.
100. 	R.J. had bruises on his hands, and the handcuffs caused him to lose
circulation, so his hands were numb for several days. Id. ¶ 18. He has stopped going out
of his home as often as before and even quit his job as an Amazon delivery driver for fear
of being stopped again. Id. ¶ 22. As of late January 2026, R.J. often observed immigration
agents in his community. Id. ¶ 23.
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Declarant and In-Court Witness Raul Aguirre Castrejon
101. 	Declarant Raul Aguirre Castrejon is Hispanic13 and a lawful permanent
resident of the United States. ECF No. 45 ¶ 1.
102. 	On January 10, 2026, Mr. Castrejon’s niece was driving him in Monticello,
Minnesota, when two ICE vehicles followed them and tried to box them in. 	Id. ¶¶ 2–7;
Evidentiary Tr. 178:4. Mr. Castrejon and his niece tried to get off the road, and the ICE
vehicles swerved and parked in front of them, forcing his niece to slam on the brakes to
avoid a collision. ECF No. 45 ¶¶ 8–9. Five or six officers demanded that Mr. Castrejon
and his niece exit their vehicle. Id. ¶ 10. The officers handcuffed Mr. Castrejon and tried
to push him into one of the ICE vehicles. 	Id. 	In total, there were about twelve vehicles
and twenty agents on the scene. Evidentiary Tr. 181:12–18.
103. 	Mr. Castrejon told the officers he was “legal,” and an officer responded,
“you’re not from here. Where are you from?” ECF No. 45 ¶ 12. Though Mr. Castrejon
had his driver’s license and residence card, the officers did not allow him to produce that
documentation. Evidentiary Tr. 182:11–17.
104. 	After a few minutes the officers released Mr. Castrejon and his niece and told
the two they were stopped because the car was registered to a man but being driven by a
woman. ECF No. 45 ¶ 20. Mr. Castrejon believes he and his niece were stopped because
of his skin color and appearance. 	Id. ¶ 24. 	Based on Mr. Castrejon’s trial testimony, I
13 	Like Mr. Martinez Garcia, Mr. Castrejon does not testify directly as to his or his
niece’s race or ethnicity. The only reasonable conclusion from his declaration and in-court
testimony is that they are Hispanic, and no party disputes that. See Evidentiary Tr. 186:4–
6 (presuming Mr. Castrejon is Latino).
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agree. 	I do not understand how the fact that a male-owned vehicle is being driven by a
female might in any rational world give immigration officers reasonable suspicion to
believe an immigration-related offense is being committed. The explanation is incredible
and, I conclude, pretextual.
105. 	Mr. Castrejon fears being targeted again and being subject to future detention
and arrest by immigration agents. Id. ¶ 26.
Declarant Antony Doe
106. 	Declarant Antony Doe is Latino and from Honduras, and he has lived in the
United States since 2021. ECF No. 93-1 ¶ 1. He has a valid work permit and a pending U
visa application. Id.
107. 	On January 10, 2026, Antony was delivering food in Brooklyn Center,
Minnesota, when his wife called, saying that immigration agents had surrounded their
apartment complex. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. About two minutes later, approximately six or seven ICE
vehicles entered the lot where Antony was parked. 	Id. ¶ 4. 	Agents yelled at Antony to
open his doors, and two of the agents pointed their guns at the front of his car. Id. ¶ 5.
108. 	Antony rolled down his windows, and one of the agents yelled, “Are you
legal?” Id. ¶ 6. Antony responded that he had a valid work permit and a pending U visa
application. Id. Agents opened the door and pulled Antony out of the car; he did not resist.
Id. ¶¶ 7–8. The agents asked for identification, and Antony produced his driver’s license.
Id. ¶ 9. The agents scanned Antony’s face and handcuffed him. Id. ¶ 11. They still have
not returned Antony’s driver’s license. Id. ¶ 9.
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109. 	The agents drove Antony to a detention center in Bloomington, processed
him, and the next day flew him and other detainees to El Paso, Texas. 	Id. ¶¶ 11–14. 	A
week later, Antony was returned to Minnesota on January 20. Id. ¶¶ 17–18.
110. 	Because the agents never indicated they knew who Antony was, failed to
present a warrant, and did not explain why he was being stopped, Antony believes the
officers stopped and arrested him solely because of his skin color and ethnicity. Id. ¶ 23.
For these same reasons—and because Defendants have produced no contrary information
regarding Antony—I agree. 	As of January 30, 2026, Antony observed federal agents
“every day” around his apartment complex. Id. ¶ 24.
Declarant K.D.
111. 	Declarant K.D. is Latino and a U.S. citizen who lives in Burnsville,
Minnesota. ECF No. 92-13 ¶ 1.
112. 	On January 11, 2026, K.D. was walking to his car in a Walgreens parking lot
on the Richfield-Bloomington border. Id. ¶ 2. A vehicle pulled up, and four or five ICE
officers jumped out and surrounded K.D. 	Id. ¶ 4. 	Two officers began asking K.D. in
Spanish where K.D. was born and whether K.D. was a citizen. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. 	K.D. answered.
Id. ¶ 7. The officers asked for identification, and K.D. produced a driver’s license. Id. ¶ 8.
113. 	After about ten minutes, the officers left without saying anything to K.D. Id.
¶ 11. They never indicated that they knew K.D.’s name, presented a warrant, or explained
why they stopped K.D. Id. ¶ 15. I find that officers stopped K.D. solely because of K.D.’s
race or ethnicity.
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Declarant and In-Court Witness Christian Eduardo Molina Silva14
114. 	Declarant Christian Eduardo Molina Silva is Hispanic and a U.S. citizen who
lives in Coon Rapids, Minnesota. ECF No. 103-1 ¶¶ 1, 3; Evidentiary Tr. 54:17–22, 55:2–
3, 55:10–11.
115. 	On January 12, 2026, Mr. Molina was driving in South Minneapolis when he
passed an alley; in the alley was a black car with tinted windows. 	ECF No. 103-1 ¶ 2;
Evidentiary Tr. 56:6–57:22. 	Mr. Molina observed ICE agents in the car wearing masks.
Evidentiary Tr. 56:22–57:1. The car exited the alley and followed him. Id. 57:2–10. Mr.
Molina made a left turn, and the car behind did the same, following for about half a block
before its flashing emergency lights were activated. Id. 57:23–58:6. Mr. Molina made one
more left turn, intending to park, when the ICE vehicle rammed Mr. Molina’s vehicle from
behind. Id. 58:7–59:12.
116. 	An agent approached, asking if Mr. Molina was a citizen and demanding
proof. ECF No. 103-1 ¶¶ 5–6. Mr. Molina was angry and responded that he was a U.S.
citizen and that did not have to prove it to them. Id. ¶ 6. After about 45 to 60 minutes, the
officers drove off. Id. ¶ 14.
117. 	Mr. Molina believes the agents confirmed his citizenship by checking his
license plate. Id. ¶ 12. The agents promised to pay for his car repair but failed to provide
insurance information. Id. ¶¶ 10, 14. 	I find that agents stopped Mr. Molina solely because
of his race or ethnicity.
14 	Mr. Molina filed a declaration under a pseudonym, but he testified at the evidentiary
hearing under his full name.
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Declarant H.S.
118. 	Declarant H.S. is Somali and U.S. citizen who lives in St. Cloud, Minnesota.
ECF No. 92-5 ¶¶ 1, 21.
119. 	On January 12, 2026, she was parked in a Dollar Tree parking lot when ICE
agents stopped her and asked if she was a citizen. 	Id. ¶¶ 3–5. She said she was, and the
agents then checked her driver’s license. Id. ¶¶ 5–6.
120. 	One agent told H.S. she was free to leave, but after H.S. started walking
away, the agent changed course and informed H.S. it was still necessary to see her passport.
Id. ¶¶ 6–7. H.S. said her passport was at home. Id. ¶ 7. H.S. called her husband, who said
he would text her a photograph of her passport. Id. ¶ 8. The ICE agent said that H.S. “only
had three seconds to provide them a picture of [the] passport,” and “counted down, three
seconds, two seconds, one second.” Id. The photograph did not come through in that time.
Id.
121. 	An agent handcuffed H.S., pushed her toward the agents’ car, took her phone
by force, and turned it off. Id. ¶ 9. H.S. told agents they were hurting her and told them
she could show them the photograph to prove her citizenship, “but they did not listen.” Id.
122. 	A bystander’s video shows the agents handcuffing H.S. and putting her in
the car while she repeatedly says she will show them the picture. 	Id. ¶ 19; ECF No. 94.
Once she was in the car, the agents asked H.S. where she was born; she explained she was
born in Somalia and was a U.S. citizen. ECF No. 92-5 ¶¶ 11–12.
123. 	The agents drove H.S. around for about an hour, and while they were driving,
searched through her bag and found her health insurance card. Id. ¶ 13. With the insurance
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card and driver’s license, they apparently confirmed her citizenship. Id. Agents brought
H.S. to a Walgreens but didn’t explain why they would not bring her back to the Dollar
Tree. Id. ¶ 14.
124. 	H.S. suffered pain in her wrists, hands, and shoulders from the encounter. Id.
¶ 15. She believes she was stopped because is Somali, speaks Somali, and wears a Hijab.
Id. ¶ 20. I agree. On this record, I find that agents stopped and detained H.S. solely because
of her race or ethnicity.
125. 	As of January 30, 2026, H.S. continued to observe ICE agents patrol St.
Cloud, and testified that at that time they were “impossible to avoid for people trying to
live a normal life in this community.” Id. ¶ 21.
Declarant Pedro Moreno
126. 	Declarant Pedro Moreno is from Mexico and has been a lawful permanent
resident of the United States since 2024. ECF No. 44 ¶¶ 1, 5.
127. 	On January 13, 2026, he was working at his construction job inside a house
when at least six ICE vehicles arrived at the work site. Id. ¶ 3. 15 Two ICE agents entered
a room in which Mr. Moreno was working and one agent asked Mr. Moreno where he was
from. Id. ¶ 5. When Mr. Moreno provided his green card, the agent “said it was fake and
that they had no way to prove it is real.” Id. ¶ 6.
15 	The declaration’s date of “January 13, 2025” is presumed to be a typographical error.
Though Mr. Moreno does not say where the worksite was located, the most sensible
inference is that it was in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. It took only two hours for him
to be arrested at the job site, driven to Fort Snelling, processed, and driven back to the job
site. See ECF No. 44 ¶ 13, 21.
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128. 	The agents handcuffed Mr. Moreno, put him in a vehicle, and drove him to
the Fort Snelling detention center. Id. ¶¶ 7–13. At Fort Snelling, Mr. Moreno waited in a
long line to present his green card documents to an immigration officer. Id. ¶ 16. When
the officer reviewed the material, he yelled at Mr. Moreno and asked why Mr. Moreno
didn’t tell ICE agents he was a permanent resident. Id. Mr. Moreno responded that he did
tell them that, and another agent apologized to him and said he was free to go. Id.
129. 	Two agents drove Mr. Moreno back to the work site, and one told him that it
“[s]erves you right for running away,” to which the other agent responded that Mr. Moreno
had not run. Id. ¶¶ 17, 19. Mr. Moreno believes he was stopped because he looks Hispanic.
Id. ¶ 22. I agree. Defendants have provided no information explaining why they stopped
Mr. Moreno initially or what reason they may have had to suspect his green card was not
legitimate.
Declarant and In-Court Witness Ramon Menera16
130. 	Declarant Ramon Menera is Hispanic and a naturalized U.S. citizen. 	ECF
No. 92-16 ¶¶ 2, 13. 	He was born in Mexico and lives in Columbia Heights, Minnesota.
Evidentiary Tr. 145:2–3, 172:4–7.
131. 	On January 14, 2026, Mr. Menera left the house with his daughter, after
roughly a week of “being cooped up” to avoid ICE agents. ECF No. 92-16 ¶ 2. When Mr.
Menera returned home, there were ICE agents outside his property, and their car blocked
his driveway. 	Evidentiary Tr. 146:25–147:13. 	Mr. Menera told the agents that he lived
16 	Mr. Menera filed a declaration under a pseudonym, but he testified at the evidentiary
hearing under his full name.
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there and needed to park. 	Id. 173:6–19. 	After accompanying his daughter inside their
residence, Mr. Menera went back outside, remained on his property, and observed a crowd
of about ten people filming and protesting. ECF No. 92-16 ¶¶ 3–4.
132. 	One ICE agent approached, and Mr. Menera told the agent he was not
allowed to enter Mr. Menera’s property. Id. ¶¶ 5–6. The agent asked Mr. Menera where
he was from, and he answered he was “from this country,” as he had been a U.S. citizen
and Minnesota resident for many years and considered the state his home. Id. ¶¶ 6–7. The
agent responded, “Now, talking to you, seeing you, hearing that you have an accent, I have
reason to believe that you are not born of this country. What country are you from, do you
have any documentation?” Id. ¶ 8. Mr. Menera said that he was not required to show the
agent anything and reminded the agent that he was on Mr. Merena’s property. Id. ¶ 9. He
repeatedly explained that he had documentation but questioned why he was asked for it.
Id. ¶ 10. The agent said, “because of your accent,” and did not give another reason. Id.
133. 	ICE agents handcuffed Mr. Menera. Id. Mr. Menera filmed a video of the
encounter that ends at this point; it supports his account. 	ECF No. 147. 	Another agent
scanned Mr. Menera’s face with a phone, and an ICE supervisor told the agent that the face
scan showed Mr. Menera was a U.S. citizen. ECF No. 92-16 ¶¶ 11–12. An ICE agent then
checked Mr. Menera’s wallet and found a U.S. passport card. 	Id. ¶ 12. 	The supervisor
ordered his release, but the agent “resisted the order . . . two or three times.” Id. ¶ 13. The
agent believed Mr. Menera had lied about where he was from, as Mr. Menera was not born
in the United States. 	See id. Before releasing him, the agent leaned in and whispered to
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Mr. Menera in Spanish something to the effect of, “I don’t care if you’re a citizen, next
time I’m going to take you. I don’t care if I have to do extra paperwork.” Id. ¶ 14.
134. 	Mr. Menera believes that the agent questioned him based on his race. 	Id.
¶ 17. Other individuals filmed and protested the agents, but they were not Hispanic, and
Mr. Menera felt “singled out” for being Hispanic. See id. ¶¶ 4, 10. The agent provided a
different reason—that Mr. Menera’s accent provided reason to believe he was not born in
America. 	Id. ¶ 8. 	The video shows that the agent approached Mr. Menera before Mr.
Menera spoke to him. Id. ¶ 4; ECF No. 147 at 0:00–0:20. It is possible that the agent heard
the accent earlier, as Mr. Menera had told the agents they were blocking his driveway, but
Mr. Menera could not tell the agents apart because they were wearing masks. Evidentiary
Tr. 173:6–174:5. 	Regardless, I find Mr. Menera’s account to be credible, and on this
record, I find that he was stopped and detained based solely on his race or ethnicity.
Defendants have identified no evidence that might have given the officers reason to believe
Mr. Menera was violating an immigration law when they stopped and detained him.
135. 	The experience has left Mr. Menera and his family in fear, and he worries
about retaliation because of the agent’s threat. Id. ¶¶ 16–17.
Declarant Jane Doe
136. 	Declarant Jane Doe is Hispanic and a U.S citizen who lives in Minneapolis,
Minnesota. ECF No. 93 ¶¶ 1, 11.
137. 	On January 14, 2026, Customs and Border Patrol officers stopped her while
she was driving in her neighborhood. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6, 15. Ms. Doe was carrying her passport,
“aware that federal immigration enforcement was in [her] community stopping people who
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look like [her],” and she held it out the car window. Id. ¶¶ 13–14, 17. The officers did not
say anything to Ms. Doe; one grabbed her passport, inspected it, and said she was free to
go. Id. ¶¶ 18–21. On this record, the information does not permit a finding regarding the
reason or reasons officers decided to stop Ms. Doe.
