Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Adriana M.Y.M.,
Petitioner,
v.
David Easterwood, in his official capacity
as Field Office Director, St. Paul Field
Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Todd M. Lyons, in his
official capacity as Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as
Secretary of Homeland Security; U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; and
U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement,
Respondents.
Civ. No. 26-213 (JWB/JFD)
ORDER ON
MOTION TO DISMISS AND
PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
Shortly before the deadline to answer Petitioner Adriana M.Y.M.’s Petition for a
Writ of Habeas Corpus in this matter (see Doc. No. 3), Respondents filed a motion to
dismiss the Petition or transfer it to the Western District of Texas based on Petitioner’s
transfer to Texas before the Petition was filed. (Doc. No. 4.) Respondents did not
otherwise answer the Petition on the merits. This Court ordered additional briefing on the
motion, and both sides submitted additional materials. (See Doc. Nos. 6, 8–11.)
Because Petitioner’s immediate custodian was not known, disclosed to counsel, or
reasonably ascertainable at the time of filing, her Petition was properly filed in this
District. Jurisdiction attached at the moment of filing, and Petitioner’s later-revealed
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transfer to Texas does not divest this Court of jurisdiction.
On the merits, this case asks whether Respondents may detain a noncitizen under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) if the noncitizen entered the United States and was arrested years
later within the country’s borders. The answer is no. Because Petitioner is already in the
country—not seeking admission at the Nation’s borders or ports of entry—Respondents
cannot subject her to mandatory detention under § 1225.
Such a broad reading of § 1225(b)(2) has been often rejected in this District,
regardless of whether the petitioner entered without inspection or was initially detained at
the border and released. See, e.g., Avila v. Bondi, Civ. No. 25-3741 (JRT/SGE), 2025 WL
2976539, at *5–7 (D. Minn. Oct. 21, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-3248 (Nov. 10,
2025); see also Maldonado v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1142–48, 1150–52 (D. Minn.
2025); Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 968–970 (D. Minn. 2025); Mayamu K.
v. Bondi, Civ. No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 3641819, at *7–8 (D. Minn. Oct. 20,
2025).
Petitioner was already in the country when she was detained by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Thus, § 1226(a), not § 1225(b), establishes the authority
for her detention. But, because Respondents have not produced a warrant or any other
exhibit that sets forth the proper basis for Petitioner’s detention, the statutory
requirements authorizing detention are not satisfied, and the Petition is granted to the
extent it seeks release.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a citizen of Ecuador. (See Doc. No. 1, Petition ¶ 8.) She entered the
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United States approximately two and a half years ago. (Id. ¶ 39.) Petitioner alleges that
she has a valid work permit, a pending asylum claim for which she has attended all
required appearances, and no criminal history. (Id. ¶¶ 45–48.)
On January 12, 2026, ICE agents arrested Petitioner outside the Target store where
she works. (Id. ¶ 40.) She was detained alongside her husband. (Id. ¶ 44.) Petitioner has
since remained in immigration custody, and her last known location before filing her
Petition was in St. Paul, Minnesota. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 17, 42.) She alleges that her attorney was
not able to speak with her between her arrest and the time of filing. (Id. ¶ 43.)
After her arrest, Petitioner was booked into ICE’s St. Paul Field Office at 7:30
a.m. (Doc. No. 9, Rich. Decl. ¶ 5.) Citing lack of bed space, Respondents sent Petitioner
to El Paso, Texas, on a flight that departed at 10:49 a.m. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 8.) She arrived in El
Paso at approximately 1:09 p.m. (Id.)
Meanwhile, Petitioner’s sister contacted counsel around 12:00 p.m. (Doc. No. 11,
Slowing-Romero Decl. ¶ 5.) Counsel then attempted to locate Petitioner using the USCIS
Online Detainee Locator, but Petitioner did not appear in the system. (Id. ¶¶ 5–7.)
Counsel knew that ICE typically processed detainees at Fort Snelling, but she had been
previously told by authorities there that legal visits were no longer allowed. (Id. ¶ 8.)
