Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Saul N.,
Petitioner,
v.
Todd Lyons, in his capacity as Acting
Director, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; Pamela
Bondi, U.S. Attorney General; Executive
Office for Immigration Review; David
Easterwood, Field Office Director of St.
Paul Field Office for U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Enforcement and Removal Operations;
Respondents.
File No. 26-CV-114 (JMB/DJF)
ORDER
Thomas R. Anderson III, Anderson & Anderson Law LLC, Minneapolis, MN, for Saul N.
Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents Todd
Lyons, Kristi Noem, Pamela Bondi, Executive Office for Immigration Review, and David
Easterwood.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Saul N.’s1 Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus (Petition) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1 [hereinafter, “Pet.”].) Respondents
Todd Lyons, Kristi Noem, Pamela Bondi, Executive Office for Immigration Review, and
1 This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial of any
nongovernmental parties in immigration cases.
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David Easterwood (together, Respondents) oppose the Petition. For the reasons explained
below, the Court grants the Petition in part.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. 	Saul N. is a citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without
inspection in 2005. (Pet. at 4, 11.)
2. 	Respondents detained Saul N. on January 7, 2026. (Id. at 4–5.)
3. 	On January 8, 2026, Saul N. filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Pet.)
On the same day, the Court ordered Respondents to file a response to the Petition by
January 14, 2026, at 11:00 a.m. (Doc. No. 3.) Respondents timely filed a response. (Doc.
No. 4.)
DISCUSSION
Respondents oppose Saul N.’s Petition, arguing that his detention is mandatory
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that
because section 1225(b) is not applicable to him, Saul N. is entitled to a bond hearing
pursuant to section 1226(a)(1).2 The Court therefore grants Saul N.’s Petition.3
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that a writ of habeas corpus may be granted
to any person who demonstrates he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of
2 As a threshold issue, the Court finds that the physical transfer of Saul N. to Texas after
the initiation of this proceeding did not deprive this Court of jurisdiction over his habeas
petition. Weeks v. Wyrick, 638 F.2d 690, 692 (8th Cir. 1981).
3 Because Saul N.’s arguments primarily concern his entitlement to a bond hearing, the
Court determines that here, the bond hearing is the primary relief sought under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 and declines to address the remaining relief requested.
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the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(concluding that the Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to
every individual detained within the United States” (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2));
Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 702 (D. Minn. 2025). For most of the nation’s
history, habeas review “has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring that it
does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.” 	Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525
(quotation omitted). The right to challenge the legality of a person’s confinement through
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “extends to . . . immigration-related detention.” Deng
Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900–01 (D. Minn. 2020) (citation omitted). 	The
petitioner bears the burden of proving that his detention is illegal by a preponderance of
evidence. 	Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), 2025 WL 2466670, at *5
(D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H., 782 F. Supp. 3d at 703).
The fundamental question raised in this case is whether Saul N. is an applicant for
admission under section 1225(b), or a noncitizen residing in the United States under
section 1226.4 	As in other cases, Respondents have argued that because Saul N. is a
4 Saul N. argues that he is a member of the class certified under Maldonado Bautista v.
Santacruz, Case No. 5:25-cv-1873, Doc. No. 92 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). 	(Pet. at 10–
11.) The Maldonado Bautista class includes:
All noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who
(1) have entered or will enter the United States without
inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon
arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the
Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody
determination.
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noncitizen who is present in the United States without having been admitted, he is an
“applicant” for admission under section 1225(b) and therefore subject to mandatory
detention under section 1225(b)(2). 	(Doc. No. 4 at 6.) 	Courts have overwhelmingly
rejected Respondents’ interpretation that section 1225(b)(2) requires the mandatory
detention of all noncitizens living in the country who are “inadmissible” because they
entered the United States without inspection. See, e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-
CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 & n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that
this interpretation had been rejected in 350 cases “decided by over 160 different judges
sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the United States” and collecting cases
in an Appendix A); Jose Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL
3146312, at *1 n.2 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025) (collecting cases); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No.
25-CV-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (collecting
cases). This Court also finds Respondents’ interpretation unpersuasive.