138. 	As of February 1, 2026, Ms. Doe “observed immigration enforcement around
[her] house.” 	Id. ¶ 27. 	This left her fearful of future stops and frightened to leave her
house. Id. ¶¶ 29–31.
Declarant A.P.
139. 	Declarant A.P. is a Vietnamese American who an encountered an ICE officer
on an early morning walk in Minneapolis on January 14, 2026. ECF No. 90-3 ¶¶ 1–2, 4.
The officer had no “visible identification” and was much larger than A.P.; frightened, A.P.
ran from the officer. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6. A.P. could not hear whether an officer shouted a command
because A.P. is deaf in one ear and had an “AirPod” in the other ear. Id. ¶ 5. As A.P. ran,
the officer returned to his vehicle, and eventually several vehicles pulled up and blocked
A.P.’s path. 	Id. ¶ 8. The officers asked A.P. for identification, questioned why A.P. ran
away, and left after verifying A.P.’s identity. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. I find A.P. was stopped because
A.P. ran from officers.
Declarant N.G.
140. 	Declarant N.G. is white and her husband is Latino; both are American
citizens. ECF No. 95 ¶¶ 1–2, 14.
141. 	On January 14, 2026, they were parked in a residential area of New Hope,
Minnesota, when ICE agents observed N.G.’s husband from another vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.
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Moments later, three ICE vehicles sped towards N.G. and her husband’s vehicle, and one
rammed the vehicle from behind. Id. ¶ 5. An agent approached and asked N.G.’s husband
to produce identification. Id. ¶ 6.
142. 	N.G.’s husband asked why they had been pulled over, and the agent
responded, “We’ll get it figured out in a sec.” Id. ¶ 8. The agent asked N.G.’s husband if
he entered the United States on a visa, and the husband responded he was a U.S. citizen.
Id. ¶ 12. The agents ran checks and provided a number to call about a tort claim. Id. ¶ 15.
Agents did not ask N.G. for identification or proof of citizenship. Id. ¶ 14. N.G. filmed a
video of the encounter, and it supports her account, though she began filming after the ICE
vehicle hit her car, and she stopped filming before the agents confirmed her husband’s
citizenship and provided a number to call about a tort claim. See id. ¶ 5 (providing link to
video). I find that agents stopped N.G. and her husband based solely on her husband’s race
or ethnicity. 	The agents had an opportunity to observe his race and ethnicity, the stop
followed immediately after, agents gave no reason for the stop, and none is evident from
the record.
Declarant M.G.
143. 	Declarant M.G. is Latina and a U.S. citizen who lives in Eden Prairie,
Minnesota. ECF No. 92-12 ¶ 1.
144. 	On January 14, 2026, she was driving near her children’s school in the Eden
Prairie area when she saw a white pickup truck she suspected was an ICE vehicle. Id. ¶ 3.
She took a photograph of the license plate. Id. Shortly after, the pickup’s emergency lights
were activated, and officers pulled M.G. over. 	Id. 	An ICE agent approached M.G. and
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demanded identification. Id. M.G. had recently misplaced her driver’s license. Id. 	She
was frightened to lower her window and attempted to show the agent her employee
identification through the window. 	Id. 	The agent threatened to break the car’s window,
produced what appeared to be a tool for breaking windows, and asked to see a passport.
Id. 	M.G. did not have a passport; she offered to show the officers a photograph of her
previous driver’s license, which she had on her phone. Id. After some discussion, the stop
ended. Id.
145. 	On this record, it is not possible to determine why officers stopped M.G. It
might have been in retaliation for her decision to photograph the officers’ vehicle. It might
have occurred because of M.G.’s race or ethnicity.
Declarant T.G.
146. 	Declarant T.G. is Hmong and a U.S. citizen who lives in Saint Paul,
Minnesota. ECF No. 92-11 ¶ 1.
147. 	On January 15, 2026, T.G. parked at his workplace when ICE agents arrived
and blocked him from walking through the parking lot. Id. ¶¶ 2–3. One agent had his hand
on his gun, and that agent asked T.G. for identification. 	Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 	T.G. provided his
driver’s license, and agents asked T.G. where he was born. 	Id. ¶ 4. 	After T.G. told the
officers he had been born in Minnesota, they let him go. 	Id. 	On this record, it is not
possible to determine why officers stopped T.G.
148. 	T.G. fears he will be stopped again because he is a minority, and he has
limited his activities to avoid encountering immigration agents. Id. ¶ 7. As of January 30,
T.G. was aware that “ICE [wa]s showing up at homes in [his] neighborhood.” Id.
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Declarant and In-Court Witness Mustafa Mohamed17
149. 	Declarant Mustafa Mohamed is Somali and a U.S. citizen who lives in New
Hope, Minnesota. ECF No. 92-7 ¶ 1.
150. 	On January 15, 2026, he was at a gas station in Shakopee, Minnesota, when
five ICE agents surrounded Mr. Mohamed’s car and two of them grabbed him. Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
The agents dragged Mr. Mohamed out of his car, twisted his shoulder, and pushed him
against the car. Id. ¶ 4. A bystander’s video shows agents handcuffing him and pushing
him against the car. ECF No. 142. One agent put his knee into Mr. Mohamed’s back, and
another agent put his elbow into Mr. Mohamed’s neck. 	ECF No. 92-7 ¶ 4. 	The agents
handcuffed him. Id. ¶ 5.
151. 	Mr. Mohamed yelled that he was a U.S. citizen, but the agents did not accept
that answer and repeatedly asked him where he was born and what country he was from.
Id. ¶¶ 5–6. They never asked for his name, and they searched his pockets and found and
scanned his Minnesota driver’s license. Id. ¶ 7. One of the agents called Mr. Mohamed a
“son of a bitch,” and another agent said to him, “shut the fuck up, motherfucker.”
Evidentiary Tr. 43:3–5. 	After apparently confirming Mr. Mohamed’s citizenship, they
removed the handcuffs and told Mr. Mohamed they were “doing [their] job.” 	ECF No.
92-7 ¶ 7.
152. 	Mr. Mohamed believes he was detained solely because of his race or
ethnicity, and I agree. Id. ¶ 11. The agents had the opportunity to observe Mr. Mohamed’s
17 	Mr. Mohamed filed a declaration under a pseudonym but testified at the evidentiary
hearing using his full name.
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race and ethnicity before pulling him from his car, they questioned his national origin and
citizenship status immediately and without obtaining any other information from Mr.
Mohamed, and Defendants introduced no evidence that might identify another reason for
this stop.
153. 	Mr. Mohamed is frightened he will be detained or arrested again because the
agents made no attempt to identify him before handcuffing him, and, as of January 22,
2026, he observed immigration agents regularly at a market where he shops. Id. ¶¶ 12–13.
Declarant V.N.
154. 	Declarant V.N. is Vietnamese and a U.S. citizen who lives in St. Louis Park,
Minnesota. ECF No. 92-6 ¶ 2.
155. 	On January 19, 2026, she was commuting to Minneapolis when an SUV cut
her off and stopped her car. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6. Three federal immigration agents approached, two
from the SUV and one from the car behind her. Id. ¶¶ 7–8. One agent asked V.N. if her
name was Carla. 	Id. ¶ 9. 	V.N. said she didn’t know who Carla was, and produced her
REAL ID. Id. ¶ 10. After one agent told V.N. she looked like Carla, the agents ended the
encounter and left the scene. Id. ¶ 12.
156. 	On this record, I cannot find that agents stopped V.N. solely because of her
race or ethnicity. The agents provided a reason for the stop—that V.N. resembled another
person they were searching for—and ended the encounter immediately after learning that
V.N. was not that person.
157. 	V.N. was upset, and for nine days worked remotely to avoid a similar
encounter. Id. ¶ 14.
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Declarant F.A.
158. 	Declarant F.A. is Somali and a U.S. citizen. 	ECF No. 93-2 ¶¶ 2, 4. 	F.A.
wears a hijab. Id. ¶ 2.
159. 	On January 21, 2026, F.A. was driving to work in Rogers, Minnesota, in a
car registered to her a mother, who is also a U.S. citizen. 	Id. ¶¶ 6–7. Two ICE vehicles
pulled F.A. over, and five agents exited the vehicles. Id. ¶¶ 9–11. The agents did not have
clothing identifying them as ICE, DHS, or Border Patrol, but they all wore bulletproof
vests, and two or three of them had guns drawn. 	Id. ¶¶ 11–12. 	They approached and
“aggressively demanded” to see F.A.’s ID and asked if she was a citizen. 	Id. ¶ 14. F.A.
produced her ID and said she was a citizen. 	Id. 	One agent told F.A. he thought her ID
looked fake, and another agent asked F.A. to produce a passport; F.A. did not have her
passport with her. 	Id. ¶ 15. 	F.A.’s identification was valid. 	Id. ¶ 16. 	The officers told
F.A. that they were unable to determine whether she was a U.S. citizen, but the officers
returned F.A.’s ID allowed her to leave. Id. ¶ 17.
160. 	F.A. believes she was stopped because of her skin color, appearance, and
hijab. Id. ¶ 21. I agree. The agents gave no reason for the stop, they presented no warrant,
and F.A.’s vehicle was registered in a citizen’s name. Id.
161. 	Fearing future injury, F.A. and her family members have begun carrying their
birth certificates with them and share their locations on their phones. Id. ¶ 20.
Declarant S.S.
162. 	Declarant S.S. is white and a U.S. citizen. ECF No. 103-2 ¶¶ 1, 16.
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163. 	On January 21, 2026, S.S. was parked at a Starbucks in Bloomington,
Minnesota, when S.S. observed an East African man exit the coffee shop with a teenage
girl wearing a hijab—S.S. presumed she was the man’s daughter. 	Id. ¶¶ 2, 5. 	After the
pair got into a car, an ICE vehicle parked directly behind them, and five or six DHS officers
exited the vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 5–7.
164. 	S.S. began to observe and record the incident. Id. ¶ 8. One officer asked the
East African man if he was a U.S. citizen; S.S. told the man that he did not need to answer
questions unless the officers had a warrant. Id. ¶¶ 9, 11. The officer told S.S. that the East
African man was being detained, and no warrant was necessary to detain and question a
person. Id. ¶ 11. A few minutes later another officer asked for the man’s residency card.
Id. ¶ 13. The man provided his U.S. passport, and in response to an officer’s question, said
he was a non-naturalized U.S. citizen. Id. ¶ 14. Twenty or thirty seconds later, the officers
stepped back, told the man to have a good day, and left. Id. ¶ 15. The officers never asked
S.S. for identification, proof of U.S. citizenship, or a residency card. 	Id. ¶ 16. 	On this
record, it is not possible to determine why officers stopped the man S.S. observed.
Declarant E.G.
165. 	Declarant 	E.G. 	is 	a 	Mexican 	American 	who 	lives 	in 	Mounds 	View,
Minnesota. ECF No. 92-10 ¶ 1.
166. 	On January 22, 2026, ICE agents approached him while he stood on the steps
of his home. 	Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 	The ICE officers asked E.G. to produce his identification and
threatened arrest if he did not. 	Id. ¶ 5. 	After E.G. gave the officers his ID, one officer
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asked E.G. what country he was born in. Id. ¶ 7. Finding the question disrespectful, E.G.
refused to answer. Id. The officers returned E.G.’s ID and left. Id. ¶ 8.
167. 	E.G. believes he was targeted for being Mexican American, id. ¶ 10, and I
agree. 	The fact that E.G. was standing on the steps of his home gave officers the
opportunity to observe his race and ethnicity. E.G. was not in a location that might have
given officers a reason to question his immigration status—he was standing on the steps of
his own home. The officers gave no reason for their actions at the time, and Defendants
have filed nothing that might explain the officers’ actions.
168. 	Following 	the 	incident, 	E.G. 	stayed 	home 	to 	avoid 	interacting 	with
immigration officers. Id. ¶ 14.
Declarant S.P.
169. 	Declarant S.P. is Latino and a U.S. citizen by birth. ECF No. 92-2 ¶ 1.
170. 	On January 26, 2026, he was driving in Richfield, Minnesota, when he was
pulled over by individuals who appeared to be law enforcement officers but who never
identified themselves. 	Id. ¶¶ 2–4, 8. 	With weapons drawn, the officers asked S.P. if he
was “from here,” and he responded that he was a U.S. citizen. 	Id. ¶¶ 6–7. 	The officers
told S.P. that they ran his license plate and his “car came up as belonging to someone who
was in the country illegally.” 	Id. ¶ 7. 	S.P. produced his driver’s license. 	Id. 	After
reviewing S.P.’s license, the officers told S.P. that his “name and birthday came up in their
system when they ran [his] plates, but that it must have been someone else.” Id.
171. 	S.P. believes he was stopped solely because of his race or ethnicity. On this
record, I agree. 	The officers’ explanation—as S.P. describes it—makes no sense, and
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Defendants have introduced no evidence to counter S.P.’s account or identify a legitimate
reason for the stop. 	I conclude that the senseless character of the officer’s explanation
justifies the conclusion that it is pretextual.
Declarant C.L.
172. 	Declarant C.L. is Asian and a U.S. citizen, and lives in Minnesota. ECF No.
103 ¶¶ 1, 3, 20.
173. 	On January 29, 2026, she was driving in Saint Paul with her husband, who is
also Asian. Id. ¶¶ 2, 20. Immigration agents stopped them and asked them to produce birth
certificates and IDs. 	Id. ¶¶ 4–6. 	C.L. and her husband presented their birth certificates,
IDs, and social security cards. Id. ¶¶ 15, 17. The agents explained that the license plates
on the vehicle were registered in the name of a male they were attempting to locate. 	Id.
¶¶ 7,9. That was false. The car was registered to C.L.’s sister. Id. ¶ 10.
174. 	C.L. believes she and her husband were stopped solely because of their skin
color and appearance, id. ¶ 20, and I agree. 	As C.L. explained, the agents’ stated
justification for the stop was not credible. 	The agents identified no other reason for the
stop. And Defendants introduced no evidence to justify the stop. For these reasons, I find
that the officers’ explanation was pretextual.
The Non-Influence of Social and News Media
175. 	At the evidentiary hearing, Plaintiffs’ witnesses uniformly testified that they
believed Defendants stopped and arrested individuals based solely on the individuals’ race
and ethnicity.
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176. 	Defendants sought to undermine this testimony. 	As part of their cross-
examination of every one of Plaintiffs’ witnesses, Defendants attempted to elicit testimony
suggesting the witnesses’ beliefs (that Defendants stopped and arrested individuals based
solely on the individuals’ race and ethnicity) had their source in social media and news
reports. 	See Evidentiary Tr. 27:18–24, 50:21–51:18, 74:1–13, 124:3–13, 166:12–167:5,
187:6–188:9. 	In other words, Defendants sought to show that Plaintiffs’ witnesses were
merely repeating a narrative they obtained from these sources.
177. 	This approach did not persuade. The witnesses’ beliefs were tethered to the
witnesses’ personal experiences. In other words, I find the witnesses would have held these
same beliefs regardless of whether the witnesses read or observed others reporting these
same beliefs on social or news media.
The “Speculation” Issue
178. 	Some of Plaintiffs’ evidentiary-hearing witnesses acknowledged on cross-
examination that their beliefs that Defendants stopped and arrested individuals based solely
on the individuals’ race and ethnicity were based on the witnesses’ “speculation.”
179. 	Considered against the larger context of their entire testimony, I find that
these witnesses understood “speculation” to mean inference-drawing. 	In other words,
some witnesses’ beliefs were not based on direct evidence of anything Defendants or any
of their officers said that might have been overtly discriminatory but were based instead on
rational inferences drawn from facts of which the witnesses possessed personal knowledge.