By the time counsel filed the Petition at 9:55 p.m., she believed Petitioner was
detained at the St. Paul Field Office. (Id. ¶¶ 9–10, 12.) She had no way to directly contact
or otherwise locate Petitioner, and Respondents had not advised anyone about a transfer
to Texas. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.) Counsel learned Petitioner was in Texas at approximately 11:30
p.m., based on the Online Detainee Locator. (Id. ¶ 12.)
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Motion to Dismiss or Transfer
Respondents seek to dismiss the Petition or transfer it, arguing this Court lacks
jurisdiction because Petitioner was not detained in this District at the time of filing. (See
Doc. No. 4.) Respondents’ argument focuses on the “district of confinement” and
“immediate custodian” rules, as well as the limited exception presented in Ex parte Endo,
323 U.S. 283 (1944) (See Doc. No. 8 at 1–5.) Petitioner contends that the “unknown
custodian exception” applies here and that jurisdiction remains proper in this District
despite Petitioner’s transfer. (See Doc. No. 10 at 6–14.)
Ordinarily, a habeas petition must be filed in the district of confinement and name
the petitioner’s immediate custodian. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434–35
(2004). An exception is recognized, however, where the petitioner’s location is unknown
at the time of filing—such as when the petitioner is in transit—or where immigration
authorities have not disclosed where the petitioner is being detained or by whom, and
circumstances have prevented or precluded contact with counsel. See Ozturk v. Hyde, 136
F.4th 382, 392 (2d Cir. 2025); Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F. Supp. 3d 387, 393
(D.N.J. 2025). Where a proper respondent is named at the time of filing and is within the
court’s territorial jurisdiction, habeas jurisdiction attaches at that moment. See Van Tran
v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-12546-ADB, 2025 WL 3171210, at *4 (D. Mass. Nov. 13, 2025).
Under this exception, a later-revealed transfer outside the district does not divest the court
of jurisdiction. See id. at *3–4; see also Padilla, 542 U.S. at 441 (recognizing that a
district court can retain jurisdiction despite petitioner being transferred after filing).
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The exception ensures that the Government’s actions do not deprive individuals of
their right to challenge the legality of their confinement and prevents “the Kafkaesque
specter of supplicants wandering endlessly from one jurisdiction to another in search of a
proper forum.” Eisel v. Sec. of the Army, 477 F.2d 1251, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1973). As other
courts have explained, the exception reflects the longstanding principle that “there is no
gap in the fabric of habeas—no place, no moment, where a person held in custody in the
United States cannot call on a court to hear the case and decide it.” Khalil v. Joyce, 777
F. Supp. 3d 369, 410 (D.N.J. 2025).
Petitioner was detained by ICE in Minnesota on the morning of January 12, 2026,
and flown to Texas hours later. (Lee Decl. ¶¶ 5–6.) Petitioner’s counsel filed the Petition
shortly before 10:00 p.m. that evening, reasonably believing that Petitioner remained
detained in Minnesota. (Petition ¶¶ 8, 17, 42; Slowing-Romero Decl. ¶¶ 9–12.) Nothing
in the record reflects that Respondents disclosed Petitioner’s transfer in advance, allowed
for communication with counsel, or otherwise conveyed Petitioner’s whereabouts at the
time of filing.
Under these circumstances, habeas jurisdiction does not turn on Petitioner’s actual
location at the moment of filing, particularly because Respondents controlled her
movements and communication with counsel was limited. See Munoz-Saucedo, 789 F.
Supp. 3d at 394; see also Ozturk, 136 F.4th at 392–93. Because Petitioner properly
named Respondents within this Court’s territorial jurisdiction based on her last known
location at the time of filing, jurisdiction attached at that moment and is not defeated by
her transfer. See Van Tran, 2025 WL 3171210, at *4.
