Colbert v. Salmon et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Leneil James Colbert, Jr.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Chris Salmon, Prison Fellowship Academey,
Eddie Miles, Nursing/Medical, Department of
Corrections, Paul Schnell, and Mark Koderick,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-3982 (NEB/DJF)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Leneil James Colbert, Jr.’s Amended Complaint
(ECF No. 5). For the reasons given below, the Court recommends dismissing this action.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Colbert is presently incarcerated at the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Lino Lakes,
Minnesota (“MCF–Lino Lakes”), a facility administered by the Minnesota Department of
Corrections (“MDOC”). (See Docket.) According to the Amended Complaint, MCF–Lino Lakes
officials admitted Mr. Colbert to the Prison Fellowship Academy (“PFA”), an MDOC-approved
program, “at the direction of” Defendant Paul Schnell, MDOC’s commissioner. (ECF No. 5 at 3.)
Mr. Colbert suggests that entering the program brought “related benefits and other agreed
opportunities,” though he does not specify what those were. (Id.) He alleges that after entering
the program, he faced biased and unfair treatment from Defendant Chris Salmon, the PFA’s
director. (See id.) Mr. Colbert alleges Mr. Salmon denied him equal access to “program
activities,” imposed “harsher disciplinary response[s],” and treated his religious practices unfairly.
(Id.) Mr. Colbert also claims Mr. Salmon spread “false and damaging” characterizations about
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Mr. Colbert to prison staff, portraying him as a dishonest “security threat,” “aggressive [and]
uncooperative.” (Id.) Mr. Colbert contends Mr. Salmon acted from personal animus, not
“legitimate program requirements.” (Id.)
The Amended Complaint alleges these actions led to Mr. Colbert’s removal from the PFA.
(See id. at 4.) Mr. Colbert asserts this removal breached a “contract agreement” with Mr. Schnell
and deprived Mr. Colbert of “program benefits and other promises relied on.” (Id.) He further
alleges Mr. Schnell and Defendant Eddie Miles, MCF–Lino Lakes’s warden, “penalized” him for
engaging in protected activities, such as “filing [a] complaint” and “asserting [his] rights.” (Id. at
4–5.) According to Mr. Colbert, this retaliation took the form of “spreading false accusation[s],”
“denying program access,” and “prohibiting the free exercise … of religion.” (Id.)
Based on these events, the Amended Complaint purports to bring claims against five
Defendants: Mr. Salmon, Mr. Miles, Mr. Schnell, MDOC and the PFA. (See id. at 1.) It asserts
four constitutional causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See id. at 1, 4–5.) Mr. Colbert asserts
two claims under the Fourteenth Amendment: an equal protection claim based on being treated
“differently than similarly situated inmates without a rational basis”; and a procedural due process
claim based on his alleged removal from PFA and resulting reputational harm without fair process.
(See id.) He also alleges retaliation against exercising his First Amendment rights. (See id. at 5.)
Finally, he asserts “Defamation Causing Constitutional Injury,” alleging that Defendants’ false
statements “damaged [his] reputation” and served as a pretext for “discriminatory and retaliatory
actions.” (Id.) For relief, Mr. Colbert seeks compensatory and punitive damages, a declaratory
judgment that Defendants’ acts were unlawful, and “[i]njunctive relief or equivalent
opportunities”, which the Court construes as a request for reinstatement in the PFA. (Id. at 6.)
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ANALYSIS
I. Standards of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), a district court “shall review … a complaint in a civil action
in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.” In that review, the court should “identify cognizable claims or dismiss the
complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint … is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or … seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief.” The Court thus reviews Mr. Colbert’s Complaint under Section
1915A(a).
When deciding whether a complaint states a viable claim for relief, a court must accept its
factual allegations as true and grant the plaintiff every reasonable inference. See, e.g., Varga v.
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 764 F.3d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Loftness Specialized Farm Equip.,
Inc. v. Twiestmeyer, 742 F.3d 845, 854 (8th Cir. 2014)). A complaint need not be detailed, but its
allegations must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It must also “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility test is
“context-specific” and depends on a court’s “judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679;
see also Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1098 (8th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Although courts must
read pro se complaints liberally, such pleadings still must contain enough facts to support each
claim asserted. See, e.g., Sandknop v. Mo. Dep’t of Corrs., 932 F.3d 739, 741–42 (8th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)).
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II. Defendants’ Capacities
The Amended Complaint does not specify whether the individual Defendants are sued in
their individual capacities, official capacities, or both. In S.A.A. v. Geisler, the Eighth Circuit
adopted the “course of proceedings test.” 127 F.4th 1133, 1135 (8th Cir. 2025) (en banc). When
a complaint is silent on capacity, this test requires the court to examine the “totality of the
litigation” to determine whether defendants had fair notice that they were sued personally.
