Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Segundo P.,
Petitioner,
v.
Todd M. Lyons, in his capacity as Acting
Director, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; Kristi Noem, Secretary, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security; Pamela
Bondi, U.S. Attorney General; Executive
Office for Immigration Review; David
Easterwood, Field Office Director of St.
Paul Field Office for U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Enforcement and Removal Operations; and
Warden Mike Jambor, Jail Warden for the
Kandiyohi County Jail,
Respondents.
File No. 26-CV-91 (JMB/SGE)
ORDER
Thomas R. Anderson III, Anderson & Anderson Law LLC, Minneapolis, MN, for
Segundo P.
Lucas B. Draisey and Ana H. Voss, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for
Respondents 	Todd 	M. 	Lyons, 	Kristi 	Noem, 	Pamela 	Bondi, 	Executive 	Office 	for
Immigration Review, and Warden Mike Jambor.
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Segundo P.’s1 Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	(Doc. No. 1 [hereinafter, “Pet.”].)
1 This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial of any
nongovernmental parties in immigration cases.
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Respondents 	Todd 	M. 	Lyons, 	Kristi 	Noem, 	Pamela 	Bondi, 	Executive 	Office 	for
Immigration Review, and Warden Mike Jambor (together, “Respondents”) oppose the
Petition. For the reasons explained below, the Court grants the Petition in part.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. 	Segundo P. is a citizen of Ecuador who entered the United States without
inspection in June 2019. (Pet. at 4, 11.)
2. 	Segundo P. was placed in removal proceedings in June 2019, charged with,
among other things, being inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who
had entered the United States without inspection. (Id.; see also Pet. Ex. A.) On June 28,
2019, he was released on his own recognizance. (Pet. Ex. K at 2.)
3. 	On March 9, 2024, Segundo P.’s removal proceedings were dismissed under
an exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
(Pet. at 12; Pet. Ex. B.)
4. 	On October 17, 2024, Segundo P. applied for asylum and withholding of
removal. (Pet. at 12; Pet. Ex. C.)
5. 	Segundo P. has no criminal history. (Pet. at 13; Pet. Ex. K at 3.)
6. 	On July 30, 2025, DHS reinitiated removal proceedings against Segundo P.
by serving him with a second Notice to Appear, again charging him as being inadmissible
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who had entered the United States without
inspection. (Pet. at 12; see also Pet. Ex. D.)
7. 	On December 30, 2025, Segundo P. was arrested by officers of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and remains in their custody. (Pet. at 12.)
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8. 	On 	December 	30, 	2025, 	Segundo 	P. 	was 	scheduled 	for 	a 	bond
redetermination hearing to be held on January 8, 2025. (Pet. at 12; Pet. Ex. G.)
9. 	On January 7, 2025, DHS filed an additional charge against Segundo P.,
charging him with being an immigrant who “at the time of application for admission, is not
in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or
other valid entry document as required by the Act, and a valid unexpired passport, or other
suitable travel document, or document of identity and nationality as required under the
regulations issued by the Attorney General under section 211(a) of the Act” (8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)). (Pet. Ex. H.)
10. 	On January 8, 2026, the immigration court where Segundo P.’s bond
redetermination hearing was scheduled to take place closed, and the hearing did not take
place. (Pet. at 13; Pet. Ex. I.)
11. 	On January 8, 2026, Segundo P. filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	(Pet.) 	Segundo P. seeks immediate release or, in the
alternative, a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Id. at 13, 17.) He also seeks
an injunction prohibiting Respondents “from invoking the auto-stay provisions during any
pending bond appeal, should the Immigration Judge issue a bond to him.” (Id. at 13–15.)
He also seeks related declaratory relief. (See id. at 17.)
12. 	On January 8, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to file a response to the
Petition by January 13, 2026 at 11:00 a.m. 	(Doc. No. 3.) 	Respondents timely filed a
response. (Doc. No. 5.)
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DISCUSSION
Respondents generally oppose Segundo P.’s Petition, explaining that the Petition
“raises legal and factual issues similar to those in prior habeas petitions this Court has
decided” and that Respondents have appealed one such petition (see Avila v. Bondi, No.