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Recent habeas decisions confirm that the unknown custodian exception remains
necessary where Government-controlled transfers—often executed within hours of
detention and before communication with counsel is possible—risk defeating timely
judicial review. See Munoz-Saucedo, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 394. Given the circumstances of
Petitioner’s detention and transfer, the exception applies here. The Petition was properly
filed in the District of Minnesota, and the motion to dismiss the Petition or transfer venue
is denied.
II. 	Habeas Petition
A. 	Legal Standard
A writ of habeas corpus may issue where a petitioner is in custody in violation of
the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The petitioner bears the burden
of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged detention lacks a
lawful statutory basis. See Aditya W. H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 703 (D. Minn.
2025) (collecting cases).
Immigration detention, like all civil detention, must rest on an express
congressional grant of authority and must bear a reasonable relation to its statutory
purpose. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687, 690 (2001) (quoting Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). Section 2241 confers jurisdiction to determine whether the
Executive Branch has statutory authority to detain an individual, including in the
immigration context. See id. at 687–88.
B. 	Analysis
Petitioner challenges only the lawfulness of her detention under federal law. She
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does not contest any removal order, the conduct of removal proceedings, or the execution
of removal. Therefore, jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to review the legal basis
for custody. See, e.g., Mohammed H. v. Trump, 786 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1154–55 (D. Minn.
2025). Because the Petition is not directed at removal, statutory channeling provisions do
not apply either. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018).
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) distinguishes between inspection,
removal proceedings, and detention authority. “Inspection” is the process by which
immigration officers determine whether a noncitizen seeking entry at the border or a port
of entry may be admitted to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a). Section 1225
governs that process and generally requires detention in the case of a noncitizen “seeking
admission.” Id.; see also Maldonado, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1149, 1152.
Section 1226, by contrast, governs detention of noncitizens already present in the
United States. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 846. Detention under § 1226(a) is not mandatory
and permits release on bond or recognizance. Maldonado, 795 F. Supp. 3d at 1149–50.
The vast majority of district courts considering the issue have determined that the
text, structure, and function of the INA’s detention provisions all indicate that § 1225
does not apply to noncitizens present in the interior of the country like Petitioner. See,
e.g., id., at *5–7; Santuario v. Bondi, Civ. No. 25-4296 (JRT/JFD), 2025 WL 3469577,
at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 2, 2025); N.A.M. v. Noem, Civ. No. 25-4737 (JRT/EMB), 2025 WL
3754145, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 29, 2025).
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), does not alter the
result either. Respondents have previously cited to it as if it reflects an independent
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adjudicatory resolution of statutory ambiguity. It does not. The Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”) is a component of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and operates
under the Attorney General’s supervisory authority. Its precedents are subject to review,
revision, and overruling by the Attorney General, who sets binding interpretations of the
INA for the Executive Branch. Yajure Hurtado thus reflects the DOJ’s adopted litigation
position concerning the scope of § 1225(b)(2), not an interpretation generated
independently of that position. See Memorandum from Rodney S. Scott, U.S. Customs &
Border Protection, Detention of Applicants for Admission (July 10, 2025) (memo from
DHS requiring that all “applicants for admission” be detained under § 1225(b)(2) during
removal proceedings).
And even if Yajure Hurtado were such an independent interpretation, it would run
headlong into the statute’s text and structure for the reasons already explained. Where an
agency’s reading conflicts with the statute Congress enacted, it does not control. See
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024) (explaining that only long-
standing and consistent agency interpretations merit weight); see also Belsai D.S. v.
Bondi, Civ. No. 25-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *7 n.5 (D. Minn. Oct. 1,
2025).
In habeas review, the question is not whether the Executive Branch has spoken
with one voice—whether through the DOJ or BIA—but whether the detention authority it
asserts is grounded in statute. That determination remains for the Article III courts. See
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688 (“[T]he habeas statute … does not require courts to defer to
the Attorney General’s interpretation of the statute. Rather, it requires the courts to
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determine whether the detention is lawful.”).