When interpreting a statute, “every clause and word of a statute should have
meaning.” 	United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432
(2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147,
152 (1883)). 	Noncitizens who have been residing in the United States but who entered
2025 WL 3713987, at *32 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), judgment entered sub nom.
Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). 	Saul N.
argues that as a class member, he is subject to that court’s declaratory relief and final
judgment holding that class members are not subject to mandatory detention and are instead
entitled to a bond hearing under section 1226(a). 	(Pet. at 11.) 	Although, based on the
factual findings above, it appears that Saul N. meets the definition of a Maldonado Bautista
class member, the Court does not address this in light of its independent determination that
Saul N. is entitled to a bond hearing pursuant to section 1226(a).
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without inspection have not, historically, been considered to still be “arriving” under
section 1225(b). 	This is because the statute itself states that, in order to apply, several
conditions must be met; specifically, an immigration officer must determine that the
noncitizen “is an applicant for admission . . . seeking admission . . . [and] not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Determining the plain
meaning of the statute requires consideration of the tense of the verb “is” and the present
participle “seeking.” 	Here, section 1225(b)(2) applies to persons who presently are
applicants for admission and who presently are seeking admission at the time of their
detention. 	To be seeking admission means to be seeking entry, which “by its own force
implies a coming from outside.” United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401
(1929). In this case, Saul N. has been residing in the United States and is, therefore, not
currently “seeking admission” into the United States.
In addition, Respondents’ interpretation of 1225(b)(2) renders superfluous other
immigration laws. Specifically, interpreting section 1225(b)(2) as applying to noncitizens
who have already entered the country and are not currently seeking admission into the
country, as Respondents urge, would render meaningless a recent amendment to section
1226 by the Laken Riley Act (LRA). The LRA added new categories of noncitizens subject
to mandatory detention under section 1226(c), and one such category was for noncitizens
lacking valid documentation and who have been charged with or convicted of certain
crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). But if Respondents’ interpretation of section
1225 were correct, then there would have been no need for the LRA to create these
additional categories because all noncitizens who are present in the United States and have
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not 	been 	admitted 	would 	have 	already 	been 	ineligible 	for 	bond 	under 	section
1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court also agrees with those courts that have found that Respondents’
interpretation of section 1225(b) is “at odds with both the relevant legislative history and
longstanding agency practice.” Belsai D.S., 2025 WL 2802947, at *7; see, e.g., Maldonado
v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1150 (D. Minn. 2025) (discussing the longstanding practice
of treating noncitizens who resided in the United States, but who had entered without
inspection, as being subject to section 1226(a)).
Therefore, because section 1225(b) is inapplicable to Saul N., he is subject to the
provisions of section 1226, which “sets forth a discretionary process for the apprehension
and detention of aliens who are already present in the United States and eligible for
removal.” Selvin Adonay E.M. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3975 (SRN/DTS), 2025 WL 3157839,
at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025). Pursuant to section 1226(a), Saul N. is entitled to a bond
hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)(2); see also Belsai D.S., 2025 WL 2802947, at *5–6; Jose
Andres R.E., 2025 WL 3146312, at *1 n.2. 	For these reasons, the Court finds that Saul
N.’s detention is governed by section 1226(a), and he is not subject to section 1225(b)’s
mandatory detention. Accordingly, the Court grants the Petition to the extent Saul N. seeks
a bond redetermination hearing.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Petition (Doc. No. 1) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part, as follows:
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1. 	Respondents must immediately provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and in any event, on or before 5:00 p.m. CT on January
16, 2026.
2. 	If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner must be immediately released from
detention.
3. 	On or before 11:00 a.m. CT on January 20, 2026, Respondents shall provide
the Court with a status update concerning the results of any bond hearing
conducted pursuant to this Order, or if no bond hearing was held, advise the
Court regarding Petitioner’s release.
4. 	Respondents shall not remove, transfer, or otherwise facilitate the removal
of Petitioner from the United States of America.
5. 	No other person or agency shall remove, transfer, or otherwise facilitate the
removal of Petitioner from the United States on Respondents’ behalf.
6. 	To the extent Petitioner seeks additional relief, the Petition is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 14, 2026 	/s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
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