State of Minnesota v. United States Department of Agriculture et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
STATE OF MINNESOTA, by and
through its Attorney General,
Keith Ellison,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE and BROOKE
ROLLINS, Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-4767 (LMP/JFD)
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR A
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Elizabeth C. Kramer, Brian Carter, Joseph Richie, Katherine Bies, Lindsey Middlecamp,
and Peter J. Farrell, Minnesota Attorney General’s Office, St. Paul, MN, for Plaintiff.
Brian A. Mizoguchi, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C., and
Adine S. Momoh, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN; for Defendants.
The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) helps low-income
households meet their basic food and nutrition needs. 7 U.S.C. § 2011. SNAP is funded
and regulated by Defendants United States Department of Agriculture and its Secretary
Brooke Rollins (collectively the “USDA”), but states are responsible for the program’s
day-to-day administration. See generally 7 U.S.C. §§ 2013(a), 2020.
States are tasked first and foremost with the verification of an applicant’s eligibility
to receive benefits and the subsequent recertification of eligible beneficiaries. 	7 U.S.C.
§ 2020(a)(1). The way in which states must go about doing so is comprehensively laid out
by federal law and USDA regulations but generally occurs on a rolling basis throughout
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the year. 	See 7 U.S.C. § 2020; 7 C.F.R. §§ 273.1 et seq. 	Plaintiff State of Minnesota
(“Minnesota”) participates in SNAP and is therefore responsible for the certification and
recertification of SNAP applicants and beneficiaries. 	To date, no one disputes that
Minnesota’s recertification process has—by all accounts—complied with all relevant
statutes and regulations. 	See, e.g., ECF No. 10 ¶ 10 (noting that the USDA’s July 2025
review found that Minnesota was “fulfilling its responsibilities for the administration” of
SNAP and was “following applicable regulations and policies”).
Nevertheless, on December 16, 2025, Secretary Rollins sent Minnesota a letter
requiring that Minnesota recertify all SNAP beneficiaries in certain counties by January 15,
2026. 	ECF No. 1-1 (hereinafter the “Recertification Letter”). 	The USDA justified its
demand by citing to the Secretary’s authority to implement “pilot projects” under 7 U.S.C.
§ 2026(b)(1)(A). Id. The USDA warned that if Minnesota fails to comply, the “USDA will
trigger noncompliance procedures” and may limit Minnesota’s “continued participation in
SNAP.” Id. at 3.
On December 23, 2025, Minnesota filed this action, alleging that the Recertification
Letter violates the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the Spending Clause of the
United States Constitution, and otherwise exceeds the scope of the USDA’s authority. ECF
No. 1 ¶¶ 129–95. Minnesota seeks a preliminary injunction or a stay pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
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§ 705 and an order enjoining the USDA from enforcing the Recertification Letter.1 ECF
No. 5.
On January 14, 2026, just minutes before the Court held a scheduled hearing on
Minnesota’s motion, the USDA provided Minnesota with a second letter. 	ECF No. 40-1
(hereinafter the “Enforcement Letter”). The Enforcement Letter makes good on the threats
from the Recertification Letter and informs Minnesota that the USDA is immediately
withholding administrative funding the USDA is otherwise required to provide. Id. at 2–
3. The USDA, as it did with the Recertification Letter, justifies its decision by relying on
Section 2026. 	Id. at 2. Accordingly, at the hearing, Minnesota requested that the Court
also enjoin enforcement of the Enforcement Letter. Counsel for the USDA conceded that
the Secretary’s actions in the Enforcement Letter are within the scope of Minnesota’s
preliminary injunction motion.
For reasons discussed at the hearing, the Court granted Minnesota’s preliminary
injunction. 	ECF No. 38. 	As the Court now explains more fully, because Minnesota is
likely to succeed on the merits of at least one of its APA claims, and because all other
prerequisites for injunctive relief fall in Minnesota’s favor, the Court granted the motion
1 	On January 13, 2026, the District of Columbia and the states of Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin filed a motion for
leave to file an amicus brief in support of Minnesota’s request for a preliminary injunction.
ECF No. 31. 	Without objection from the USDA, the Court granted the motion. 	ECF
No. 39. The amicus brief was filed at ECF No. 41.
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and enjoined the USDA from taking any action on the Recertification and Enforcement
Letters.
BACKGROUND
I. 	An Overview of SNAP
A. 	Federal and State Participation and Implementation
Recognizing that “limited food purchasing power of low-income households
contributes to hunger and malnutrition among members of such households,” Congress
created SNAP in 1964 to “permit low-income households to obtain a more nutritious diet
through normal channels of trade by increasing food purchasing power for all eligible
households who apply for participation.” 	7 U.S.C. § 2011. 	SNAP functions as a
partnership between states and the federal government. The USDA operates the program
at the federal level by approving state plans of operation, promulgating regulations, and
providing all beneficiary funds to participating states. 	7 U.S.C. §§ 2013(a)(1), 2013(c),
2020(d); ECF No. 10 ¶ 5. In return, states are responsible for SNAP’s administration and
split the administrative costs with the USDA. 7 U.S.C. § 2025(a).
To qualify for SNAP, a state must comply with strict administrative guidelines.
7 C.F.R. § 276.4(a)(2) (noting that the USDA will review compliance and “may determine
a State agency’s administration of the Program to be inefficient or ineffective if the State
agency fails to comply with the SNAP requirements established by the Food and Nutrition
Act of 2008, the regulations issued pursuant to the Act, or the [Food and Nutrition Service
(FNS)]-approved State Plan of Operation”). 	Relevant here, a state must first develop a
“plan of operation specifying the manner in which such program will be conducted” and
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submit such plan of operation for USDA approval. 	7 U.S.C. § 2020(d); see 7 C.F.R.
§ 272.2. The plan of operation, in turn, is a blueprint for how a state runs its SNAP program
and outlines how a state will meet federal requirements. See generally 7 U.S.C. § 2020(d),
(e); 7 C.F.R. § 272.2. Relevant to a household’s initial application, a state must: (1) allow
a household to apply for SNAP benefits the same day that it contacts a SNAP office,
7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(2)(B)(iii); (2) process that application “promptly” and provide benefits
within 30 days of receiving an application, id. § 2020(e)(3); and (3) provide “a clear written
statement” explaining how a household must cooperate in obtaining verification and
otherwise complete the application process, id.2 A state is not eligible for SNAP benefits
until the USDA approves its plan of operation. Id. § 2020(d).
The process of reviewing applications for SNAP benefits is largely governed by
USDA regulations. 	The overarching principle is that a state must implement a review
process to “best serve households” and to “provide timely, accurate, and fair service to
applicants.” 	7 C.F.R. § 273.2(a)(1). 	In general, the application and review process has
three steps: (1) the application form must be completed and signed; (2) the household or
its authorized representative must be interviewed, and (3) certain information on the
application must be verified. 7 C.F.R. § 273.2(d)(1). A household’s noncompliance with
any of these steps can justify an application’s denial. This is the case only if the household
refuses to cooperate, meaning that a household “demonstrate[s] that it will not take actions
2 	For certain households with extremely low incomes, a state must provide benefits
no later than seven days after an application. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(9)(A)–(B).
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that it can take and that are required to complete the application process.” Id. A refusal to
cooperate must constitute more than “failing to appear for [an] interview.” Id.
As 	for 	the 	interview 	itself, 	regulations 	generally 	require 	“a 	face-to-face
interview . . . at initial certification and at least once every 12 months thereafter.” 	Id.
§ 273.2(e)(1). 	This interview “may be conducted at the SNAP office or other mutually
acceptable location, including a household’s residence.” Id. However, a state “may use a
telephone interview instead of the face-to-face interview” in all cases, so long as a state
“that chooses to routinely interview households by telephone in lieu of the face-to-face
interview . . . specif[ies] this choice in its State plan of operation and describe[s] the types
of households that will be routinely offered a telephone interview in lieu of a face-to-face
interview.” 	Id. § 273.2(e)(2); see also id. § 272.2(d)(xvi)(B); ECF No. 23 ¶ 14. A state
must schedule such an interview “as promptly as possible to insure eligible households
receive an opportunity to participate within 30 days after the application is filed,” must
notify 	a 	household 	“that 	misses 	its 	interview 	appointment” 	that 	the 	household 	is
“responsible for rescheduling a missed interview,” and must reschedule the interview if the
household “contacts the State agency within the 30 day application processing period.”
7 C.F.R § 273.2(e)(3).
If a household qualifies for SNAP, a state must certify eligibility for a definite period
of time, known as the “certification period.” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(4); 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(f).
Certification periods must be the longest period possible “based on the predictability of the
household’s circumstances,” 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(f), but in general are no less than six
months, id. § 273.10(f)(3). A state must also notify the household—when a state grants an
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application—of 	“the 	beginning 	and 	ending 	dates 	of 	the 	certification 	period,” 	id.
§ 273.10(g)(1)(i)(A), and may not “end a household’s certification period earlier than its
assigned termination date, unless the State agency receives information that the household
has become ineligible,” id. § 273.10(f)(4). Further, a state “may not require households to
report for an in-office interview during their certification period, though they may request
households to do so.” Id. § 273.2(e)(1).
A recipient household is required to recertify by the time its certification period
ends. To make sure households are aware of the expiration of a certification period, a state
is required to provide notice of the impending deadline “prior to the start of the last month
of its certification period” and advise “the household that it must submit a new application
in order to renew its eligibility.” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(4). And a state must also “establish
procedures for notifying households of expiration dates, providing application forms,
scheduling interviews, and recertifying eligible households prior to the expiration of
certification periods.” 7 C.F.R. § 273.14(a). Part of the recertification process must include
“an interview with a member of the household” conducted under the same procedures as
the initial interview. 	Id. § 273.14(b)(3)(i). 	Further, the recertification interview must be
scheduled so that “the household has at least 10 days after the interview in which to provide
verification before the certification period expires.” 	Id. § 273.14(b)(3)(iii). 	Like the
original interview, if a household misses the initial recertification interview but requests
another, a state is required to reschedule. Id. If a household submits a timely recertification
application, the state must approve or deny that application “by the end of the[] current
certification period.” Id. § 273.14(d)(2).