The analysis here is straightforward. Petitioner has resided in the United States for
approximately two and a half years. When ICE detained Petitioner in Minnesota, she was
in the interior of the country, not at a port of entry. Being arrested by ICE on January 12,
2026 did not transform Petitioner, who has lived in the community for more than two
years, into a noncitizen “seeking admission.” Petitioner was arrested while within the
country and, thus, to the extent that Petitioner is subject to detention, that detention would
be pursuant to § 1226. Even so, there is no evidence in the record that Respondents
properly invoked that authority to detain Petitioner here.
The Supreme Court has consistently treated §§ 1225 and 1226 as addressing
different populations at different procedural moments, not as interchangeable sources of
detention authority. Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 836–38. Allowing Respondents to toggle
between detention regimes in this way would collapse the statutory structure Congress
enacted and render § 1226 largely superfluous. While Congress may extend detention
authority by statute, the courts and the Executive Branch cannot.
On this record, Petitioner’s continued detention rests on a statute and an
interpretation that do not apply and is unlawful. Khalid B.Q. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 25-4584
(JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 10 at 6 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2025); Xuseen A. v. Bondi, Civ. No. 25-
4514 (JWB/DJF), Doc. No. 16 at 7 (D. Minn. Dec. 19, 2025). Further, even if
Respondents had sought to detain Petitioner under § 1226, the record contains no
evidence that there is a valid basis for detention at all.
Thus, Petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus that grants her immediate
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release. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (describing release as the “typical
remedy” for “unlawful executive detention”). When the Executive Branch detains
without statutory authorization, habeas relief is not limited to ordering additional process.
The function of habeas corpus is to obtain release from unlawful custody. Wajda v.
United States, 64 F.3d 385, 389 (8th Cir. 1995). Where detention lacks a lawful predicate,
release is an available and appropriate remedy. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693.
Where the record shows no valid statutory basis for detention in the first place, the
remedy is not to supply one through further proceedings. Because Petitioner has shown
Respondents have not invoked a provision of the INA that authorizes her continued
detention, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is granted, and Petitioner’s other habeas
claims are not reached.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings in this case,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss or Transfer (Doc. No. 4) is DENIED.
2. 	Petitioner Adriana M.Y.M.’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.
No. 1) is GRANTED.
3. 	Release. Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner from custody.
She must be released in Minnesota.
If Petitioner is currently held outside Minnesota, Respondents shall immediately
initiate Petitioner’s return to Minnesota for the sole purpose of effectuating release.
Respondents shall not delay initiating Petitioner’s return based on administrative
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convenience, transportation availability, or detention-capacity considerations.
Upon Petitioner’s arrival in Minnesota, Respondents shall effectuate release
forthwith. If, at the time release would otherwise occur, weather conditions would expose
Petitioner to extreme cold or other reasonably dangerous conditions, Respondents may
delay physical release only for the brief period necessary to effectuate release in a safe
manner. Respondents shall employ the earliest reasonably available safe means of release
and may not delay release where a safe option is available. Any such delay must be
strictly limited and must not be used to justify continued custody, supervision, or
discretionary release authority.
4. 	Notice. Within 48 hours of this Order, Respondents shall file an update on
the status of Petitioner’s release. In the update, Respondents must confirm the time, date,
and location of the release or anticipated return and release. If Petitioner has been
removed from Minnesota, Respondents must file a confirmation of the time, date, and
location of release promptly upon Petitioner’s arrival in Minnesota.
5. 	Respondents may not administratively recharacterize this release as
discretionary release under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 or any regulation, nor may they continue or
impose conditions of supervision in conjunction with release (including release on
recognizance or similar instruments), without prior notice to and authorization from the
Court, or absent a new and independently lawful custody decision properly executed
under the law. For the avoidance of doubt, Respondents’ compliance with this Order
requires Petitioner’s immediate release in Minnesota without any conditions of
supervision or restraint.
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6. 	Respondents may not re-detain Petitioner under a statutory theory this
Court has rejected in this proceeding absent materially changed circumstances.
7. 	Petitioner’s other claims are not reached.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Date: January 24, 2026 	s/ Jerry W. Blackwell
JERRY W. BLACKWELL
United States District Judge
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