Scheffler v. Davis et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
TROY KENNETH SCHEFFLER,
Plaintiff,
v.
BEN DAVIS, in his official capacity as
State Representative, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25‐CV‐4382 (NEB/LIB)
ORDER
Troy Kenneth Scheffler, pro se.
Janine Wetzel Kimble, MINNESOTA ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, for
all defendants.
Andrew Wilson, WILSON & CLAS, for defendant Josh Heintzeman.
In this action, plaintiff Troy Kenneth Scheffler brings various constitutional and
civil‐rights claims against “approximately one hundred defendants.” ECF No. 160 at 8;
see also ECF No. 1. Scheffler previously moved to disqualify the presiding judge, Judge
Nancy E. Brasel, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. See generally ECF No. 147; Scheffler
Aff., ECF No. 148. Judge Brasel denied Scheffler’s motion, concluding that his affidavit
was legally insufficient under § 144 and that he failed to establish grounds for
disqualification under § 455. ECF No. 157. This matter is now before the Court on
Scheffler’s request that the undersigned, as Chief Judge of the District, assign his case to
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another judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 137. ECF No. 160. For the reasons explained
below, Scheffler’s request is denied.
Scheffler misunderstands both § 137 and § 144. He urges the undersigned to
exercise his “supervisory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 137” and “administratively
reassign” his case to another judge. ECF No. 160 at 1, 11–14. But § 137 does not provide
a mechanism by which a litigant may file “a direct motion to the chief judge for
reassignment of a case.” Jarvis v. Mohave Cnty., No. CV‐25‐8077‐PCT‐MTL (ESW), 2025
WL 1754752, at *3 (D. Ariz. June 25, 2025); see also Chytka v. Wright Tree Serv., Inc., No.
11‐CV‐0968‐REB‐KLM, 2014 WL 4197564, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 25, 2014) (holding that a
litigant “is not entitled to demand reassignment” of her case and that “the Chief Judge
does not have the legal authority to review the rulings of other district judges or
magistrate judges in the district”).
But even if Scheffler could proceed under § 137, his arguments under § 144 are
without merit. Contrary to Scheffler’s belief, “[t]he simple filing of an affidavit does not
automatically disqualify a judge.” United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 851, 857 (10th Cir.
1976); see also ECF No. 160 at 1–2. Rather, Judge Brasel had “an affirmative duty to
probe the legal sufficiency of [Scheffler’s] affidavit of prejudice and not to disqualify
[herself] unnecessarily.” Davis v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 734 F.2d 1302, 1303 (8th
Cir. 1984); see also United States v. Faul, 748 F.2d 1204, 1210 (8th Cir. 1984) (“Relief under
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section 144 is expressly conditioned on the timely filing of a legally sufficient
affidavit.”). It is only after a “litigant has sufficiently alleged bias or prejudice” that
recusal becomes mandatory under § 144. Akins v. Knight, 863 F.3d 1084, 1086 (8th Cir.
2017) (emphasis added).
To be legally sufficient, an affidavit must generally allege personal bias or
prejudice that “‘stem[s] from an extrajudicial source’”—that is, “a source outside the
judicial proceeding at hand.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 544–45 (1994) (quoting
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)). Although “bias derive[d] from
an extrajudicial source” is not an absolute requirement, disqualification is “seldom
appropriate” when the alleged bias arises from judicial proceedings themselves. United
States v. Aldridge, 561 F.3d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).
Here, Scheffler does not allege any extrajudicial source of bias or prejudice. See
generally Scheffler Aff. As far as the record reflects, Judge Brasel has learned about
Scheffler solely from presiding over his cases. In that situation, an affidavit is not
legally sufficient unless it establishes “that the judge had a disposition ‘so extreme as to
display clear inability to render fair judgment.’” United States v. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104,
1111 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Liteky, 510 U.S. at 551).
None of the facts Scheffler alleges, either individually or in combination,
establish a legally sufficient basis for recusal:
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First, Scheffler suggests that Judge Brasel’s rulings in a prior case that he filed
demonstrate a “pattern of non‐engagement with [his] central arguments.” ECF No. 160
at 3; see also Scheffler Aff. ¶¶ 3, 5–7, 10. But “judicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555; see also
Fletcher v. Conoco Pipe Line Co., 323 F.3d 661, 665 (8th Cir. 2003) (“An adverse ruling does
not constitute a sufficient basis for disqualification without a clear showing of bias or
partiality.”); McLaughlin v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 869 F.2d 1039, 1047 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Bias
cannot be inferred from a mere pattern of rulings by a judicial officer, but requires
evidence that the officer had it ‘in’ for the party for reasons unrelated to the officer’s
view of the law[.]”). Disagreements with a judge’s rulings are properly directed to the
court of appeals, not recast as grounds for recusal. See Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 (“Almost
invariably, [judicial rulings] are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal.”).