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B. 	USDA Oversight
Although the administration of SNAP largely falls on the states, the USDA
maintains significant oversight responsibility. 	For instance, a state must submit various
plans to the USDA before a state is approved to receive SNAP funding. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R.
§ 272.10 (plans for computerization of benefits); id. § 272.2(c)(1) (explaining that states
must 	submit 	“for 	approval 	a 	Budget 	Projection 	Statement 	and 	Program Activity
Statement”); id. § 275.11(a) (requiring state submission of plans for quality control
sampling); see generally id. § 272.2(d) (listing almost 20 plans that require USDA
approval). 	Further, the USDA must “conduct an annual review of certain functions
performed at the State agency level in the administration/operation of the program.” 	Id.
§ 275.3(a). 	This review “determine[s] the efficiency and effectiveness” of a state’s
administration of SNAP and, in particular, its payment error rates. Id. § 275.23(a)–(b). To
assist in the USDA’s oversight, states are required to conduct “quality control reviews” on
active households in an effort “to determine if households are eligible and receiving the
correct allotment of SNAP benefits.” Id. § 275.10(a).
The USDA also offers, and must approve, a request for waivers to any of the
certification and recertification processes outlined in its regulations. 7 C.F.R. § 272.3(c)(1)
(providing that the USDA “may authorize waivers to deviate from specific regulatory
provisions” where it “determines that the waiver would result in a more effective and
efficient administration of the program”). But the USDA may not grant a waiver request
that is “inconsistent with the provisions” of the Food and Nutrition Act. Id. § 272.3(c)(2)(i).
To that end, the USDA has recognized at least “28 SNAP options, demonstration projects,
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and waivers” that states may use to help “simplify program administration and operations
while promoting priorities such as program access, customer service, effective stewardship
of Government resources, and program integrity.” U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Food & Nutrition
Serv., State Options Report (17th ed. 2025)3 at 6 (hereinafter “State Options Report”); see
also id. at 7–8 (listing out the various options). 	Relevant here, the USDA has granted
Minnesota and 17 other states the option to conduct certification and recertification
interviews 	telephonically 	“within 	a 	specified 	time 	period” 	after 	the 	application 	or
reapplication, id. at 33; and granted Minnesota and 12 other states the option to take
telephonic signatures as long as Minnesota documents the signature in the case file, id.
at 39.
The 	USDA may 	impose 	penalties 	on 	states 	that 	demonstrate 	inefficient 	or
ineffective SNAP programs. See 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g); 7 C.F.R. § 276.4(a). For instance, if
the USDA determines that a state failed to comply with federal law, a USDA regulation, or
the state’s own approved plan of operation, the USDA may seek “injunctive relief to
compel compliance” or may seek “a suspension or disallowance” of the federal share of
the state agency’s administrative funds. 	7 C.F.R. § 276.1(a)(4). 	Before the USDA may
seek a suspension or disallowance of administrative funds, the USDA must first provide
“written advance notification that such action is being considered,” and if the state does
not satisfactorily respond, the USDA must then “provide the State agency with a formal
warning of the possibility of suspension or disallowance action.” Id. § 276.4(d). The same
3 	Available at https://perma.cc/Q3SD-J5FU.
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is true if the USDA desires injunctive relief to require a state to comply with federal law.
First, the USDA must “provide the State agency with a specific period of time to correct
the deficiency.” Id. § 276.5(b). If the state does not do so, the USDA may then “refer the
matter to the Attorney General with a request that injunctive relief be sought.” Id.; see also
7 U.S.C. § 2020(g) (allowing the USDA to stay administrative funds and seek injunctive
relief if the USDA determines “there is a failure by a State agency without good cause to
comply,” provided that the USDA allowed “a specified period of time for the correction of
such failure”).
C. 	Pilot Projects
The USDA also may institute “pilot projects” to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the SNAP program. 	Some of these pilot projects are mandatory: for
instance, the USDA must carry out pilot projects “to test innovative Federal-State
partnerships to identify, investigate, and reduce fraud by retail food stores,” 7 U.S.C.
§ 2021(i); must carry out pilot projects “to be sufficient to test the feasibility of determining
and issuing allotments” to residents of certain facilities before making changes to those
allotments, id. § 2017(f)(2)(A); and must carry out pilot projects “under which State
agencies shall enter into cooperative agreements with the Secretary to develop and test
methods . . . for employment and training programs and services,” id. § 2025(h)(1)(F)(i)(I).
Other pilot projects can be implemented at the discretion of the USDA. 	Relevant
here, 7 U.S.C. § 2026(b)(1)(A) states:
The Secretary may conduct on a trial basis, in one or more areas of the United
States, pilot or experimental projects designed to test program changes that
might 	increase 	the 	efficiency 	of 	the 	supplemental 	nutrition 	assistance
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program and improve the delivery of supplemental nutrition assistance
program benefits to eligible households, and may waive any requirement of
this chapter to the extent necessary for the project to be conducted.
Significantly, such pilot projects (hereinafter a “Section 2026 project”)4 must comply with
certain statutory and regulatory restrictions. 	First, the USDA may not conduct a Section
2026 project unless: (1) “the project is consistent with the goal of the supplemental
nutrition assistance program of providing food assistance to raise levels of nutrition among
low-income individuals”; and (2) “the project includes an evaluation to determine the
effects of the project.” 	Id. § 2026(b)(1)(B)(i). 	Second, the USDA may not conduct a
Section 2026 project that, among other things, is inconsistent with a state’s plan of
operations, the state’s requirement “promptly” to process an application within 30 days,
and the USDA and the state’s 50-50 split of administrative costs of SNAP under 7 U.S.C.
§ 2025(a). 	See 7 U.S.C. § 2026(b)(1)(B)(iv)(III). 	And third, should the USDA seek to
implement a Section 2026 project, it must publish a General Notice in the Federal Register
if the pilot project “will likely have a significant impact on the public,” and must do so at
least 30 days before the pilot project starts. 	7 C.F.R. § 282.1(b). 	That notice must “set
forth the specific operational procedures and shall explain the basis and purpose” of the
pilot project, and, if “significant comments are received in response to this General Notice,
4 	The parties variously refer to these projects as “pilot projects,” “pilots,” or
“demonstration projects.” 	See e.g., ECF No. 6 at 18; ECF No. 22 at 22, 25. 	The Court
adopts “Section 2026 project” but all terms refer to the same thing: a project governed by
7 U.S.C. § 2026(b)(1)(A).
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the [USDA] will take such action as may be appropriate prior to implementing the project.”
Id.
Section 	2026 	also 	details 	when 	the 	USDA may 	“waive 	any 	requirement.”
Specifically, not later than 60 days after receiving a waiver request from a Section 2026
pilot project participant, the Secretary shall provide a response that approves the waiver;
denies the waiver and describes needed modifications for approval; denies the waiver and
provides reasons for denial; or requests clarification of the waiver request. 	7 U.S.C.
§ 2026(b)(1)(D)(i).
II. 	Minnesota’s SNAP Administration
SNAP is administrated in part by Minnesota’s Department of Children, Youth, and
Families (“DCYF”) and in part by individual counties. 	Minn. Stat. § 142F.05, subd. 1;
ECF No. 10 ¶ 5, ECF No. 7 ¶ 4; see also State Options Report at 18 (recognizing that
Minnesota and nine other states use a “region, district, or county administered” model).
Approximately 440,000 Minnesotans receive SNAP benefits, totaling approximately $75
million each month in benefit payments. ECF No. 10 ¶ 6. The USDA and DCYF split the
$160 million annual costs of administering SNAP. Id. ¶ 7. The USDA provides all of the
beneficiary funding. 7 U.S.C. § 2013(a).
Minnesota counties are largely responsible for processing SNAP applications and
recertifications. ECF No. 7 ¶ 4; ECF No. 11 ¶ 7. But DCYF maintains responsibility for
informing households about the upcoming expiration of their certification period. 	ECF
No. 10 ¶ 31. 	DCYF typically sends the notice 45 days before the end of a certification
period, as required by 7 C.F.R. § 273.14(b)(1). 	Id. 	The individual counties schedule
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interviews and determine eligibility. Id. ¶¶ 32, 34. Counties overwhelmingly conduct those
interviews telephonically, as allowed by USDA regulations. Id.; see also ECF No. 8 ¶ 5;
ECF No. 11 ¶ 9; ECF No. 16 ¶ 9. 	And as required by USDA regulations, the counties
schedule those interviews at least 10 days before the end of the certification period. ECF
No. 	10 	¶¶ 	32–33. 	After 	conducting 	the 	interviews 	and 	evaluating 	submitted
documentation, the counties determine a household’s continuing eligibility for SNAP. Id.
¶ 34.
Hennepin County, Ramsey County, Washington County, and Wright County (the
“Recertification Counties”) are responsible for the yearly recertification of approximately
106,000 households, totaling approximately 191,000 Minnesotans. ECF No. 10 ¶ 24; ECF
No. 11 ¶ 13; ECF No. 7 ¶ 5; ECF No. 8 ¶ 4. 	Because a household’s typical certification
period is 12 months and recertification coincides with the original application date,
Minnesota counties recertify households on a rolling-basis throughout the year. 	ECF
No. 10 ¶ 35; see also State Options Report at 90 (recognizing that Minnesota uses 12- and
24-month certification periods); id. at 38 (reiterating that “State agencies must assign
eligible households a certification period for a finite period of months” and that “State
agencies cannot shorten the certification period without a waiver”). 	In practice, the
Recertification Counties certify approximately one-twelfth of eligible households every
month. See generally ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 13–14; ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 4–5; ECF No. 7 ¶ 7.
