Horswell v. State of MN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Phillip Horswell,
Plaintiff,
v.
State of Minnesota,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cv-4490 (LMP/SGE)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Phillip Horswell’s Complaint, Dkt. 1,
and his Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Dkt. 2 (“IFP Application”). For the
reasons below, the Court recommends dismissing this action and denying the IFP Applica-
tion as moot.
Mr. Horswell is civilly committed and currently housed at the Minnesota Security
Hospital in St. Peter, Minnesota. See Compl. 1, 6.1 He alleges that in March 2016, while
on provisional discharge from civil commitment,2 state officials unlawfully revoked that
discharge and returned him to the treatment facility without a judicial arrest warrant or due
1 Because the Complaint is not consecutively paginated, the Court cites it using the page
numbers assigned by the District’s CM/ECF electronic-filing system.
2 Mr. Horswell was civilly committed in 2010 under Minnesota’s civil-commitment provi-
sions for persons deemed mentally ill and dangerous. See, e.g., In re Commitment of Hor-
swell, No. A10-488, 2010 WL 3220161, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2010); Register of
Actions, In re Commitment of Horswell, No. 46-PR-09-1036 (Minn. Dist. Ct.); cf. Minn.
Stat. § 253B.18 (providing relevant statutory framework, including provisions on provi-
sional discharge).
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process. See id. at 4–5. Mr. Horswell claims that these actions violated his Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights by effectively rearresting and confining him without a warrant or
fair hearing. See id. The Complaint seeks $31,500,000 in damages and an injunction “to
have [his] provisional discharge reinstated.” Id. at 7. On the latter point, the Court notes
that although Mr. Horswell used a standard civil-complaint form, he also refers to this ac-
tion twice as though it features a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See id. at 4. Mr.
Horswell’s pleading is therefore somewhat unclear, but courts must construe pro se filings
liberally. See, e.g., Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 90 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Mungai v. Univ. of Minn., 141 F.4th 959, 963 (8th Cir. 2025)
(citing Sandknop v. Mo. Dep’t of Corrs., 932 F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 2019)).
If the Court construes Mr. Horswell’s Complaint as a standard civil complaint, it
faces a threshold problem. The only defendant he names is the State of Minnesota. But
under the Eleventh Amendment, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. And notwithstand-
ing this “another State” wording, it is well established that the Amendment bars suits by a
state’s own citizens. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
98 (1984) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)); Klingler v. Dir., Dep’t of Revenue,
455 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir. 2006) (same).
There are limited exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity: a state can waive
it, and Congress may abrogate it in some circumstances. See, e.g., Va. Off. for Prot. &
Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011) (citing College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
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Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675–676 (1999)); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55–72 (1996). But nothing in the Complaint suggests that Minnesota
has waived immunity for claims like Mr. Horswell’s claims, and Congress did not abrogate
that immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
339–45 (1979); Roe v. Nebraska, 861 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66–67 (1989)).3 This Court therefore recommends dis-
missing the Complaint insofar as it asserts civil claims against the State of Minnesota.4
What remains in the Complaint is Mr. Horswell’s habeas-type request to reinstate
his provisional-discharge status. That claim cannot proceed in this action. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has made clear that when a state prisoner (or detainee) challenges “the very
fact or duration of his physical imprisonment” and seeks a determination that he is entitled
to immediate or speedier release from custody, “his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas
corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also, e.g., Adams v. Agniel,
3 This aspect of § 1983 matters because, to the extent that Mr. Horswell seeks a civil action
based on alleged violations of constitutional rights, he must bring that suit under § 1983.
See, e.g., Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[A]
litigant complaining of a constitutional right violation must utilize 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”)
(citing cases)); Smuda v. Futchko, No. 25-CV-1721 (JRT/JFD), 2025 WL 2622608, at *2
n.3 (D. Minn. May 5, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2205929
(D. Minn. Aug. 4, 2025) (citing cases, including Azul-Pacifico)).
4 Furthermore, even if Mr. Horswell had sued an appropriate defendant, the Court would
still dismiss any civil claims in this action. It is well established that state detainees cannot
use § 1983 to seek damages for allegedly unlawful confinement until that confinement has
been invalidated through appropriate procedures. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
486–87 (1994); see also, e.g., Thomas v. Eschen, 928 F.3d 709, 711 (8th Cir. 2019) (con-
cluding that Heck’s “favorable termination” rule applies to cases challenging civil commit-
ment).
