Hoel v. Hennepin County et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Robert Brooks Hoel, Minneapolis, MN, pro se.
Matthew Lloyd Robert Messerli, Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN,
for Defendants Hennepin County, Dawanna Witt, S. Bukkila, D. Welwolie, B. Brugger,
Helmandollar, Dhimbil, Brandon Butler, and John Does 1–10.
Pro se Plaintiff Robert Brooks Hoel claims that Hennepin County Government
Center security officers violated his rights under the Federal and Minnesota Constitutions
when they stopped him from recording in the Government Center’s security lobby, served
him with a Trespass Notice, and ordered him to leave the building. 	Defendants seek the
Complaint’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 	The motion will
be granted. Mr. Hoel’s claims are not plausibly alleged.
Robert Brooks Hoel,
Plaintiff,
v.
Hennepin County, a Minnesota political
subdivision; Dawanna Witt, Sheriff – official
capacity; S. Bukkila, Sgt. – Badge #526; D.
Welwolie, Deputy – Badge #703; B.
Brugger, Deputy – Badge #246;
Helmandollar, Deputy – Badge #203;
Dhimbil, Deputy – Badge #649; Brandon
Butler, Lt. – Badge #117; John Doe, 1 –
Court Security Officer; and John Does, 2–
10,
Defendants.
File No. 25-cv-3581 (ECT/DTS)
OPINION AND ORDER
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I
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a
court must accept a complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 	Gorog v. Best Buy Co., 760 F.3d 787, 792
(8th Cir. 2014). 	Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they must be
sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” 	Id. at 570. 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[T]he tenet that
a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions.” Id.
Because he is pro se, Mr. Hoel’s Complaint is entitled to liberal construction.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). 	“[H]owever inartfully pleaded,” pro se
complaints 	are 	held 	“to 	less 	stringent 	standards 	than 	formal 	pleadings 	drafted 	by
lawyers.” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S.
at 94). 	“[I]f the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court should
construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within
the proper legal framework.” 	Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004)). The liberal-construction rule
does not excuse a pro se plaintiff from alleging sufficient facts to support the claims he
advances. Stone, 364 F.3d at 914. And notwithstanding the liberal-construction rule, “pro
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se litigants are not excused from failing to comply with substantive and procedural
law.” Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1984); see Sorenson v. Minn. Dep’t of
Corr., No. 12-cv-1336 (ADM/AJB), 2012 WL 3143927, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 2, 2012).
In adjudicating Rule 12(b)(6) motions, “courts are not strictly limited to the four
corners of complaints,” but may consider other matters, including “matters incorporated
by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public
record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the
complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned[] without converting the motion into one for
summary judgment.” Dittmer Props., L.P. v. FDIC, 708 F.3d 1011, 1021 (8th Cir. 2013)
(citation modified); see Zean v. Fairview Health Servs., 858 F.3d 520, 526–27 (8th Cir.
2017) (explaining that consideration of matters outside the pleadings or evidence in
opposition to the pleadings generally converts a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary
judgment).
Here, 	the 	parties 	draw 	facts 	from 	two 	extra-complaint 	documents—a
“Memorandum 	of 	Understanding” 	between 	the 	Fourth 	Judicial 	District 	Court 	and
Hennepin County Administration governing the use of cameras and other recording devices
in certain areas of the Hennepin County Government Center, ECF No. 18-1, and a
“Trespass Notice” issued to Mr. Hoel, ECF No. 14 at 3. These documents may properly
be considered in adjudicating Defendants’ motion. 	The Complaint refers to both
documents as support for Mr. Hoel’s claims. The documents seem integral to the claims.