DCYF must comply with the USDA’s reporting and auditing requirements. 	ECF
No. 10 ¶ 8. 	For example, pursuant to 7 C.F.R. § 275.2(a), DCYF has a “continuing
performance reporting system,” which involves data collection through management
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evaluation reviews and quality control reviews; analysis and evaluation of the data;
corrective action planning, implementation, and monitoring; and reporting to the USDA on
program performance. ECF No. 10 ¶ 8. DCYF also monitors compliance by the counties
with 	SNAP 	requirements 	by 	conducting 	management 	evaluation 	reviews, 	and, 	in
July 2025, the USDA conducted a review of Minnesota’s management evaluation review
processes, procedures, methodology, and corrective action. Id. ¶ 10. The USDA’s review
concluded that Minnesota was fulfilling its responsibilities for the administration of SNAP
and was following applicable regulations and policies. 	Id. 	DCYF also conducts quality
control, which involves a review of a statistically valid sample of cases to determine
whether households are receiving SNAP benefits to which they are entitled and to
determine whether county decisions to deny, suspend, or terminate cases are correct. 	Id.
¶ 11. 	Finally, DCYF takes various other measures to monitor SNAP administration for
fraud, including instituting a fraud prevention investigation program, implementing
protections for the use of electronic benefit transfer cards, and ensuring household
recertification as required by federal law. See id. ¶¶ 12–14. DCYF contends its payment
error rates are below the national average and that fraud in the SNAP program is low. Id.
¶¶ 16–18; ECF No. 41 at 8, n.10 (noting that “SNAP fraud is rare”).
III. 	The USDA’s Recertification Letter and the Present Lawsuit
On December 16, 2025, the USDA sent Minnesota a letter purportedly “requiring
Minnesota to participate in a [SNAP] pilot project, conducted pursuant to 7 U.S.C.
§ 2026(b)(1)(A), to increase the efficiency of SNAP and improve the delivery of SNAP
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benefits to eligible households.” 	ECF No. 1-1 at 2. 	The pilot project requires that
Minnesota:
1. 	Conduct recertifications, within 30 days of receipt of this letter, of all
SNAP households in Hennepin, Ramsey, Washington, and Wright
counties.
2. 	As part of the recertification process, ensure SNAP households in
Hennepin, 	Ramsey, 	Washington, 	and 	Wright 	counties 	meet 	all
eligibility requirements for SNAP, including by accounting for the
income 	and 	resources 	of 	any 	excluded 	household 	members,
conducting in-person interviews, and using federal eligibility tools
like 	the 	improved, 	cost-free 	Systematic 	Alien 	Verification 	for
Entitlements (SAVE) Program database.
3. 	Upon review of the information obtained during the recertification
process, make determinations as to eligibility of SNAP benefits for
each SNAP household in Hennepin, Ramsey, Washington, and Wright
counties and unenroll any ineligible households.
4. 	Document and preserve all information relied upon to demonstrate
compliance 	with 	this 	pilot 	project 	and 	completion 	of 	accurate
recertifications of eligibility. 	This includes but is not limited to all
documentation pertaining to any excluded household members and
recertification 	determinations. 	[DCYF] 	must 	also 	preserve 	all
documentation it relied upon for the immediately prior certification
related to the SNAP households in question.
ECF No. 1-1 at 2–3. The Recertification Letter further states that Minnesota’s “[f]ailure to
participate in this pilot project as specified by USDA will 	trigger noncompliance
procedures codified in 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g). 	It may also affect Minnesota’s continued
participation in SNAP.” Id. at 3.
On December 23, 2025, Minnesota brought this action alleging that the USDA’s
Recertification Letter and the demands therein violate federal law and the United States
Constitution. ECF No. 1. Specifically, Minnesota contends that the USDA’s actions violate
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the APA because: (1) the USDA did not follow APA-mandated procedures in 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 before sending the Recertification Letter, id. ¶¶ 129–38; (2) the USDA’s demands
are contrary to law and exceed the USDA’s authority, id. ¶¶ 139–65; and (3) the USDA’s
actions are arbitrary and capricious, id. ¶¶ 166–85. 	Minnesota further alleges that the
USDA’s demands violate the Spending Clause of the United States Constitution, id.
¶¶ 186–90, and that the USDA otherwise acted beyond the scope of its constitutional and
statutory authority, id. ¶¶ 191–95.
Not only does Minnesota assert that the USDA’s demands violate the law and
require it to violate the law, but Minnesota also alleges that it is impossible to comply with
the Recertification Letter. 	For example, the SNAP coordinator for Hennepin County
declares that Hennepin County has 54,316 active SNAP households and that it typically
processes 4,500 to 5,500 recertifications per month. 	ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 13–14. 	The
Recertification Letter, by contrast, would require Hennepin County to process “roughly 10
times” that many recertifications in a month. 	Id. 	The same is largely true for the other
Recertification Counties. See, e.g., ECF No. 7 ¶ 7 (Ramsey County has 34,000 households
and averages 2,800 recertifications per month); ECF No. 8 ¶¶ 7–8 (Washington County has
5,477 households and averages 600 recertifications per month); ECF No. 16 ¶¶ 12–13
(Wright County has 2,861 households and averages 300 recertifications per month).
Simply put, those Recertification Counties affirm that it is impossible for them to comply
with the Recertification Letter’s demands.
As a result of the demands made in the Recertification Letter, and the USDA’s
threats of potential penalties for noncompliance, on December 29, 2025, Minnesota sought
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preliminary injunctive relief. 	ECF No. 5 at 1–2. 	On December 31, 2025, the Court
scheduled a hearing on Minnesota’s preliminary injunction motion for January 14, 2026,
at 2 p.m. and set forth an expedited briefing schedule. ECF No. 18. On January 5, 2026,
the Court held a status conference and ordered the parties to meet and confer before the
USDA’s deadline to file its response. Id. On January 8, 2026, the USDA filed its opposition
brief and argued that the Recertification Letter does not violate any federal law or the
Constitution and that Minnesota does not face a threat of irreparable injury. ECF No. 22.
IV. 	The Enforcement Letter
Minutes before the scheduled January 14, 2026 hearing, the USDA’s attorney
handed Minnesota’s attorney a new letter from Secretary Rollins. 	ECF No. 40-1. 	The
USDA’s attorney admitted that he had received the Enforcement Letter just 25 minutes
before the hearing started and did not have a full understanding of its content. 	The
Enforcement 	Letter 	purports 	to 	establish 	a 	“new” 	pilot 	project 	under 	7 	U.S.C.
§ 2026(b)(1)(A). Id. at 2. It goes on to say that under “7 U.S.C. § 2020(g),” the Secretary
has the authority to withhold “the Federal government’s share of the State’s administrative
costs” if the Secretary finds “a pattern of lack of compliance by a State agency.” 	Id. 	It
then explains that “Minnesota’s persistent and public indifference to ongoing fraud and an
unwillingness to comply with safeguards against fraud” constitutes such a pattern, and that
the USDA “immediately withholds the Federal government’s portion of Minnesota’s
administrative costs for the first quarter of calendar year 2026.” Id. at 3.
The Enforcement Letter acknowledges that the USDA neither informed Minnesota
of any such failure ahead of time nor allowed Minnesota any time to correct the purported
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failure, as is required by 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g). ECF No. 40-1 at 2. But the USDA says that
it can waive those provisions under the “Secretary’s authority” in Section 2026, and that
“this pilot project modifies these administrative procedures to accelerate corrective action.”
Id.
Because the Enforcement Letter’s makes real the threats made in the Recertification
Letter, at the preliminary injunction hearing, Minnesota asked the Court to grant a
preliminary injunction that covers both the Enforcement Letter and the Recertification
Letter. The USDA’s attorney conceded that the Enforcement Letter fell within the scope
of Minnesota’s preliminary injunction motion.5 	This Court then granted Minnesota’s
preliminary injunction and enjoined the USDA and Secretary Brooke Rollins from taking
any action against Minnesota based on the letters of December 16, 2025, ECF No. 1-1, and
January 14, 2026, ECF No. 40-1, including withholding any portion of the federal
government’s share of Minnesota’s administrative costs for the first quarter of calendar
year 2026, ECF No. 38.
The Court ordered the USDA to file the Enforcement Letter by January 15, 2026,
id., and the USDA has done so, ECF No. 40-1. 	The Court ordered Minnesota to file its
plan of operation by January 15, 2026, ECF No. 38, and Minnesota has done so, ECF
5 	The USDA had known for weeks of the emergency request filed by Minnesota, and
this Court’s schedule was set to ensure it could issue a ruling by the January 15, 2026
deadline stated in the USDA’s December 16, 2025 Recertification Letter. The January 14,
2026 Enforcement Letter surfaced just moments before the start of the preliminary
injunction hearing. In it, the Secretary preemptively took the very action that Minnesota’s
motion sought to enjoin. This is deeply troubling to the Court.
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No. 43 (providing a link to the website that hosts Minnesota’s Combined Manual, which is
an operational and instructional tool for counties and Tribal Nations to use in administering
SNAP in Minnesota). With that, this Court now issues its Order to further explain its grant
of Minnesota’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
ANALYSIS
A preliminary injunction “is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.”
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). 	Such relief is designed,
primarily, to preserve “the status quo until the district court has an opportunity to grant full
effective relief.” Tumey v. Mycroft AI, Inc., 27 F.4th 657, 664 (8th Cir. 2022). Section 705
of the APA similarly provides that “[o]n such conditions as may be required and to the
extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury, the reviewing court . . . may issue all
necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to
preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. § 705.
Accordingly, while a Court may issue a preliminary injunction under its traditional
equitable powers, Section 705 provides an express statutory grant of authority to courts
reviewing agency action to provide essentially the same relief. 	See Make the Rd. N.Y. v.
Noem, No. 25-5320, 2025 WL 3563313, at *9 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 22, 2025) (describing a
Section 705 stay as preserving “the parties’ relative positions pending litigation based on a
preliminary assessment of the merits”).
