Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Saengnakhone S.,
Petitioner-Plaintiff,
v.
Kristi Noem, in her official capacity as
Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Todd Lyons, in his
official capacity as Acting Director of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
Michael Bottjen, in his official capacity as
Acting Deputy Field Office Director of St.
Paul-Minneapolis Office, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement; and David Isais,
in his official capacity as Jail
Commissioner, Sherburne County Jail,
Respondents-Defendants.
File No. 25-cv-4775 (ECT/LIB)
OPINION AND ORDER
Mai Neng Moua, Mai N. Moua Law Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Petitioner-Plaintiff
Saengnakhone S.
Ana H. Voss and Trevor Brown, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for
Respondents-Defendants Kristi Noem, Todd Lyons, and Michael Bottjen.
Petitioner Saengnakhone S. is detained pending his removal from the United States
to Laos. In this habeas case, Saengnakhone claims his detention violates the United States
Constitution and federal statutes and regulations. 	He seeks a preliminary injunction that
would, if issued, require his immediate release from custody and forbid Respondents from
removing him until a final judgment is entered in this case. The motion will be denied, and
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the petition will be dismissed, because Saengnakhone’s detention does not violate federal
law and because the record at this stage is sufficient for the Petition’s final adjudication.
I
Saengnakhone S., a Laotian national, entered the United States in 1991, when he
was about one year old.1 	Pet. [ECF No. 3] ¶ 13; ECF No. 8 ¶ 4. 	He has resided in the
United States ever since. 	Pet. ¶ 14. 	On June 18, 2009, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) served Saengnakhone with a Notice to Appear, Form I-862. 	ECF
No. 8 ¶ 5. On June 30, 2009, the Immigration Court in Bloomington, Minnesota, ordered
1 	Saengnakhone alleges he entered the United States as a refugee. 	Pet. ¶ 13. 	If
Saengnakhone means “refugee” as the term is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42), the
allegation is not plausible. Under that statute,
[t]he term “refugee” means (A) any person who is outside any
country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling
to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion, or (B) in such special circumstances as the
President after appropriate consultation (as defined in section
1157(e) of this title) may specify, any person who is within the
country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person
having no nationality, within the country in which such person
is habitually residing, and who is persecuted or who has a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, 	membership 	in 	a 	particular 	social 	group, 	or
political opinion.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Saengnakhone nowhere alleges he fears persecution in Laos, and
there is no independent record of refugee status. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (governing
annual admission of refugees).
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him removed to Thailand or, in the alternative, to Laos. Pet. ¶ 15; ECF No. 8 ¶ 6; ECF No.
8-1 at 1. 	Saengnakhone was initially detained pending removal but then released from
custody on an order of supervision on September 30, 2009. Pet. ¶ 15; ECF No. 8 ¶ 7.
On December 12, 2025, ICE arrested Saengnakhone, detained him, and served him
with a Notice of Revocation of Release. Pet. ¶¶ 20–22; ECF No. 8 ¶ 8. In relevant part,
the Notice reads as follows:
This letter is to inform you that your case has been reviewed
and it has been determined that you will be kept in the custody
of [ICE] at this time. This decision has been made based on a
review of your file and/or your personal interview on account
of changed circumstances in your case. 	ICE has determined
that 	there 	is 	a 	significant 	likelihood 	of 	removal 	in 	the
reasonably foreseeable future in your case.
. . .
Since [your] being released, removal from the U.S. is now
significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. Based
on changed circumstances in your case you will be brought
back into ICE custody.
Based on the above, and pursuant to 8 CFR 241.4, you are to
remain in ICE custody at this time.
ECF No. 8-2 at 1. 	The Notice explained that Saengnakhone would receive an informal
interview during which he could respond to the reasons for the revocation and present
evidence. Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3) (requiring ICE to provide an interview). ICE (or
Enforcement and Removal Operations) conducted the interview that same day (December
12), but Saengnakhone provided no verbal or written response. ECF No. 8 ¶ 9; ECF No.
8-3 at 1. Saengnakhone has since been detained at Sherburne County Jail. Pet. ¶ 21.
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The parties agree that, until recently, Laos “refused to accept deportees from the
United States” and refused to accept the repatriation of Laotian nationals from the United
States. 	Id. ¶¶ 26–28; see ECF No. 8 ¶ 11. 	But things have changed. 	Respondents
submitted evidence showing that “Laos has resumed issuing travel documents for removals
and accepting individuals for repatriation.” 	ECF No. 8 ¶ 11.2 	“On December 19, 2025,
[Enforcement and Removal Operations (or “ERO”)] St. Paul submitted a travel document
request to ERO HQ,” which Respondents expect to be approved soon. Id. ¶ 13.