The testimony of Plaintiffs’ witnesses was not based on speculation.
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Evidence Regarding Broader Community Impacts
Declarant Allison Sharkey
180. 	Declarant Allison Sharkey is the Executive Director of the Lake Street
Council. 	ECF No. 36 ¶ 1. 	Lake Street has “[o]ver 2,500 small businesses, at least 60
percent of which are owned by immigrants or persons of color,” and it contains “several
Latino and East African shopping malls/centers, including Karmel Mall).” 	Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
Since December 1, 2025, ICE officers have appeared on Lake Street, and the frequency of
their presence increased through December and early January. 	Id. ¶ 8. 	They have used
business parking lots “as staging grounds for operations.” Id. ¶ 9. “Lake Street restaurant
and shop owners have reported to [Ms. Sharkey] and [her] staff that, since ICE’s operations
began in December, business has fallen by 70 to 80 percent, as their regular customers
(many of whom are immigrants) are too scared to visit.” 	Id. ¶ 10. 	Ms. Sharkey has
personally witnessed that “as of early January, just one out of the seven restaurants at a
Latino shopping center is still open,” and “at Karmel Mall, more than 200 of the 300 shops
are now closed.” Id. ¶ 11.
Declarant Ianni Houmas
181. 	Declarant 	Ianni 	Houmas, 	the 	Executive 	Director 	of 	the 	Southeast
Community 	Organization, 	testified 	that 	his 	organization 	is 	aware 	of 	“documented
significant impacts on local businesses following recent enforcement activity in the area”
and he identified several impacted businesses. 	ECF No. 93-7 ¶¶ 1, 3. 	No Plaintiff or
declarant, however, testified that they were stopped or arrested at any of these sites.
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Immigration Lawyers
182. 	Several immigration lawyers submitted declarations as well, namely Alison
Griffith, 	ECF 	No. 	93-3, 	Evangeline 	Dhawan-Maloney, 	ECF 	No. 	93-4, 	Robyn
Meyer-Thompson, ECF No. 93-5, and Kelly Kristine Clark, ECF No. 93-6.
183. 	These lawyers’ clients have reported stops, arrests, and detentions in much
greater volume and of a “dramatically different” character than those in previous years.
ECF No. 93-3 ¶ 8; see ECF No. 93-5 ¶ 11; ECF No. 93-6 ¶ 3. As Ms. Dhawan-Maloney
described the state of things, “officers seem to be approaching people who they think might
not be a U.S. citizen, generally if they appear to be Hispanic or Somali, and demanding
proof of citizenship or lawful permanent residence.” ECF No. 93-4 ¶ 9. “[I]f the person
does not have proof that they are a U.S. citizen or a lawful permanent resident, officers
seem to be booking them into custody.” 	Id. 	According to these attorneys, their clients
have been stopped without facts supporting reasonable suspicion and arrested without facts
supporting probable cause. See id. ¶ 10; ECF No. 93-5 ¶¶ 9–10.
Official Statements Regarding Defendants’ Policies
184. 	In addition to the testimony above, Plaintiffs provided evidence of statements
made by agency officials.
Defendant Gregory Bovino
185. 	On 	October 	7, 	2025, 	Defendant 	Gregory 	Bovino—at 	the 	time 	the
Commander-at-Large of U.S. Border Patrol—was reported to say about ICE operations in
Chicago, “We need reasonable suspicion to make an immigration arrest. . . . You notice I
did not say probable cause, nor did I say I need a warrant. We need reasonable suspicion
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of illegal alienage that’s well-grounded within the United States immigration law.”
Priscilla Alvarez & Michael Williams, Border Patrol Official Denies Racial Profiling
Factors in Immigration Arrests, Says Officers Do Consider Whether People Appear
“Panicked” or “Scared,” CNN (Oct. 7, 2025) (filed at ECF No. 48-1 at 12).
Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem
186. 	Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem told a reporter on January 15,
2026, that DHS was “doing targeted enforcement,” and that “[i]f we are on a target, there
may be individuals surrounding that criminal that we may be asking who they are and why
they’re there and having them validate their identity.” 	Aaron Rupar (@atrupar), X (Jan.
15, 2026) (filed at ECF No. 48-12 at 2).
Acting Executive Associate Director of ERO Marcos Charles
187. 	In an interview published January 18, 2026, Acting Executive Associate
Director of ERO Marcos Charles told a reporter, “[o]ur officers are . . . conducting targeted
enforcement looking for the worst of the worst. If they encounter anybody in the area of
which they’re operating, they are okay to talk to those people. They’ve been authorized to
talk to anybody that’s around there and establish[] citizenship.” 	Cecilia Vega et al.,
Minneapolis’ Police Chief Fears Possible ‘Moment Where It All Explodes’ as ICE
Operation Continues, CBS News (Jan. 18, 2026, 19:00 ET) (filed at ECF No. 140-3 at 10);
see ICE Leadership, U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, https://www.ice.gov/leadership (last
visited Mar. 7, 2026) (showing Acting Executive Associate Director Charles’s title).
DHS Official X Account
188. 	On December 16, 2025, DHS posted on its official X account,
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Allegations 	that 	ICE 	engages 	in 	‘racial 	profiling’ 	are
disgusting, reckless and categorically FALSE. 	What makes
someone a target for immigration enforcement is if they are
illegally in the U.S.—NOT their skin color, race, or ethnicity.
Under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, DHS
law enforcement uses “reasonable suspicion” to make arrests.
Homeland Security (@DHSgov), X (Dec. 16, 2025) (filed at ECF No. 48-2 at 2); see ECF
No. 140-8 at 2 (showing similar DHS statement on X on January 17, 2026); ECF No. 140-9
at 2 (showing similar DHS statement on X on January 16, 2026); ECF No. 140-10 at 2
(showing similar DHS statement on X on January 16, 2026).
DHS Former Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Tricia McLaughlin
189. 	DHS Former Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Tricia McLaughlin told
press multiple times that “[l]aw enforcement uses ‘reasonable suspicion’ to make arrests,
as allowed under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.” 	Anthony Iafrate,
‘Nothing but Green Lights’: ICE Memo Expands Agents’ Warrantless Arrest Powers,
Daily Caller (Jan. 31, 2026) (filed at ECF No. 140-5 at 2); see Michelle Hackman et al.,
The Standoff that Has Turned Minneapolis into a Tinderbox, Wall St. J. (Jan. 17, 2026)
(filed at ECF No. 140-6 at 4).
190. 	Defendants did not dispute that each of these officials or sources made each
of these statements.
Defendants’ Evidence of Their Policies
191. 	Defendants’ evidence of their policies falls into two categories: (1) evidence
regarding ICE and CBP officer training; and (2) a memorandum from ICE Acting Director,
Todd M. Lyons, dated January 28, 2026.
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Assistant Field Office Director Michael Bottjen
192. 	Assistant Field Office Director Michael Bottjen testified that ERO officers
are trained at an initial training “that includes Fourth Amendment and arrest authorities,”
and that they receive a “refresher Fourth Amendment training twice a year.” ECF No. 82
¶ 13. The refresher training covers warrantless arrest authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1357 and
standards for enforcement activity under 8 C.F.R. § 287.8. 	ECF No. 82 ¶ 13. 	Officers
detailed to the Saint Paul Field Office received additional refresher training for officers
entering a large-scale operation. Id.
193. 	Under that training, officers are taught that they must have probable cause to
make an arrest. 	Id. ¶ 14; see 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (authorizing immigration officers to
arrest noncitizens when the officer “has reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the
United States in violation of any such law or regulation and is likely to escape before a
warrant can be obtained for his arrest”). Additionally, “[i]n considering the ‘likelihood of
escape,’ an ICE officer or agent must consider the totality of the circumstances known to
the officer before the arrest. There is no exhaustive list of factors that should be considered
in determining whether an individual is ‘likely to escape before a warrant can be
obtained.’” ECF No. 82 ¶ 14.
194. 	Assistant Field Office Director Bottjen testified that ERO officers are
“trained to identify when there is reasonable suspicion to briefly detain an individual for
further investigation into alienage and immigration status.” Id. ¶ 15. Reasonable suspicion
may arise “in any number of ways,” like “subjects making incriminating statements” or
“failing to produce any documentation during consensual encounters,” as well as by
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“information 	from 	open-source 	investigations, 	other 	law 	enforcement 	agencies,
informants, and surveillance; and information gleaned from records and database checks.”
Id. Officers may also consider whether subjects “produc[ed] documentation suspected to
be fraudulent” or “exhibit[ed] suspicious behavior during consensual encounters.” 	Id.
According to Assistant Field Office Director Bottjen, “ERO officers do not develop
reasonable suspicion or probable cause solely based on an individual’s race, ethnicity, or
national origin.” Id. ¶ 16.
CBP Officer Kyle Harvick
195. 	CBP Officer Kyle Harvick provided a similar assessment of CBP officer
training. Officers undergo basic training, which instructs them in “comprehensive tactical,
operational, and legal training over the course of the months-long training program.” ECF
No. 83 ¶ 13. They receive 100 hours of legal instruction, some of which covers the Fourth
Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. “Legal topics covered include
criminal 	law, 	criminal 	procedure, 	courtroom 	testimony, 	customs 	law, 	forfeiture,
immigration law, use of force, nationality law, and report writing.” Id. CPB officers also
receive on-the-job training and periodic refreshers, including on the Fourth Amendment.
Id. ¶ 14.
196. 	Officer Harvick attested that CBP officers in Minneapolis go to “targeted
enforcement areas,” and engage in “consensual encounters,” in which “individuals were
free to walk away and terminate the encounter, decline to answer questions, and refuse to
provide requested identification documents.” 	Id. ¶ 7. 	Officers may “engag[e] in
investigative detentions” when they
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have reasonable suspicion that the individual committed or was
committing a federal crime or federal immigration violation.
This reasonable suspicion is based on various factors including
intelligence sources; information from law enforcement and
open-source databases; analysis of trends; facts developed in
the field by agents or officers; rational inferences that led an
agent or officer to suspect criminal or immigration violations;
and 	the 	officers 	or 	agents’ 	observations, 	training, 	and
experience.
Id. ¶ 10. Officers look to the totality of the circumstances in assessing whether reasonable
suspicion exists. Id.
Additionally, 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(a)(1) specifically authorizes
CBP officers and agents conducting a temporary, investigative
detention based on reasonable suspicion to interrogate any
alien or person believed to be an alien concerning his or her
right to be, or to remain, in the United States. 	Furthermore,
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2), if CBP officers and agents
have a reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts,
that the person being questioned is, or is attempting to be,
engaged in an offense against the United States or is an alien
illegally in the United States, CBP officers and agents may
briefly detain the person for questioning.
ECF No. 83 ¶ 10.
197. 	Lastly, as to arrests, Officer Harvick attested that “CBP officers and agents
have conducted warrantless arrests for immigration violations pursuant to applicable legal
authorities, including 8 U.S.C. § 1357 and 19 U.S.C. § 1589a and federal criminal statutes,
such as 18 U.S.C. § 111.” ECF No. 83 ¶ 11.
The January 28, 2026 Memorandum
198. 	Defendants locate relevant ICE policies in a memorandum dated January 28,
2026, which ICE’s Acting Director, Todd M. Lyons, wrote to “All ICE Personnel.” ECF
No. 81 at 47; see ECF No. 85-1 (“Lyons Memo”). The Lyons Memo discusses the standard
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for conducting a warrantless arrest; it does not discuss the standard for making an
investigatory stop. See ECF No. 85-1. The memorandum states that immigration officers
may
execute a warrantless arrest of: (1) any alien who in his
presence or view is entering or attempting to enter the United
States in violation of any law or regulation made in pursuance
of law regulating the admission, exclusion, expulsion, or
removal of aliens; or (2) if he has reason to believe that the
alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any such
law or regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can
be obtained for his arrest.
ECF No. 85-1 at 1–2 (footnotes omitted).
199. 	The Lyons Memo explains that courts have construed “reason to believe” as
equivalent to “probable cause.” 	Id. at 1 n.5. 	A removable alien is “likely to escape,”
according to the memorandum, “if an immigration officer determines he or she is unlikely
to be located at the scene of the encounter or another clearly identifiable location once an
administrative warrant is obtained,” a determination that must be “based on the totality of
the circumstances known to the immigration officer at the time of the encounter and prior
to the arrest.” 	Id. at 4. 	Officers may consider several factors, such as the subject’s
behavior, ability to leave the scene of encounter promptly, age and health. 	Id. 	Officers
may also consider the subject’s “[p]ossession of identity or work authorization documents
that the immigration officer suspects are fraudulent,” and “[p]resentation of unverifiable or
suspected false information to the immigration officer.” 	Id. at 4–5. 	“This on-the-spot
determination as to the likelihood of escape is often made with limited information about
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the subject’s identity, background, or place of residence and no corroboration of any
self-serving statements made by the subject.” Id. at 6.
200. 	Under the Lyons Memo, after an ICE officer conducts a warrantless arrest,
the officer must “clearly, succinctly, and contemporaneously document” in Form I-213 “all
factors considered in determining that the alien was likely to escape before a warrant could
be obtained.” Id. at 6. The Lyons Memo does not require officers to document consensual
encounters or investigatory detentions that did not amount to an arrest, nor does it require
them to document the factors supporting or undermining probable cause that the individual
was violating or had violated federal immigration law. See id.; Oral Argument Tr. [ECF
No. 163] 39:20–22 (noting that it was “not policy to make a record of” “Terry stops or
investigative stops”).
Operation Metro Surge Drawdown
201. 	On February 12, 2026, Border Czar Tom Homan announced that Operation
Metro Surge would be winding down, reducing the numbers of ICE and CBP officers and
agents assigned to the mission. 	See ECF No. 167 ¶ 3. 	“On February 4, 2026, CBP
demobilized approximately 680 CBP officers and Border Patrol agents assigned to
Operation Metro Surge, leaving approximately 349 CBP officers, Border Patrol agents,
[Air and Marine Operations] personnel and support staff to assist the operation.” ECF No.
169-1 ¶ 8. 	On February 12, CBP demobilized around 200 more, and on February 16, it
demobilized 82 more. 	Id. ¶ 9. 	And CBP intended to demobilize its remaining 67
employees by February 23, though whether that final demobilization happened is not in the
record. 	Id. ¶ 10. 	There were approximately 3,000 additional ERO and HSI officers
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detailed to the Saint Paul Field Office, but as of February 23, only 270 ERO officers and
700 HSI agents remained. 	ECF No. 169-2 ¶¶ 4–5. 	In a February 23 declaration, Field
Office Director Samuel Olson stated that approximately 107 ERO officers and 300 HSI
agents would be on detail to the Saint Paul Field Office by February 25, 2026. Id. ¶ 6.
