Horswell v. State of MN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
PHILLIP HORSWELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF MINNESOTA,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cv-4490 (LMP/SGE)
ORDER ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), ECF No. 3, of
United States Magistrate Judge Shannon G. Elkins, which recommends dismissing Plaintiff
Phillip Horswell’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, without prejudice and denying Horswell’s
Application to Proceed to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”), ECF No. 2, as
moot. Horswell did not file any formal objections but did respond to the R&R by filing a
motion for leave to amend his complaint. 	ECF No. 5. 	For the reasons that follow, the
Court adopts the R&R, denies the motion to amend, and dismisses the complaint.
BACKGROUND
Horswell brought this action on December 1, 2025. 	ECF No. 1. 	In general,
Horswell alleges that in 2016, Minnesota state officials unlawfully revoked his provisional
discharge from his previous civil commitment because officials arrested and detained him
CASE 0:25-cv-04490-LMP-SGE Doc. 10 Filed 03/09/26 Page 1 of 6

2
without a judicial arrest warrant or due process. ECF No. 1 at 1, 4–6.1 He has remained
civilly committed since he was re-detained. Id. at 6. Horswell asserts that the state violated
his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by placing him back in civil commitment.
Id. at 5–6.
As the R&R notes, it is unclear whether Horswell intended his initial complaint as
a standard civil action asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or a federal habeas action
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 3 at 2–6. Cautioning against construing the complaint
as a habeas action, id. at 5–6, Magistrate Judge Elkins recommended dismissing the
complaint because of fundamental deficiencies. 	First, Horswell named only the State of
Minnesota as a defendant, but the State of Minnesota is entitled to sovereign immunity. Id.
at 2–3. 	Second, to the extent Horswell’s complaint sought monetary damages under
Section 1983 for unlawful detainment, see ECF No. 1 at 7, he would not be entitled to such
damages until his detainment is invalidated through appropriate procedures, ECF No. 3
at 3 n.4 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994)). And third, to the extent
Horswell sought a return to provisional discharge status, ECF No. 1 at 7, he is barred from
doing so through a Section 1983 action and instead must do so through a habeas action
under Section 2254, ECF No. 3 at 3–4.
Instead of filing an objection to the R&R, Horswell filed a motion for leave to amend
his complaint in which he simply requests that the Court add “Martin Count[y] Human
1 	Horswell was civilly committed in 2010 under Minnesota’s civil-commitment
provisions for persons deemed mentally ill and dangerous. In re Commitment of Horswell,
No. A10-488, 2010 WL 3220161, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2010).
CASE 0:25-cv-04490-LMP-SGE Doc. 10 Filed 03/09/26 Page 2 of 6

3
Services, Martin County Sheriff’s Department and the MN Department of Human
Services” as defendants. ECF No. 5. He later filed a motion for default judgment asserting
that none of the proposed defendants had answered the complaint. ECF No. 9.
ANALYSIS
In general, the Court’s review of an R&R is subject to one of two standards. 	If a
party serves written objections to the R&R, the Court must “make a de novo determination
of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The district judge “may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge.” Id. If, on the other hand, no objections are filed, the Court reviews the R&R for
clear error. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996)
(per curiam).
Horswell’s motion for leave to amend is by no means a formal objection. But it is
at least partially responsive to the R&R. As noted, the R&R explained that Horswell had
only named Minnesota as a defendant but that the State of Minnesota is immune from suit.
ECF No. 3 at 2–3. The motion for leave to amend seeks to correct that deficiency and add
three new defendants “as the report from the Magistrate [Judge] recommended.” 	ECF
No. 5 at 1. But Horswell provides no response to the R&R’s other noted deficiencies. It
does not address the R&R’s conclusion that Horswell is barred from seeking monetary
damages at this point. Nor does it address the R&R’s conclusion that Horswell cannot seek
release from custody through a Section 1983 action. 	And most importantly it does not
provide any clarification as to whether Horswell intends his complaint to operate as a
CASE 0:25-cv-04490-LMP-SGE Doc. 10 Filed 03/09/26 Page 3 of 6