Second, Scheffler claims that Judge Brasel “demonstrated personal hostility
toward [him]” by referring to “his many lawsuits” while presiding over one of his
many lawsuits. Scheffler Aff. ¶ 4; see also id. ¶ 9. Scheffler himself acknowledges the
truth of this statement, ECF No. 160 at 6 (“That the characterization may be factually
accurate does not make it relevant[.]”)—and, as the judges of this District are well
aware, Scheffler has filed many lawsuits. An accurate statement grounded in “facts
introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior
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proceedings” does not evince the type of “deep‐seated favoritism or antagonism” that
would mandate recusal. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555–56 (noting that critical, disapproving, or
even hostile judicial remarks “ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge”
unless “they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair
judgment impossible”); see also Dennis v. K&L Gates LLP, No. 1:20‐CV‐9393 (MKV), 2025
WL 2941611, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2025) (characterizing a plaintiff’s “repetitive
emails, phone calls, and filings,” as “harassing” was “not a basis for recusal”).
Third, Scheffler alleges that his pending appeal of rulings made by Judge Brasel
in a related case create a “structural conflict of interest” because a favorable ruling by
Judge Brasel in the present case would undermine her prior rulings. ECF No. 160 at
3–4; see also Scheffler Aff. ¶¶ 9–10. Again, a “judge’s rulings in a related case are not a
sufficient basis for recusal, except where pervasive bias is shown.” In re Bush, 232 F.
App’x 852, 854 (11th Cir. 2007); see also Wilson v. Huffman, No. 3:10‐CV‐0054, 2010 WL
697364, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2010) (“[I]nvolvement in a litigant’s prior case does not
create a conflict of interest preventing a judge from hearing a subsequent case involving
the same litigant, whether or not the first case has been appealed.”); Tallant v. Tallant,
No. 5:20‐CV‐0129‐KDB‐DCK, 2020 WL 6813227, at *2–3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 14, 2020)
(“Merely acting as the judge in a related action and entering a ruling that the Defendant
has appealed is, standing alone, plainly not grounds for recusal[.]”). The mere existence
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of a related appeal, therefore, does not demonstrate a disqualifying conflict, particularly
when (as Scheffler notes) the present claims are “brought under a different statute” than
those on appeal. Scheffler Aff. ¶ 10.
Finally, Scheffler argues that Judge Brasel exhibited bias by “rigidly” enforcing
“local formatting rules” against him “as a pro se litigant.” Scheffler Aff. ¶ 8.
Specifically, Scheffler points to the dismissal of his complaint under Rule 8, the
imposition of a “10,000‐word cap on any amended complaint,” and the requirement
that he submit a redlined comparison between his original complaint and any proposed
amended complaint. ECF No. 160 at 7–8; Scheffler Aff. ¶ 8. These routine case‐
management decisions also do not warrant recusal. See, e.g., Morton v. Astrue, 380 F.
App’x 892, 895 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Judicial rulings, routine trial administration efforts,
and ordinary admonishments are not grounds for recusal.”); In re Livingston, No. 25‐
1858, 2025 WL 1467435, at *2 (3d Cir. May 22, 2025) (“[R]outine case management
decisions . . . [are] not an appropriate basis for [recusal].”). Courts have likewise
rejected recusal motions premised on filing restrictions or similar limitations. See, e.g.,
Townsend v. Aptar, Inc., No. 1:22‐mi‐56‐MLB, 2023 WL 12129958, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 17,
2023) (concluding that a recusal motion based on filing restrictions was “wholly without
merit”); Lynn v. Willnauer, No. 23‐3111, 2024 WL 5040627, at *5 (10th Cir. Dec. 9, 2024)
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(rejecting plaintiff’s claim that filing restrictions were imposed as retaliation for recusal
motion).
Because Scheffler has not credibly alleged bias—much less extrajudicial
bias—Judge Brasel had an “affirmative duty” to deny his recusal motion. Davis, 734
F.2d at 1303. She fulfilled her duty. Accordingly, Scheffler’s request for administrative
reassignment is denied.1
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT plaintiff’s request for administrative reassignment
[ECF No. 160] is DENIED.
Dated: March 24, 2026 	/s/ Patrick J. Schiltz
Patrick J. Schiltz, Chief Judge
United States District Court
1Under both § 144 and § 455, “the standard is the same: recusal is required if the
judge bears bias or prejudice that might call into question his or her impartiality.”
Akins, 863 F.3d at 1086 (quotation omitted). The Court finds that recusal under § 455 is
not required for the same reasons that it finds that Scheffler’s affidavit is insufficient
under § 144. See Faul, 748 F.2d at 1210–11.
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