Because of the overlap between the relief granted by a preliminary injunction and a
Section 705 stay, the parties agree that a Section 705 stay is analyzed under the standard
that federal courts ordinarily use to analyze preliminary injunction requests. 	Immigrant
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Defs. L. Ctr. v. Noem, 145 F.4th 972, 995 (9th Cir. 2025) (explaining that “the factors used
to determine whether to issue a § 705 stay under the APA are the same equitable factors
used to consider whether to issue a preliminary injunction”); see also B & D Land &
Livestock Co. v. Conner, 534 F. Supp. 2d 891, 905 (N.D. Iowa 2008).
Accordingly, whether framed as a preliminary injunction or a Section 705 stay,
Minnesota has the burden to show: (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that
Minnesota is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that
the balance of equities tips in Minnesota’s favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public
interest. Cigna Corp. v. Bricker, 103 F.4th 1336, 1342 (8th Cir. 2024) (citing Winter, 555
U.S. at 20). Each factor supports a preliminary injunction.
I. 	Likelihood of Success on the Merits
Though no one factor for injunctive relief is dispositive, “probability of success” is
the most significant factor. 	Minn. Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v.
Blissenbach, 155 F.4th 1015, 1021 (8th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). Minnesota only needs
to establish that it is likely to succeed on the merits of one of its claims to be granted an
injunction. 	Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 826 F.3d
1030, 1040 (8th Cir. 2016).
At the outset, the Court observes that the parties use different formulations of this
factor: Minnesota states that it must only show a “fair chance of prevailing,” ECF No. 6
at 14, while the USDA asserts that Minnesota must show that it is “likely to prevail,” ECF
No. 22 at 20. In the Eighth Circuit, courts ordinarily are to apply the “fair chance” standard,
under which a party need not “prove a greater than fifty per cent likelihood” of succeeding.
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Jet Midwest Int’l Co. v. Jet Midwest Grp., LLC, 953 F.3d 1041, 1044–45 (8th Cir. 2020)
(citation omitted). But the Eighth Circuit uses a “more rigorous” standard, one of “likely
to prevail,” when a party requests an injunction of a “government action based on
presumptively reasoned democratic processes.” Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v.
Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 732–33 (8th Cir. 2008).
The Court need not resolve which standard applies here because Minnesota satisfies
either standard. Accordingly, the Court applies the standard that is more favorable to the
USDA: the “likely to prevail” standard.
A. 	APA Violations
Minnesota first asserts that it is likely to prevail on its APA claims because the
Recertification Letter is procedurally and substantively invalid. ECF No. 6 at 14–27. The
Court agrees.
The APA “empowers federal courts to ‘hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions’ if they fail to conform with any of six specified standards.” Iowa
League of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 855 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Marsh v. Or. Nat. Res.
Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375 (1989)).6 Those six standards provide that agency action may
not be:
6 	The APA only makes “final” agency action reviewable by a court. Union Pac. R.R.
Co. v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., No. 24-2547, 2025 WL 3639277, at *5 (8th Cir. Dec. 16, 2025)
(citation omitted) (explaining that the APA provides for review of a “final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court”). Agency action is final if it satisfies
two conditions: (1) the action must mark the consummation of the agency’s decision-
making process and not be merely tentative or interlocutory in nature, and (2) “the action
must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal
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(A) 	arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) 	contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) 	in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(D) 	without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) 	unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556
and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute; or
(F) 	unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial
de novo by the reviewing court.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2). A Section 706(2)(D) challenge is known as a “procedural challenge”
and generally requires that certain agency rules comply with the notice and comment
procedures of 5 U.S.C. § 553. 	See Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d at 872. The rest of the
Section 706 challenges are referred to as “substantive challenges” because they attack the
propriety of the action itself, not only whether it went “through the proper procedural
channels.” Id. at 876.
The Court begins with Minnesota’s substantive challenges, which allege that the
Recertification Letter is contrary to law or exceeds the scope of the USDA’s authority.
Minnesota also alleges that the USDA’s actions are arbitrary and capricious because the
consequences will flow.” 	Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997)).
The USDA did not address whether the Recertification Letter is “final agency action” in
its briefing but conceded during oral argument that it is. The Court agrees. The challenged
action not only is final but also determines Minnesota’s obligations and the consequences
flowing from a failure to comply therewith. 	See California v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
No. 25-cv-06310-MMC, 2025 WL 2939227, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2025).
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USDA provided no well-reasoned explanation for issuing the Recertification Letter. 	See
ECF No. 6 at 17–27. The Court agrees on both fronts.
(i) 	Contrary to Law or in Excess of Statutory Authority
Minnesota argues that the Recertification Letter is contrary to law or in excess of
the USDA’s authority because: (1) the USDA may not force a state to participate in a
Section 2026 project; (2) the USDA is not allowed to impose new requirements on states
through a Section 2026 project; (3) the Recertification Letter does not detail a valid pilot
project; (4) the Recertification Letter requires Minnesota to violate federal laws and
regulations; and (5) the USDA may not withhold funds based on Minnesota’s failure to
participate in a pilot project. ECF No. 6 at 17–22. The USDA responds to some, but not
all, of Minnesota’s arguments. See ECF No. 22 at 15–17. The Court finds that Minnesota
is likely to succeed on its arguments that the Recertification Letter is contrary to the law
because the Recertification Letter (and the companion Enforcement Letter) does not
establish a valid pilot project, and the USDA acted outside of its authority when it imposed
new requirements on Minnesota’s recertification of SNAP.7
(a) 	The Recertification Letter’s Requirements are Contrary to Law
The Court first finds, for at least four independent reasons, that Minnesota is likely
to prevail on its claim that the requirements set forth in the Recertification Letter violate
the statutory restrictions on Section 2026 projects.
7 	Because the Court finds that Minnesota is likely to succeed on these two grounds,
it need not—and does not—weigh in on the remainder of Minnesota’s arguments
supporting its claim that the Recertification Letter is contrary to law.
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First, a Section 2026 project must “include[] an evaluation to determine the effects
of the project.” 	7 U.S.C. § 2026(b)(1)(B)(i)(II); see also ECF No. 22 at 13 (USDA’s
briefing acknowledging the same); State Options Report at 26 (the USDA’s “statutory
authority to approve demonstration projects requires that projects include an evaluation
component”). Yet the Recertification Letter includes no such proposal for evaluation, see
generally ECF No. 1-1, and the USDA makes no claim that it conducted such an evaluation.
That deficiency alone is enough to set aside the Recertification Letter as contrary to law.
C.f. Stewart v. Azar, 313 F. Supp. 3d 237, 243 (D.D.C. 2018) (single “omission renders
[agency] determination arbitrary and capricious”).
Second, a Section 2026 project may not be inconsistent with Section 2020(e)(2)(B),
see 7 U.S.C. § 2026(b)(1)(B)(iv)(III)(ff), which requires a state to “provide timely,
accurate, and fair service to applicants” and to “develop an application containing the
information necessary to comply” with federal law, id. § 2020(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). 	But the
Recertification Letter’s demands trample over the statutory and regulatory guardrails that
ensure fair, accurate, and timely service to SNAP recipients. As explained earlier, federal
law and the USDA’s own regulations require states to provide an eligible applicant with a
guaranteed “certification period,” 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(4); 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(f); require
states to notify the household at the outset of “the beginning and ending dates of the
certification period,” 7 C.F.R. § 273.10(g)(1)(i)(A); and prohibit states from ending “a
household’s 	certification 	period 	earlier 	than 	its 	assigned 	termination 	date,” 	id.
§ 273.10(f)(4). 	The Recertification Letter violates each of these mandates because the
Recertification Letter requires Minnesota to end every SNAP recipient’s certification
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period before its “assigned termination date.”8 Terminating a SNAP recipient’s guaranteed
certification period, for reasons wholly unrelated to the recipient’s eligibility or conduct, is
fundamentally unfair because it defeats the recipient’s reasonable reliance on the guarantee
of uninterrupted benefits during that period. 	See Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 719
(1878) (“The United States are as much bound by their [agreements] as are individuals. If
they repudiate their obligations, it is as much repudiation, with all the wrong and reproach
that term implies, as it would be if the repudiator had been a State or a municipality or a
citizen.”).
What’s more, federal law and the USDA’s regulations require a state to provide
notice to a household of the ending of the household’s certification period “prior to the start
of the last month of its certification period advising the household that it must submit a
new application in order to renew its eligibility for a new certification period.” 7 U.S.C.
§ 2020(e)(4). This statute “literally requires strict compliance with its provisions.” Garnett
v. Zeilinger, 301 F. Supp. 3d 199, 208 (D.D.C. 2018) (citation omitted). 	And for good
reason: providing timely and adequate advance notice to SNAP recipients is critical to
ensuring that recipients are aware of an impending termination of critical benefits if they
do not act. 	Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970) (explaining for the
8 	Of course, the USDA’s regulations allow a state to end a household’s certification
period earlier than its assigned termination date in limited circumstances: when the state
“receives information that the household has become ineligible,” or when a household fails
to comply with various reporting requirements. 	7 C.F.R. § 273.10(f)(4). 	But the USDA
has not demonstrated that any household in Minnesota has become ineligible for SNAP
benefits, nor has it demonstrated that any household in Minnesota has failed to comply
with SNAP reporting requirements.
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administration of welfare benefits that principles of due process “require that a recipient
have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, and an
effective opportunity to defend”). 	But the Recertification Letter’s 30-day deadline to
interview and recertify all SNAP households in the Recertification Counties renders it
impossible for Minnesota to provide the required notice at least “prior to the start of the
last month” of a recipient’s certification period. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(4). Such mandates are
aimed squarely at providing fair and timely service to SNAP participants, and because the
Recertification Letter directly contradicts those provisions, it is “inconsistent” with Section
2020(e)(2)(B).