Over December 24 and 25, 2025, Saengnakhone commenced this action by filing a
Complaint and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Pet. ¶ 11, and
he 	filed 	an 	Emergency 	Motion 	for 	Temporary 	Restraining 	Order 	and 	Preliminary
Injunction, ECF No. 2. Saengnakhone claims his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s
substantive and procedural due process guarantees, Pet. ¶¶ 47–57, and the Administrative
Procedure Act, id. ¶¶ 58–73, and he claims Respondents otherwise acted outside their
lawful authority, id. ¶¶ 74–81. 	Saengnakhone requests preliminary injunctive relief
“requiring (1) his immediate release from Respondents’ custody and (2) an order
prohibiting his transfer or removal while this Court adjudicates his habeas petition and
related claims.” ECF No. 2 at 2.
2 	Several news sources corroborate this claim. See Reid Forgrave & Rachel Hutton,
Two Dozen Hmong Minnesotans Await Deportation to Laos After New Round of ICE
Arrests, Minn. Star Trib. (July 3, 2025), https://www.startribune.com/hmong-minnesotans-
face-deportation-laos-ice-arrests/601385285; 	Claire 	Wang, 	ICE’s 	Deportations 	of
South-East Asian Refugees Creating ‘Ripple Effect’ of Trauma: ‘I Didn’t Get to Say Bye to
My Husband,’ Guardian (Sep. 29, 2025), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/
sep/29/ice-deportation-south-east-asians-vietnam-war.
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II
A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy.” 	Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted); Watkins Inc. v. Lewis, 346 F.3d
841, 844 (8th Cir. 2003). The Eighth Circuit’s familiar Dataphase decision describes the
list of considerations to decide whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief: “(1) the
likelihood of the movant’s success on the merits; (2) the threat of irreparable harm to the
movant in the absence of relief; (3) the balance between that harm and the harm that the
relief would cause to the other litigants; and (4) the public interest.” Lexis-Nexis v. Beer,
41 F. Supp. 2d 950, 956 (D. Minn. 1999) (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640
F.2d 109, 112–14 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc)). “The burden of establishing the four factors
lies with the party seeking injunctive relief.” CPI Card Grp., Inc. v. Dwyer, 294 F. Supp.
3d 791, 807 (D. Minn. 2018) (citing Watkins, 346 F.3d at 844).
“While no single factor is determinative, the probability of success factor is the most
significant.” Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 721 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation
modified). Although this factor uses the term “probability,” the movant need not show a
greater than fifty percent likelihood of success. 	Dwyer, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 807. 	The
movant “need only show likelihood of success on the merits on a single cause of action,
not every action it asserts.” 	Id. 	“[T]he absence of a likelihood of success on the merits
strongly suggests that preliminary injunctive relief should be denied . . . .” 	CDI Energy
Servs. v. W. River Pumps, Inc., 567 F.3d 398, 402 (8th Cir. 2009).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, federal courts have jurisdiction to order the release of a
prisoner who “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
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States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). This authority includes the release of detained noncitizens
when ICE fails to follow its own regulations. See Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d
137, 165–66 (W.D.N.Y. 2025); Rombot v. Souza, 296 F. Supp. 3d 383, 389 (D. Mass.
2017); Mohammed H. v. Trump, 781 F. Supp. 3d 886, 895 (D. Minn. 2025). Agencies must
follow their own regulations. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260,
265–68 (1954); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 602 n.7 (1988); Mohammed H., 781 F. Supp.
3d at 895. However, “release need not be the exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate
one in every case in which the writ is granted.” 	Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779
(2008); see Accardi, 347 U.S. at 268 (holding that habeas petitioner was entitled to a new
hearing in which the agency must follow the required procedures).
Turn to the statutory and regulatory scheme governing Saengnakhone’s claims.
“Except as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered removed, the
Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days
. . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). As relevant here, the 90-day clock begins to run on “[t]he
date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).
Another provision authorizes prolonged detention for other categories of aliens, such as
certain criminal offenders, or those “determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the
community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)
(incorporating 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182, 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), and 1227(a)(4)). 	The Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause does not permit indefinite detention under this statute;
a six-month detention is presumptively constitutional, after which “once the alien provides
good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
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foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing.” 	Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). 	If an alien falls outside the
§ 1231(a)(6) categories and is not removed within the 90-day window, he “will be released
subject to supervision.” Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 529 (2021) (first citing
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3); and then citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.5).