202. 	Though many DHS personnel have left or are leaving Minnesota, Border
Czar Homan told the press throughout February 2026 that ICE would continue to enforce
immigration laws in Minnesota. See PBS NewsHour, Border Czar Tom Homan Announces
End to Immigration Crackdown in Minneapolis, at 2:00 (YouTube, Feb. 12, 2026),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ySTe_rVxJZc&t=3s (“Through targeted enforcement
operations based on reasonable suspicion and prioritizing safety and security, ICE will
continue to identify, arrest, and remove illegal aliens that pose a risk to public safety like
we’ve done for years.”); id. at 18:02 (“I’m not going to remove everybody, out of the safety
of our officers . . . .”); id. at 19:15 (“[E]nforcement of Title 8 is not going to end.”). That
same day, he told an outlet that “even though we’re drawing down resources, we’re still
going to have hundreds of special agents here” focusing on fraud investigation and
enforcement, and that “this is ending the surge, but we’re not going away.” Tom Homan
Addresses ICE’s Minneapolis Withdrawal: If We Need to Come Back, We Will, Fox News:
Ingraham 	Angle, 	at 	2:26, 	2:56 	(Feb. 	12, 	2026), 	https://www.foxnews.com/video/
6389151376112. On February 19, Mr. Homan repeated that idea: “If you’re in the country
illegally, you’re not off the table; we’ll come for you too.” Austin Erickson, Tom Homan
Optimistic About ICE Agreements in MN, Says Federal Gov’t Paying for Damage During
MPLS Operations ‘Ain’t Gonna Happen,’ WDAY, at 8:47 (Feb. 19, 2026), https://www
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.wdayradionow.com/news/regional-news/tom-homan-optimistic-about-ice-agreements-
in-mn-says-federal-govt-paying-for-damage-during-mpls-operations-aint-gonna-happen.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiffs’ Standing to Pursue Forward-Looking Relief
1. 	Defendants challenge subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing Plaintiffs lack
standing to pursue injunctive relief. ECF No. 81 at 25–33.18
General Rules Regarding Article III Standing
2. 	Article 	III 	of 	the 	Constitution 	limits 	the 	federal 	judicial 	power 	(or
jurisdiction) to adjudicating “Cases” and “Controversies.” This provision keeps the federal
courts out of the business of the legislative and executive branches, and the Supreme
Court’s standing jurisprudence guides the federal courts in determining whether a litigant
seeks adjudication of a genuine “Case” or “Controversy” or instead hopes to have the court
act as if it were one of the political branches. 	The general rules governing Article
III standing are settled:
Federal jurisdiction is limited by Article III, § 2, of the U.S.
Constitution to actual cases and controversies. Therefore, the
plaintiff’s standing to sue “is the threshold question in every
federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the
suit.” Warth [v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)]. To show
Article III standing, a plaintiff has the burden of proving: (1)
that 	he 	or 	she 	suffered 	an 	“injury-in-fact,” 	(2) 	a 	causal
relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct,
18 	Defendants also argue that 8 U.S.C. § 1252 strips district courts of jurisdiction to
decide this action as to some putative class members, though they concede § 1252 is no
barrier to jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. 	ECF No. 81 at 51–52 & n.10. 	Because
Plaintiffs do not have standing to seek injunctive relief, and because, even if they did, the
preliminary-injunction motion would be denied for other reasons, it is not necessary to
address this argument.
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and (3) that the injury likely will be redressed by a favorable
decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–
61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992).
Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir. 2000). An injury-in-fact is the “invasion
of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citation modified).
3. 	To have standing to obtain injunctive relief, the plaintiff must show that he
is likely to suffer future injury by the defendant and that the sought-after relief will prevent
that future injury. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–03 (1983). “In future
injury cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the threatened injury is certainly
impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.” In re SuperValu, Inc.,
870 F.3d 763, 769 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation modified); see Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2
(“Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched
beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for
Article 	III 	purposes—that 	the 	injury 	is 	certainly 	impending.” 	(citation 	modified)).
“Allegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.” 	Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (citation modified). And when a plaintiff seeks forward-looking
declaratory or injunctive relief, “past injuries are relevant only for their predictive value.”
Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 59 (2024). 	In other words, past injuries do not by
themselves show a plaintiff’s standing to seek prospective relief, but they may “serve as
evidence of threatened future injury.” Id.; see Smook v. Minnehaha County, 457 F.3d 806,
816 (8th Cir 2006) (“It is well settled that ‘[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in
itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied
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by any continuing, present adverse effects.’” (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,
495–96 (1974))).
4. 	“[S]tanding is based on the facts as they existed at the time the lawsuit was
filed.” Steger, 228 F.3d at 893; see Conners v. Gusano’s Chi. Style Pizzeria, 779 F.3d 835,
840 (8th Cir. 2015) (“We must assess standing in view only of the facts that existed at the
time the former employees challenged the enforceability of the arbitration agreement.”);
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 569 n.4 (“The existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the
facts as they exist when the complaint is filed.” (citation modified)).
5. 	In the Eighth Circuit, evidence that postdates the complaint generally cannot
be used to support standing to seek injunctive relief. See Park v. Forest Serv. of U.S., 205
F.3d 1034, 1037 (8th Cir. 2000). 	In Park, the plaintiff alleged she was subjected to an
unconstitutional checkpoint in 1996, and she sued to obtain an injunction. Id. In the Eighth
Circuit’s view, evidence that the defendant used checkpoints in 1997, 1998, and 1999 was
not “relevant on the issue of standing because all of these events occurred after Ms. Park
filed her original complaint.” Id.
We believe that it is Ms. Park’s burden to show that, at the time
she filed her suit in 1996, there was a real and immediate threat
that she would again be subjected by the Forest Service to an
unconstitutional checkpoint. We do not think that she may use
evidence of what happened after the commencement of the suit
to make this showing.
Id. Similarly, in Steger, plaintiffs alleged that one of defendant’s buildings failed to comply
with the Americans with Disabilities Act. 	228 F.3d at 891. 	At the time of filing, one
plaintiff presented no evidence that he had been in the building or intended to enter the
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building. Id. at 893. The fact that he visited the building after filing suit could not support
his standing to seek injunctive relief. Id. Other courts have reached similar conclusions.
See Nat’l Football Players Ass’n v. Nat’l Football League, 874 F.3d 222, 229 (5th Cir.
2017).19
6. 	Standing “must exist not only at the time the complaint is filed, but through
all stages of the litigation.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (citation
modified); Twin Cities Safety, LLC v. Moe, 139 F.4th 1015, 1019 (8th Cir. 2025) (per
curiam). 	“A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a Case or Controversy for
purposes of Article III—when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” 	Already, LLC, 568 U.S. at 91 (citation
modified). A case may be mooted by a defendant’s voluntary conduct only “if subsequent
events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably
be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528
U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n, 393
U.S. 199, 203 (1968)).
7. 	Each element of standing “must be supported in the same way as any other
matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of
evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” 	Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). “At the preliminary
19 	The Eighth Circuit’s rule seems inconsistent with Supreme Court decisions. 	In
Murthy, for example, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in May 2022. 	603 U.S. at 54.
Considering whether there was standing to pursue injunctive relief, the Court looked to
events in April 2023, among other periods. Id. at 66–67.
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injunction stage . . . the plaintiff must make a clear showing that [it] is likely to establish
each element of standing.” 	Murthy, 603 U.S. at 58 (citation modified). 	When, as here,
parties introduce evidence to support their positions regarding whether a preliminary
injunction should be entered, “the plaintiff cannot rest on mere allegations, but must instead
point to factual evidence.” 	Id. (citation modified). 	The standing analysis can be
“fact-intensive.” Denmon v. Kan. Couns., Inc., 149 F.4th 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 2025).
8. 	Plaintiffs who wish to represent an injunctive-relief class under Rule 23(b)(2)
must themselves possess standing to seek injunctive relief. 	Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578
U.S. 330, 338 n.6 (2016) (“That a suit may be a class action adds nothing to the question
of standing, for even named plaintiffs who represent a class must allege and show that they
personally have been injured, not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified
members of the class to which they belong.” (citation modified)); Hodgers-Durgin v. de la
Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Unless the named plaintiffs are themselves
entitled to seek injunctive relief, they may not represent a class seeking that relief.”); John
Does 1–100 v. Boyd, 613 F. Supp. 1514, 1529 (D. Minn. 1985) (MacLaughlin, J.) (denying
motion for Rule 23(b)(2) certification because the named plaintiffs lacked standing to
pursue injunctive relief).
9. 	Whether Defendants have a policy requiring or authorizing unlawful conduct
is relevant for plaintiffs’ likelihood of future injury. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105–06 (finding
no standing to pursue injunctive relief where plaintiff did not allege “the City ordered or
authorized police officers” to engage in unlawful conduct). “Courts generally agree that,
‘when the threatened acts that will cause injury are authorized or part of a policy, it is
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significantly more likely that the injury will occur again,’ and it is consequently more likely
that plaintiffs have standing to pursue equitable relief.” Escobar Molina v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-3417, 2025 WL 3465518, at *15 (D.D.C. Dec.
2, 2025) (quoting Hinton v. District of Columbia, 567 F. Supp. 3d 30, 49 (D.D.C. 2021));
see Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1339 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding standing to
pursue injunctive relief where “plaintiffs allege that municipal policy authorizes the
constitutional deprivations that they claim to have suffered at the hands of City officials”).
10. 	Assuming the policy that was absent in Lyons could be established in similar
ways that plaintiffs may show § 1983 municipal liability, Plaintiffs have several options to
demonstrate the policy’s existence. Plaintiffs can show there is an official agency policy,
where “the decisionmaker in question possesses final authority to establish [agency] policy
with respect to the action ordered.” Bolderson v. City of Wentzville, 840 F.3d 982, 985 (8th
Cir. 2016); see Parada v. Anoka County, 481 F. Supp. 3d 888, 895 (D. Minn. 2020)
(finding, upon defendant’s admission in discovery, an unwritten policy of referring all
inmates born outside the United States to ICE). Or they can show a “pervasive” unofficial
custom 	“demonstrated 	by 	a 	continuing, 	widespread, 	and 	persistent 	pattern 	of
unconstitutional misconduct.” 	Bolderson, 840 F.3d at 986; see R.I.L-R v. Johnson, 80 F.
Supp. 3d 164, 174–76 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding policy based on statistical evidence of ICE
detention and release patterns and on affidavits of immigration experts and attorneys).
Outside this Circuit, courts have offered formal tests to establish the likelihood of future
injury based on a policy or pattern theory. See Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 997–
98 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We have enumerated two ways in which a plaintiff can demonstrate
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that such injury is likely to recur. First, a plaintiff may show that the defendant had, at the
time of the injury, a written policy, and that the injury stems from that policy. Second, the
plaintiff may demonstrate that the harm is part of a pattern of officially sanctioned
behavior, violative of the plaintiffs’ federal rights.” (citation modified)). Other courts have
found unlawful policies relying on the bottom-up method. 	See Ramirez Ovando v.
Noem, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 1:25-cv-03183-RBJ, 2025 WL 3293467, at *18 (D. Colo.
Nov. 25, 2025) (finding policy of unlawful arrests by “harmonizing the plaintiffs’
undisputed anecdotal experience with the many media statements from top immigration
officials, the nature of ICE’s ongoing enforcement operations, and the agency’s own
statistics regarding the criminal histories of those it has arrested” (citation modified)).
Plaintiffs’ Standing Theories
11. 	Plaintiffs offer three theories of standing. See Oral Argument Tr. 13:17–18
(explaining two theories); ECF No. 138 at 18–20 (pressing a third theory).
12. 	The first theory is that their injury lies in the likelihood of future unlawful
stops and arrests. 	ECF No. 138 at 14–18. 	Under this theory, Defendants are likely to
enforce a policy of unconstitutional seizures against Plaintiffs, such that Plaintiffs are
suffering “a real and immediate threat of future injury.” Id. at 14.
13. 	The second theory is akin to the First Amendment’s “chilling effect”
doctrine: Plaintiffs claim they are injured going forward because “DHS’s illegal policies
are forcing them . . . to alter their lives in new and painful ways.” Id. at 18; see Missourians
for Fiscal Accountability v. Klahr, 830 F.3d 789, 794 (8th Cir. 2016) (First Amendment
chilling effect). This second theory finds support in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,
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561 U.S. 139, 154–55 (2010). In Monsanto, the Court concluded that alfalfa farmers had
standing to challenge an agency’s decision to deregulate a strain of genetically engineered
alfalfa, because that decision created “[a] substantial risk of gene flow.” Id. at 154. “[T]o
continue 	marketing 	their 	product 	to 	consumers 	who 	wish 	to 	buy 	non-genetically-
engineered alfalfa,” farmers would have to test their crops for contamination, which would
be costly. Id. They would also incur costs in attempting to minimize contamination, such
as by “contracting with growers outside of the United States to ensure [the supply of]
genetically pure, conventional alfalfa seed.” Id. at 155.
14. 	On the third theory, Plaintiffs’ physical and psychological harms are
ongoing. 	ECF 	No. 	138 	at 	18–19 	(describing 	Plaintiffs’ 	continuing 	fear, 	stress,
sleeplessness, and anxiety).
15. 	Though the theories are distinct, to be valid, each must meet the requirement
of a “certainly impending” or significantly probable future injury. Park, 205 F.3d at 1040
(finding that plaintiff failed to show “a significant probability” that defendant would
subject her to the challenged action in the future); see Bost v. Ill. State Board of Elections,
146 S. Ct. 513, 522 (2026) (“Plaintiffs cannot manufacture standing by voluntarily
incurring costs. They must incur those costs to mitigate or avoid a substantial risk of some
independent harm.” (citation modified)); Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416 (“Respondents’
contention that they have standing because they incurred certain costs as a reasonable
reaction to a risk of harm is unavailing—because the harm respondents seek to avoid is not
certainly impending.”).
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Whether Defendants Maintain an Unlawful Policy or Policies – Rules
16. 	The three theories are premised on the conclusion that Defendants act
according to unconstitutional policies, patterns, or practices. 	Though it may seem that
establishing whether an unconstitutional policy exists at the outset is putting the merits cart
before the jurisdictional horse, it’s necessary to address this question here. The standing
determination depends partially on the nature of Defendants’ policies, so those policies
must be determined at the outset. 	See Melendres, 695 F.3d at 997–98 (reasoning that
plaintiffs could establish standing for prospective relief by showing a harm occurring from
officially sanctioned behavior that violated their federal rights).
17. 	Plaintiffs 	claim 	that 	Defendants 	have 	three 	unconstitutional 	policies,
patterns, or practices. 	As they see it, Defendants have (1) a policy and practice of
conducting stops without reasonable suspicion; (2) a policy and practice of conducting
arrests without probable cause of removability; and (3) a policy and practice of conducting
arrests without probable cause of flight risk. ECF No. 138 at 20–29.
18. 	The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure
. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 	U.S. Const. amend. IV. 	A person is
“seized” under the Fourth Amendment “when, by means of physical force or a show of
authority, his freedom of movement is restrained,” or, put another way, if “in view of all
the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave.” 	United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1980).
“Under well-settled Fourth Amendment case law, both investigative stops and arrests are
‘seizures,’ but an investigative stop must be supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion
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that criminal activity may be afoot, whereas an arrest must be supported by probable
cause.” United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 1992). “Probable cause exists
when the totality of the circumstances at the time of the arrest is sufficient to lead a
reasonable person to believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an
offense . . . .” 	Garang v. City of Ames, 2 F.4th 1115, 1121 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation
modified). In the immigration context, an immigration officer may
arrest any alien who in his presence or view is entering or
attempting to enter the United States in violation of any law or
regulation made in pursuance of law regulating the admission,
exclusion, expulsion, or removal of aliens, or to arrest any alien
in the United States, if he has reason to believe [1] that the alien
so arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law
or regulation and [2] is likely to escape before a warrant can be
obtained for his arrest.
8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). “Because the Fourth Amendment applies to arrests of illegal aliens,
the term ‘reason to believe’ in § 1357(a)(2) means constitutionally required probable
cause.” 	United States v. Quintana, 623 F.3d 1237, 1239 (8th Cir. 2010). 	The Supreme
Court has not construed “likely to escape,” but it treats that circumstance as “specific” and
“limited.” 	Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 410 (2012). 	Persuasive authorities
interpret the phrase to mean, “likely to evade detention by immigration officers.” Moreno
v. Napolitano, 213 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1006–07 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (collecting cases); see
Campos v. United States, 888 F.3d 724, 734–35 (5th Cir. 2018) (interpreting it as likely to
“disappear before a warrant could be obtained”); Araujo v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 2d
1095, 1102 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (finding no likelihood of escape where arrestee was living
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with his wife and had applied for lawful permanent resident status, “hardly evincing an
intention to flee”).