25-3248 (8th Cir.)). 	(Doc. No. 5.) 	Respondents then incorporate by reference all of the
arguments raised in the Avila appeal and request denial of the petition. (Id.) In this way,
Respondents reiterate their argument that the detention of petitioners similarly situated to
Segundo P. is mandatory pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). For the reasons discussed below,
the Court concludes that because section 1225(b) is not applicable to him, Segundo P. is
entitled to a bond hearing pursuant to section 1226(a)(1). 	The Court therefore grants
Segundo P.’s Petition.2
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that a writ of habeas corpus may be granted
to any person who demonstrates he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
(concluding that the Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to
every individual detained within the United States” (citing U.S. Const., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2));
Aditya W.H. v. Trump, 782 F. Supp. 3d 691, 702 (D. Minn. 2025). For most of the nation’s
history, habeas review “has remained a critical check on the Executive, ensuring that it
2 Because Segundo P.’s arguments primarily concern his entitlement to a bond hearing, the
Court determines that here, the bond hearing is the primary relief sought under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 and declines to address the remaining relief requested, including immediate release,
declaratory relief, and injunctive relief concerning a hypothetical request for an “auto-stay”
of an order by an immigration judge at the yet-to-occur bond redetermination hearing.
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does not detain individuals except in accordance with law.” 	Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525
(quotation omitted). The right to challenge the legality of a person’s confinement through
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “extends to . . . immigration-related detention.” Deng
Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900–01 (D. Minn. 2020) (citation omitted). 	The
petitioner bears the burden of proving that his detention is illegal by a preponderance of
evidence. 	Jose J.O.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3051 (ECT/DJF), 2025 WL 2466670, at *5
(D. Minn. Aug. 27, 2025) (citing Aditya W.H., 782 F. Supp. 3d at 703).
The fundamental question raised in this case is whether Segundo P. is an applicant
for admission under section 1225(b), or a noncitizen residing in the United States under
section 1226.3 In other cases, Respondents have argued that a noncitizen who is
present in the United States without having been admitted, like Segundo P., is an
3 Segundo P. argues that he is a member of the class certified under Maldonado Bautista v.
Santacruz, Case No. 5:25-cv-1873, Doc. No. 92 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). 	(Pet. at 11.)
The Maldonado Bautista class includes:
All noncitizens in the United States without lawful status who
(1) have entered or will enter the United States without
inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon
arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the
Department of Homeland Security makes an initial custody
determination.
2025 WL 3713987, at *32 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025), judgment entered sub nom.
Maldonado Bautista v. Noem, 2025 WL 3678485 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). Segundo P.
argues that as a class member, he is subject to that court’s declaratory relief and final
judgment holding that class members are not subject to mandatory detention and are instead
entitled to a bond hearing under section 1226(a). 	(Pet. at 11.) 	Although, based on the
factual findings above, it appears that Segundo P. meets the definition of a Maldonado
Bautista class member, the Court does not address this in light of its independent
determination that Segundo P. is entitled to a bond hearing pursuant to section 1226(a).
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“applicant” for admission under section 1225(b) and therefore subject to mandatory
detention under section 1225(b)(2). 	(Doc. No. 9 at 2.) 	Courts have overwhelmingly
rejected Respondents’ interpretation that section 1225(b)(2) requires the mandatory
detention of all noncitizens living in the country who are “inadmissible” because they
entered the United States without inspection. See, e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-
CV-6582 (LAK), 2025 WL 3295903, at *4 & n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (noting that
this interpretation had been rejected in 350 cases “decided by over 160 different judges
sitting in about fifty different courts spread across the United States” and collecting cases
in an Appendix A); Jose Andres R.E. v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-3946 (NEB/DLM), 2025 WL
3146312, at *1 n.2 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2025) (collecting cases); Belsai D.S. v. Bondi, No.
25-CV-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *5–6 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (collecting
cases). This Court also finds Respondents’ interpretation unpersuasive.
When interpreting a statute, “every clause and word of a statute should have
meaning.” 	United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 432
(2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147,
152 (1883)). 	Noncitizens who have been residing in the United States but who entered
without inspection have not, historically, been considered to still be “arriving” under
section 1225(b). 	This is because the statute itself states that, in order to apply, several
conditions must be met; specifically, an immigration officer must determine that the
noncitizen “is an applicant for admission . . . seeking admission . . . [and] not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). Determining the plain
meaning of the statute requires consideration of the tense of the verb “is” and the present
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participle “seeking.” 	Here, section 1225(b)(2) applies to persons who presently are
applicants for admission and who presently are seeking admission at the time of their
detention. 	To be seeking admission means to be seeking entry, which “by its own force
implies a coming from outside.” United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398, 401
(1929). In this case, Segundo P. has been residing in the United States and is, therefore,
not currently “seeking admission” into the United States.