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And no party disputes either document’s authenticity. See Compl. [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 12–13
(referencing Memorandum of Understanding); id. ¶ 16 (referencing Trespass Notice).1
II
On May 29, 2025, Mr. Hoel entered the Hennepin County Government Center “to
use the Law Library.” 	Compl. ¶ 11. 	He possessed a copy of the Memorandum of
Understanding. 	Id. ¶ 13.2 Mr. Hoel “recorded in the security lobby” of the Government
Center. 	Id. ¶ 12. 	Defendant “John Doe 1 stopped the recording.” 	Id. ¶ 14. 	Mr. Hoel
“attempted to show” the Memorandum of Understanding to security officers, evidently to
demonstrate that his recording activities did not violate the Memorandum. See id. ¶¶ 12–
13. 	One of the officers, Lieutenant Butler, “refused to review the [Memorandum] and
summoned deputies.” Id. ¶ 14.3 Five deputies—each of whom has been sued in this case—
1 	Defendants filed the Trespass Notice. 	ECF No. 14 at 3. 	Like many forms, the
Notice form has spaces for the name, address, and other identifying information of the
individual to whom it might be issued. See id. In the Trespass Notice filed here, only the
“First Name” and “Last Name” spaces are filled out, but the name appearing in those spaces
is “John Doe.” 	Id. 	Regardless, Mr. Hoel and Defendants agree that the filed Trespass
Notice is an authentic copy of the Notice issued to Mr. Hoel. The record does not indicate
why Mr. Hoel’s name and other identifying information do not appear in the Notice, or
why “John Doe” does.
2 	To be precise, the Complaint alleges that, when Mr. Hoel entered the Government
Center, he carried a copy of a “Judicial Order.” 	Compl. ¶ 12. 	The Complaint does not
mention the Memorandum of Understanding by that name. 	One might reasonably ask
whether the document the Complaint refers to as the “Judicial Order” is the Memorandum
of Understanding or something different. But Mr. Hoel made clear in his opposition brief
that the Complaint’s reference to “Judicial Order” is intended to refer to the Memorandum
of Understanding. ECF No. 17 at 2; see ECF No. 18-1.
3 	It doesn’t matter, but as best I can tell, the Memorandum of Understanding did not
address the use of cameras or recording devices in the Government Center’s security lobby.
See ECF No. 18-1 at 1.
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then “surrounded [Mr. Hoel] and escorted him out, despite his offer to stop recording and
comply.” Id. ¶ 15.
Before the deputies escorted him out of the Government Center, Lieutenant Butler
issued the Trespass Notice to Mr. Hoel. Id. ¶ 16; ECF No. 14 at 3. As his justification for
issuing the Notice, the Complaint alleges, Lieutenant Butler cited “Recording/Staff
Disturbance.” Compl. ¶ 16.4 The Notice included the following paragraph:
This is notice that due to your behavior and/or conduct while
on these premises, Hennepin County hereby prohibits you from
entering the [Government Center], parking lot, grounds or
other property. Any entry by you hereafter onto such property
shall constitute a trespass by you and shall be reported as such
to 	appropriate 	law 	enforcement 	officials, 	or 	you 	will 	be
arrested and delivered to a peace officer. 	This action is
authorized under Minnesota Statutes Section 609.605. 	A
trespass under the statute constitutes a misdemeanor.
ECF No. 14 at 3. 	The Notice included exceptions that allowed Mr. Hoel to enter the
Government Center to receive county services, attend scheduled appointments, and
“[w]hen escorted by security staff.” 	Id. 	Before entering the Government Center for any
excepted purpose, the Notice instructed Mr. Hoel to check in with security staff when he
arrived. Id.
The Notice included a section for Mr. Hoel’s signature. Id. An illegible signature
appears in that section, id., but Mr. Hoel does not dispute that the signature is his. 	The
Notice explained that, by signing, Mr. Hoel acknowledged receiving and understanding the
4 	The Trespass Notice does not appear to identify “Recording/Staff Disturbance” as
the justification for its issuance. 	In a section titled “Summary,” it seems to read
“Noncompliance w/Staff” and “Disturbance.” ECF No. 14 at 3.
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Notice and its contents. Id. The Notice explained, however, that Mr. Hoel’s signature did
not imply his agreement with the circumstances that prompted the Notice’s issuance and
did not “waive [his] ability to contest the ban.” 	Id. 	The Notice provided a procedure to
contest it. Id. The procedure allowed Mr. Hoel to submit a written response to “Security
Operations.” Id. The Complaint does not allege whether Mr. Hoel took advantage of that
procedure. 	See Compl. 	The Trespass Notice expired June 28, 2025. 	See id. ¶ 21; ECF
No. 14 ¶ 2 (stating Notice was served on May 29, 2025); ECF No. 14 at 3 (stating Notice
would be effective for thirty days).