4
Section 1983 action or as a habeas petition, despite Magistrate Judge Elkins’s careful
consideration of the issue. As a result, even if the Court considered the motion to amend
as an objection and reviewed the R&R de novo, Horswell’s complaint must be dismissed
because he cannot obtain the relief he seeks through a Section 1983 action, regardless of
whether he adds the new defendants. And for the same reasons that led Magistrate Judge
Elkins to decline to recharacterize Horswell’s complaint as a habeas action (namely, that it
would almost certainly be dismissed and that such dismissal would restrict Horswell’s
ability to seek further habeas relief, ECF No. 3 at 5), the Court will likewise decline to
recharacterize Horswell’s complaint given his silence on the issue. If Horswell did intend
to initiate a habeas action, he is free to file a new complaint making his intentions clear.
But Horswell is cautioned that—if he intends to seek habeas relief in federal court—he
must explain how he meets the strict procedural requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
Two final housekeeping matters. First, if Horswell’s motion for leave to amend was
filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, it suffers from several procedural
issues. 	See D. Minn. L.R. 15.1 (noting that “any amended pleading must be complete in
itself and must not incorporate by reference any prior pleading” and that a “motion to
amend a pleading must be accompanied by” a copy of “the proposed amended pleading”).
Regardless, the Court would deny it as futile. See Zutz v. Nelson, 601 F.3d 842, 850 (8 th Cir.
2010) (citation omitted) (holding that a court may properly deny leave to amend when the
proposed amended complaint is futile because it “could not withstand a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”). Specifically, a claim against
CASE 0:25-cv-04490-LMP-SGE Doc. 10 Filed 03/09/26 Page 4 of 6

5
the Minnesota Department of Human Services would be barred by sovereign immunity,
see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984), the Martin
County Sheriff’s Department is not an entity subject to suit, see De La Garza v. Kandiyohi
Cnty. Jail, Corr. Inst., 18 F. App’x 436, 437 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam), and a claim against
Martin County Human Services would have to satisfy the requirements of Monell v.
Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which the Complaint
does not purport to do.
Second, the Court denies Horswell’s motion for default judgment. 	Again, the
motion is procedurally deficient. 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55 (explaining that before a litigant
can seek a default judgment it must first seek an entry of default with the Clerk of Court).
It is also meritless. 	No defendant or purported defendant has been served. 	Stuke v.
Leonard, Street & Deinard, No. 11-cv-0141 MJD/SER, 2011 WL 2491377, at *2 (D. Minn.
May 10, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 2490715 (D. Minn.
June 23, 2011) (“When a defendant is not properly served with a summons and the
complaint, the plaintiff is not entitled to default judgment.”). Even if a defendant had been
served, Horswell is also not entitled to a default judgment because his complaint is
meritless as pleaded. 	Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that a
district court should dismiss a complaint and deny default judgment when factual
allegations do not constitute legitimate cause of action).
ORDER
Based upon all of the files, records, and proceedings in this matter, IT IS
ORDERED THAT:
CASE 0:25-cv-04490-LMP-SGE Doc. 10 Filed 03/09/26 Page 5 of 6

6
1. 	The R&R (ECF No. 3) is ADOPTED;
2. 	Horswell’s 	complaint 	(ECF 	No. 	1) 	is 	DISMISSED 	WITHOUT
PREJUDICE;
3. 	Horswell’s IFP Application (ECF No. 2) is DENIED as moot;
4. 	Horswell’s motion for leave to amend (ECF No. 5) is DENIED; and
5. 	Horswell’s motion for default judgment (ECF No. 9) is DENIED.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 9, 2026 	s/Laura M. Provinzino
Laura M. Provinzino
United States District Judge
CASE 0:25-cv-04490-LMP-SGE Doc. 10 Filed 03/09/26 Page 6 of 6