Horswell v. Saint Peter Regional Treatment Center

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Phillip Horswell,
Plaintiff,
v.
Saint Peter Regional Treatment Center,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cv-4581 (JMB/LIB)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to a general assignment made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636, this matter
comes before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge upon review of Plaintiff’s
Complaint. [Docket No. 1]. For the reasons explained below, the Court recommends dismissing
this action and denying Plaintiff’s pending motions as moot.
Plaintiff was civilly committed in 2010 under Minnesota’s civil-commitment provisions
for persons deemed mentally ill and dangerous. See, e.g., In re Commitment of Horswell, No. A10-
488, 2010 WL 3220161, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2010); Register of Actions, In re
Commitment of Horswell, No. 46-PR-09-1036 (Minn. Dist. Ct.).1 From the address Plaintiff
provides and the details in the Complaint, it appears he is presently committed at the St. Peter
Regional Treatment Center (now better known as the Minnesota Security Hospital). (See Compl.
[Docket No. 1] at 1, 4). The Center is this action’s sole defendant. (See Id. at 1).
1 The details of Plaintiff’s civil commitment are not included in Plaintiff’s Complaint, but the Court can nevertheless
take judicial notice of public court records, such as the State Court docket for Plaintiff’s civil-commitment
proceedings. See, e.g., Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Eagleboy,
200 F.3d 1137, 1140 (8th Cir. 1999)); Dahir v. Bolin, No. 24-cv-1304 (ECT/ECW), 2025 WL 3027462, at *1 n.1 (D.
Minn. Sept. 30, 2025) (citing cases, including Stutzka), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3023516 (D.
Minn. Oct. 29, 2025).
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The Complaint’s factual allegations consist of one paragraph. (See Id. at 4). Plaintiff alleges
that the Center “is forcing a group that teaches us how to be gay or that it is alright to be gay which
is against my religion.” (Id.) What “forcing” means here is unclear, but the Court construes Plaintiff
to mean that Center officials require him to attend a class on those topics. Plaintiff seeks an “order
making [the Center]” stop “forcing us not to practice our Roman Catholic faith.” (Id.)
The Complaint fails on a threshold jurisdictional issue: this Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.
Federal Courts have limited jurisdiction and may hear only matters which fall within the
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. Marine Equipment Management Co. v. United States, 4 F.3d
643, 646 (8th Cir. 1993). This creates in the Federal Courts a self-imposed duty to inquire whether
the prerequisite of subject matter jurisdiction has been satisfied in every case before them. See
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). “When a requirement goes to subject-matter
jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider sua sponte issues that the parties have disclaimed or
have not presented.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 649 (2012) (citing United States v. Cotton,
535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)). Subject matter jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited and can be
addressed at any time. See Gonzalez, 132 S. Ct. at 649.
A federal district court may have subject matter jurisdiction based on either federal
question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or on the basis of diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. §
1332. Under § 1331, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Under § 1332,
“[t]he district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and cost, and is between—
(1) citizens of different States . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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It is well established that the party asserting federal-court jurisdiction bears the burden of
establishing it. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)
(citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182–183 (1936)); Ark. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield v. Little Rock Cardiology Clinic, P.A., 551 F.3d 812, 816 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing
Kokkonen). Here, Plaintiff bears that burden.
Plaintiff prepared his present Complaint on a template form that asks questions concerning
subject-matter jurisdiction, and Plaintiff checked a box indicating that he believes federal-question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 exists here. (See Compl. [Docket No. 1] at 3). But the template
also asks a litigant asserting federal-question jurisdiction to state what “federal Constitutional,
statutory or treaty right is at issue[.]” Plaintiff leaves this blank. In other words, when asked to
justify his claim of federal-question jurisdiction, Plaintiff fails to provide any response. (See Id.).
It is Plaintiff’s burden to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, and thus, his failure to provide any
justification for his conclusory assertion that federal question jurisdiction exists here represents a
sufficient basis upon which to recommend the dismissal of this action without further examination
of Plaintiff’s pleading.