III
Mr. Hoel asserts ten claims: (1) Through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Hoel claims the
officers stopped his recording, removed him from the Government Center, and issued the
Trespass Notice in retaliation for protected First Amendment activity. Compl. ¶¶ 23–25.
(2) Through § 1983, Mr. Hoel alleges “Defendants imposed a categorical ban on recording
in a public lobby” in violation of the First Amendment. Id. ¶¶ 27–28. (3) Through § 1983,
Mr. Hoel claims Defendants denied him access to the Government Center’s law library,
resulting in a denial of his constitutional right of access to the courts. Id. ¶ 30. (4) Through
§ 1983, Mr. Hoel alleges the Trespass Notice “was imposed without warning, notice, or
opportunity to contest” in violation of his procedural-due-process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 	Id. ¶ 32. 	(5) Through § 1983, Mr. Hoel contends the Trespass
Notice “was arbitrary and retaliatory” in violation of his substantive-due-process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (6) Through § 1983, Mr. Hoel claims the officers
“restrained” him and “compelled him out” of the Government Center, which amounted to
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an unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 	Id. ¶ 34. 	(7) Mr. Hoel
claims Hennepin County is liable for the officers’ constitutional violations under Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 	Id. ¶ 36. 	(8) Mr. Hoel claims
Defendants’ actions violated parallel provisions of the Minnesota Constitution. 	Id. ¶ 38.
(9) Mr. Hoel claims Defendants conspired to violate his civil rights in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3). 	Id. ¶¶ 40–44. 	(10) Mr. Hoel claims that Sheriff Witt and Lieutenant
Butler failed to prevent civil-rights infractions in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Id. ¶ 45.
For relief, Mr. Hoel seeks compensatory and punitive damages; a declaratory
judgment that “Defendants’ actions violated the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments
(and Minnesota Constitution)”; injunctive relief requiring Hennepin County to “[p]rohibit
categorical bans on non-disruptive recording in public lobbies,” “[p]rovide warnings
before issuing trespass notices,” “[r]estrict trespass authority to sworn deputies under
neutral standards,” and “[t]rain deputies/security on recording rights and due process”;
attorney’s fees and costs; “[a]dverse inference and spoilation sanctions if video, BWC, or
paperwork are destroyed or withheld”; and other relief “the Court deems just and proper.”
Id. at 5–6.
IV
Though not raised by Defendants, there is a subject-matter jurisdiction issue
regarding Mr. Hoel’s ability to seek forward-looking relief. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (observing that a federal court has “an independent obligation to
determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge
from any party”). To have Article III standing to seek prospective relief, a plaintiff must
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show he is likely to suffer future injury resulting from the defendants’ conduct and that the
sought-after relief will prevent that future injury. 	See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 102–03 (1983). 	“In future injury cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
threatened injury is certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will
occur.” In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 769 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation modified); see
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564 n.2 (1992) (“Although imminence is
concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which
is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the
injury is certainly impending.” (citation modified)). “Allegations of possible future injury
are not sufficient.” 	Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (citation
modified). Each standing element “must be supported in the same way as any other matter
on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of
evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” 	Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).
Here, the Complaint does not allege facts plausibly showing that Mr. Hoel faces a
certainly impending future injury. 	Regarding this issue, Mr. Hoel alleges only that he
“remains at risk of repeat retaliation, especially given his pending civil-rights lawsuits
against Minneapolis and St. Louis County.” Compl. ¶ 21. Without more, the possibility
of this “risk” coming to pass is quite uncertain and speculative. Mr. Hoel does not allege
how or why officers might be positioned to retaliate against him based on his prior
lawsuits—he does not allege how officers responsible for enforcing the Government
Center’s recording policies in the future might know about his prior lawsuits. 	Nor does
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Mr. Hoel identify activities he regularly pursues or activities he is certain to pursue at the
Government Center that would place him at substantial risk of being subjected to the same
suit-prompting conduct again in the future. 	Subject-matter jurisdiction over Mr. Hoel’s
claims for forward-looking declaratory and injunctive relief is absent.