Applying the test here, the Court finds Defendants are sued in both their individual and
official capacities. Geisler identified several factors that indicate an individual-capacity suit,
including whether the complaint seeks punitive damages. See id. at 1140 (“Punitive damages are
not available against government officials sued in an official capacity, so inclusion of punitive
damages in a complaint suggests an intent to sue the official in her individual capacity.” (citing
Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004)); see also, e.g., Savage v. City of Cambridge, No.
25-cv-4123 (JMB/ECW), 2026 WL 177914, at *2 n.3 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2026) (citing Geisler).
As noted above, the Amended Complaint seeks punitive damages. Accordingly, and given the
Court’s duty to construe pro se filings liberally, the Court treats the Amended Complaint as
bringing claims against the individual Defendants in their individual capacities. Furthermore,
since the Amended Complaint challenges the alleged conduct of these Defendants in their roles on
behalf of MNDOC, the Court concludes that it also asserts claims against them in their official
capacities. Therefore, the Court deems the Amended Complaint to assert both individual and
official capacity claims against each individual Defendant.
III. State Sovereign Immunity
As a threshold matter, the Court must address MDOC’s legal status. As an agency of the
State of Minnesota, MNDOC is shielded from federal litigation by Eleventh Amendment sovereign
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immunity. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984);
Monroe v. Ark. State Univ., 495 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing cases). Moreover, its state-
agency status also means that it is not a “person” subject to suit under Section 1983. See, e.g.,
Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)); Mungai v. Univ. of Minn., 141 F.4th 959, 967 (8th Cir. 2025) (citing
Treleven v. Univ. of Minn., 73 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 1996)). The Court therefore recommends
dismissing all claims against MDOC without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
Under the Amended Complaint’s allegations, Warden Miles and Commissioner Schnell
are State employees.1 To the extent Mr. Colbert sues these Defendants in their official capacities,2
his claims amount to claims against the State. See, e.g., Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (citing cases); Calzone
v. Hawley, 866 F.3d 866, 872 (8th Cir. 2017) (citing Will). The Court thus recommends dismissing
the Amended Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, to the extent it brings official-capacity claims for
damages or other retrospective relief against Defendants Miles and Schnell.3
IV. Failure to State a Claim
A. Equal Protection
Count 1 asserts that Defendants “intentionally treated [Mr. Colbert] differently than
similarly situated inmates without a rational basis” or “legitimate government purpose.” Mr.
1 It is unclear whether Salmon, identified simply as the PFA’s “director,” is a State
employee.
2 The Amended Complaint makes no effort to distinguish any of its causes of action, or
requests for relief, by particular Defendants. (See ECF No. 5 at 4–6.)
3 Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, the Court does have jurisdiction over any official-
capacity claims against Defendants Miles and Schnell that seek prospective injunctive relief. See,
e.g., Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645–48 (2002) (discussing
doctrine (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908))).
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Colbert invokes the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. (ECF No. 5 at 4.) This
Clause “generally requires the government to treat similarly situated people alike.” Klinger v.
Dep’t of Corrs., 31 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 1994); see also, e.g., Cherry v. MCF–Moose Lake, No.
22-cv-2012 (JRT/JFD), 2023 WL 1767832, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 17, 2023) (quoting Klinger),
report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 1767303 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2023).
Equal protection claims fall into two main categories. See, e.g., Engquist v. Ore. Dep’t of
Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 601–02 (2008). The first involves “governmental classifications that ‘affect
some groups of citizens differently than others.’” Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425 (1961)); see also, e.g., Gilmore v. Cnty. of Douglas, 406 F.3d 935, 937 (8th Cir. 2005).
In these cases, plaintiffs “allege that they have been arbitrarily classified as members of an
‘identifiable group’ and then subjected to unequal treatment.” Engquist, 553 U.S. at 601 (quoting
Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)); see also, e.g., Jidoefor v. City of
Minneapolis Police Dep’t, No. 22-cv-1686 (KMM/TNL), 2023 WL 2823159, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr.
7, 2023).