But the problems actually deepen on closer scrutiny. Documents submitted with the
Complaint suggest that Plaintiff bases his claims here on a regulation that Plaintiff identifies as
“C.M.R. 03, 201, ch. 10, subsec. 201-10-24.3.” (See Docket No. 1-2 (civil cover sheet citing this
regulation); Docket No. 1-1 at 3–12 (purporting to be copy of relevant regulation)). Plaintiff does
not identify the source of the “C.M.R. 03, 201, ch. 10, subsec. 201-10-24.3” regulation upon which
he relies. It does not appear to be a federal law or regulation. As far as the Court can tell, it is not
even a Minnesota law or regulation. In fact, it appears to be a provision from the State of Maine’s
administrative regulations for its own Department of Corrections. See 03-201 Me. Code R. ch. 10,
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Subs. 24.3, § I–VII. Plaintiff has flatly failed to carry his burden of showing federal-question
jurisdiction here.2
The Court therefore recommends dismissing this action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Given that recommendation of dismissal, the Court also recommends denying as moot
Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis in this matter, [Docket No. 2], and his motion
seeking an “[e]mergency [i]nju[n]ction,” [Docket No. 3].
This leaves one final point. Courts have authority to control matters pending before them,
and while there is a right to access the courts, that right does not extend to frivolous actions or
those filed with malicious intent. See, e.g., In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1292 (8th Cir. 1988) (citation
omitted). When a litigant repeatedly files frivolous claims, the Court may order him to obtain court
approval before filing future lawsuits. See, e.g., Sassower v. Carlson, 930 F.2d 583, 584 (8th Cir.
1991). In the last year, Horswell has filed five lawsuits in this District (including this one), with
four of the five actions having been filed since December 1, 2025. Two of these suits were quickly
dismissed, and dismissal has been recommended in the other two. See Horswell v. State of MN,
No. 25-cv-1004 (ECT/JFD), 2025 WL 1371814, at *1 (D. Minn. May 12, 2025); Horswell v. All
50 States, No. 25-cv-4563 (PAM/DLM), 2025 WL 3540847, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 10, 2025);
2 To be sure, Horswell’s allegations could be read to implicate two federal-law theories that he does not specifically
invoke: a First Amendment free-exercise claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a claim under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”), Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000cc–2000cc-5). But even if the Court supplied those legal labels, the Complaint would not state a viable claim.
Because Horswell names only the Center (presumably an arm of the State of Minnesota), the Eleventh Amendment
bars suit in federal court against that defendant absent waiver or valid congressional abrogation, and § 1983 supplies
neither (nor does it authorize suits against States or their agencies). See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341–45
(1979); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 & n.10 (1989). And while RLUIPA provides a cause of
action for certain burdens on the religious exercise of institutionalized persons, Congress limited that protection to
burdens imposed in a “program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance” (or, alternatively, those affecting
interstate commerce). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b). Here, the Complaint does not allege facts from which the Court
could reasonably infer either predicate, so RLUIPA does not provide a basis for relief on the pleadings presented.
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Horswell v. REM River Bluffs, No. 25-cv-4507 (JWB/JFD) (D. Minn. Dec. 11, 2025);3 Horswell
v. Minnesota, No. 25-cv-4490 (LMP/SGE) (D. Minn. Dec. 11, 2025).
The Court therefore recommends warning Plaintiff that if he continues to file meritless
litigation in this District, he will be added to this District’s list of restricted filers. Once placed on
this list, Plaintiff will be unable to file new lawsuits in the District of Minnesota unless he is
represented by an attorney or receives prior written approval from a judicial officer in the District.
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Plaintiff Phillip Horswell’s Complaint, [Docket No. 1], be DISMISSED without
prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction;
2. 	Plaintiff’s IFP application, [Docket No. 2], be DENIED as moot;
3. 	Plaintiff’s Motion seeking an “[e]mergency [i]nju[n]ction,” [Docket No. 3], be
DENIED as moot; and
4. 	Plaintiff be warned that if he continues to file meritless litigation in this District, he will
be added to this District’s restricted-filer list.
Dated: December 17, 2025 	s/Leo I. Brisbois
Hon. Leo I. Brisbois
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District
Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
3 The Court notes that Horswell’s filings in the REM River Bluffs matter also appear to rely on the Maine regulation
discussed above. See Horswell v. REM River Bluffs, No. 25-cv-4507 (JWB/JFD), Report and Recommendation
[Docket No. 4] at 2 (D. Minn. Dec. 11, 2025).
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Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate
judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the
Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being
served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must
comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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