In addition, Respondents’ interpretation of 1225(b)(2) renders superfluous other
immigration laws. Specifically, interpreting section 1225(b)(2) as applying to noncitizens
who have already entered the country and are not currently seeking admission into the
country, as Respondents urge, would render meaningless a recent amendment to section
1226 by the Laken Riley Act (LRA). The LRA added new categories of noncitizens subject
to mandatory detention under section 1226(c), and one such category was for noncitizens
lacking valid documentation and who have been charged with or convicted of certain
crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). But if Respondents’ interpretation of section
1225 were correct, then there would have been no need for the LRA to create these
additional categories because all noncitizens who are present in the United States and have
not 	been 	admitted 	would 	have 	already 	been 	ineligible 	for 	bond 	under 	section
1225(b)(2)(A).
The Court also agrees with those courts that have found that Respondents’
interpretation of section 1225(b) is “at odds with both the relevant legislative history and
longstanding agency practice.” Belsai D.S., 2025 WL 2802947, at *7; see, e.g., Maldonado
v. Olson, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1150 (D. Minn. 2025) (discussing the longstanding practice
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of treating noncitizens who resided in the United States, but who had entered without
inspection, as being subject to section 1226(a)). Indeed, the argument is even at odds with
Respondents’ practice in this case. 	The fact that Respondents released him on his own
recognizance in 2019 (Pet. Ex. K at 2), and then in 2025, scheduled Segundo P. for a bond
redetermination hearing, which was cancelled simply because the immigration court
facility where the hearing was to be held was closed (Pet. at 12–13; Pet. Exs. G & I), is
further confirmation that he is subject to section 1226(a).
Segundo P.’s application for asylum does not change the conclusion. The definition
of “admission” in this context means “the lawful entry of the noncitizen into the United
States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Barco Mercado, 2025
WL 3295903 at *5 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (emphasis altered)). 	Even by
applying for asylum, a “noncitizen who already has entered the United States illegally and
is living here cannot be said to be actively seeking lawful entry into the United States,”
because the “entry, whether lawful or unlawful, occurred years ago.” 	Id. (emphasis in
original). 	Other courts have reached this same conclusion under similar facts. 	E.g.,
Quishpe-Guaman v. Noem, No. 4:25-CV-00211-TWP-KMB, 2025 WL 3201072, at *4
(S.D. Ind. Nov. 17, 2025) (finding it was “strong evidence” that the federal government
earlier released a noncitizen on her own recognizance under section 1226 and rejecting
Respondents’ argument that her asylum application shows that she “is plainly seeking
admission to the United States”); Mayamu K. v. Bondi, File No. 25-3035 (JWB/LIB), 2025
WL 3641819, at *4, 8 (D. Minn. Oct. 20, 2025) (concluding that despite a pending asylum
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application, the petitioner’s previous Order of Release on Recognizance under section 1226
precludes detention under section 1225).
Therefore, because section 1225(b) is inapplicable to Segundo P., he is subject to
the 	provisions 	of 	section 1226, 	which 	“sets 	forth 	a 	discretionary 	process 	for 	the
apprehension and detention of aliens who are already present in the United States and
eligible for removal.” 	Selvin Adonay E.M. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-3975 (SRN/DTS), 2025
WL 3157839, at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 12, 2025). Pursuant to section 1226(a), Segundo P. is
entitled to a bond hearing. 	8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)(2); see also Belsai D.S., 2025 WL
2802947, at *5–6; Jose Andres R.E., 2025 WL 3146312, at *1 n.2. For these reasons, the
Court finds that Segundo P.’s detention is governed by section 1226(a), and he is not
subject to section 1225(b)’s mandatory detention. 	Accordingly, the Court grants the
Petition to the extent Segundo P. seeks a bond redetermination hearing.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Petition (Doc. No. 1) is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part, as follows:
1. 	Respondents must immediately provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and in any event, on or before 5:00 p.m. CT on January
15, 2026.
2. 	If Respondents do not provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner must be immediately released from
detention.
3. 	On or before 10:00 a.m. CT on January 19, 2026, Respondents shall provide
the Court with a status update concerning the results of any bond hearing
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conducted pursuant to this Order, or if no bond hearing was held, advise the
Court regarding Petitioner’s release.
4. 	Respondents shall not remove, transfer, or otherwise facilitate the removal
of Petitioner from the District of Minnesota prior to compliance with
Paragraphs 1–3 of this Order.
5. 	To the extent Petitioner seeks additional relief, the Petition is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 14, 2026 /s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
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