Tietz v. Hennepin County Human Services et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Jennifer M. Tietz,
Plaintiff,
v.
Hennepin County Human Services;
Galadriel Ingram, in her individual and
official capacities; Nancy Applebaum,
Guardian ad Litem, in her individual
capacity; and Rebecca Hanscom, Hennepin
County Juvenile County Attorney, in her
individual and official capacities,
Defendants.
File No. 26-cv-53 (ECT/DTS)
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Jennifer M. Tietz’s Complaint for
Violation of Civil Rights [ECF Nos. 1 and 1-1] and Application to Proceed In Forma
Pauperis [ECF No. 2 (“IFP Application”)]. For the following reasons, this action will be
dismissed and Tietz’s IFP Application will be denied as moot.
I
Tietz sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations during child-
protection proceedings in Hennepin County, Minnesota. See Compl. [ECF No. 1-1] at 2–
3. Tietz claims custodial rights over her minor siblings after their mother’s death in July
2023. 	Id. ¶¶ 1, 10, 14. She contends that Hennepin County officials lacked authority to
assume 	jurisdiction 	over 	custody 	proceedings 	and 	contradicted 	another 	county’s
determinations. Id. ¶ 13.
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Tietz alleges that on June 21, 2023, she tried to pick up her minor siblings in
Hastings, Minnesota, and requested police assistance “to avoid conflict.” 	Id. ¶¶ 10–11.1
An officer refused to let Tietz take the children, based on information from Defendant
Galadriel Ingram, identified as a “Hennepin County CPS worker.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 11–12. Ingram
reportedly told the officer that Hennepin County had placed a “hold” on the children and
that a court hearing was scheduled for the next day. See id. ¶ 12. Tietz alleges no hearing
occurred and that she received no notice of an emergency custody order. Id.
On June 28, 2023, Tietz appeared at a hearing in Hennepin County Juvenile Court
concerning allegations against her mother. Id. ¶ 13. Tietz asserts “[t]hese allegations [had
already been] screened out by Anoka County,” presumably meaning they were deemed
unsubstantiated. 	Id.2 Consequently, Tietz suggests Hennepin County lacked jurisdiction
but proceeded with the child-protection case. See id. Tietz states that after her mother died
in July 2023, she became the children’s only legal parent or guardian. Id. ¶ 14.
Tietz alleges procedural irregularities and the deprivation of her parental rights
throughout the state-court proceedings. See id. ¶¶ 15–23. She claims her court-appointed
attorney “pressured” her into surrendering her “parental rights,” causing her to discharge
that attorney for inadequate representation. 	Id. ¶ 15. After reviewing the case file, Tietz
allegedly found documents indicating Hennepin County “initiated and continued [child-
1 	The source of this foreseen “conflict” is not explained.
2 	The Complaint does not provide state-court case numbers for any of the relevant
proceedings.
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protection] proceedings without jurisdiction,” and made determinations contrary to earlier
findings by Anoka County. Id. ¶ 16.
The Complaint further states that at a juvenile court trial, a judge found that
Hennepin County failed to provide “reasonable reunification efforts.” Id. ¶ 17. At a later
hearing, the judge allegedly ordered the County to provide Tietz “full discovery” and
access to certain “school and medical records,” and “acknowledged that [Tietz’s] parental
rights remained intact.” Id. ¶ 18. Despite this order, Hennepin County officials allegedly
“withheld discovery” for about a year and denied Tietz access to certain “records,
communication, and visitation.” 	Id. ¶ 19. 	Tietz received partial school records in May
2025, but the records “only extended through October 2025.” Id. ¶ 20. She claims she was
also excluded from one child’s special-education (IEP) planning despite her parental status.
Id.
Tietz asserts she fully complied with her case plan throughout this period. Id. ¶ 21.
Under this plan, she successfully completed a home assessment, completed “[t]wo years of
parenting education,” took a drug test, underwent psychological evaluations, and attended
multiple meetings with unspecified “department” officials. Id. In return, Hennepin County
allegedly failed to meet with her, provide “required services” or “mandated financial
assistance,” or fulfill its obligations to facilitate reunification. 	Id. ¶ 22; see id. ¶ 23.
Consequently, Tietz and the children allegedly remain separated without justification,
causing ongoing interference with her custodial relationship and parental rights. 	See id.
¶ 23.