“Sections 241.4 and 241.13 of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations govern
the release of noncitizens pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).” Quan v. Bowen, No. 5:25-cv-
02546-HDV-PVC, 2025 WL 3691858, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2025); see E.M.M. v.
Almodovar, No. 25-CV-08212 (MMG), 2025 WL 3077995, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2025)
(explaining regulatory framework). 	Section 241.4 applies to aliens detained under
§ 1231(a)(6), but its “custody review procedures . . . do not apply after the Service3 has
made a determination, pursuant to the procedures provided in 8 CFR 241.13, that there is
no significant likelihood that an alien under a final order of removal can be removed in the
reasonably foreseeable future.” 	8 C.F.R. § 241.4(a), (b)(4). 	Under § 241.13, supervised
release may be revoked in two situations—when the alien violates release conditions or “if,
on account of changed circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant
likelihood that the alien may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13(i)(1)–(2). 	In 	either 	case—a 	supervised 	release 	violation 	or 	changed
3 	The “Service” formerly referred to the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
since dissolved. 	Its functions under this regulation are now performed by ICE. 	See
Fuentes-Pena v. Barr, 917 F.3d 827, 830–31 (5th Cir. 2019); 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (“Service means
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and/or
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as appropriate in the context in which the
term appears.”).
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circumstances—the regulations require ICE to notify the alien “of the reasons for
revocation of his or her release” and to
conduct an initial informal interview promptly after his or her
return to Service custody to afford the alien an opportunity to
respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.
The alien may submit any evidence or information that he or
she believes shows there is no significant likelihood he or she
be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, or that he or
she has not violated the order of supervision. The revocation
custody review will include an evaluation of any contested
facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether
the facts as determined warrant revocation and further denial
of release.
8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(3).
Saengnakhone argues that “his detention is unsupported by statutory authority and
violates due process.” 	ECF No. 2 at 3 (relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 699–700). 	As he sees it, § 1231(a)(6) allows “detention beyond the removal
period . . . where the noncitizen is found to be a danger to the community or a flight risk,”
and 	“where 	removal 	is 	not 	reasonably 	foreseeable, 	continued 	detention 	is
unconstitutional,” and these determinations have not happened in his case. ECF No. 2 at 3–
4.
This argument applies the wrong legal framework; Saengnakhone’s re-detention
must be analyzed under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). To the extent he raises a Zadvydas challenge,
it is premature, as Saengnakhone was detained only a few days past the 90-day removal
period in 2009 and has been detained for only a few weeks since his December 2025 arrest.
See Pet. ¶¶ 15, 20; ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 6–8. 	“A habeas petitioner must wait until the
presumptively reasonable six-month detention period has passed before bringing a habeas
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petition challenging that detention.” Brian B. v. Tollefson, No. 24-cv-2884 (NEB/ECW),
2024 WL 4029657, at *1 (D. Minn. July 26, 2024), R. & R. adopted, 2024 WL 4026259
(D. Minn. Sep. 3, 2024). Because his detention past the removal period has been relatively
brief, it does not matter here whether the Zadvydas clock resets with each detention. See
ECF No. 9 at 4–5 (arguing the clock does not reset); Chen v. Holder, No. 6:14-2530, 2015
WL 13236635, at *2 (W.D. La. Nov. 20, 2015) (“Surely, under the reasoning of Zadvydas,
a series of releases and re-detentions by the government, as was done in this case, while
technically not in violation of the presumptively reasonable jurisprudential six month
removal period, in essence results in an indefinite period of detention, albeit executed in
successive six month intervals.”).4 Saengnakhone is not likely to succeed on the merits on
this ground because his challenge is premature.
As for alleged procedural violations, Saengnakhone argues “Respondents revoked
[his] order of supervision without complying with mandatory regulations governing who
may revoke supervision, what findings must be made, and what procedures must be
followed, including notice and an opportunity to respond.” ECF No. 2 at 4 (citing 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.4(l)). In his reply brief, Saengnakhone specifies that he objects to Respondents’ lack
of individualized evidence that his removal is likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The 	parties 	dispute 	which 	set 	of 	regulations 	applies 	to 	Saengnakhone, 	but
Respondents are correct that § 241.13 governs the re-detention decision, not § 241.4.
4 	Several of Saengnakhone’s citations contain errors. 	For example, he quotes Chen
as saying that the government may not “restart the clock by releasing and re-detaining the
petitioner,” ECF No. 9 at 4 n.1, but that quotation does not appear in the opinion, see Chen,
2015 WL 13236635.
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Section 241.13 applies “where the alien has provided good reason to believe there is no
significant likelihood of removal to the country to which he or she was ordered removed,
or to a third country, in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 	8 C.F.R. § 241.13(a); see 8
C.F.R. § 241.4(b)(4) (stating § 241.4 custody review procedures do not apply after the
Service determines there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably
foreseeable 	future). 	Neither 	Saengnakhone 	nor 	Respondents 	have 	produced
documentation of his September 2009 release, which presumably would show that ICE
determined his removal was not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future.