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405 F.3d 643, 644 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Preiser).5 Such relief cannot be obtained through
a civil-rights action. So the proper way for Mr. Horswell to pursue provisional discharge
from his civil commitment in federal court would be to file a habeas corpus petition under
§ 2254 (assuming he can meet the procedural requirements for § 2254 petitions). See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d) (establishing statute of limitations for § 2254 petitions); id.
§ 2254(b)(1)(A) (establishing requirement of state-court exhaustion for petitioners using
§ 2254).6
5 Preiser and Adams involve prisoners, but caselaw makes clear that, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, civilly committed individuals may use habeas to challenge their commitments.
See, e.g., Palmer v. United States, No. 21-CV-1980 (MJD/JFD), 2022 WL 1272128, at *2
(D. Minn. Mar. 25, 2022) (citing cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL
1271672 (D. Minn. Apr. 28, 2022), aff’d, No. 22-1965, 2022 WL 16753131 (8th Cir. June
28, 2022).
6 The Court recognizes some ambiguity in how to characterize a request for “provisional
discharge” under Minnesota’s civil-commitment scheme. On one view, confinement at the
Minnesota Security Hospital and provisional discharge in the community are both forms
of “custody” for habeas purposes. Moving from one to the other could then be treated as
an adjustment in one’s conditions of confinement rather than an outright end to custody.
Under that framing, a demand for provisional discharge seems more like a conditions-of-
confinement claim cognizable in a civil-rights action.
On the other hand, Minnesota law expressly defines provisional discharge as a “reduction
in custody,” Minn. Stat. § 253B.18, subd. 4c(b), and such a discharge here would appar-
ently move Mr. Horswell from inpatient confinement to living in his home in the commu-
nity, subject to conditions. That shift is more than an incremental change in living condi-
tions within the same institution; it is a “quantum change in the level of custody,” of the
kind the Supreme Court has described as lying within the “core” of habeas corpus, like
release from prison to parole. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487–88; Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 82–83, 86 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d
379, 381 (7th Cir. 1991)). The Court therefore assumes for present purposes that a request
for immediate provisional discharge like Mr. Horswell’s is properly pursued (if at all) in
habeas.
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Given Mr. Horswell’s pro se status and his references to a “Writ of Habeas Corpus”
in the pleading’s text, the Court has considered whether to recharacterize what remains of
this action as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Eighth
Circuit has indicated that courts should consider such recharacterization when appropriate.
See, e.g., Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 469, 471 (8th Cir. 2014). Before doing so, however,
a court should “consider the potential detriment” that recharacterizing a claim might cause
the litigant. Id.
The Court concludes that the safer course for Mr. Horswell is to decline to rechar-
acterize the rest of this action as a § 2254 matter. First, as noted above, a § 2254 petitioner
must satisfy strict statutory requirements, and the Complaint does not explain Mr. Hor-
swell’s position on whether he has met them here. Second, there are significant restrictions
on “second or successive” habeas petitions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (requiring dismissal
of claims presented in a second habeas application that were or could have been raised
previously). As a result, if the Court recharacterized this civil action as an initial § 2254
petition and that petition were later dismissed for nonexhaustion or on other grounds, any
later § 2254 challenge by Mr. Horswell could be deemed a second or successive petition.
The Court therefore recommends dismissing this action rather than recharacterizing it.
To be sure, the distinction is largely academic here. Even if the Court treated Mr. Horswell’s
request for provisional discharge as a conditions-of-confinement claim cognizable in a civil
action, the claim would still have to be dismissed because the Complaint names only the
State of Minnesota, which enjoys sovereign immunity from such claims (as noted above)
and also is not a “person” subject to § 1983 liability. See, e.g., Will, 491 U.S. at 64, 71.
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Given that recommendation, the Court also recommends denying the IFP Application as
moot.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Plaintiff Phillip Horswell’s Complaint, Dkt. 1, be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
2. 	Mr. Horswell’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, Dkt. 2, be
DENIED as moot.
Dated: December 11, 2025 	s/Shannon G. Elkins
SHANNON G. ELKINS
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objec-
tions within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2).
All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local
Rule 72.2(c).
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