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The Complaint names four defendants. Aside from Ingram (sued in her individual
and 	official 	capacities), 	these 	include 	Hennepin 	County 	Human 	Services; 	Nancy
Applebaum, a Guardian ad Litem “appointed in the Hennepin County juvenile case”; and
Rebecca Hanscom, “a Hennepin County Juvenile County Attorney” who worked on the
same matter. 	Id. ¶¶ 2–5.3 The Complaint suggests five causes of action: (1) violation of
Tietz’s right to familial integrity (invoking substantive due process); (2) denial of
procedural due process; (3) unreasonable seizure of the children (invoking the Fourth
Amendment); (4) denial of equal protection; and (5) Monell municipal liability4 against
Hennepin County for an unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice. Id. ¶¶ 24–31.
Tietz seeks various forms of injunctive relief, including the children’s immediate
return to her custody, dismissal or transfer of “all Hennepin County Juvenile Court
proceedings,” and orders for record access and to stop alleged unconstitutional practices.
Id. at 4. She also seeks compensatory and punitive damages, “[d]eclaratory relief stating
that Defendants violated [Tietz’s] constitutional rights,” attorneys’ fees and costs, and
“[a]ny additional relief the Court deems just and proper.” Id. at 4.5
3 	Applebaum is sued in her individual capacity only; Hanscom is sued in her individ-
ual and official capacities. Compl. at 1.
4 	Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
5 	Neither the causes of action nor the requested relief distinguish at all between the
various Defendants; in other words, all Defendants are purportedly targeted by all five
causes of action, and are being sued for all requested forms of relief. See Compl. at 3–4.
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II
Rather than pay this action’s filing fee, Tietz submitted the IFP Application. That
filing suggests that, as a financial matter, Tietz may well qualify for in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) status here. 	But under the federal statute governing IFP proceedings, “the court
shall dismiss [an IFP proceeding] at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . .
is frivolous[,] [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 	28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2).
A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); see also, e.g., Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d
421, 423 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Neitzke). As relevant here, courts in this District regularly
dismiss complaints as factually frivolous when they do not allege how a defendant’s actions
establish liability. 	See, e.g., Logering v. Morrison Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 23-cv-0177
(JWB/LIB), 2023 WL 3276515, at *4 (D. Minn. May 5, 2023) (citing cases), aff’d, No. 23-
2376, 2023 WL 8713781 (8th Cir. Dec. 18, 2023).
III
The Complaint lacks any specific allegations regarding the conduct of Defendants
Nancy Applebaum and Rebecca Hanscom; it therefore fails to explain what these
Defendants did or did not do to establish liability to Tietz. The Court therefore dismisses
the Complaint without prejudice, as frivolous, to the extent it brings claims against
Applebaum and Hanscom.
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IV
The Complaint specifically asks to “dismiss[]” or “transfer” certain Hennepin
County Juvenile Court proceedings. This is construed to mean state-court proceedings are
ongoing. If they were not, dismissal or transfer would be unnecessary. This raises the issue
of Younger abstention.6
The Younger doctrine mandates federal abstention from interfering in certain
ongoing state proceedings. See, e.g., Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72
(2013) (citing cases). 	The Eighth Circuit uses “a three-part inquiry” to determine when
Younger abstention applies:
First, does the underlying state proceeding fall within one of
the 	three 	“exceptional 	circumstances” 	where 	Younger
abstention 	is 	appropriate? 	Second, 	if 	the 	underlying
proceeding fits within a Younger category, does the state
proceeding 	satisfy 	what 	are 	known 	as 	the 	“Middlesex”
factors? [7] And third, even if the underlying state proceeding
satisfies the first two inquiries, is abstention nevertheless
inappropriate because an exception to abstention applies?
Wassef v. Tibben, 68 F.4th 1083, 1087 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting 375 Slane Chapel Rd., LLC
v. Stone County, 53 F.4th 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 2022)); see also Auleciems v. Township of
West Lakeland, No. 24-cv-1661 (KMM/DJF), 2025 WL 509188, at *7–8 (D. Minn. Feb.
14, 2025) (quoting Wassef), aff’d, No. 25-1387, 2025 WL 3062719 (8th Cir. Nov. 3, 2025).
6 	Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 	A district court can consider issues of
Younger abstention sua sponte. See, e.g., Geier v. Mo. Ethics Comm’n, 715 F.3d 674, 676
(8th Cir. 2013) (affirming district-court dismissal based on sua sponte consideration of
Younger abstention).