The second type of equal-protection claim is a “class of one” claim. Engquist, 553 U.S. at
601–02 (discussing Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam)). In
these cases, “[w]hen those who appear similarly situated are nevertheless treated differently, the
Equal Protection Clause requires at least a rational reason for the difference, to ensure that all
persons subject to legislation or regulation are indeed being ‘treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions.’” Id. (quoting Olech, 528 U.S. at 564). To bring this type of claim, however, a
plaintiff must allege that he is “‘similarly situated to others who allegedly received preferential
treatment.’” Sanimax USA, LLC v. City of S. St. Paul, 95 F.4th 551, 564 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Robbins v. Becker, 794 F.3d 988, 996 (8th Cir. 2015)). A plaintiff must also provide a “specific
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and detailed account” of how others were favored. Higgins Electric, Inc. v. O’Fallon Fire Prot.
Dist., 813 F.3d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting cases; cleaned up); see also Myers v. Kleffman,
No. 24-CV-3890 (JMB/LIB), 2024 WL 5301741, at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 19, 2024) (quoting Higgins
Electric), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 48643 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2025). This
presents a “significant hurdle,” as “the persons alleged to have been treated more favorably must
be identical or directly comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects”—and without such
allegations, “a class-of-one claim must fail.” Sanimax USA, 95 F.4th at 564 (quoting Robbins, 794
F.3d at 996 (quotation marks removed)).
The Amended Complaint does not explicitly allege that Mr. Colbert belongs to a protected
class, though it asserts “unfair treatment regarding religion” and alleges that Mr. Salmon made
negative statements about Mr. Colbert’s “religion.” (ECF No. 5 at 3.) Religion-based
discrimination can trigger equal-protection scrutiny, but Mr. Colbert does not identify his faith or
explain how inmates of other faiths were treated. The Court therefore cannot determine whether
Mr. Colbert seeks to assert a religious-discrimination claim or a class-of-one claim.
Regardless, Mr. Colbert’s allegations are too conclusory to state a plausible equal
protection claim. He recites legal elements, but he provides almost no factual detail about
“similarly situated” inmates or specific instances of differential treatment. And while his
assertions of “unequal access” and “harsher discipline” suggest a class-of-one theory, such a claim
is likely not viable as a matter of law under Engquist because it would require federal courts to
manage day-to-day prison operations, a context where discretionary decision-making is
paramount. Cf. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 603 (“There are some forms of state action, however, which
by their nature involve discretionary decision-making based on a vast array of subjective,
individualized assessments. In such cases the rule that people should be treated alike, under like
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circumstances and conditions is not violated when one person is treated differently from others,
because treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion
granted.”); see also, e.g., Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 558 F.3d 794, 799 (8th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Engquist).4 The Court recommends dismissing the remainder of Count 1 for failure to
state a claim on these grounds.
B. Procedural Due Process
Count 2 alleges that Defendants deprived Mr. Colbert of “program status, reputation, and
promised opportunities by imposing adverse actions without fair process or neutral decision
making,” violating his procedural-due-process rights. (ECF No. 5 at 5.) The gist of this claim is
that Defendants removed Mr. Colbert from the PFA program, and as a result, he lost associated
(but unspecified) benefits and faced false accusations and bias without adequate procedural
protections.
To plead a procedural due process violation, Mr. Colbert must allege that: (1) “‘a protected
liberty or property interest at stake’”; and (2) Defendants “‘deprived him of [that] interest without
due process of law.’” Schmidt v. Des Moines Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d 811, 817 (8th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Gordon v. Hansen, 168 F.3d 1109, 1113 (8th Cir. 1999)); see also, e.g., Rud v. Johnston,
4 The Court notes that any claims against Defendants Schnell and Miles face an additional
obstacle: The Amended Complaint does not allege that either of them personally engaged in
disparate treatment of Mr. Colbert as compared to other inmates. Commissioner Schnell’s alleged
role was approving Mr. Colbert’s entry into the PFA and allegedly promising certain benefits;
Warden Miles’s alleged role is limited to serving as MCF–Lino Lakes’s warden. The Amended
Complaint does not allege that either Commissioner Schnell or Warden Miles directed Mr. Salmon
to treat Mr. Colbert differently for arbitrary or discriminatory reasons. That omission is fatal.
Liability under Section 1983 requires personal, intentional action; there is no vicarious liability
based solely on a supervisory role. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (citing cases); Jones v. City of
St. Louis, 104 F.4th 1043, 1049 (8th Cir. 2024) (citing cases, including Iqbal).
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No. 23-cv-0486 (JRT/LIB), 2023 WL 6318615, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2023) (reciting similar
standard (quoting cases, including Schmidt)). He has not met this test.
