Savage v. City of Cambridge et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Spencer Sterling Savage,
Plaintiff,
v.
City of Cambridge, County of Isanti, Officer
Cristiano 	Rosa 	(individual 	capacity),
Sergeant 	Matthew 	Giese 	(individual
capacity), Deputy Jonathon Vander Vegt
(individual 	capacity), 	Kari 	Sue 	Collin
(individual capacity), and John/Jane Does
1–10,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-CV-4123 (JMB/ECW)
ORDER
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff Spencer Sterling Savage’s Second
Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 8 [hereinafter, “Compl.”),1 as well as his Application to
Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (IFP Application) (Doc. No. 2;
see also Doc. No. 9 (supplementing income information)). For the following reasons, the
Court dismisses much, but not all, of this action and grants the IFP Application.
According to the Complaint, on the night of March 17, 2023, Savage was pulled
over in Cambridge, Minnesota, by Defendant Officer Cristiano Rosa of the Cambridge
1 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, after first amending a complaint under Rule
15(a)(1), a party “may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent
or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The court “should freely give leave when
justice so requires.” 	Id. 	Given that Savage filed his Second Amended Complaint while
his IFP Application was still pending and prior to any appearance by any Defendant in this
action, the Court approves the second amendment.
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Police Department (“CPD”) for a suspected headlight violation. 	(See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 13.)
Rosa asked Savage to open the car door, which he promptly did. (Id. ¶ 3.) Savage had a
passenger in his vehicle, Defendant Kari Sue Collin, whom Rosa appeared to recognize.
(See id. ¶ 14.) Another officer on the scene remarked that “she” (presumably a reference
to Collin) “had a lot of contacts with the drug task force and stuff,” suggesting that Collin
was known to law enforcement. (Id. ¶ 16.) Within 13 seconds of when Savage opened the
door at Rosa’s direction, Rosa asked Savage if he had any weapons, despite Savage
displaying “no objective signs of nervousness” or threat. (Id. ¶ 17; see also Doc. No. 8-1
at 6–7.)
The encounter then allegedly escalated. Savage was removed from the vehicle and
placed in handcuffs. (See id. ¶ 18.) Rosa’s supervisor, Defendant Sergeant Matthew Giese,
who had arrived to assist, proceeded to search a Yeti container inside Savage’s vehicle and
claimed to discover methamphetamine inside. (See id.; see also Doc. No. 8-1 at 3.) Savage
was then arrested and later charged in state court with multiple drug offenses. (See Compl.
¶ 19.) 	Rosa and Giese coauthored the criminal complaint and probable-cause statement
supporting the charges, which Savage alleges included false or fabricated assertions. (See
id. ¶¶ 19, “22–27”.) 	Defendant Deputy Jonathon Vander Vegt of the Isanti County
Sheriff’s Office was listed as a witness in Savage’s criminal case (and in two other related
cases that the Complaint references), but the precise nature of his involvement in Plaintiff’s
arrest is not detailed. (See id. ¶¶ 20–21.)
Because of the arrest and charges, Savage alleges that he was detained in jail for six
days and suffered various harms. 	(See id. ¶ 22.) 	His name was published in a local
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“newsflyer,” allegedly causing reputational damage. 	(Id.) 	He also claims the incident
exacerbated symptoms of his pre-existing post-traumatic stress disorder. (See id.)
On April 24, 2024, the state-court judge presiding over Savage’s criminal case
issued an order suppressing all evidence obtained during the traffic stop and dismissed the
charges against Savage. (See, id. ¶ 23; Doc. No. 8-1.) In that order (attached as an exhibit
to the complaint), the court found that Rosa had unlawfully expanded the scope of the
traffic stop by inquiring about a weapon without any reasonable basis, thereby violating
Savage’s Fourth Amendment rights. 	Because the inquiry about a firearm was not
supported by reasonable suspicion, “any evidence discovered after the inquiry [was]
suppressed and the resulting charges [were] dismissed.” (Doc. No. 8-1 at 7.)
Based on this conduct, the Complaint presses three causes of action. (See Compl.