7 	Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
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All three elements are met here. 	First, the three “exceptional circumstances”
mentioned in Wassef are (1) ongoing state criminal prosecutions; (2) certain quasi-criminal
civil 	enforcement 	proceedings, 	typically 	state-initiated 	proceedings 	to 	sanction
wrongdoing; and (3) civil proceedings implicating a state court’s judicial functions. 	See,
e.g., Sprint Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 72 (quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of
New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367–68 (1989)); Wassef, 68 F.4th at 1087 (quoting Sprint
Commc’ns). 	The Hennepin County proceedings concerning Tietz fall within the second
category. 	Child-protection cases are routinely treated as quasi-criminal enforcement
actions: they are initiated by the state, prosecuted by county attorneys, and enforce child-
welfare laws through orders that can curtail parental rights. See, e.g., Oglala Sioux Tribe
v. Fleming, 904 F.3d 603, 610 (8th Cir. 2018); Rubbelke v. Zarembinski, No. 23-cv-0707
(PJS/ECW), 2023 WL 3094371, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr. 26, 2023) (collecting cases applying
Younger abstention in circumstances involving state family-court proceedings).
The next consideration is whether the state proceeding meets the Middlesex factors.
These are straightforward: (1) there must be an ongoing state judicial proceeding at the
time the federal action is filed; (2) the proceeding must implicate important state interests;
and (3) the state proceeding must provide an adequate opportunity to raise federal
constitutional challenges. Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm’n, 457 U.S. at 432; accord Wassef
v. Tibben, 68 F.4th at 1088 (quoting Minn. Living Assistance, Inc. v. Peterson, 899 F.3d
548, 553 (8th Cir. 2018)). There is no serious question that these factors favor abstention
here.
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Finally, no exception to Younger abstention applies. The Complaint lacks plausible
allegations that “the pending state action was brought in bad faith or for the purpose of
[harassment],” or that other “extraordinary circumstances” make abstention inappropriate.
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446–47 (1977); see also, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327, 	338 	(1977) 	(noting 	Younger-abstention 	exception 	where 	“state 	proceeding 	is
motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith” (quoting Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975))).
Ordinarily, Younger requires dismissing claims for declaratory and injunctive relief
and staying damages claims until the relevant state case ends. See Quackenbush v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996). 	But this case fits a narrow exception where dismissing
damages claims is appropriate. 	Under binding precedent, a federal court may dismiss
damages claims under Younger when they are so bound up with the state proceeding that
awarding damages would effectively declare the state process or result unconstitutional.
See Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 115–16 (1981). The
Eighth Circuit applied this principle in Amerson v. Iowa, affirming dismissal of both
equitable and monetary claims because damages could not be awarded “without first
declaring unconstitutional a state court judgment on a matter firmly committed to the
states.” 94 F.3d 510, 512–13 (8th Cir. 1996).
Following Amerson, Minnesota district courts have dismissed damages claims in
§ 1983 suits challenging ongoing state-court proceedings when those claims depend on
undermining state-court rulings. 	See, e.g., Guertin v. Hennepin County, No. 24-cv-2646
(JRT/DLM), 2024 WL 4355087, at *3 (D. Minn. Sep. 30, 2024) (citing Amerson); Carlson
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v. County of Ramsey, No. 16-cv-765 (SRN/BRT), 2016 WL 3352196, at *6 n.3 (D. Minn.
June 15, 2016) (same), aff’d, 673 F. App’x 601 (8th Cir. 2017). 	That is the case here.
Tietz’s damages claims could not prevail without undercutting rulings in the ongoing state
proceedings. The Court therefore dismisses all remaining claims—for all forms of relief—
based on Younger abstention.
Based on the discussion above, the Court dismisses this action in its entirety. As a
result, the Court also denies the IFP Application and the motion for a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction as moot.
ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Plaintiff Jennifer M. Tietz’s Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights [ECF
Nos. 1 and 1-1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2),
as frivolous, to the extent it purports to bring claims against Defendants Nancy Applebaum
and Rebecca Hanscom.
2. 	The remainder of this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
based on application of Younger abstention.
3. 	Tietz’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis [ECF No. 2] is DENIED
AS MOOT.
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4. 	Tietz’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
[ECF No. 3] is DENIED AS MOOT.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 9, 2026 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
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