V
A
Whether Mr. Hoel’s § 1983 individual-capacity constitutional claims should be
dismissed depends on qualified immunity. The general rules governing this immunity are
settled. 	In determining whether the officers have qualified immunity, two questions are
answered: “(1) whether the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a
constitutional . . . right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the
defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th
Cir. 2009); see Watson v. Boyd, 2 F.4th 1106, 1109 (8th Cir. 2021). Courts may consider
the questions in either order. 	Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). A § 1983
plaintiff can defeat a claim of qualified immunity only if the answer to both questions is
yes. Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 564 (8th Cir. 2009). “Qualified immunity ‘protects
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Kong Tr. ex rel.
Kong v. City of Burnsville, 960 F.3d 985, 991 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes,
584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018)), cert. denied sub nom., Kong v. City of Burnsville, 141 S. Ct.
2839 (2021). If the material facts are not genuinely disputed, then the constitutionality of
an officer’s conduct is a question of law. See Thompson v. Reuting, 968 F.2d 756, 759 (8th
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Cir. 1992); Pollreis v. Marzolf, 66 F.4th 726, 732 n.2 (8th Cir. 2023); Bell v. Irwin, 321
F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2003).
“For purposes of the second prong, [courts] look to ‘the legal rules that were clearly
established at the time’ the action at issue was taken.” 	Graham v. Barnette, 5 F.4th 872,
881 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 711 (8th Cir. 2004)). “A right is
clearly established when it is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he is doing violates that right.’” 	Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595
U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (per curiam)). 	“This
inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad
general proposition.’” Id. at 5–6 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)
(per curiam)). 	As the Eighth Circuit has explained, a plaintiff can show that a right was
clearly established in different ways:
[A] plaintiff may [1] point to existing circuit precedent that
involves sufficiently “similar facts” to “squarely govern[]” the
officer’s actions such that the officer had “notice that [his]
specific use of force [was] unlawful,” Kisela v. Hughes, 584
U.S. [100, 105] (2018) (per curiam), [2] present “a robust
consensus of cases of persuasive authority” doing the same, see
De La Rosa v. White, 852 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2017), or [3]
demonstrate that a general constitutional rule applied with
“obvious clarity” to the facts at issue, see Rokusek v. Jansen,
899 F.3d 544, 548 (8th Cir. 2018).
Boudoin v. Harsson, 962 F.3d 1034, 1040 (8th Cir. 2020).
The interplay between qualified immunity and the motion-to-dismiss procedural
posture deserves mention. The United States Supreme Court and our Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals “repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving [qualified] immunity
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questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Payne v. Britten, 749 F.3d 697, 701
(8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam)). In the
Rule 12(b)(6) context, a court is to “ask only whether the facts as alleged plausibly state a
claim and whether that claim asserts a violation of a clearly established right,” Payne, 749
F.3d at 702, or put it another way, “whether immunity is established on the face of the
complaint,” Schatz Fam. ex rel. Schatz v. Gierer, 346 F.3d 1157, 1159 (8th Cir.
2003). See Elder v. Gillespie, 54 F.4th 1055, 1062 (8th Cir. 2022); Stanley v. Finnegan,
899 F.3d 623, 627 (8th Cir. 2018); see also Watkins v. City of St. Louis, 102 F.4th 947, 951
(8th Cir. 2024) (“To overcome qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff
must plead facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,
and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”
(citation modified)). 	Next, apply these rules to each of Mr. Hoel’s § 1983 individual-
capacity claims.
B
1
To state a § 1983/First Amendment-retaliation claim, Mr. Hoel must allege that:
“(1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) the government official[s] took adverse action
against him that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing in the activity,
and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of the protected
activity.” Bennie v. Munn, 822 F.3d 392, 397 (8th Cir. 2016).