That is the only plausible way to read the record and briefing, and Saengnakhone
acknowledges that his “prior release necessarily reflects a determination that there was no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 	ECF No. 9 at 1;
see id. at 5 (“Petitioner already made that showing years ago, and Respondents agreed by
releasing him from their custody.”). 	The removal order and the Notice of Revocation of
Release support this position. 	Saengnakhone was ordered to be removed to Thailand or
Laos, ECF No. 8-1 at 1, and the parties agree that Laos was not accepting deportees until
recently (and no party argues it is likely he will be removed to Thailand), see Pet. ¶ 28;
ECF No. 8 ¶ 11. 	The Notice of Revocation of Release states that circumstances of have
changed: “ICE has determined that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future in [Saengnakhone’s] case.” ECF No. 8-2 at 1. That implies
ICE previously determined there was not a significant likelihood of his removal, and
therefore § 241.4 does not govern the re-detention decision. 	See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(b)(4);
Nguyen v. Hyde, 788 F. Supp. 3d 144, 149 (D. Mass. 2025) (applying § 241.13(i) to
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challenge to “ICE’s authority to re-detain [Petitioner] after he was issued a final order of
removal, detained, and subsequently released on an [order of supervision]”); Balouch v.
Bondi, No. 9:25-CV-216-MJT, 2025 WL 2871914, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2025).
Therefore, § 241.13(i) governs the re-detention procedures.
Applying § 241.13 is fatal to several of the process-based challenges, such as
Saengnakhone’s claim that “Respondents revoked [his] order of supervision without
complying with mandatory regulations governing who may revoke supervision, [and] what
findings must be made.” 	ECF No. 2 at 4 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)). 	To the extent
Saengnakhone asserts ICE was required to make findings under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(2), see
Pet. ¶¶ 37–38, 63, he applies the wrong regulatory scheme. Re-detention under § 241.13(i)
does not require ICE to make findings that revocation is in the public interest or that the
detainee is dangerous or unlikely to comply with a removal order. 	8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i);
see Pet. ¶¶ 63–64. 	The same goes for the argument that “the official responsible for
revoking [his] order of supervision lacked delegated authority.” ECF No. 2 at 3; see Pet.
¶ 23 (“Upon information and belief, the official responsible for revoking Petitioner’s order
of supervision did not first refer the case to the ICE Executive Associate Director . . . .”).
This requirement is not imposed in § 241.13(i).
Saengnakhone 	argues 	that 	the 	law 	requires 	a 	“fact-specific, 	individualized
assessment” about the likelihood of removal, and that “speculative assertions and general
statements about diplomatic progress or other removals are insufficient.” ECF No. 9 at 5.
In his view, evidence that Laos has recently accepted deportees for repatriation is not
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enough to show that his circumstances have changed such that there is now a significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 6–7.
Respondents have explained what changed circumstances make Saengnakhone’s
removal likely, as required by § 241.13(i)(2).5 Though previously Laos had not accepted
deportees, it has now “resumed issuing travel documents for removals and accepting
individuals for repatriation.” ECF No. 8 ¶ 11. Federal authorities have requested a travel
document for Saengnakhone and expect it to be approved soon, possibly in the next few
months. Id. ¶ 13. The submitted request, along with evidence that “[s]ince March 2025,
ERO St. Paul has been able to remove over 20 individuals to Laos,” id. ¶ 11, and that a
similar 	document 	request 	was 	approved 	quickly, 	id. 	¶ 13, 	satisfy 	the 	regulation’s
requirement. 	See 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(f) (requiring ICE to consider factors such as “the
history of the Service’s efforts to remove aliens to the county in question” and “the views
of the Department of State regarding the prospects for removal of aliens to the country or
countries in question”). Other courts have denied injunctive relief on similar grounds. See
5 	Saengnakhone does not argue that ICE failed to notify him what circumstances
changed that made it significantly likely he would be removed in the reasonably
foreseeable future. See Sarail A. v. Bondi, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 25-cv-2144 (ECT/JFD),
2025 WL 2533673, at *4–6 (D. Minn. Sep. 3, 2025). The absence of this argument makes
sense. 	At this stage, there is no uncertainty regarding what circumstances changed—
Respondents 	have 	produced 	evidence 	that 	Laos 	is 	now 	accepting 	deportees, 	and
Saengnakhone has challenged only the sufficiency of this evidence, not its veracity. Even
if Saengnakhone were likely to succeed on the merits on this ground, the other Dataphase
factors would counsel against granting injunctive relief. He hasn’t shown irreparable harm;
Respondents would have the same (sufficient) grounds to re-detain him as they have shown
here. 	The balance of harms and public interest do not favor releasing Saengnakhone so
that ICE may give him notice of changed circumstances that Saengnakhone has already
litigated in this action.