19. 	Short of an arrest, “[a]n officer can ‘conduct a brief, investigatory stop’—
what we call a ‘Terry stop’—‘when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot.’” 	Haynes v. Minnehan, 14 F.4th 830, 835 (8th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
19–20 (1968). “A lawful Terry stop ‘may nonetheless violate the Fourth Amendment if it
is excessively intrusive in its scope or manner of execution.’” 	Haynes, 14 F.4th at 835
(quoting El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, 636 F.3d 452, 457 (8th Cir. 2011)). 	In the
immigration context, “officers ‘may briefly detain’ an individual ‘for questioning’ if they
have ‘a reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the person being
questioned . . . is an alien illegally in the United States.” Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo, 146
S. Ct. 1, 1 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b)(2)); see 8
U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1) (authorizing immigration officials “to interrogate” without a warrant
“any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United
States”). 	Whether 	reasonable 	suspicion 	exists 	depends 	on 	“the 	‘totality 	of 	the
circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and
objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
20. 	An individual’s race or ethnicity alone does not provide reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886–87 (1975); Trump
v. Illinois, 607 U.S. ---, 146 S. Ct. 432, 436 n.4 (2025) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“The
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Fourth Amendment requires that immigration stops must be based on reasonable suspicion
of illegal presence, stops must be brief, arrests must be based on probable cause, and
officers must not employ excessive force. Moreover, the officers must not make interior
immigration stops or arrests based on race or ethnicity.”); United States v. Clay, 640 F.2d
157, 159 (8th Cir. 1981) (“Police cannot have grounds for suspicion based solely on the
race of the suspect.”).
21. 	“A lawful Terry stop may become an arrest, requiring probable cause, if the
stop lasts for an unreasonably long time or if the officers use unreasonable force.” Irvin v.
Richardson, 20 F.4th 1199, 1206 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation modified); see United States v.
Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Although there is no bright line of
demarcation between investigative stops and arrests, a de facto arrest occurs when the
officers’ conduct is more intrusive than necessary for an investigative stop.” (citation
modified)). Factors that weigh in favor of an arrest are “delay unnecessary to the legitimate
investigation of the law enforcement officers,” “the degree of fear and humiliation that the
police conduct engenders,” whether the police transported the suspect to another location,
whether they handcuffed the suspect, and whether they confined the suspect to a police
vehicle. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d at 917 (first quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
687 (1985); and then quoting United States v. Lego, 855 F.2d 542, 545 (8th Cir. 1988)).
Whether Defendants Maintain an Unlawful Policy or Policies – Analysis
22. 	Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Defendants’ agents stopped twenty-three
individuals without reasonable suspicion of immigration law violations, in Minnesota,
between December 2025 and the filing of this suit. See ECF No. 42 (Mr. Eydarus and his
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mother); ECF No. 30 (Mr. Aguilar Garcia); ECF No. 32 (Mr. Dahir); ECF No. 41 (Luisa
Doe), ECF No. 38 (Ms. Castillo and Rosa); ECF No. 92-8 (E.M.); ECF No. 29 (Mr.
Osman); ECF No. 43 (Mr. Castillo); ECF No. 39 (Mr. Martinez Garcia); ECF No. 37
(A.A.); ECF No. 45 (Mr. Castrejon and his niece); ECF No. 93-1 (Antony Doe); ECF No.
92-13 (K.D.); ECF No. 103-1 (Mr. Molina); ECF No. 92-5 (H.S.); ECF No. 44 (Mr.
Moreno); ECF No. 92-16 (Mr. Menera); ECF No. 95 (N.G. and her husband); ECF No.
92-7 (Mustafa Mohamed).
23. 	These witnesses’ accounts and related evidence show these witnesses were
detained by DHS officers and questioned about their immigration status based solely on
their race or ethnicity, and that a reasonable person in the same situation would not have
felt free to leave. See, e.g., Evidentiary Tr. 11:4–21 (officers surrounded Mr. Eydarus and
blocked his movement); ECF No. 92-7 ¶ 3 (officers surrounded and grabbed Mr.
Mohamed); ECF No. 43 ¶ 5 (noting that officers “cornered” Mr. Castillo). 	These
encounters were, at the very least, Terry stops, meaning the subjects were protected by the
Fourth Amendment. See Haynes, 14 F.4th at 835.
24. 	Plaintiffs 	have 	made 	a 	clear 	showing 	that 	there 	was 	not 	reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity supporting the stops of these twenty-three
individuals.20 See id. Plaintiffs and Declarants were stopped while going about their daily
20 	To confirm, following Steger and Park, this standing analysis does not consider
evidence of events that occurred after the filing of this suit—i.e., evidence of stops or
arrests that occurred after January 15, 2026. Of course, that line of cases does not preclude
consideration of stops that occurred before filing but were attested to in declarations signed
after the suit commenced. 	On the same logic, post-January-15 statements of policy or
practice will be considered to the extent they refer to policies in place before January 15.
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business—shoveling snow, ECF No. 42 ¶¶ 8–10, delivering pick-up orders at Target, ECF
No. 30 ¶ 1, exiting a residence, ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 5–6, arriving at work, ECF No. 38 ¶¶ 4–6,
walking to the mosque, ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 5–7—when they were stopped and questioned about
their citizenship status. Plaintiffs and Declarants repeatedly note that the officers did not
indicate they knew Plaintiffs’ or Declarants’ identities before stopping them. 	E.g., ECF
No. 42 ¶ 17; ECF No. 38 ¶ 12; ECF No. 29 ¶ 24; ECF No. 37 ¶ 12; ECF No. 93-1 ¶ 23;
ECF No. 92-13 ¶ 15. For reasons described in the findings above, I concluded that these
individuals were stopped based solely on their race or ethnicity. 	E.g., ECF No. 42 ¶ 37;
ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 24–25; ECF No. 43 ¶¶ 11–13; ECF No. 37 ¶ 19; ECF No. 45 ¶ 24; ECF
No. 93-1 ¶ 23; ECF No. 92-5 ¶ 20; ECF No. 92-16 ¶ 17; ECF No. 92-7 ¶ 11. This record
is devoid of facts that would have given the officers reasonable suspicion to make
immigration-related Terry stops of the twenty-three individuals. 	Cf. United States v.
Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622, 624–25 (8th Cir. 1971) (finding no reasonable suspicion to stop
defendant for questioning where officers were not investigating any particular crime, had
no information about the defendant’s car or any of the car’s occupants, had no information
about suspicious activities in the area at the time, observed the car for a short period of
time, and where the time of the stop was a reasonable hour for people to be outside in the
area, and the defendant was a black man in a predominantly black neighborhood).
25. 	Defendants argue that Mr. Eydarus, Ms. Castillo, Mr. Castillo, and Mr. Dahir
were 	consensual 	encounters, 	and 	therefore 	outside 	the 	protection 	of 	the 	Fourth
Amendment, but this is unconvincing. See ECF No. 81 at 39. Mr. Eydarus testified that
ICE officers approached him, armed with “guns, tasers, and pepper spray,” ECF No. 42
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¶ 12, and that they stood a couple feet away from him, surrounded him, and blocked his
movement, Evidentiary Tr. 11:4–21. ICE officers boxed in Ms. Castillo’s car, approached
her wearing masks, and ordered her not to move. ECF No. 38 ¶¶ 6–7. Officers forced Mr.
Castillo to stand in the cold without winter clothes for twenty to thirty minutes while they
checked his license. ECF No. 43 ¶ 2, 11. Officers told Mr. Dahir that they needed to talk
to him, and four of them surrounded him. ECF No. 32 ¶¶ 5–6. A reasonable person would
not have felt free to leave in these circumstances. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553–54.
26. 	Defendants argue there was reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Aguilar Garcia,
A.A., Mr. Martinez Garcia, Mr. Moreno, and Mr. Osman, but the record does not support
this contention with respect to any of these individuals. See ECF No. 81 at 41.
27. 	Defendants argue that the following facts provided reasonable suspicion to
stop Mr. Aguilar Garcia: He “refused to answer questions about his citizenship and
attempted to flee when federal agents approached him outside of his department store
worksite,” and he “stated he went outside when he was notified that ICE agents might be
in the parking lot of his workplace.” Id. These fail to show reasonable suspicion that Mr.
Aguilar Garcia was engaged in criminal activity. It is difficult to understand how walking
toward the parking lot—where the ICE officers were—suggests evasion. And there is no
evidence that the officers were aware that Mr. Aguilar Garcia had come out to confront
them. 	See Buffkins v. City of Omaha, 922 F.2d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1990) (“In order to
constitute a reasonable articulable suspicion the known facts must reasonably relate to the
person about to be stopped and demonstrate a reasonable suspicion that the person has
engaged or will engage in criminal activity.” (emphasis added)). 	Mr. Aguilar Garcia’s
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refusal to answer questions about his citizenship is not itself grounds for reasonable
suspicion. 	See United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[A]bsent
reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry investigative stop, the citizen is free to refuse to
answer questions and walk away.”); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991) (“[W]hen
officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask
questions of that individual, ask to examine the individual’s identification, and request
consent to search his or her luggage—as long as the police do not convey a message that
compliance with their requests is required.” (citations omitted)); cf. Terry, 392 U.S. at 34
(White, J., concurring) (stating that an individual properly subject to an investigatory stop
“is not obliged to answer” an officer’s questions, “and refusal to answer furnishes no basis
for an arrest”). 	And Mr. Aguilar Garcia did not flee. 	The video shows him confronting
the officers in the parking lot and backing away from them slowly. 	The officer who
eventually tackled Mr. Aguilar Garcia walked directly toward him for about forty seconds.
Mr. Aguilar Garcia’s sudden movement toward the Target entrance cannot reasonably be
understood as flight, and it does not support reasonable suspicion.
28. 	Defendants 	argue 	that 	A.A. 	was 	misidentified 	and 	released 	upon
confirmation of his identity. 	ECF No. 81 at 41. 	This record does not support this
description. A.A. attested that officers grabbed him in a parking lot. ECF No. 37 ¶¶ 2–3.
Though they reached into his pockets and took his wallet, they did not look through it; had
they, they would have found his driver’s license and green card. Id. ¶ 3. They handcuffed
him, took him to a police station, and for the first time asked his name. 	Id. ¶ 7. 	After
getting a translator on the phone, officers communicated through the translator that they
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were looking for someone with the same first and last name as A.A. Id. No officer testifies
that A.A. was misidentified, and the fact that they did not attempt to identify A.A. until he
arrived at the police station undermines that explanation. On these facts, ICE officers did
not have reasonable suspicion to stop A.A.
29. 	Defendants argue there was reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Martinez Garcia
and 	Mr. 	Moreno 	because 	they 	“were 	encountered 	at 	construction 	worksites 	that
traditionally indicate illegal aliens.” ECF No. 81 at 41. As to Mr. Martinez Garcia, this is
incorrect. His declaration states he works in cleaning and property removal and does not
mention construction. ECF No. 39 ¶ 2. Setting that aside, there is recent Supreme Court
precedent on this issue. In a concurrence to an emergency order staying a district court’s
injunction, Justice Kavanaugh listed several factors supporting reasonable suspicion for an
immigration-related stop in the Los Angeles area:
that there is an extremely high number and percentage of illegal
immigrants in the Los Angeles area; that those individuals tend
to gather in certain locations to seek daily work; that those
individuals often work in certain kinds of jobs, such as day
labor, landscaping, agriculture, and construction, that do not
require paperwork and are therefore especially attractive to
illegal immigrants; and that many of those illegally in the Los
Angeles area come from Mexico or Central America and do
not speak much English.
Vasquez Perdomo, 146 S. Ct. at 3 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 	In other words, Justice
Kavanaugh relied on specific facts about illegal immigrants in Los Angeles. 	Facts like
those are not in this record. Compare id. at 1 (“About 10 percent of the people in the Los
Angeles region are illegally in the United States—meaning about 2 million illegal
immigrants out of a total population of 20 million.”), with ECF No. 48-10 at 3 (showing
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that about 76 percent of the 388,000 Hispanics in Minnesota are U.S. citizens, and not
showing any record now many Hispanic noncitizens living in Minnesota are in the country
illegally). 	What’s more, other circumstances undermined the stops’ justifications. Both
Mr. Martinez Garcia and Mr. Moreno provided identification, but the officers did not
accept their documents. ECF No. 39 ¶¶ 9–10; ECF No. 44 ¶ 6. Absent any objective facts
suggesting that the documents would appear to a reasonable officer to be invalid or
untrustworthy, those documents dispelled any reasonable suspicion created by their
presence at a construction site (or working in cleaning or property removal). See Kansas
v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 386 (2020).
30. 	Defendants argue that Mr. Osman “was briefly detained while officers
confirmed his identity[,] and then he was released.” ECF No. 81 at 41. The length of the
stop is relevant to whether the detention “exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry stop,”
United States v. Maltais, 403 F.3d 550, 556 (8th Cir. 2005), but it is irrelevant to whether
the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion to “initiate” the stop, Glover, 589 U.S. at
380.
31. 	Defendants argue that six individuals—H.S., E.M., Antony Doe, N.G. and
her husband, and Mr. Molina—“appear to have been pulled over based, in part, on license
plate searches.” 	ECF No. 153 at 8; see Glover, 589 U.S. at 381 (finding reasonable
suspicion where officer conducted a license plate search, which revealed that the registered
owner of the vehicle had a revoked license). 	Defendants provided no evidence that a
license plate search was run on the vehicles of H.S., E.M., Antony Doe, or N.G. and her
husband. Defendants instead argue that a search can be inferred from the declarations. See
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ECF No. 153 at 8. 	One declarant, Mr. Molina, attested that he believed a license plate
check was run, but only after ICE agents had rammed his car. ECF No. 103-1 ¶ 12. That
search revealed, he believed, that he was a citizen, id., so a license plate search would not
have supported reasonable suspicion that Mr. Molina was violating immigration law.
32. 	Even if officers ran license plate searches for the other five individuals, the
record does not show the searches’ results. See Glover, 589 U.S. at 381. In some cases, it
is not plausible to conclude that the result could have indicated that the stopped individual
was violating immigration law. 	When H.S. was stopped, officers checked her driver’s
license, and then told her she had to produce a passport too. 	ECF No. 92-5 ¶¶ 6–7. 	No
officer explained that there was a discrepancy between a license plate search and her
driver’s license. Agents stopped Antony Doe and apparently took his driver’s license as
confirmation that he was unlawfully present: They detained him, processed him, and flew
him to El Paso, Texas. ECF No. 93-1 ¶¶ 9, 12–14. After a week, they flew him back to
Minnesota and released him. 	Id. ¶¶ 17–18. This was not a case in which a license plate
search gave reasonable suspicion, which was dispelled upon checking a driver’s license.
If Defendants had a legitimate reason to stop and detain Antony Doe based on a license
plate search, it is not discernible on this record.
33. 	Defendants argue that some Declarants’ refusal to provide identification
during consensual encounters and investigatory stops provided reasonable suspicion. ECF
No. 153 at 9 (citing Ojeda-Vinales v. INS, 523 F.2d 286, 288 (2d Cir. 1975)). 	This
argument confuses the timeline of events—officers must have reasonable suspicion before
initiating a Terry stop, and in a consensual encounter, a person’s refusal to provide
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identifying information alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion. 	See Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. at 884 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment . . . forbids stopping or detaining persons for
questioning about their citizenship on less than a reasonable suspicion that they may be
aliens.”). 	Defendants’ citation to Ojeda-Vinales does not support their position; in that
case, the officers had reasonable suspicion that the individual was unlawfully present in
the country before they questioned him, so his “failure to produce identification” amounted
to “further indication that he was in violation of the immigration laws.” 523 F.2d at 288
(emphasis added).