Third, a Section 2026 project may not be inconsistent with other provisions of
Title 7 of the U.S. Code. 	See 7 U.S.C. § 2026(b)(1)(B)(iv)(III)(hh). 	One of those
provisions, Section 2025(a), provides that 	the USDA pay half 	of a state’s 	SNAP
administrative costs. See 7 U.S.C. § 2025(a). But the Recertification Letter threatened to
withhold the USDA’s administrative funds, ECF No. 1-1 at 3, making the remedial nature
of the Recertification Letter inconsistent with the USDA’s statutory requirement to pay half
of the administrative costs. 	The Enforcement Letter, which purportedly authorized yet
another 	Section 	2026 	project 	allowing 	the 	USDA 	to 	immediately 	suspend 	such
administrative costs, is an impermissible project for the same reason. ECF No. 40-1.
Fourth, and finally, the USDA’s own regulations require that Section 2026 projects
likely to have “a significant impact on the public” must first be published in the Federal
Register at least 30 days prior to the initiation of a pilot project. 7 C.F.R. § 282.1(b). It is
undisputed that the USDA did not provide such notice in the Federal Register. And it is
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implausible that a Section 2026 project that requires Minnesota to recertify over 100,000
households within a month, requires Minnesota to violate USDA regulations to do so, and
threatens to impede the SNAP benefits of all Minnesotans does not constitute a “significant
impact on the public.” 	Indeed, the USDA does not even try to argue otherwise.9 Again,
that regulation is not mere box-checking. 	It ensures that when the USDA undertakes a
Section 2026 project of significant public importance, the agency hears from those affected
by the proposed Section 2026 project and considers whether to “adjust or abandon [its]
proposals in light of public comments or internal agency reconsideration.” 	Kooritzky v.
Reich, 17 F.3d 1509, 1513 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see 7 C.F.R. § 282.1(b) (explaining that if the
USDA receives “significant comments” in response to a proposed Section 2026 project,
the USDA “will take such action as may be appropriate prior to implementing the project”).
What the USDA may not do, however, is disregard its own regulations. 	Nat’l Env’t Dev.
9 	The USDA’s decision to ignore its obligation to provide notice is not insignificant.
As the Eighth Circuit has identified, notice and comment procedures secure the values of
government transparency and public participation. 	See Iowa League of Cities, 711 F.3d
at 873. 	Indeed, the Amici, representing a diverse coalition of states, have noted that no
state could likely perform the impossible task the USDA demanded of Minnesota. 	ECF
No. 41 at 13 (“Amici States are a diverse group, but no matter how an Amici State is
situated, it is highly unlikely that it could perform the impossible task assigned by a similar
Recertification Demand.”). Such concerns would surface through a notice-and-comment
period. 	For example, some of the Amici states provide SNAP benefits to millions of
recipients a month; others to less than 150,000 recipients. Id. Some delegate recertification
to counties; others handle recertification at the state level. 	Id. 	Some are geographically
small and densely populated; others are expansive and sparsely populated. Id. Critically,
“for different reasons, all Amici states would likely be unable to comply with the
Recertification Demand. Large states or agencies would be overwhelmed trying to process
millions of recertification applications and interviews all at once. Small states or agencies
might have a smaller caseload, but they also have less staff and other resources to dedicate
to those recertifications.” Id.
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Ass’n’s Clean Air Project v. EPA, 752 F.3d 999, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“It is axiomatic,
however, that an agency is bound by its own regulations.” (citation modified)); see also
Ratsantiboon v. Noem, No. 25-cv-1315 (JMB/JFD), 2025 WL 1118645, at *2 (D. Minn.
Apr. 15, 2025) (“An agency’s unexplained refusal to follow its own regulations effecting
individuals’ procedural benefits poses a high probability that the agency is not acting in
accordance with the APA.”).
Accordingly, 	despite 	being 	framed 	as 	initiating 	Section 	2026 	projects, 	the
Recertification Letter’s demands and the Enforcement Letter’s actions are contrary to
Section 2026’s explicit requirements for such projects and therefore are contrary to law.
See California v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 800 F. Supp. 3d 1015, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2025)
(rejecting USDA’s authority to demand data from participating states where the demand
itself violated Section 2020).
(b) 	The Recertification Letter Is Outside the Scope of the USDA’s
Authority
Similarly, the Court agrees with Minnesota that it is likely to prevail on its claim
that the USDA exceeded its authority in issuing the Recertification Letter because the
demands in the Recertification Letter require Minnesota to violate federal laws and
regulations that govern the recertification process. In addition to the regulatory violations
discussed above, the Recertification Letter requires Minnesota to conduct “in-person”
interviews of each household. 	ECF No. 1-1 at 2. 	But the USDA identifies no legal
authority that allows it to demand that Minnesota conduct in-person interviews of each
household—likely because the USDA’s own regulations allow a state to conduct interviews
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telephonically. 	7 C.F.R. § 273.2(e)(2); see also id. § 272.2(d)(xvi)(B). 	To that end, the
USDA requires states who choose to conduct telephonic interviews to inform the USDA in
the state’s plan of operation that the state will do so. 	Id. § 273.2(e)(2). And the USDA
recognizes that Minnesota has chosen to do so. See State Options Report at 90–91.
Now, however, the Recertification Letter’s requirement of in-person interviews
forbids Minnesota from availing itself of an interview process that is explicitly provided
for in the USDA’s own regulations. The USDA argues that it may do so because Section
2026 provides it the authority to “waive any requirement of this chapter to the extent
necessary for the project to be conducted.” See 7 U.S.C. § 2026(b)(1)(A). But the USDA
reads that provision in isolation and out of context, violating the well-established rule that
a court interpreting a statute must consider “the specific context in which . . . language is
used” and “the broader context of the statute as a whole.” Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573
U.S. 302, 321 (2014) (citation omitted). 	That much is clear by looking to Section
2026(b)(1)(D)(i), which describes the process for the USDA to respond to a “request for a
waiver under [7 U.S.C. § 2026(b)(1)(A)]” (emphasis added). 	Accordingly, the USDA’s
authority to “waive any requirement” explicitly refers to waivers requested by a state who
is participating in a Section 2026 project. See 7 U.S.C. § 2026(b)(1)(D)(i). It does not, as
the USDA purports to read it, allow the USDA to “waive” all statutory provisions relating
to SNAP when creating a Section 2026 project. The USDA has, historically, understood
as much. See, e.g., State Options Report at 26 (“State agencies can request approval from
FNS to conduct demonstration projects” under Section 2026) (emphasis added).
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Even if the meaning of “waive” in Section 2026(b)(1)(A) was subject to reasonable
doubt, the “major questions” doctrine counsels against adopting the USDA’s interpretation.
That doctrine of statutory interpretation applies when a “statute at issue is one that confers
authority upon an administrative agency,” and provides that a court’s interpretation must
be “shaped, at least in some measure, by the nature of the question presented—whether
Congress in fact meant to confer the power the agency has asserted.” West Virginia v. EPA,
597 U.S. 697, 721 (2022) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	The
doctrine developed through a series of cases in which “agencies assert[ed] highly
consequential power beyond what Congress could reasonably be understood to have
granted.” Id. at 724. In general, it suggests that there are “extraordinary cases” in which
“the history and the breadth of the authority that the agency has asserted, and the economic
and political significance of that assertion, provide a reason to hesitate before concluding
that Congress meant to confer such authority.” Id. (citation modified).
The USDA’s reading of Section 2026(b)(1)(A) is, essentially, that it may amend
willy-nilly any statute relating to SNAP—dashed off in a letter—in the name of instituting
a “pilot project.” 	That cannot be the case. 	The Supreme Court has explained that
“[e]xtraordinary grants of regulatory authority are rarely accomplished through modest
words, vague terms, or subtle devices,” and that Congress does not “typically use oblique
or elliptical language to empower an agency to make a radical or fundamental change to a
statutory scheme.” Id. at 723 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). But
that is what the USDA requests here. It seeks “unfettered” authority in its administration
of SNAP. The scope of the USDA’s position is breathtaking. According to the USDA, it
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may add new requirements to the recertification process, rewrite its own regulations, and
even withdraw all guaranteed SNAP funding from a state, so long as it labels such additions
or actions as part of a “pilot project.” 	These projects are, by their nature, meant to be
conducted 	“on 	a 	trial 	basis” 	to 	tentatively 	“test 	program 	changes.” 	7 	U.S.C.
§ 2026(b)(1)(A). 	The Enforcement Letter further highlights the unfettered sweep of the
USDA’s position. 	The Enforcement Letter acknowledges that Congress established an
enforcement proceeding that could result in the USDA’s withholding of administrative
funds. 	7 U.S.C. § 2020(g). 	The Enforcement Letter even acknowledged that Congress
provided parameters for such enforcement and that the USDA must: (1) inform a state that
it believes the state to be out of compliance with USDA rules, and then (2) give the state a
definite period of time to come back into compliance. Id. But the Enforcement Letter did
neither. 	Instead, the USDA indicates that it can disregard the congressionally mandated
two-step process of Section 2020(g), so long as it cloaks its action as a Section 2026 “pilot
project.” Additionally, neither party could identify a circumstance where the USDA could
unilaterally compel a state to participate in a Section 2026 project. Nor could the Amici.
ECF No. 41 at 10 (noting that the Recertification Letter appears to “represent the first time
that USDA has attempted to compel a State to participate in a pilot project over its objection
and subject to the threat of losing statutorily mandated federal administrative funding”);
id. at 11 (recognizing “to be sure, the federal government is entitled to disagree with policy
choices made by certain States; however, nothing in the text of the statutes governing
SNAP allows USDA to force a state to participate in a pilot project”). 	Under the major
questions doctrine, much more in the way of Congressional approval would be required
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before the Court could adopt such an expansive reading.10 West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 723
(quoting Util. Air., 573 U.S. at 324) (“To convince us otherwise, something more than a
merely plausible textual basis for the agency action is necessary. The agency instead must
point to ‘clear congressional authorization’ for the power it claims.”); see also Missouri v.