Mr. Hoel’s claim fails under the first element because the Complaint does not allege
facts plausibly showing that Mr. Hoel’s recording activities in the Government Center on
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May 29, 2025, were in a category the First Amendment protects. The act of recording is
not always protected under the First Amendment. 	“If the act of making a photograph or
recording is to facilitate speech that will follow, the act is a step in the ‘speech process,’
and thus qualifies itself as speech protected by the First Amendment.” 	Ness v. City of
Bloomington, 11 F.4th 914, 923 (8th Cir. 2021). If, on the other hand, “the photography
or recording is unrelated to an expressive purpose . . . , then the act of recording may not
receive First Amendment protection.” 	Id. 	Here, the Complaint does not allege facts
showing the purpose underlying Mr. Hoel’s recording activities. 	It does not allege what
he was recording or why. It does not allege how his recording (of whatever it was) might
have facilitated follow-on speech. 	It is true that the Complaint describes Mr. Hoel’s
recording as “protected newsgathering activity.” 	Compl. ¶ 3; accord id. ¶ 23. 	But the
Complaint alleges no facts to support that characterization. 	It does not allege how the
recordings might have facilitated Mr. Hoel’s sharing of news. 	Absent those allegations,
the “newsgathering” description is best characterized as a legal conclusion that cannot be
accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
If the Complaint plausibly alleged that Mr. Hoel’s recording activities were First
Amendment-protected, there is another problem. Qualified immunity applies “regardless
of whether the government official’s error is ‘a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a
mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.’” 	Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 (quoting
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). 	In other words,
Defendants here are entitled to qualified immunity unless every reasonable official should
have known as a factual matter that Mr. Hoel’s recording activities fell into the First
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Amendment-protected speech-facilitation category. The Complaint gives no hint as to how
Defendants knew or should have known that fact. See Compl.
2
Mr. Hoel alleges that “Defendants imposed a categorical ban on recording in a
public lobby,” and he characterizes this prohibition as “an unconstitutional prior restraint.”
Compl. ¶¶ 27–28. “The term prior restraint is used to describe administrative and judicial
orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time that such
communications are to occur.” 	Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993)
(citation modifed). 	Put another way, “[a] prior restraint is a government regulation that
limits or conditions in advance the exercise of protected First Amendment activity.”
Auburn Police Union v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886, 903 (1st Cir. 1993).
Mr. Hoel’s prior-restraint claim fails for two fundamental reasons. 	First, as
explained in the preceding section, the Complaint does not allege facts plausibly showing
that Mr. Hoel’s recording activities were protected by the First Amendment. 	Second, if
the Complaint passed that hurdle, Mr. Hoel has not shown that the right he claims—to
record in a courthouse’s “security lobby,” Compl. ¶ 12—was clearly established in May
2025. 	It is difficult to see how he could. 	Courts addressing the issue have held that
courthouse lobbies are nonpublic forums. See, e.g., Enoch v. Hamilton Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.,
No. 22-3946, 2024 WL 3597026, at *5 (6th Cir. July 31, 2024) (“In a nonpublic forum like
a courthouse, ‘the First Amendment rights of everyone . . . are at their constitutional
nadir.’” (quoting Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 2005)), cert. denied, 145 S.
Ct. 1429 (2025); Hodge v. Talkin, 799 F.3d 1145, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (classifying
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Supreme Court plaza as nonpublic forum); Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 90 (2d Cir.
2005) (holding that “courthouses, court lands, and parking lots” are nonpublic forums);
Sefick v. Gardner, 164 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1998) (classifying federal courthouse lobby
as nonpublic forum); Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1997) (“A courthouse
. . . is a nonpublic forum.”); United States v. Vosburgh, 59 F.3d 177 (9th Cir. 1995)
(unpublished table decision) (“Courthouses are nonpublic fora, even though the public has
virtually unlimited access to them.”). “In addition to time, place, and manner regulations,
the State may reserve [a nonpublic] forum for its intended purposes, communicative or
otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” Fams. Achieving
Indep. & Respect v. Neb. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 111 F.3d 1408, 1419 (8th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
Mr. Hoel has not attempted to show that any policy under which Defendants issued the
Trespass Notice violated these rules.