34. 	Defendants argue that, because some stops were justified by reasonable
suspicion, Plaintiffs “cannot support the assertion that all officers always violate the
Constitution in conducting stops.” ECF No. 153 at 6. Plaintiffs need not show, however,
that all stops were unsupported by reasonable suspicion to meet their standing burden. See
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106. Along similar lines, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ evidence of
individual encounters amounts to “a handful of anecdotal experiences during an operation
where over 3,000” illegal immigrants were detained, and that such limited information does
not show the alleged policy. ECF No. 81 at 37. This is not persuasive. True, “[a]necdote
is not policy,” id. at 38, but it is evidence of policy, when authenticated and sworn-to under
oath. 	Here, considering the breadth of Operation Metro Surge, Plaintiffs submitted a
significant volume of testimony, especially considering the logistical challenges of this
particular case and the general nature of expedited litigation.
35. 	The record contains comparatively little evidence of official statements of
policy for making investigatory immigration stops. Secretary Noem stated that DHS was
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“doing targeted enforcement,” and that “[i]f we are on a target, and doing an operation,
there may be individuals surrounding that criminal that we may be asking who they are and
why they’re there and having them validate their identity.” ECF No. 48-12 at 2. ERO’s
Acting Executive Associate Director Charles said, “[o]ur officers are . . . conducting
targeted enforcement looking for the worst of the worst. If they encounter anybody in the
area of which they’re operating, they are okay to talk to those people. 	They’ve been
authorized to talk to anybody that’s around there and establish[] citizenship.” 	ECF No.
140-3 at 10. 	I conclude that these comments do not help answer whether Defendants
maintain a policy of making investigatory immigration stops without reasonable suspicion.
36. 	Evidence 	from 	officer 	training 	offers 	glimpses 	into 	Defendants’
immigration-stop policy. Recall that Assistant Field Office Director Bottjen testified that
ERO officers “are trained to identify when there is reasonable suspicion to briefly detain
an individual for further investigation into alienage and immigration status.” ECF No. 82
¶ 15. The training explains that reasonable suspicion could arise “in any number of ways,”
like “subjects making incriminating statements” or “failing to produce any documentation
during 	consensual 	encounters,” 	as 	well 	as 	by 	“information 	from 	open-source
investigations, 	other 	law 	enforcement 	agencies, 	informants, 	and 	surveillance; 	and
information gleaned from records and database checks.” 	Id. 	Officers may also consider
whether subjects “produc[ed] documentation suspected to be fraudulent” or “exhibit[ed]
suspicious behavior during consensual encounters.” 	Id. 	“ERO officers do not develop
reasonable suspicion or probable cause solely based on an individual’s race, ethnicity, or
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national origin.” 	Id. ¶ 16. 	Along these same lines, Officer Harvick testified that CBP
officers and agents are trained they were permitted to stop an individual if they had
reasonable suspicion that the individual committed or was
committed a federal crime or federal immigration violation.
This reasonable suspicion is based on various factors including
intelligence sources; information from law enforcement and
open-source databases; analysis of trends; facts developed in
the field by agents or officers; rational inferences that led an
agent or officer to suspect criminal or immigration violations;
and 	the 	officers 	or 	agents’ 	observations, 	training, 	and
experience.
ECF No. 83 ¶ 10.
37. 	I conclude that Plaintiffs have made a clear showing that Defendants have
adopted a policy authorizing federal immigration officers to conduct investigatory stops
based on ethnicity or race without reasonable suspicion that the individuals were violating
immigration laws. The evidence from individual encounters is compelling and troubling.
About two dozen people were stopped without reasonable suspicion in Minnesota from
mid-December 2025 to mid-January 2026. 	See generally Escobar Molina, --- F. Supp.
3d ---, 2025 WL 3465518, at *3–9 (finding unlawful policy on evidence of twenty-one
individual stops and arrests); Ramirez Ovando, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3293467, at
*5–10 (finding unlawful policy on evidence of eight individual arrests, plus hearsay
evidence that of fifteen to twenty more arrests); United Farm Workers v. Noem, 785 F.
Supp. 3d 672, 689–93 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding unlawful policy on evidence of thirteen
stops and arrests), appeal filed, 25-4047 (9th Cir. June 30, 2025). 	The stops share
similarities. 	Defendants’ agents approached people on the street, or pulled them over in
their vehicles, and requested identification without any explanation for why the stop
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occurred and often without identifying themselves. The only salient factor in these cases
was the individual’s race or ethnicity. Officers stopped Somali and Hispanic individuals
without reasonable suspicion while they did not stop similarly situated nearby white
individuals. Race or ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion. Clay, 640 F.2d
at 	159. 	The 	stopped 	individuals 	understood 	that 	they 	were 	required 	to 	produce
identification. 	See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435 (allowing officers to question individuals
without reasonable suspicion “as long as the police do not convey a message that
compliance with their requests is required”).
38. 	On this record, Defendants’ evidence of officer training and policy carries
little 	weight. 	Testimony 	that 	officers 	rely 	on 	“information 	from 	open-source
investigations, 	other 	law 	enforcement 	agencies, 	informants, 	and 	surveillance; 	and
information gleaned from records and database checks” is beside the point because that’s
not what happened here. 	ECF No. 82 ¶ 15; see ECF No. 83 ¶ 10 (“This reasonable
suspicion is based on various factors including intelligence sources; information from law
enforcement and open-source databases; analysis of trends; facts developed in the field by
agents or officers; rational inferences that led an agent or officer to suspect criminal or
immigration 	violations; 	and 	the 	officers 	or 	agents’ 	observations, 	training, 	and
experience.”). Defendants produced no evidence about specific factors justifying the stops
of any individuals other than Mr. Hussen, Santiago Doe, Luisa Doe, and Julio Doe.
Defendants acknowledged at oral argument that they did not have a policy to make a record
of Terry stops, Oral Argument Tr. 39:20–22, and the lack of evidence downstream from
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that decision undermines the high-level testimony that reasonable suspicion justifies their
immigration stops.21
39. 	Plaintiffs 	have 	demonstrated 	that 	Defendants’ 	agents 	arrested 	eleven
individuals without probable cause that those individuals were violating immigration law,
or that they were likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained, in Minnesota,
between December 2025 and the filing of this suit. 	See ECF No. 34 (Mr. Hussen); ECF
No. 30 (Mr. Aguilar Garcia); ECF No. 29 (Mr. Osman); ECF No. 39 (Mr. Martinez Garcia);
ECF No. 37 (A.A.); ECF No. 92-9 (R.J.); ECF No. 93-1 (Antony Doe); ECF No. 92-5
(H.S.); ECF No. 44 (Mr. Moreno); ECF No. 92-16 (Mr. Menera); ECF No. 92-7 (Mr.
Mohamed).
40. 	These witnesses’ accounts show that federal immigration officials arrested
them. Some of the arrests began as investigatory stops, but officers detained them for an
unreasonably long time or used excessive force in conducting the stop. See Bloomfield, 40
F.3d at 916–17. 	These individuals were detained for lengthy periods of time; for Mr.
Hussen and Mr. Aguilar Garcia, about an hour and a half or two hours. ECF No. 34 ¶ 30;
ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 3, 19. In some cases, that period was longer than necessary to determine
citizenship status. E.g., ECF No. 34 ¶ 15 (stating officers ignored Mr. Hussen’s employer
presenting citizenship verification); ECF No. 29 ¶ 12 (stating Mr. Osman was willing to
21 	Amicus City of Minneapolis produced evidence that police departments of several
large cities require their officers to document Terry stops. 	ECF No. 130-2 at 18–19
(Minneapolis); id. at 35 (Dallas); id. at 37–41 (Chicago); id. at 50–52 (Cleveland); id. at
54–55 (New Orleans); id. at 74 (New York); id. at 92–94 (Baltimore). The International
Association of Chiefs of Police also recommends documenting Terry stops in its model
policy. Id. at 132.
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show his identification, but the agents would not let him present it); see ECF No. 39 ¶ 14
(stating Mr. Martinez Garcia was detained for thirty minutes, despite showing his driver’s
license and REAL ID paperwork); ECF No. 37 ¶ 9 (stating A.A. was handcuffed after
officers determined his lawful status until they returned him to the arrest site); ECF No.
93-1 ¶¶ 2, 12, 18 (stating Antony Doe was flown to Texas and was away from home for ten
days); ECF No. 92-5 ¶¶ 8, 12 (stating officers would not allow H.S. to show her passport
photo and drove her around for an hour). All but Mr. Osman were handcuffed. See Hussen
Ex. 4 0:17–0:56; ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 7–8; ECF No. 39 ¶ 12; ECF No. 37 ¶ 4; ECF No. 92-9
¶ 9; ECF No. 93-1 ¶ 9; ECF No. 92-5 ¶ 9; ECF No. 44 ¶ 8; ECF No. 92-16 ¶ 12; ECF No.
92-7 ¶ 5. Officers put some in DHS vehicles. 	E.g., ECF No. 34 ¶ 12; ECF No. 30 ¶ 10;
ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 14–15; ECF No. 39 ¶ 14; ECF No. 37 ¶ 4; ECF No. 92-9 ¶ 10. Some were
subject to unreasonable force. 	E.g., ECF No. 34 ¶ 20 (officers tightened Mr. Hussen’s
handcuffs); ECF No. 30 ¶¶ 5–6 (officer tackled Mr. Aguilar Garcia); ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 10–13
(officer pinned Mr. Osman to the ground); ECF No. 92-9 ¶¶ 6, 9, 18 (officers pointed a gun
at R.J. and pinned him to the ground, and his hands were bruised and numb from the cuffs);
ECF No. 92-5 ¶ 9 (agent pushed H.S. toward car); ECF No. 92-7 ¶ 4 (agents pushed knee
against Mr. Mohamed’s back and elbow against his neck). 	In some cases, the officers’
conduct engendered fear and humiliation. 	E.g., ECF No. 30 ¶ 11 (playing loud Mexican
music while Mr. Aguilar Garcia and Andres were detained); ECF No. 44 ¶ 19 (telling Mr.
Moreno his arrest “[s]erves [him] right for running away” when he did not run); ECF No.
92-16 ¶ 14 (telling Mr. Menera in Spanish, “I don’t care if you’re a citizen, next time I’m
going to take you”); ECF No. 92-7 ¶ 4 (using profanity toward Mr. Mohamed).
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41. 	Defendants argue that the detentions of H.S., Mr. Mohamed, R.J., and Mr.
Menera did not amount to arrests. See ECF No. 153 at 10–11. They cite case law justifying
handcuffs when officers have a reasonable belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous,
see Pollreis v. Marzolf, 9 F.4th 737, 745 (8th Cir. 2021), but this record is devoid of
evidence that would lead a reasonable officer to believe these four individuals posed a
safety threat, see Haynes, 14 F.4th at 835 (“[H]andcuffing ‘absent any concern for safety’
violates the second Terry prong.” (quoting El-Ghazzawy, 636 F.3d at 460)). 	Defendants
argue that Mr. Mohamed and Mr. Menera “were handcuffed for a short period of time
during which officers confirmed their identification,” ECF No. 153 at 10, but neglect to
mention that Mr. Mohamed was subject to much more intrusive physical contact, ECF No.
92-7 ¶ 4, and that one officer resisted his supervisor’s order to release Mr. Menera “two or
three times,” ECF No. 92-16 ¶ 13. 	They argue that detaining H.S. and R.J. in a vehicle
was necessary because observers were approaching the officers. ECF No. 153 at 10. Even
taking the observers’ presence into consideration, under the totality of the circumstances,
these stops became de facto arrests because of the handcuffing, excessive force, and refusal
to examine the proffered identification.
42. 	Plaintiffs have made a clear showing that officers did not probable cause that
any of these individuals were violating immigration laws. I have already concluded that,
except for Mr. Hussen and R.J., all these individuals were stopped without reasonable
suspicion. 	For those arrestees, nothing transpired that would have given a reasonable
officer probable cause that those individuals had committed an immigration crime. Instead,
the arrestees provided reason to think they were citizens or lawfully present—they
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repeatedly asserted as much or proffered documentation. See ECF No. 31-2 at 1:38–2:10
(Mr. Aguilar Garcia’s statement that he was a citizen and had a passport); ECF No. 29 ¶ 12
(Mr. Osman’s statement that he was willing to show his ID, but the agents wouldn’t let
him); ECF No. 39 ¶¶ 9–10 (Mr. Martinez Garcia’s statement that he produced his driver’s
license and REAL ID paperwork, but the officer said those didn’t prove anything); ECF
No. 37 ¶ 3 (showing officers declined to look for A.A.’s documentation, even though they
had his wallet, which contained his driver’s license and green card); ECF No. 93-1 ¶ 9
(detaining Antony Doe despite confirming his identity through his driver’s license); ECF
No. 92-5 ¶¶ 5–6, 8 (demanding H.S.’s passport after reviewing her driver’s license, and not
giving her a reasonable time to produce the passport); ECF No. 44 ¶ 6 (reviewing Mr.
Moreno’s green card and telling him it was fake); ECF No. 92-16 ¶ 13 (resisting order to
release Mr. Menera after he confirmed his citizenship). 	In Mr. Hussen’s case, while his
flight gave officers reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, probable cause was absent
because he offered to show his driver’s license and a copy of his passport card on his phone.
ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 13–14. The officers did not allow him to do so, insisting on a facial scan,
which Mr. Hussen refused. Id. ¶ 13. His employer presented a copy of the passport card
through the ICE vehicle’s windshield, but officers ignored it. 	Id. ¶ 15. 	On its own, Mr.
Hussen’s refusal to submit to a facial scan could support probable cause of criminal
activity; combined with his offer to demonstrate citizenship in other ways, it does not. See
Kuehl v. Burtis, 173 F.3d 646, 650 (8th Cir. 1999) (“An officer contemplating an arrest is
not free to disregard plainly exculpatory evidence, even if substantial inculpatory evidence
(standing by itself) suggests that probable cause exists.”). 	The agents who arrested R.J.
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asked for his name, but did not ask for or look at his identification, similarly ignoring
exculpatory evidence. ECF No. 92-9 ¶ 9. On this record, Defendants’ agents did not have
probable cause that any of these eleven individuals had violated or were violating
immigration law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).
43. 	Further, Plaintiffs have made a clear showing that federal immigration
officers did not have probable cause that any of the eleven individuals were likely to escape
before a warrant could be obtained for their arrest. There is no evidence in the record that
officers made an individualized inquiry into the arrestees’ likeliness of disappearing or
evading 	detention, 	as 	required 	by 	statute. 	8 	U.S.C. 	§ 1357(a)(2) 	(authorizing 	an
immigration officer to make warrantless arrests “if he has reason to believe that the alien
so arrested is . . . likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained”). 	Defendants offer a
list of justifications other courts have found to determine likelihood of escape: when
removability is clear and undisputed; when the arrestee admitted he had been picked up
before; when he appeared nervous and seemed to be “looking for an opportunity to run”;
when he admitted he had previously been removed; when he attempted to evade custody;
when he was stopped in a vehicle; and when he presented conflicting documents about his
status. 	ECF No. 81 at 48 (citing cases); see Oral Argument Tr. 33:19–25 (describing a
person stopped “on the side of the highway” as likely to escape, since he would have left
the scene by the time the officer obtained a warrant); 	see also United States v.