Trump, 128 F.4th 979, 995–96 (8th Cir. 2025) (rejecting an agency’s reading of a statute
that would provide it “nearly limitless power to transform federal loans” because
“Congress would have provided clear signs if it authorized such significant power to the
Secretary”). The USDA cannot do so.
(ii) 	Arbitrary and Capricious
Minnesota alternatively asserts that the Recertification Letter violates the APA’s
prohibition on arbitrary and capricious agency action under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) because
it: (1) is unexplained; (2) is based on inappropriate factors; (3) is not rationally connected
to the facts; (4) requires the impossible; (5) ignores Minnesota’s reliance interests; and
(6) targets Minnesota for partisan reasons. ECF No. 6 at 22–27.
10 	The USDA’s reading of Section 2026(b)(1)(A) also runs counter to the canon against
surplusage, which provides that a statute “ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that,
if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or
insignificant.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citation omitted). This canon
of interpretation is “strongest when an interpretation would render superfluous another part
of the same statutory scheme.” Marx v. Gen. Rev. Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 386 (2013). Here,
if the Secretary could simply circumvent all of SNAP’s substantive statutory provisions by
creating a pilot project, then what purpose would those substantive provisions serve?
Indeed, the USDA’s interpretation of Section 2026(b)(1)(A) would swallow the entirety of
Title 7, Chapter 51 of the United States Code, boiling that chapter down to a single
command: 	the 	USDA can 	implement 	SNAP as 	it 	pleases. 	Because 	the 	USDA’s
interpretation would render superfluous basically all of SNAP’s statutory scheme, that
interpretation must be rejected.
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An agency action is arbitrary and capricious if:
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Missouri ex rel. Bailey v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, 73 F.4th 570, 576–
77 (8th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). 	This ensures that agencies engage in “reasoned
decisionmaking,” and that the process by which an agency reaches a particular result is
“logical and rational.” 	Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374
(1998) (citation omitted). 	And an agency may not take “action that is internally
inconsistent or not reasonable and reasonably explained.” Firearms Regul. Accountability
Coal., Inc. v. Garland, 112 F.4th 507, 520 (8th Cir. 2024). That does not mean, however,
that a court may substitute its own policy judgment for that of the agency. Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Instead,
a court “simply ensures that the agency has acted within a zone of reasonableness and, in
particular, has reasonably considered the relevant issues and reasonably explained the
decision.” FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021).
For at least three independent reasons, the Court finds that the Recertification Letter
lacks the “reasoned decisionmaking” demanded of federal agency action. Allentown Mack
Sales & Serv., 522 U.S. at 374.
First, the USDA did not offer a “satisfactory explanation” for its action. Niobrara
River Ranch, L.L.C. v. Huber, 373 F.3d 881, 884 (8th Cir. 2004). 	The only justification
for the demands made in the Recertification Letter is that there is “highly publicized and
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ongoing fraud affecting federally funded benefits” in Minnesota but referenced only the
“Feeding Our Future fraud scheme” that “exploited” the USDA’s child nutrition programs.
ECF No. 1-1. But as Minnesota points out, and the USDA does not contest, the Feeding
Our Future fraud scheme “ended years ago, did not involve SNAP, and exploited the
[COVID-19] pandemic.” ECF No. 6 at 23 (citing ECF No. 10 ¶ 26). It cannot therefore
constitute a reasonable basis for the Recertification Letter’s demands as it provides no
rational connection between the Feeding Our Future fraud scheme and the potential of
fraud within SNAP, an entirely different entitlement program.
In its briefing, the USDA has largely abandoned its principal reliance on the Feeding
Our Future fraud scheme, and instead now asserts that its demands “took into consideration
MDCYF performance, public reporting, and concerns over the State’s administration of
SNAP over the course of multiple years.” ECF No. 22 at 26. But the USDA provided none
of those explanations in the Recertification Letter, so it may not rely on such “post hoc
rationalization” now.11 	Mandan, Hidatsa & Arikara Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
11 	Nor does the USDA offer such explanation in its Enforcement Letter written a
month after the initial Recertification Letter. 	Nonetheless, the USDA offers no evidence
to corroborate its claim of fraud in Minnesota’s administration of SNAP. The USDA states,
in a conclusory manner, that based on its review of data gathered from the SNAP
Information Database, it has determined that “States with a county-administered program,
like Minnesota, are more likely to have higher rates of fraud, waste, and abuse than States
that do not delegate administration of SNAP to the county level.” ECF No. 23 ¶ 16. Even
if that broad determination is true, the USDA conspicuously fails to make any specific
allegation, much less provide evidence, of such “fraud, waste, and abuse” within any of the
Recertification Counties. The USDA also purports to have developed concerns regarding
Minnesota’s payment error rate of 8.98% in fiscal year 2024, which exceeds the 6%
statutory threshold to trigger a requirement to develop a “corrective action plan.” Id. ¶ 22.
But Minnesota developed a corrective action plan, which the USDA approved, id., and the
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95 F.4th 573, 582 (8th Cir. 2024); see Firearms Regul. Accountability Coal., 112 F.4th
at 525 n.15 (quoting Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 23
(2020)) (“Agency actions require ‘contemporaneous explanations,’ and not just post hoc
justifications ‘raised in court by those appearing on behalf of the agency or by agency
officials themselves.’”); President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs., 798 F. Supp. 3d 77, 129 (D. Mass. 2025) (“Even an indisputably worthy goal,
however, 	does 	not 	allow 	Defendants 	to 	change 	course 	on 	decades 	of 	federal
funding . . . without providing a reasoned explanation.”).
Second, even if the USDA was able to rely on its now-proffered reasons, it failed
entirely to provide a reasoned explanation for how this pilot project will help it assess fraud
in Minnesota. 	Take the Recertification Letter’s demand that recertification must be
completed in 30 days. Why 30 days? Considering the crushing burden that timeline places
on the Recertification Counties (as described below), the USDA fails to articulate any
satisfactory explanation for why such a compressed timeline is warranted (particularly
when recertification ordinarily occurs on a rolling basis throughout the year). See Motor
USDA does not suggest that Minnesota has failed to comply with that corrective action
plan. In fact, in July 2025, the USDA reviewed Minnesota’s administration of SNAP and
found that Minnesota was “fulfilling its responsibilities for the administration of the
program” and was “following applicable regulations and policies.” ECF No. 10 ¶ 10. So,
what has changed? 	The USDA does not bother to say. 	Instead, the USDA evidently
believes that it may make sweeping, nonspecific, and unsupported accusations of “fraud,
waste, and abuse” and threaten to withhold administrative funding from Minnesota when,
if anything, the evidence before this Court—including from the USDA itself—undermines
those allegations. 	It should go without saying that this hardly justifies the USDA’s post
hoc assertions about its purported “concerns over [Minnesota’s] administration of SNAP.”
ECF No. 22 at 26.
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Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43 (citation omitted) (“[An] agency must examine the relevant
data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 	Nor
does it explain why the compressed timeline would increase the efficiency of SNAP and
improve the delivery of SNAP benefits to eligible households.
Take 	also 	the 	Recertification 	Letter’s 	demand 	that 	all 	households 	in 	the
Recertification Counties be interviewed in-person, despite the fact that the USDA’s own
regulations 	permit 	Minnesota 	to 	interview 	households 	telephonically, 	see 	7 	C.F.R.
§ 273.2(e)(2), and that Minnesota counties have long conducted household interviews
telephonically, ECF No. 8 ¶ 5; ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 32, 34; ECF No. 11 ¶ 9; ECF No. 16 ¶ 9.
The USDA offers zero explanation for that 180-degree pivot. Indeed, the Recertification
Letter does not even recognize that the agency is making such a pivot, which reveals its
arbitrary nature. 	See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 220 (2016)
(quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009)) (explaining that
when an agency changes its existing position, the agency “must at least ‘display awareness
that it is changing position’ and ‘show that there are good reasons for the new policy’”).
Nor does it explain why the USDA has selected Hennepin, Ramsey, Washington,
and Wright counties to bear the burden of its pilot project. Does the USDA believe fraud
is higher in those counties? The Recertification Letter provides no answer. Neither does
the USDA’s brief. 	At the hearing, counsel for the USDA stated that he “knows” those
counties to be some of the most populous in Minnesota and that he “knows” those counties
to be home to many of the defendants from the Feeding Our Future fraud scheme. But not
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only is this impermissible “ad hoc” reasoning, it is plainly insufficient because the USDA
again fails to show how even those considerations are in any way tied to the SNAP fraud
the USDA purportedly seeks to uncover. 	If it is true that the USDA is concerned about
SNAP fraud in Minnesota, it must proffer some rationale as to how its specific, heavy-
handed demands would help uncover that fraud. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43.
Third, the USDA failed to consider, and continues to disregard, the weight of its
demands. 	Minnesota asserts, and the Court has already concluded, that complying with
the Recertification Letter would require Minnesota to violate a number of statutory
guidelines and regulations placed on a Section 2026 project. 	The USDA, astoundingly,
reiterates that the Recertification Letter does not demand any alterations to what Minnesota
is already legally required to do. See e.g., ECF No. 22 at 9 (“The Secretary’s pilot involves
no change other than to perform, once, an accelerated re-certification of eligibility.”); id.
at 24 (“Minnesota was only asked to promptly complete responsibilities it already had.”);
id. at 29 (“That a subset of Minnesota’s counties were asked to accelerate this work is not,
as Minnesota exclaimed, imposition of ‘entirely new conditions.’”). That the USDA does
not even acknowledge the weight of its demands suggests, by itself, that the Recertification
Letter is arbitrary and capricious. 	Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43 (explaining that
agency action is arbitrary when the agency “entirely failed to consider an important aspect
of the problem”); FDA v. Wages & White Lion Invs., L.L.C., 604 U.S. 542, 568 (2025)
(citation modified) (“Agencies are free to change their existing policies as long as they
provide a reasoned explanation for the change, display awareness that they are changing
position, and consider serious reliance interests.”); Am. Fed’n of Tchrs. v. Dep’t of Educ.,
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779 F. Supp. 3d 584, 616–17 (D. Md. 2025) (“If anything, the government’s repeated
assertions that the Letter says nothing new indicate that it is still either unaware or
unwilling to admit that it has changed positions.”).