4.) First, Savage brings a section 1983 claim against Rosa, Giese, Vander Vegt, and Collin
for violating his Fourth Amendment rights (specifically, for unreasonable search and
seizure and false arrest). (See id.) Second, he advances a Monell claim2 against the City
of Cambridge and the County of Isanti, alleging that policies, customs, and failures to train
and supervise caused the constitutional violations. (See id.) Third, he alleges a conspiracy
under sections 1983 and 1985(3). (Id.)
For relief, Savage seeks compensatory and punitive damages. 	(See id.) 	He also
seeks “[d]eclaratory and injunctive relief,” including unspecified “retraining” and “policy
reform.” (Id.)
2 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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Rather than pay this action’s filing fee, Savage filed the IFP Application. His filings
are adequate to show that as a financial matter, Savage qualifies for in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) status. 	(See Doc. Nos. 2, 9.) 	Under the federal statute governing IFP matters,
“[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court
shall dismiss [an IFP matter] at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . is
frivolous . . . [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 	28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). Section 1915(e)(2) refers to dismissing “the case,” but this District’s courts
routinely use § 1915(e)(2) to dismiss portions of actions, as well. E.g., Perkins v. Daniels,
No. 19-CV-2663 (SRN/ECW), 2020 WL 6121268, at *2 (D. Minn. July 13, 2020), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 19-CV-2663-SRN-ECW, 2020 WL 5495229 (D. Minn.
Sept. 11, 2020).
When determining if a complaint states a claim on which a court may grant relief, a
district court accepts the complaint’s factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 	See, e.g., Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1098 (8th
Cir. 2015) (en banc) (citations omitted). 	A complaint’s factual allegations need not be
detailed, but they must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must “state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A district court’s determination of whether a pleading states a
claim is “context-specific”; a court must “draw on its judicial experience and common
sense.” Id. at 679; Zink, 783 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). Courts should construe pro
se complaints “liberally,” but such pleadings must still allege enough facts to support the
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claims advanced. 	Sandknop v. Mo. Dep’t of Corrs., 932 F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)).
Count I alleges that Rosa, Giese, Vander Vegt, and Collin violated Savage’s rights
under the Fourth Amendment.3 (See Compl. at 4.) In light of the state-court suppression
order, for purposes of screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court assumes that the
Complaint pleads sufficient facts to state a Fourth Amendment claim against Rosa and
Giese in their individual capacities.4 That leaves Vander Vegt and Collin.
As for Vander Vegt, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim
against him. 	The Complaint alleges that Vander Vegt was present at the traffic stop and
was listed as an “additional witness” in certain state criminal cases. 	(See id. ¶¶ 20–21.)
The Complaint, however, alleges no specific conduct by Vander Vegt that might violate
the Fourth Amendment. (See id.)
With respect to Collin, she is a private citizen, so she can be liable under section
1983 only if her conduct is fairly attributable to the State (e,g., by jointly participating with
3 The Eighth Circuit applies a “course of proceedings” test to determine the capacity in
which a § 1983 defendant is sued. See, e.g., S.A.A. v. Geisler, 127 F.4th 1133, 1137 (8th
Cir. 2025) (en banc). Under that test, the key question is whether the allegations and relief
sought would put a defendant on notice that the plaintiff is pursuing individual liability.
See id. at 1139–40. 	Because Savage seeks punitive damages and refers in the caption to
suing each named individual in his or her “individual capacity” (see Compl. at 1, 4), the
Court construes the Complaint as suing each individual Defendant in his or her individual
capacity. 	See S.A.A., 127 F.4th at 1140 (“Punitive damages are not available against
government officials sued in an official capacity, so inclusion of punitive damages in a
complaint suggests an intent to sue the official in her individual capacity.”).
4 This statement is without prejudice to the remaining Defendants, after service, answering
or otherwise responding to the Complaint in any way permitted by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
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officers in the alleged constitutional violation). See, e.g., Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187,
194–96 (2024) (citing cases). Savage labels Collin an “off-book confidential informant”
simply based on Collin’s presence in the car, without describing any concrete acts or
communications showing an agreement. 	(Compl. ¶¶ 11, 14, 16.) 	These conclusory
allegations are insufficient to plausibly plead a section 1983 claim against a private citizen.
See Murray v. Lene, 595 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).