Murillo-Gonzalez, 524 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1151 (D.N.M. 2021) (“Casanova also had reason
to believe that Defendant was likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained given
that Defendant was stopped in a vehicle. Although Defendant was not behind the wheel
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during the encounter, Casanova testified that there was always the possibility that
Defendant might attempt to flee and that a foot chase could ensue.” (citation omitted)),
aff’d, No. 22-2123, 2024 WL 3812480 (10th Cir. Aug. 14, 2024). 	Most of these
justifications are inapplicable here. None of the eleven individuals was removable or stated
they had been removed. None presented conflicting documentation regarding their status.
For some of them, nothing about the location or circumstances of their arrest suggested
flight. 	Mr. Menera was at home. ECF No. 92-16 ¶ 4. 	Mr. Osman was walking in his
family’s neighborhood. ECF No. 29 ¶¶ 5–7. Others were outside their workplace. ECF
No. 30 ¶ 2 (Mr. Aguilar Garcia); ECF No. 39 ¶ 5 (Mr. Martinez Garcia); ECF No. 44 ¶ 3
(Mr. Moreno). It’s true that several individuals were either in or near a car, and that Mr.
Hussen initially fled. ECF No. 37 ¶ 2 (A.A., in a parking lot); ECF No. 93-1 ¶ 4 (Antony
Doe, in a parking lot); ECF No. 92-5 ¶ 4 (H.S., in a parking lot); ECF No. 92-9 ¶¶ 4, 10
(R.J., on a busy road); ECF No. 84 ¶ 6 (Mr. Hussen). But no officer presented evidence
showing the officer engaged in an individualized inquiry to determine if the arrestee would
escape detention, including Officer Berry, who provided a declaration describing Mr.
Hussen’s arrest. 	See ECF No. 84. 	I cannot “defer[] to the officer’s on-the-scene
judgment[]” when none has been presented. Murillo-Gonzalez, 524 F. Supp. 3d at 1151.
And objective factors indicate officers did not consider the totality of the circumstances
that would have supported or discounted probable cause of flight. 	Officers did not ask
A.A. his identity or for documents. ECF No. 37 ¶ 3. R.J. was only asked for his name, not
where he lived or for his identification. ECF No. 92-9 ¶ 11. Antony Doe presented a valid
work permit, but officers apparently did not accept it. ECF No. 93-1 ¶ 6. Officers did not
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allow H.S. to present a photograph of her passport, ECF No. 92-5 ¶ 8, and did not let Mr.
Hussen show them his identification, ECF No. 34 ¶¶ 8, 13. A subject’s possession of valid
identification showing citizenship or lawful status is relevant to the flight-risk analysis.
See Davila v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 3d 650, 669–70 (W.D. Pa. 2017). On this record,
officers’ decisions to ignore that evidence or fail to develop it undercuts Defendants’
argument that those individuals were likely to escape.
44. 	Officials’ statements support the conclusion that Defendants maintained a
policy of arresting individuals without probable cause. Plaintiffs produced evidence that
Mr. Bovino told the press: “We need reasonable suspicion to make an immigration
arrest. . . . 	You notice I did not say probable cause, nor did I say I need a warrant. 	We
need reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage that’s well-grounded within the United States
immigration law.” ECF No. 48-1 at 12. They also point to multiple posts on DHS’s official
X account making the same basic claim. 	See ECF No. 48-2 at 2 (“Under the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, DHS law enforcement uses ‘reasonable suspicion’
to make arrests.”); see ECF No. 140-8 at 2; ECF No. 140-9 at 2; ECF No. 140-10 at 2.
Defendants did not disclaim these statements in briefing or oral argument, other than to
assert that the Lyons Memo outlined the actual policy, and that it had been announced DHS
spokesperson Tricia McLaughlin would be stepping down from her position. 	Oral
Argument Tr. 97:3–6.
45. 	I conclude that Plaintiffs have made a clear showing that Defendants adopted
a policy authorizing federal immigration officers to conduct warrantless arrests without
probable cause that the arrestees were violating immigration laws, and without probable
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cause that the arrestees were likely to escape before a warrant for their arrest could be
obtained, in Minnesota from mid-December 2025 to mid-January 2026. The evidence from
individual encounters is strong. Though there are fewer instances of arrests than stops, the
eleven individuals arrested without probable cause of criminal activity or flight provide
substantial evidence of a common policy, consistent with what other courts have found.
See generally Escobar Molina, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3465518, at *3–9 (finding
unlawful policy on evidence of twenty-one individual stops and arrests); 	Ramirez
Ovando, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3293467, at *5–10 (finding unlawful policy on
evidence of eight individual arrests, plus hearsay evidence that of fifteen to twenty more
arrests); United Farm Workers, 785 F. Supp. 3d at 689–93 (finding unlawful policy on
evidence of thirteen stops and arrests). The public statement made by Mr. Bovino—that
officers arrest based on reasonable suspicion—is also evidence that Defendants have
authorized arrests without probable cause. 	DHS’s official X account repeated Mr.
Bovino’s statement. See Escobar Molina, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3465518, at *23–
24 (considering DHS’s social media posts as evidence of DHS policy).
46. 	The Lyons Memo does little to convince otherwise because the record shows
officers have not followed one of its key provisions. 	Its definition of “likely to escape”
asks whether the subject “is unlikely to be located at the scene of the encounter or another
clearly identifiable location once an administrative warrant is obtained.” ECF No. 85-1 at
4 (emphasis added). There is no evidence that officers attempted to determine whether the
subjects would be at their home, work, or any other clearly identifiable location. Witnesses
repeatedly testified that Defendants did not ask about community ties. 	And as with the
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reasonable-suspicion analysis, the high-level statements about Fourth Amendment training
do not move the needle. I conclude that Defendants have a policy authorizing their officers
to arrest individuals without probable cause to believe that the arrestee had committed a
crime or was likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained.
Likelihood that Plaintiffs Will Be Subject to Unconstitutional Policies – Analysis
47. 	Recall that to prevail on any of the three theories of standing, Plaintiffs must
show “the threatened injury is certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk that the
harm will occur.” In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 769 (citation modified). The question
is whether the evidence shows a significant probability that Defendants will stop or arrest
Mr. Hussen, Mr. Eydarus, or Mr. Aguilar Garcia in the imminent future. On this record,
Plaintiffs have not shown that such an injury is sufficiently likely to meet their Article III
standing burden.
48. 	Lyons and Clapper found no standing for injunctive relief where the
plaintiffs’ asserted injuries followed a speculative chain of events. 	To have standing to
seek injunction of a future chokehold, the plaintiff in Lyons would have had to show that a
Los Angeles police officer would stop him for a traffic violation or other offense, and the
officer would then subject him to another chokehold “without provocation or legal excuse.”
461 U.S. at 108. Clapper found a future injury speculative where
(1) the Government will decide to target the communications
of non-U.S. persons with whom they communicate; (2) in
doing so, the Government will choose to invoke its authority
under 	§ 1881a 	rather 	than 	utilizing 	another 	method 	of
surveillance; (3) the Article III judges who serve on the Foreign
Intelligence 	Surveillance 	Court 	will 	conclude 	that 	the
Government’s 	proposed 	surveillance 	procedures 	satisfy
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§ 1881a’s many safeguards and are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment; (4) the Government will succeed in intercepting
the 	communications 	of 	respondents’ 	contacts; 	and 	(5)
respondents will be parties to the particular communications
that the Government intercepts.
568 U.S. at 410.
49. 	Here, the chain of events is not so long, but it includes one speculative link.
For Plaintiffs to suffer a future injury, they must show that (1) Defendants have a policy
authorizing unconstitutional stops and arrests; and (2) Defendants are likely to subject
Plaintiffs to a stop or arrest under those policies. 	Plaintiffs have cleared the first hurdle,
but not the second. Several considerations point to that conclusion.
50. 	No Plaintiff or declarant has been unlawfully stopped or arrested a second
time. In a field of thirty-three total witnesses, the lack of a subsequent encounter makes it
less likely that future violations are certainly impending. See Smith v. City of Chicago, 143
F. Supp. 3d 741, 752 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (finding standing to seek prospective relief where
plaintiffs alleged officers had “repeatedly subjected them to unconstitutional stops and
frisks, which leads to the reasonable inference of the likelihood that [the] officers will
unlawfully stop and first Plaintiffs in the future”); Thomas v. County of Los Angeles, 978
F.2d 	504, 	507 	(9th 	Cir. 	1992) 	(“Repeated 	instances 	of 	violence 	and 	retaliatory
confrontations are ‘continuing present adverse [e]ffects’ and cause the threatened injury to
be ‘sufficiently real and immediate to show an existing controversy.’” (quoting O’Shea,
414 U.S. at 496)). If post-January-15 evidence could be considered to establish standing,
no subsequent stop or arrest occurred in that period either. 	Considered against this fact,
evidence that witnesses regularly observe immigration agents does not show a substantial
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risk of a future stop or arrest. 	See ECF No. 34 ¶ 38; ECF No. 30 ¶ 27; Evidentiary Tr.
20:5–21:18; 29:6–21.
51. 	Defendants’ policy of authorizing unlawful stops and arrests, as opposed to
requiring or mandating them, somewhat supports this same conclusion. Clapper, 568 U.S.
at 412 (“Moreover, because [the statute] at most authorizes—but does not mandate or
direct—the surveillance that respondents fear, respondents’ allegations are necessarily
conjectural.”).
52. 	I conclude that “plaintiffs have no good basis to believe that law enforcement
will unlawfully stop [or arrest] them in the future based on the prohibited factors—and
certainly no good basis for believing that any stop [or arrest] of the plaintiffs is imminent.”
Vasquez Perdomo, 146 S. Ct. at 3 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).22
53. 	Other persuasive authorities reach different conclusions, but I am not
persuaded they apply here. 	Plaintiffs rely on another court that considered similar facts
and reached the opposite conclusion, Escobar Molina, --- F. Supp. 3d. ---, 2025 WL
3465518, at *15–17. 	Similarly, after briefing was completed, a court in the District of
22 	If Plaintiffs could show a substantial risk of a future unlawful stop, the likelihood
of a future unlawful arrest is subject to more contingencies and therefore more speculative.
On this record, most investigatory stops did not last long enough to become arrests. The
turning point usually occurred when officers reviewed and confirmed the individual’s
identity. In some cases, that review and confirmation was unreasonably delayed, and the
subject was arrested. 	See ECF No. 34 (Mr. Hussen); ECF No. 30 (Mr. Aguilar Garcia);
ECF No. 29 (Mr. Osman); ECF No. 39 (Mr. Martinez Garcia); ECF No. 37 (A.A.); ECF
No. 92-9 (R.J.); ECF No. 93-1 (Antony Doe); ECF No. 92-5 (H.S.); ECF No. 44 (Mr.
Moreno); ECF No. 92-16 (Mr. Menera); ECF No. 92-7 (Mr. Mohamed). But the evidence
does not show an obvious throughline between these cases. 	In other words, when an
individual is stopped without reasonable suspicion, it remains speculative whether that
individual will be subject to an unconstitutional arrest.
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Oregon found standing under similar circumstances. M-J-M-A- v. Hermosillo, --- F. Supp.
3d ---, No. 6:25-cv-02011-MTK, 2026 WL 562063, at *15–16 (D. Or. Feb. 27, 2026). In
these cases, the courts determined that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue forward-looking
relief based on a policy, plaintiffs’ membership in the targeted group, and plaintiffs’
inability to “avoid repeating the quotidian conduct that led to their” initial encounters.
Escobar Molina, --- F. Supp. 3d. ---, 2025 WL 3465518, at *15–17; see M-J-M-A-, 2026
WL 562063, at *15–16. In the latter case, binding Ninth Circuit precedent found standing
for injunctive relief when plaintiffs suffered “exposure” to an unconstitutional policy
“while going about one’s daily life,” even when “the likelihood of a future stop of a
particular individual plaintiff may not be ‘high.’” 	Melendres, 695 F.3d at 998. 	To the
extent this describes a lower standard than “certainly impending,” or “a substantial risk,”
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 769, it does not support standing under Eighth Circuit
precedent.
54. 	Because Plaintiffs have not shown a substantial risk of future injury,
Plaintiffs’ other standing theories fail. 	The Monsanto theory requires a justified fear of
future injury. 	Bost, 146 S. Ct. at 522. 	Plaintiffs have not shown that here. 	Plaintiffs’
“ongoing psychological harm” theory does not provide a basis to seek injunctive relief. It
is true that the Supreme Court has said that “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in
itself 	show 	a 	present 	case 	or 	controversy 	regarding 	injunctive 	relief, 	however, 	if
unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495–96.
But O’Shea was discussing the defendant’s ongoing unlawful treatment of the plaintiffs,
not the lingering effects of the plaintiffs’ injury. Id. at 496 (“[None] of the named plaintiffs
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at the time the complaint was filed were themselves serving an allegedly illegal sentence
or were on trial or awaiting trial before petitioners.”).
55. 	Because Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood that a future injury is
certainly impending or that there is a substantial risk of future injury, they likely do not
possess standing to seek injunctive or declaratory relief, and their preliminary-injunction
motion will be denied.23
Preliminary Injunction
56. 	Had Plaintiffs shown a likelihood of a future Article III-worthy injury, I
would nonetheless conclude that they are not entitled to a preliminary injunction.
57. 	A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy.” Winter v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008); Watkins Inc. v. Lewis, 346 F.3d 841, 844 (8th
Cir. 2003). 	The Eighth Circuit’s familiar Dataphase decision describes the list of
considerations applied to decide whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief: “(1) the
likelihood of the movant’s success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the
movant in the absence of relief; (3) the balance between that harm and the harm that the
relief would cause to the other litigants; and (4) the public interest.” Lexis-Nexis v. Beer,
41 F. Supp. 2d 950, 956 (D. Minn. 1999) (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640
23 	To be clear, had Plaintiffs established standing, this case would not be moot, as
Defendants conceded at oral argument. 	Oral Argument Tr. 17:12–15. The drawdown of
Operation Metro Surge has not “made it absolutely clear” that the unlawful stops and
arrests “could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Laidlaw Env’t Servs., 528 U.S. at 189
(Concentrated Phosphate, 393 U.S. at 203). 	As Bordar Czar Homan stated when
announcing the drawdown, ICE would remain present in Minnesota and would “continue
to identify, arrest, and remove illegal aliens that pose a risk to public safety like we’ve done
for years.” PBS NewsHour, supra, at 2:00.
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F.2d 109, 112–14 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)). The core question is whether the equities “so
favor[] the movant that justice requires the court to intervene to preserve the status quo
until the merits are determined.” Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113. “The burden of establishing
the four factors lies with the party seeking injunctive relief.” CPI Card Grp., Inc. v. Dwyer,
294 F. Supp. 3d 791, 807 (D. Minn. 2018) (citing Watkins, 346 F.3d at 844).
Likelihood of Success on the Merits
58. 	Plaintiffs are likely to prevail on the merits of their Fourth Amendment claim.
As Justice Kavanaugh recently summarized:
The Fourth Amendment requires that immigration stops must
be based on reasonable suspicion of illegal presence, stops
must be brief, arrests must be based on probable cause, and
officers must not employ excessive force. 	Moreover, the
officers must not make interior immigration stops or arrests
based on race or ethnicity.
Illinois, 146 S. Ct. at 436 n.4 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 	For the reasons already
explained, 	Plaintiffs 	have 	provided 	strong 	evidence 	that 	Defendants 	have 	adopted
unconstitutional policies in the relevant time frame and geographic area: (1) a policy
authorizing federal immigration officers to conduct investigatory stops based on ethnicity
or race without reasonable suspicion that the individuals were violating immigration laws;
and (2) a policy authorizing federal immigration officers to conduct warrantless arrests
without probable cause that the arrestees were violating immigration laws and without
probable cause that the arrestees were likely to escape before a warrant for their arrest could
be obtained.