The first question is whether Mr. Colbert had a liberty or property interest in continued
participation in the PFA program or in the “promised opportunities” related to it. Mr. Colbert’s
incarceration significantly, and necessarily, curtails his protected liberty interests. Critically, a
prison inmate has no inherent constitutional right to participate in rehabilitative programs. In
Sandin v. Conner, the United States Supreme Court held that, in prison, state-created liberty
interests are generally limited to “freedom from restraint[s] [that] impose[] atypical and significant
hardship on [an] inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 515 U.S. 472, 484
(1995); see also, e.g., Hamner v. Burls, 937 F.3d 1171, 1180 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting Sandin), as
amended (Nov. 26, 2019). Denial of placement in a voluntary prison program like the PFA
typically does not amount to an “atypical and significant hardship” compared to normal prison life.
The Eighth Circuit has therefore repeatedly held that prisoners do not have a protected liberty
interest in participating in such rehabilitative programs. See Persechini v. Callaway, 651 F.3d 802,
807 (8th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Vergara v. Eischen, No. 25-cv-1328
(NEB/DJF), 2025 WL 1737527, at *1 (D. Minn. May 13, 2025) (citing cases), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1736921 (D. Minn. June 22, 2025). Mr. Colbert’s removal
from the PFA therefore cannot support a procedural due process claim.
The Amended Complaint also refers to “promised opportunities” and an alleged
“contract/cooperation agreement” with Commissioner Schnell. Liberally construed, Mr. Colbert
appears to allege an agreement under which he would enroll in the PFA program and, in return,
receive certain benefits or opportunities. (See ECF No. 5 at 3, 5.) Mr. Colbert frames the failure
to honor these promises as a “breach of contract” by Commissioner Schnell. (Id. at 4.) But Mr.
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Colbert does not identify the consideration exchanged or other terms of the “contract” he alleged
Commissioner Schnell breached. Moreover, not every broken promise gives rise to a
constitutional claim. To qualify as a due process interest, an asserted benefit must be something
to which the plaintiff has a “‘legitimate claim of entitlement.’” Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,
545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577
(1972)). Such entitlements are “‘created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law.’” Id. (quoting Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709); see also, e.g., McGuire v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 833, 863 F.3d 1030,
1034 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985)).
Nothing in the Amended Complaint suggests that any Minnesota law or MNDOC regulation
guarantees an inmate a right to complete the PFA program or to receive specific benefits upon
completion.
Finally, Mr. Colbert also appears to argue that Defendants’ conduct damaged his reputation
without due process. But it is well established that damage to one’s reputation alone is not a liberty
or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Paul, 424 U.S. at 711–12;
Does 1–2 v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 999 F.3d 571, 583 (8th Cir. 2021) (citing cases,
including Paul). The Court therefore recommends dismissing what remains of Count 2 for failure
to state a claim.
C. Count 3 (First Amendment Retaliation)
Count 3 alleges Defendants retaliated against Mr. Colbert for engaging in protected First
Amendment activity. Specifically, Mr. Colbert asserts he was “punished … for engaging in
protected speech and religion,” citing actions like spreading false accusations about him, denying
him access to the PFA, or interfering with his free exercise of religion. (ECF No. 5 at 5.) This
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claim should be dismissed as well because the Amended Complaint does not plead the essential
elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim with sufficient factual detail.
To plead a First Amendment retaliation claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege
that: “‘(1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) the government official took adverse action
against him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity, and (3)
the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected activity.’” Rinne
v. Camden Cnty., 65 F.4th 378, 383 (8th Cir. 2023) (quoting Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 876
(8th Cir. 2004)); see also, e.g., Jackson v. Schnell, No. 23-cv-3827 (KMM/DLM), 2025 WL
80660, at *8 (D. Minn. Jan. 13, 2025) (citing Revels-reliant caselaw), report and recommendation
adopted, 2025 WL 889596 (D. Minn. Mar. 24, 2025). Even read liberally, Mr. Colbert’s
allegations are too conclusory and sparse to meet these requirements.
First, the Amended Complaint does not describe any specific instance of Mr. Colbert
engaging in protected First Amendment conduct. It broadly asserts that Mr. Colbert was
“penalized … for protected expressions, including filing [a] complaint, raising concerns, and
asserting [his] rights,” and alleges that Defendants punished him for “engaging in protected speech
and religion.” (ECF No. 5 at 4–5.) Filing a prison grievance or lawsuit is protected First
Amendment activity, and an inmate’s sincere religious exercise is also protected. But Mr. Colbert
does not identify what grievance he filed, what issues he “raised” or when, or what religious
exercise he undertook that led to any conflict. Without some description of the protected activity,
the Court cannot reasonably infer that Mr. Colbert engaged in conduct protected by the First
Amendment. Conclusory references to “filing [a] complaint” or “asserting my rights,” without
supporting facts, do not state a plausible claim. See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Sandknop,
932 F.3d at 741–42.
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The Amended Complaint suffers from the same lack of specificity with respect to Mr.