The USDA also appears not to have considered the crushing operational burden that
the Recertification Letter’s demands would place on Minnesota. 	Minnesota and the
Recertification Counties put forth evidence that requiring them to comply with the
Recertification Letter’s demands would be close to impossible, as it would require the four
counties to divert nearly all available resources and expend additional resources to even
come close to meeting the Recertification Letter’s deadline. See, e.g., ECF No. 7 ¶ 7; ECF
No. 8 ¶¶ 7–8; ECF No. 11 ¶¶ 13–14, 17–21; ECF No. 16 ¶¶ 13, 19. For example, to meet
the USDA’s demands, Ramsey County explains that it would need to triple its workforce
dedicated to SNAP administration, reassign all of those employees to exclusively perform
SNAP recertifications, and complete in-person interviews of 34,000 households—all in the
span of 30 days. ECF No. 7 ¶ 7. Wright County similarly explains that to meet the USDA’s
demands, it would need to reassign all employees trained in SNAP administration to
conduct SNAP recertification interviews, and those employees would need to work twenty
hours per day (including weekends and holidays) to complete all interviews by the
Recertification Letter’s deadline. 	ECF No. 16 ¶ 19. 	That leaves the distinct impression
that the USDA has set Minnesota and the Recertification Counties up to fail, a consequence
that is about as arbitrary as they come. See Messina v. U.S. Citizenship & Immig. Servs.,
No. Civ. A. 05CV73409DT, 2006 WL 374564, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 16, 2006) (“It is
arbitrary and capricious to require compliance with a regulation when compliance is
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impossible.”). And although the USDA readily responds that Minnesota could simply do
whatever it could to comply, ECF No. 22 at 26, the USDA ignores that when a federal
agency drastically changes its own policies and practices, it is the agency’s burden to
“consider the alternatives” that are “within the ambit of the existing” policy. 	Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. at 30 (citation modified). This inquiry must take into account
“whether there were reliance interests, determine whether they were significant, and weigh
any such interests against competing policy concerns.” Id. at 33.
The USDA did none of this. 	Instead, it pulled the rug out from under Minnesota
without offering any reasoned explanation or one that considered the weight of its new
demands. 	Minnesota is accordingly likely to prevail on its claim that the Recertification
Letter (and the companion Enforcement Letter) is arbitrary and capricious.
B. 	Remaining Claims
Because the Court concludes that Minnesota is likely to prevail on at least one, and
likely several, of its substantive APA claims, the Court need not consider Minnesota’s
procedural 	APA 	claims, 	its 	constitutional 	claim, 	or 	its 	ultra 	vires 	claim. 	See
Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth., 826 F.3d at 1040. Accordingly, the Court turns to the
remaining factors for injunctive relief.
II. 	Irreparable Harm
Minnesota easily demonstrates a likelihood of irreparable harm absent injunctive
relief. To show irreparable harm, “a party must show that the harm is certain and great and
of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.” 	Dakotans
for Health v. Noem, 52 F.4th 381, 392 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Irreparable harm
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occurs “when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically because its injuries cannot
be fully compensated through an award of damages.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s,
LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 319 (8th Cir. 2009).
Minnesota argues that it will suffer two categories of harm if the Recertification
Letter remains in full force and effect: (1) “compliance” harms associated with attempting
to comply with the Recertification Letter’s demands; and (2) “noncompliance” harms if it
fails to do so. 	ECF No. 6 at 28–31. 	As for compliance harms, Minnesota asserts that
meeting the January 15, 2026 deadline would cause it to suffer: (1) economic damage
because it and the targeted counties would need to spend hundreds of thousands of dollars
in increased employee pay to meet the demand, ECF No. 11 ¶ 21; ECF No. 16 ¶ 19;
(2) administrative harm because it would need to divert workers from their usual jobs and
responsibilities to meet the new recertification deadline, ECF No. 7 ¶¶ 7–9; ECF No. 8 ¶ 8;
ECF No. 10 ¶ 37; ECF No. 11 ¶ 22; and (3) a loss of the trust it has built with its SNAP
beneficiaries, ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 51–52. As for noncompliance harms, Minnesota asserts that
USDA’s threat (and, pursuant to the Enforcement Letter, action) to withhold all or a portion
of the $80 million dollars the USDA provides annually in administrative funding, or to
remove Minnesota from the SNAP program entirely, “would wreak massive harms” and
could not be fully replaced. ECF No. 6 at 30–31; ECF No. 10 ¶¶ 47–50.12
12 	The Recertification Letter threatened to end “Minnesota’s continued participation
in SNAP.” ECF No. 1-1 at 3. The USDA at the preliminary injunction hearing represented
that it would never withdraw beneficiary funds from Minnesota. 	Whether or not that is
true, at this preliminary injunction stage, the Court takes the words of the Recertification
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The Court agrees that either attempting to comply, or failing to comply, would inflict
harm that is “certain and great and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need
for equitable relief.” Dakotans for Health, 52 F.4th at 392. Minnesota put forth evidence
that it would need to spend significant money and divert other tangible and intangible
resources to try to recertify SNAP recipients in the Recertification Counties by January 15,
2026. 	Requiring a state to comply “with a regulation later held invalid almost always
produces the irreparable harm of nonrecoverable compliance costs.” 	Texas v. EPA, 829
F.3d 405, 433 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200,
220–21 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment)); see, e.g., Kansas v.
Becerra, 764 F. Supp. 3d 801, 811 (N.D. Iowa 2025) (“[C]ompliance costs incurred to
comply with a potentially invalid regulation . . . may constitute irreparable harm.”); Doe v.
Trump, 157 F.4th 36, 79 (1st Cir. 2025) (holding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it determined state-plaintiffs would face irreparable harm stemming from
having to overhaul verification systems as required by new federal policy); 	New York v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 969 F.3d 42, 86 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding irreparable harm
where state-plaintiffs alleged that they would be required by federal policy to undertake
costly revisions to systems designed to verify eligibility of noncitizens for benefits);
District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1, 42 (D.D.C. 2020) (“These
harms from the forced diversion of resources are similar to those recognized as irreparable
Letter at face value: noncompliance may result in the complete withholding of SNAP
beneficiary funds.
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harm in other suits.”). 	Indeed, the USDA describes no mechanism by which Minnesota
could recover its sunk compliance costs, and any attempt to recover these costs from the
federal 	government 	would 	likely 	run 	headlong 	into 	sovereign 	immunity. 	This
“heighten[s]” the need for injunctive relief. Entergy, Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 210 F.3d 887,
899 (8th Cir. 2000).
The USDA does not argue that compliance costs cannot constitute irreparable harm
in the abstract but instead asserts that Minnesota cannot cite compliance costs as a basis
for irreparable harm because Minnesota has not actually attempted to comply with the
January 15, 2026 deadline. ECF No. 21 at 28 (noting that by not acting to comply with the
Recertification Letter, “Minnesota elected to ensure its noncompliance and any alleged
harm about which it now complains”). 	There is some merit to this argument: when
Minnesota moved for a preliminary injunction on December 29, 2025, ECF No. 5, the
substantial compliance costs Minnesota complained about were real and imminent. 	But
now, with the arrival of the January 15, 2026 deadline, it does not appear that any of the
compliance costs were borne out. Nor does it appear that the Recertification Letter imparts
any continuing obligations on Minnesota, such that these compliance costs would remain
at issue moving forward. ECF No. 22 at 24 (the USDA asserting that it “simply called for
a one-time acceleration . . . of the work that Minnesota is in all events obligated to
perform”). In some respects, then, the issue of compliance harm is moot.
But what remains are the costs of not complying. Indeed, the Recertification Letter
left Minnesota with two paths: comply with its demand or face the consequences.
Attempting to comply would have brought the associated harms discussed above (along
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with the very likely possibility that its efforts would have ultimately proven futile). 	But
now that Minnesota has not complied, the Recertification Letter’s threat of consequences
has arrived. ECF No. 1-1 at 3. And what is more, the Enforcement Letter followed through
on the harms threatened in the Recertification Letter. ECF No. 40-1.
In its briefing, the USDA, tellingly, outright ignores Minnesota’s assertion that the
loss of administrative and beneficiary funding constitutes irreparable harm and, provides
no argument as to why the loss of administrative funding would not, legally, constitute such
harm. Nor could it. “Irreparable harm exists when a party has no adequate remedy at law,
typically because its injuries cannot be fully compensated through an award of damages.”
Missouri, 128 F.4th at 996 (citation omitted). A party has no adequate remedy at law when
the damage is “financial loss” from the federal government because of the federal
government’s sovereign immunity. 	Id. 	Accordingly, there is little doubt that the loss of
administrative or SNAP beneficiary funding is, therefore, a sufficient irreparable harm.
See, e.g., Washington v. Trump, 145 F.4th 1013, 1037 (9th Cir. 2025) (finding irreparable
harm because “the denial of reimbursements and administrative costs are economic injuries
for which monetary damages are not available”); California v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
No. 25-cv-06310-MMC, 2025 WL 2939227, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2025) (loss of
SNAP administrative funding constitutes irreparable harm);13 New York v. Trump, 769 F.
13 	The USDA summarily asserts in a footnote that the Court should not rely on
California because it dealt with the “recent lapse in appropriations,” and that the threat to
withhold administrative funding here “is not the same thing as Congress failing to
appropriate funds for SNAP.” ECF No. 22 at 28. The USDA misses the mark. California
was not about the appropriations issue, but about a similar letter from the USDA
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Supp. 3d 119, 142 (D.R.I. 2025) (“It is so obvious that it almost need not be stated that
when money is obligated and therefore expected . . . and is not paid as promised, harm
follows—debt is incurred, debt is unpaid, essential . . . services stop, and budgets are
upended.”); Maine v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 778 F. Supp. 3d 200, 233 (D. Me. 2025)
(“Federal 	Defendants’ termination 	of 	the 	State’s 	Title 	IX 	funding 	will 	harm 	the
beneficiaries and employees of those programs that rely on these funds.”).