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59. 	The evidence after January 15, 2026, provides additional support that
Defendants are stopping individuals in Minnesota without reasonable suspicion. See ECF
No. 93-2 ¶¶ 2, 6–7, 9–11, 14–15; ECF No. 92-10 ¶¶ 3–4; ECF No. 92-2 ¶¶ 7, 10; ECF No.
103 ¶¶ 9–10. These declarations support the conclusion that Defendants maintain a policy
authorizing 	their 	agents 	to 	stop 	individuals 	without 	reasonable 	suspicion 	that 	the
individuals are committing immigration violations. 	In each of those cases, the stopped
individual was Somali, Hispanic, or Asian. (The supplemental declarations do not contain
any evidence of arrests.)
60. 	Because Plaintiffs have made a clear showing of these policies, they are
likely to succeed on their Fourth Amendment and Immigration and Nationality Act claims.
The Fourth Amendment requires that immigration stops be based on reasonable suspicion,
which does not arise solely from an individual’s race or ethnicity. 	Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. at 886–87; Vasquez Perdomo, 146 S. Ct. at 1 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). 	It also
requires immigration arrests to be based on probable cause of criminal activity. Quintana,
623 F.3d at 1239. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, immigration officers must
have probable cause “[1] that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation of any
such law or regulation and [2] is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for his
arrest” to issue a warrantless arrest. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2); see 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c)(2)(i)–
(ii). Defendants’ policies authorize stops and arrests below this constitutional and statutory
threshold, so Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Fourth Amendment and
Immigration and Nationality Act claims.
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61. 	Count VI of the Complaint alleges a violation of the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment. 	Compl. ¶¶ 202–11. 	The Fifth Amendment’s
protection of due process of law contains an implicit guarantee of equal protection under
the laws. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954). Plaintiffs may demonstrate a
violation by showing that the federal government’s conduct was motivated, at least in part,
by intent to discriminate based on race, ethnicity, or national origin. 	See Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–66 (1977). Plaintiffs did
not advance their Fifth Amendment claim in the preliminary-injunction briefing, so I do
not reach a conclusion regarding whether Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of
this claim.
62. 	Several causes of action advance violations of the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”). Compl. ¶¶ 183–201 (Counts III, IV, and V); see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C)
(authorizing “the reviewing court” to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions” the court finds to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law,” or “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or
limitations, or short of statutory right”). As with the Fifth Amendment claim, Plaintiffs did
not rely on the APA claims in their initial preliminary-injunction brief, see ECF No. 27,
though their reply brief argued the claims were viable, see ECF No. 138 at 30–33. 	To
determine whether an action is final, courts consider whether it “mark[s] the consummation
of the agency’s decisionmaking process” and whether it is “one by which rights or
obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” Bennett
v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (citation modified); accord Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S.
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785, 808 (2022). 	On this record—and considering the APA claims received minimal
attention—I cannot conclude that the policies identified earlier are likely to meet either
prong of Bennett’s test.
Irreparable Harm
63. 	“Irreparable harm occurs when a party has no adequate remedy at law,
typically because its injuries cannot be fully compensated through an award of damages.”
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009). “The denial
of a constitutional right is a cognizable injury and an irreparable harm.” 	Ng v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of Minn., 64 F.4th 992, 998 (8th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). The harm
must be “likely in the absence of an injunction,” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, “great[,] and of
such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief,” Iowa Utils. Bd.
v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418, 425 (8th Cir. 1996). A plaintiff must show more than a future risk
of irreparable harm; “there must be a clear showing of immediate irreparable injury.”
Berkley Risk Adm’rs Co. v. Accident Fund Holdings, Inc., No. 16-cv-2671 (DSD/KMM),
2016 WL 4472943, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 2016) (citation modified). “Failure to show
irreparable harm is an independently sufficient ground upon which to deny a preliminary
injunction.” Watkins, 346 F.3d at 844; see Gamble v. Minn. State Indus., No. 16-cv-2720
(JRT/KMM), 2017 WL 6611570, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2017) (collecting cases).
64. 	Plaintiffs have two factors in their favor: They are likely to show a
constitutional harm, and there is at least a question whether they could be compensated by
damages. Their alleged harm is a Fourth Amendment violation, and constitutional injuries
are paradigmatic irreparable harms. 	See Ng, 64 F.4th at 998. 	Setting aside whether
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damages could compensate this injury, it is at least questionable whether they are available
to Plaintiffs, given the thorny interplay of federal sovereign immunity, the Federal Tort
Claims Act, and the narrow scope of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 	See generally Campos v. United States, 888
F.3d 724 (5th Cir. 2018); Ramirez v. Reddish, 104 F.4th 1219 (10th Cir. 2024).
65. 	Regardless, 	Plaintiffs 	have 	not 	made 	“a 	clear 	showing 	of 	immediate
irreparable injury.” Berkley Risk Adm’rs Co., 2016 WL 4472943, at *4 (citation modified).
As explained with respect to standing, whether Plaintiffs will be subject to a future
unconstitutional stop or arrest is speculative. 	The drawdown of Operation Metro Surge
makes it less likely that irreparable harm will occur absent an injunction. See Winter, 555
U.S. at 22. 	At its peak, more than 3,000 federal immigration officers and agents were
detailed to the Saint Paul Field Office, and by February 23, 2026, that number dropped
below 1,000. ECF No. 169-2 ¶¶ 4–5. And it is reasonable to infer that scaling down law
enforcement by 60–70% dramatically reduces the number of stops and arrests. 	If
Defendants carried through on their intention to keep only about 107 ERO officers and 300
HSI agents at the Saint Paul Field Office, id. ¶ 6, the likelihood of irreparable injury would
decline even further.
Balance of Equities
66. 	The final factors—the balance of harms and the public interest—“merge
when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).
Courts analyze “whether the movant’s likely harm without a preliminary injunction
exceeds the nonmovant’s likely harm with a preliminary injunction in place.” Cigna Corp.
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v. Bricker, 103 F.4th 1336, 1347 (8th Cir. 2024). “There is generally no public interest in
the perpetuation of unlawful agency action.” Missouri v. Trump, 128 F.4th 979, 997 (8th
Cir. 2025) (quoting League of Women Voters of the United States v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12
(D.C. Cir. 2016)). When constitutional violations are alleged, the plaintiff’s likelihood of
success often tips the balance of the equities in his favor. 	See Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th
1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2023); see Vasquez Perdomo, 146 S. Ct. at 4 n.3 (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring) (“[E]specially in cases involving a significant new law or government action,
the interim harms and equities are typically weighty on both sides. In those situations, . . .
resolving the application therefore often will depend on [the] assessment of likelihood of
success on the merits.”).
67. 	Here, the balance of the equities favors Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have shown it is
likely that Defendants’ policies authorize immigration agents to take unconstitutional
actions as part of Operation Metro Surge. See Vasquez Perdomo, 146 S. Ct. at 4 n.3.
Class Certification
68. 	Plaintiffs seek to provisionally certify the following classes:
Stops Class: All persons who, since December 1, 2025, have
been or will be subject to an investigatory stop for immigration
purposes by DHS in Minnesota.
Equal Protection Subclass: All persons who, since
December 1, 2025, have been or will be stopped for
immigration purposes by DHS in Minnesota pursuant to
a policy of stopping Somali or Latino people based on
race or ethnicity.
Warrantless Arrests Class: All persons who, since December
1, 2025, have been or will be subject to a warrantless arrest for
immigration purposes by DHS in Minnesota.
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Removability 	Subclass: 	All 	persons 	who, 	since
December 1, 2025, have been or will be subject to a
warrantless arrest for immigration purposes by DHS in
Minnesota without probable cause that the person is a
non-citizen who is subject to removal from the United
States.
Flight 	Risk 	Subclass: 	All 	persons 	who, 	since
December 1, 2025, have been or will be subject to a
warrantless arrest for immigration purposes by DHS in
Minnesota without probable cause that the person is
likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained.
Compl. ¶ 160; see ECF No. 52 at 10–11. Perhaps recognizing these proposed classes are
quite broad, Plaintiffs proposed alternative classes. These include the following:
Stops Class: All persons in the Twin Cities metro area who,
since December 1, 2025, have been or will be subject to DHS’s
policy, pattern, and/or practice of subjecting persons to an
investigatory 	stop 	for 	immigration 	purposes 	without 	an
individualized assessment of reasonable suspicion.
Removability Class: All persons in the Twin Cities metro area
who, since December 1, 2025, have been or will be subject to
DHS’s policy, pattern, and/or practice of subjecting persons to
a warrantless arrest for immigration purposes without an
individualized assessment of probable cause that the person is
a non-citizen who is subject to removal from the United States.
Flight Risk Class: All persons in the Twin Cities metro area
who, since December 1, 2025, have been or will be subject to
DHS’s policy, pattern, and/or practice to a warrantless arrest
for 	immigration 	purposes 	without 	an 	individualized
assessment of probable cause that the person is likely to escape
before a warrant can be obtained.
ECF No. 139 at 21.
69. 	“To be certified as a class, plaintiffs must meet all of the requirements of
Rule 23(a) and must satisfy one of the three subsections of Rule 23(b).” 	In re St. Jude
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Med., Inc., 425 F.3d 1116, 1119 (8th Cir. 2005); see Ebert v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 823 F.3d
472, 477 (8th Cir. 2016). 	Under Rule 23(a), plaintiffs must show that “the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,” that “there are questions of law or
fact common to the class,” that “the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class,” and “the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Plaintiffs move to
certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class, in which “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to
act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” 	Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(2). 	“A district court may not certify a class until it ‘is satisfied, after a
rigorous analysis,’ that Rule 23(a)’s certification prerequisites are met.” In re Target Corp.
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 847 F.3d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2011)). “Though the Supreme Court has not
articulated what, specifically, a ‘rigorous analysis’ of class certification prerequisites
entails, at a minimum the rule requires a district court to state its reasons for certification
in terms specific enough for meaningful appellate review.” Id.
70. 	“Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment
would provide relief to each member of the class.” 	Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 360. 	“Civil
rights cases against parties charged with unlawful, class-based discrimination are prime
examples.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997). Members do not
have the opportunity to opt out, so “a Rule 23(b)(2) class requires even greater
cohesiveness than a Rule 23(b)(3) class seeking damages.” Ahmad v. City of St. Louis, 995
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F.3d 635, 644 (8th Cir. 2021). 	“Thus, when named plaintiffs attempt to aggregate a
plethora of discrete claims into one super-claim against a government agency, without
demonstrating that the class members have been harmed in essentially the same way, the
proposed Rule 23(b)(2) class is deficient.” Id. (citation modified).
71. 	Here, the proposed classes would not be certifiable. In this Circuit, a class
may not be certified if some of its members lack standing to bring the suit themselves.
Avritt v. Reliastar Life Ins., 615 F.3d 1023, 1034 (8th Cir. 2010); In re Zurn Pex Plumbing
Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 616 (8th Cir. 2011). Each class member is not required
to “submit evidence of personal standing,” but a class must “be defined in such a way that
anyone within it would have standing.” 	Avritt, 615 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Denney v.
Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 263–64 (2d Cir. 2006)). Here, all proposed definitions
include members without Article III standing to seek prospective relief, as they all
comprise persons who “have been or will be subject to” the challenged policies. But “[p]ast
exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding
injunctive relief.” 	O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495. 	The named Plaintiffs lack standing to seek
injunctive relief. Looking at the putative class, it is virtually certain that some individuals
who were subject to unconstitutional immigration stops and arrests are not likely to be
stopped or arrested unlawfully again. 	Consider Mr. Osman. 	He lives in Louisville,
Kentucky, and was illegally stopped and arrested during a visit to Minneapolis. See ECF
No. 29 ¶¶ 1, 4, 10–21. 	He left Minneapolis on January 9, 2026. 	Id. ¶ 4. 	He signed his
declaration on January 14, 2026, in Kentucky. 	Id. at 6. 	He does not state whether he
intends to return to Minnesota. 	Mr. Osman would be a member of each proposed class,
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but there is no question his risk of a future stop or arrest in Minnesota (or the Twin Cities
metro area) is speculative.
72. 	There are other problems. 	The classes Plaintiffs originally sought to be
certified would have included members who suffered no legal wrong. 	For example, the
“Stops Class” as proposed originally included “All persons who, since December 1, 2025,
have been or will be subject to an investigatory stop for immigration purposes by DHS in
Minnesota.” 	Compl. ¶ 160. 	As discussed, however, it is likely that one Plaintiff (Mr.
Hussen) and several non-party witnesses were lawfully subjected to investigatory stops.
That, in turn, would raise an adequacy problem for Mr. Hussen and commonality problems
for the class. Plaintiffs’ narrowed definition of this class—to include persons subjected to
“DHS’s policy, pattern, and/or practice of subjecting persons to an investigatory stop for
immigration purposes without an individualized assessment of reasonable suspicion”—
poses at least practical problems. ECF No. 139 at 21. For example, answering whether a
person is in this class would seem to require an individualized, fact-intensive, time-
consuming determination that the person’s investigatory stop lacked reasonable suspicion.
But without that, it is at least difficult to understand how I might answer the numerosity
question. In addition to those issues, the class definition does not define the “Twin Cities
Metro Area” boundaries, making it difficult to ascertain whether, for example, persons
stopped in places like St. Cloud, Monticello, or Shakopee would fall within the class.
Regardless, because the preliminary-injunction motion will be denied for other reasons, it
is not necessary to address these questions at this time.
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The Pseudonyms Issues
73. 	Though “[f]ederal courts disfavor the use of fictitious names in legal
proceedings,” they have allowed parties to appear pseudonymously when “(1) the party
seeking anonymity was challenging government activity; (2) identification threatened to
reveal information of a sensitive and highly personal nature; and (3) a party would be
required, absent anonymity, to admit an intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby
risking criminal prosecution.” 	Cajune v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 194, 105 F.4th 1070, 1076–77
(8th Cir. 2024); see Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981). Other factors may
also be relevant, like danger of retaliation and prejudice to the defendants. 	Cajune, 105
F.4th at 1077; Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004); In re: Chiquita
Brands Int’l, Inc., 965 F.3d 1238, 1247 (11th Cir. 2020); Doe v. Innovate Fin., Inc., No. 21-
cv-1754 (JRT/TNL), 2022 WL 673582, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2022).
74. 	Several Declarants—A.A., Santiago Doe, Julio Doe, Luisa Doe, Jane Doe,
N.G., F.A., and Antony Doe—moved to proceed under pseudonyms. 	ECF Nos. 60, 98.
Those motions were granted for the purpose the evidentiary hearing, subject to further
consideration after the hearing. ECF No. 150. Plaintiffs submitted additional briefing and
declarations in support of those motions. 	ECF No. 175 (brief); ECF Nos. 176–88
(declarations). 	Those additional materials provide sufficient evidence of retaliation and
harassment that Declarants’ fear of appearing in this case publicly is reasonable. They will
be allowed to proceed pseudonymously in this case for any remaining matters.
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ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 25] is DENIED.
2. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion for Provisional Class Certification and Appointment of
Class Counsel [ECF No. 50] is DENIED.
3. 	Defendants’ Motion to Strike [ECF No. 172] is DENIED.
4. 	Plaintiffs’ Motion to Supplement to Record [ECF No. 175] is GRANTED
as follows:
A. 	Declarants A.A., Santiago Doe, Julio Doe, Luisa Doe, Jane Doe, N.G.,
F.A., and Antony Doe are permitted to proceed in this action under the pseudonyms
identified in their declarations in all public filings and proceedings, unless otherwise
ordered by the Court.
B. 	Defendants shall maintain those individuals’ identities by using these
pseudonyms and redacting their full names and personally identifying information
in all filings, including all exhibits in which their names appear, unless otherwise
ordered by the Court.
Dated: March 9, 2026 	s/Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
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