Colbert’s retaliation claim. To assert a viable claim, Mr. Colbert must plead specific facts showing
he suffered a concrete adverse action by Defendants. Mr. Colbert asserts he was removed from
the PFA program, depriving him of (again, unspecified) benefits. That outcome might qualify as
an adverse action in some circumstances, but the Amended Complaint does not allege the essential
details. It does not specify when or how Mr. Colbert was removed or blocked. It merely alleges
an outcome without supporting facts.
Similarly, Mr. Colbert contends Defendants’ retaliation included spreading false
accusations about him and prohibiting his free exercise of religion. (See ECF No. 5 at 5.) These
assertions describe the general nature of the harms Mr. Colbert claims to have suffered, but they
lack supporting detail. For example, the Amended Complaint does not identify the specific false
accusations made or the religious practices prevented. Without such factual allegations, Mr.
Colbert does not plead a concrete adverse action attributable to any specific Defendant. The
pleading consistently offers conclusions rather than facts.
Finally, the Amended Complaint does not plead a plausible causal link between any
protected activity and an adverse action against Mr. Colbert. To proceed, Mr. Colbert must allege
facts suggesting Defendants subjected him to adverse action because he engaged in protected
activity. The Amended Complaint alleges no such retaliatory motive. It does not allege that any
Defendant was aware of Mr. Colbert’s purported protected activity or acted in response to it. Mr.
Colbert instead asserts he was punished “for engaging in” protected speech or religious exercise,
without alleging tangible facts (e.g., a clear chronology or particular comments on a given date by
any Defendant) that would support such an inference. Bare, conclusory assertions of causation
like this are insufficient to survive dismissal. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kirchmeier, 28 F.4th 888, 896–
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97 (8th Cir. 2022); Evenstad v. Schnell, No. 20-CV-1464 (WMW/DTS), 2022 WL 617598, at *6–
7 (D. Minn. Jan. 13, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 616962 (D. Minn.
Mar. 2, 2022). For these reasons, the Court recommends dismissing the remainder of Count 3 for
failure to state a claim.
D. Defamation Causing Constitutional Injury
Count 4 of the Amended Complaint alleges Defendants’ false statements damaged Mr.
Colbert’s reputation and were used to justify discriminatory and retaliatory actions against him.
(See ECF No. 5 at 5.) Mr. Colbert appears to assert that this defamation constitutes a distinct
constitutional injury. As discussed above, however, to the extent he seeks to assert a standalone
Section 1983 defamation claim, it fails as a matter of law. See, e.g., Paul, 424 U.S. at 711–12;
Does 1–2, 999 F.3d at 583. The Court thus recommends dismissing the remainder of Count 4 for
failure to state a claim.
V. Supplemental Jurisdiction
Based on the above analysis, the Court recommends dismissing the federal claims asserted
in the Amended Complaint in their entirety. The Amended Complaint uses terms that suggest
potential state-law causes of action (e.g., “breach of contract,” “defamation”). To the extent Mr.
Colbert intends to assert any state-law claims, the Court must address supplemental jurisdiction.
Generally, when a court dismisses all federal-law claims early in a case, it should decline
supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state-law claims. See, e.g., Wilson v. Miller, 821
F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Johnson v. City of Shorewood, 360 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir.
2004)); Logering v. Morrison Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 23-cv-0177 (JWB/LIB), 2023 WL
3276515, at *7 (D. Minn. May 5, 2023) (quoting Wilson), aff’d, No. 23-2376, 2023 WL 8713781
(8th Cir. Dec. 18, 2023). The result here is straightforward: because no federal-law claims will
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proceed in this matter, the Court recommends dismissing without prejudice any state-law claims
reflected in the Amended Complaint.
The Court therefore recommends dismissing the Amended Complaint in its entirety.
RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. Plaintiff Leneil James Colbert, Jr.’s amended complaint (ECF No. 5
(“Amended Complaint”)) be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, for
lack of jurisdiction, to the extent it brings: (a) claims against Defendant
Department of Corrections; and (b) official-capacity claims for damages or
retrospective relief against Defendants Eddie Miles and Paul Schnell.
2. The Amended Complaint otherwise be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), for failure to state a claim, to
the extent it brings any other federal-law claims.
3. Supplemental jurisdiction over any state-law claims in the Amended
Complaint be declined.
Dated: February 5, 2026 s/ Dulce J. Foster
DULCE J. FOSTER
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District
Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate
judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the
Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being
served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must
comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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