At the hearing, the USDA asserted that Minnesota could just move money around
to cover the costs the USDA is now promising to withhold. 	He also represented that the
loss of $20 million in first-quarter administrative funding was “de minimis.” 	Neither
argument holds water. 	The USDA fails to grapple with the fact that even if Minnesota
could move money from another department to cover the loss of administrative funds
within Minnesota’s DCYF, that is still money that Minnesota will lose and cannot recover
from the federal government. 	The other argument is beside the point. 	Minnesota
represented at the hearing that losing the first quarter of administrative funding would
significantly impede its ability to administer SNAP in Minnesota. That is not, as the USDA
urged, “de minimis” loss. 	Nor would it help Minnesota uncover fraud to remove the
funding Minnesota uses to do so.
To be clear, the irreparable harm here does not boil down to mere dollars and cents.
Hundreds of thousands of Minnesotans rely on SNAP to sustain their most basic human
threatening to withhold administrative funding. 	California, 2025 WL 2939227, at *12.
The court in that case concluded that the loss of such funding constitutes irreparable harm,
id., a conclusion which this Court finds persuasive.
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need for adequate food and nutrition—just as Congress intended. 	ECF No. 10 ¶ 6; see
7 U.S.C. § 2011 (“It is declared to be the policy of Congress, in order to promote the general
welfare, to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation’s population by raising levels
of nutrition among low-income households.”). 	Going without food has long been
recognized as an irreparable harm in the American legal tradition, because the “deprivation
of nutrition, and the psychological and physical distress attending that deprivation, are
quite likely to impose lingering, if not irreversible effects.” 	District of Columbia, 444 F.
Supp. 3d at 43 (citation omitted). The USDA’s threat to terminate all administrative and
beneficiary SNAP funding to Minnesota risks such irreparable harm.
The Court easily concludes that the threatened or real withholding of such monies
demonstrates a likelihood of irreparable harm.
III. 	Balance of the Equities
When a party seeks an injunction against the government, the final two preliminary
injunction factors merge, and the Court must ask whether “balance of the equities and the
public interest also support a preliminary injunction.” Missouri, 128 F.4th at 996–97. In
analyzing the question, the Court considers whether the moving party’s likely harm without
a preliminary injunction exceeds the nonmoving party’s likely harm with a preliminary
injunction in place. Cigna Corp., 103 F.4th at 1347. Again, the Court has little difficulty
concluding that the equities support a preliminary injunction here.
As discussed, the harm Minnesota and its SNAP recipients would suffer in the
absence of a preliminary injunction is significant and, given the USDA’s Enforcement
Letter, guaranteed to occur. The USDA asserts, as a counter, that an injunction will harm
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it and the public because an injunction would “curtail the Federal Government’s ability to
timely test and discover the extent to which Minnesota is failing to properly administer and
enforce SNAP.” 	ECF No. 22 at 25. 	But even taking the USDA’s assertion at face value
that a rushed recertification process will help identify fraud, there are two problems with
the USDA’s argument.
First, as the USDA repeatedly asserts in its briefing, Minnesota is already required
to take the recertification steps the USDA demands. See, e.g., id. at 32. As a result, if an
injunction issues, Minnesota could not avoid the recertification process. It would simply
prevent Minnesota from having to do so right now and allow Minnesota to continue to do
the required recertifications throughout the year, as it always has. To the extent, then, that
the recertification process will uncover fraud in Minnesota, that fraud will be exposed in
due course, and the USDA would be entitled to claw back any funds that it finds were
inappropriately sent out because of fraud or negligence. See 7 C.F.R. § 276.3 (specifying
that if the USDA “determines that there has been negligence or fraud on the part of the
State agency in the certification of applicant households, the State agency shall, upon
demand, pay to [the USDA] a sum equal”).
Second, as explained above, Minnesota has demonstrated a “strong likelihood of
success in showing” the USDA’s demands exceed its authority. Missouri, 128 F.4th at 997.
In such a case, “[t]here is generally no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful
agency action.” Id. (quoting League of Women Voters of the U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12
(D.C. Cir. 2016)); see also D.M. ex rel. Bao Xiong v. Minn. State High Sch. League, 917
F.3d 994, 1004 n.5 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding equities favored an injunction where the
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moving party’s “los[s] at trial” was “highly unlikely”). 	The only harm that the USDA
stands to suffer is the requirement to follow the law—which is to say, no harm at all. See
League of Women Voters of S.C. v. Andino, 497 F. Supp. 3d 59, 78 (D.S.C. 2020) (finding
no harm to the government from having to follow the law because it “should be doing that
anyway”); Walter A. v. Berg, No. 25-cv-4376 (PJS/DLM), 2025 WL 3296278, at *2
(D. Minn. Nov. 26, 2025) (“[T]he public interest is served by ensuring that the Executive
Branch follows the law.”).
Having 	satisfied 	all 	factors 	for 	a 	preliminary 	injunction, 	the 	Court 	grants
Minnesota’s motion.
IV. 	Remaining Issues
Finally, the USDA made two requests in the event that the Court grant an injunction.
First, the USDA asked for an order requiring Minnesota to post “an appropriate bond”
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c). ECF No. 22 at 26. Second, it asked the
Court to stay its injunction pending the disposition of any appeal or, at a minimum, for a
period of forty-eight hours to allow the United States to seek an emergency, expedited stay
from the court of appeals. Id.
As to bond, Rule 65 states that a court may issue a preliminary injunction or a
temporary restraining order only if the moving party “gives security in an amount that the
court considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c). The USDA did not specify an appropriate
dollar amount in its brief, ECF No. 22 at 26, but at the hearing suggested $20 million as an
appropriate amount because that is the amount it seeks to withhold from Minnesota in the
first quarter of 2026.
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The Court disagrees. 	District courts have wide discretion in 	implementing
Rule 65(c) and may refuse to enter a bond “where the damages resulting from a wrongful
issuance of an injunction have not been shown,” Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers Auth., 826
F.3d at 1043. The USDA’s failure to request an appropriate dollar amount in briefing could,
in some respects, be considered a waiver of its obligation to show the damages it would
suffer from a wrongful injunction. 	Waxing the City Franchisor LLC v. Katularu,
No. 24-cv-2479 (JMB/DJF), 2024 WL 3887109, at *10 (D. Minn. Aug. 20, 2024) (“The
party seeking bond is required to establish a rational basis for the amount of the proposed
bond.”). Even considering the $20 million the USDA asked for at the hearing, the USDA
provided no rational basis on which to conclude that such a number is appropriate beyond
hand-waving to the amount it has threatened to withhold. Powerlift Door Consultants, Inc.
v. Shepard, No. 21-cv-1316 (WMW/ECW), 2021 WL 2911177, at *8 (D. Minn. July 12,
2021) (declining bond where non-moving party sought a “substantial” bond but did not
provide a rational basis for such relief). 	But that the USDA threatened to withhold that
amount does not mean that it would be entitled to that amount if the Recertification Letter
were later determined to have been inappropriately enjoined. 	For reasons already
discussed, it is likely unlawful for the USDA to withhold administrative funding because
of Minnesota’s decision not to engage in the proposed Section 2026 project. 	See supra
pp. 26. 	The USDA would instead have to follow 7 U.S.C. § 2020(g). 	Should the
Recertification Letter turn out to be a valid Section 2026 project with which Minnesota
should have complied, even then, the withholding of administrative funds is still not likely
to be an appropriate remedy. 	Further, given the USDA’s unlikelihood of success on the
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merits, a bond is not appropriate here. 	See Bixby v. Lifespace Communities, Inc.,
No. 18-cv-817 (JRT/KMM), 2018 WL 3218697, at *7 (D. Minn. July 2, 2018) (concluding
bond not necessary where the moving party “demonstrated a high likelihood of success on
the merits”).
The Court likewise declines to grant a stay pending appeal. A stay pending appeal
“has some functional overlap with an injunction, particularly a preliminary one.” Nken v.
Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 428 (2009). And both involve consideration of the same factors:
likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm absent a stay, the balance of harms,
and the public interest. Id. at 434. The USDA develops no argument on any of the factors,
and for the same reasons that the Court grants Minnesota’s motion for a preliminary
injunction, the Court concludes that all of the Nken factors weigh against a stay of the
injunction pending appeal.
CONCLUSION
The primary function of a preliminary injunction “is to preserve the status quo until,
upon final hearing, a court may grant full, effective relief.” 	Missouri, 128 F.4th at 990
(citation omitted). 	By all accounts, Minnesota has operated its SNAP recertification
process in compliance with federal law and with the express blessing of the USDA. The
Recertification Letter and Enforcement Letter seek to upend that status quo, and, without
any reasoned explanation, demand that Minnesota implement an entirely new process
within 30 days. 	This sort of haphazard decisionmaking is precisely what the APA is
intended to prevent and what a preliminary injunction is to remedy. Accordingly, because
Minnesota is likely to succeed on at least one of its APA claims, and because all other
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factors for injunctive relief fall in Minnesota’s favor, the Court grants Minnesota’s motion
for a preliminary injunction.
ORDER
For 	the 	reasons 	stated 	above, 	Minnesota’s 	motion 	(ECF 	No. 	5) 	is 	hereby
GRANTED, and the USDA is PRELIMINARILY ENJOINED from taking any adverse
action against Minnesota based on the Recertification Letter, and PRELIMINARILY
ENJOINED from withholding any of Minnesota’s administrative funding for the first
quarter of calendar year 2026 as threatened in the Enforcement Letter.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: January 16, 2026 	s/Laura M. Provinzino
Laura M. Provinzino
United States District Judge
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