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Nouansisouhak v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-2222-K-BW, 2025 WL 3165161, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
Oct. 9, 2025) (“Respondents have shown that they re-detained Nouansisouhak because the
previous barriers to removing him to Laos have been eliminated, and it is therefore
significantly likely that he can be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.”), R. & R.
adopted, 2025 WL 3161730 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2025); Roe v. Oddo, No. 3:25-CV-128,
2025 WL 1892445, at *7 (W.D. Pa. July 9, 2025) (“Respondents have represented that,
due to changes in circumstances—such as the administrative policy change and the
submission of a travel document application—Petitioner’s removal is likely in the
reasonably foreseeable future.”).
Saengnakhone’s cited authorities do not undermine this conclusion. 	See Lema v.
INS, 341 F.3d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying habeas relief because petitioner “refuse[d]
to cooperate fully and honestly with officials to secure travel documents from a foreign
government”); Banyee v. Garland, 115 F.4th 928, 933–34 (8th Cir. 2024) (denying habeas
relief where delay was caused by petitioner’s appeal); Seretse-Khama v. Ashcroft, 215 F.
Supp. 2d 37, 50 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding removal not significantly likely where respondents
failed to explain why “the INS has been successful in repatriating over two hundred other
Liberians over the past five years” and “over that same span of time Liberia has consistently
refused to accept petitioner”); Abdel-Muhti v. Ashcroft, 314 F. Supp. 2d 418, 426, 429–30
(M.D. Pa. 2004) (granting habeas petition where petitioner was detained for almost two
years despite his good faith effort to obtain travel documents). Saengnakhone cites a case
that he captions “Sheikh v. Holder,” but whose citation leads to Hernandez v. Holder,
606 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2010). ECF No. 9 at 6 n.3. There are two immigration cases named
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Sheikh v. Holder reported at 696 F.3d 147 (1st Cir. 2012) and 379 F. App’x 697 (9th Cir.
2010); neither the two Sheikhs nor Hernandez support the statement that “speculation
cannot be the basis for relief” in the context of re-detention under § 241.13(i) or Zadvydas.
The final case Saengnakhone cites seems irrelevant; it discusses speculative evidence at
summary judgment. See Moody v. St. Charles County, 23 F.3d 1410, 1412 (8th Cir. 1994).
Saengnakhone has not shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits on grounds that
Respondents failed to comply with the relevant regulations.
The remaining Dataphase factors do not support awarding Saengnakhone injunctive
relief. 	“Irreparable harm occurs when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically
because its injuries cannot be fully compensated through an award of damages.” 	Gen.
Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009). The harm must
be “likely in the absence of an injunction,” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, “great[,] and of such
imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief,” Iowa Utils. Bd. v.
FCC, 109 F.3d 418, 425 (8th Cir. 1996). Saengnakhone has not shown irreparable harm
because he has not shown that his detention is unlawful. 	See Westley v. Harper,
No. 25-229, 2025 WL 592788, at *8 (E.D. La. Feb. 24, 2025) (“Because [petitioner’s]
rights were not violated, there is no irreparable harm.”). 	Saengnakhone argues that his
serious medical condition—“recurrent seizures and a recent head injury, which cannot be
adequately treated in detention”—further constitute irreparable harm. ECF No. 2 at 4. I am
sympathetic to these health issues, but Saengnakhone has not shown how his medical
condition justifies release or other habeas relief. The balance of the equities and the public
interest “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” 	Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S.
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418, 435 (2009); accord Mohammed H., 2025 WL 1170448, at *2. Because Saengnakhone
is subject to a final removal order, and Federal Respondents have shown there is a
significant likelihood he will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, these factors
favor Federal Respondents. See Nouansisouhak, 2025 WL 3165161, at *7.
ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings in
this case, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Petitioner 	Saengnakhone 	S.’s 	Emergency 	Motion 	for 	Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction [ECF No. 2] is DENIED.
2. 	Petitioner’s Complaint and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 3]
is DISMISSED without prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 6, 2026 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
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