Therefore, the section 1983 claim against Vander Vegt and Collin is dismissed
without prejudice. 	The claim as against Rosa and Giese, in their individual capacities,
remains.
Count II purports to assert Monell liability against the City of Cambridge and the
County of Isanti. 	(See Compl. at 4.) 	Count II fails to state a claim. 	Under Monell, a
municipality or local government cannot be held vicariously liable for its employees’
constitutional torts. 	See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997)
(“[A] municipality may not be held liable under section 1983 solely because it employs a
tortfeasor.”). Instead, a plaintiff must allege that a policy or custom of the relevant local
government caused a constitutional violation. 	See, e.g., Marsh v. Phelps Cnty., 902 F.3d
745, 751–52 (8th Cir. 2018) (discussing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91). 	The Complaint
alleges no facts identifying a relevant policy or custom of the City of Cambridge or Isanti
County. Therefore, the Court dismisses Count II without prejudice.
Count III alleges that all “individual Defendants” conspired to violate Savage’s civil
rights. 	Here, Savage invokes 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), which the Court will
consider in turn.
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To plead a section 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting a
reasonable inference that defendants reached a “meeting of the minds” to commit an
unconstitutional act and that the agreement led to an actual constitutional deprivation (i.e.,
at least one conspirator committed an overt act that injured the plaintiff), not just
conclusory labels that defendants worked together. See Murray, 595 F.3d at 870. Given
the relative lack of detail pleaded in the Complaint, Savage’s theory here is difficult to
discern. He appears to theorize that Collin provided officials a tip or somehow set him up
(Compl. ¶ “22–27” (alleging that “Collin jointly participated as the off-book CI”); Vander
Vegt failed to stop and ratified the scheme, (id. ¶¶ 20, “22–27” (alleging that Vander Vegt
“failed to intervene and ratified the violation” and “witnessed or authorized poor police
conduct”)); and Rosa and Giese carried out an unconstitutional search and then fabricated
probable cause (id. ¶¶ 17–19, “22–27”). 	The Complaint, however, supplies almost no
concrete details about when, how, or through what communications any such agreement
between these individuals formed; indeed, it entirely omits facts about Collin and Vander
Vegt’s acts. 	The Court therefore dismisses Count III without prejudice to the extent it
attempts to plead a conspiracy claim under section 1983.
To state a claim under the equal protection provisions of section 1985(3), a plaintiff
must make factual allegations to support each of the following four elements: (1) a
conspiracy, (2) for the purpose of depriving another of the “equal protection of the laws,
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws;” (3) an act in furtherance of the
conspiracy; and (4) an injury to a person or property, or the deprivation of a legal right.
Federer v. Gephardt, 363 F.3d 754, 757–58 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge,
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403 U.S. 88, 102–03 (1971); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)). Such a claim also requires proof of a
class-based animus, as well as an allegation that an independent federal right has been
infringed. 	Id. 	Savage’s account here does not plausibly allege that any defendant acted
because of Savage’s membership in some protected class: nothing suggests race, ethnicity,
gender, or similar bias motivated the stop, and though Savage references disability in
passing (see Compl. ¶ 2), he does not allege that defendants targeted him out of any anti-
disability animus. Thus, Savage’s section 1985(3) claim is dismissed without prejudice.
In summary, much of this case is dismissed, but certain individual-capacity claims
remain against Defendants Rosa and Giese. 	By separate order, the Court will initiate
service against those Defendants.
This leaves three pending motions by Savage. 	(Doc. Nos. 4–6.) The Court denies
all three motions without prejudice as premature because the Complaint has not been
served, no defendant has appeared, and discovery has not begun.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Count I of Plaintiff Spencer Sterling Savage’s Second Amended Complaint
(Doc. No. 8 (“Complaint”)) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as
against Jonathon Vander Vegt and Kari Sue Collin.
2. 	Counts 	II 	and 	III 	of 	the 	Complaint 	are 	DISMISSED 	WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
3. 	Defendants City of Cambridge, County of Isanti, Vander Vegt, and Collin
are DISMISSED from this action.
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4. 	Savage’s pending motions at Doc. Nos. 4, 5, and 7 are DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
Dated: January 22, 2026 	/s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
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