3
The right of access to the courts “is ancillary to the underlying claim”—that is, the
claim hindered by the assertedly wrongful conduct—“without which a plaintiff cannot have
suffered injury by being shut out of court.” 	Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415
(2002). “To prove a violation of the right of meaningful access to the courts,” a plaintiff
must establish “the hindrance of a nonfrivolous and arguably meritorious underlying legal
claim,” or, in other words, an “actual injury.” 	White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677, 680 (8th
Cir. 2007) (first citing Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413; and then citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
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343, 351, 353, 355 (1996)); see Casey, 518 U.S. at 351 (holding a plaintiff must
“demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the library or legal assistance program
hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim”). “[T]he underlying cause of action, whether
anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as
allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.” 	Harbury, 536 U.S.
at 415.
The Complaint does not plausibly allege an underlying legal claim or how that claim
was hindered by Mr. Hoel’s inability to access the Hennepin County Government Center
law library. 	The Complaint says Mr. Hoel has “pending civil-rights lawsuits against
Minneapolis and St. Louis County.” 	Compl. ¶ 21. 	It provides no further information
regarding these cases. It does not say what the cases are about. It does not identify what
research Mr. Hoel might have been attempting to undertake in the Government Center law
library to aid in these suits’ prosecutions. Nor does the Complaint identify why Mr. Hoel’s
access to the Government Center law library was essential. 	It is difficult to understand
how restricting Mr. Hoel’s access to that law library plausibly denied him access to the
courts when many other law libraries—both throughout the Twin Cities and in St. Louis
County—were (and remain) open and available for him to conduct legal research. 	Mr.
Hoel does not suggest he is prohibiting from accessing other law libraries, and the
Complaint gives no reason to think that whatever research Mr. Hoel was attempting to
conduct could only be accomplished in the Government Center law library.
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4
“As for the Due Process Clause, standard analysis under that provision proceeds in
two steps: We ask first whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person
has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures followed by the State were
constitutionally sufficient.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011). If the plaintiff
cannot identify any protected liberty or property interest of which he was deprived, “any
procedural due process claim necessarily fails.” 	Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017,
1047 (8th Cir. 2012); see Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir. 2006)
(explaining that courts do not consider what process is due unless a plaintiff has a protected
liberty or property interest).
Mr. Hoel’s procedural-due-process claim fails at the first step. 	To support this
claim, Mr. Hoel alleges “[t]he trespass ban was imposed without warning, notice, or
opportunity to contest.” 	Compl. ¶ 32. 	The liberty or property interest of which he was
deprived, in other words, was unrestricted access to the Government Center. (Recall that
the Trespass Notice did not bar Mr. Hoel from accessing the facility. The Notice included
exceptions. And it was temporary.) “There is no property or liberty interest in ‘having an
unlimited access to a public building.’” Peterson v. City of North St. Paul, No. 21-cv-458
(NEB/KMM), 2021 WL 5235092, at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 10, 2021) (quoting Royer ex rel.
Est. of Royer v. City of Oak Grove, 374 F.3d 685, 689 (8th Cir. 2004)).
If unlimited access were a liberty or property interest, Mr. Hoel has not plausibly
alleged that the procedures associated with the deprivation were constitutionally deficient.
He does not allege what more notice was required before the citation was issued, and the
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idea that more notice might be required in this context is difficult to accept. 	When
government security officers observe what they believe to be a policy or rule violation,
nothing prevents them from acting immediately to stop the violation and perhaps issue a
citation. 	Notice to the offender is not required. And the Trespass Notice gave Mr. Hoel
the opportunity to contest the ban by submitting a written response to a mailing address or
to an email address for the Government Center’s “Security Operations.” ECF No. 14 at 3.
The Complaint alleges no facts showing that Mr. Hoel was unable to take advantage of this
procedure or why this procedure was insufficient.
5
Mr. Hoel’s substantive-due-process claim is not plausible. 	As the Eighth Circuit
has explained:
In addition to its procedural protections, the Due Process
Clause protects individual liberties from government action
“regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement
them.” 	Mills v. City of Grand Forks, 614 F.3d 495, 498 (8th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	To state a
substantive due process claim against a state official, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that a fundamental right was violated and
that the official’s conduct shocks the conscience. 	Folkerts v.
City of Waverly, 707 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2013).
Mitchell v. Dakota Cnty. Soc. Servs., 959 F.3d 887, 898 (8th Cir. 2020). 	A fundamental
right is one that is “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’”
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 	Mr. Hoel cites no authority supporting the
proposition that unrestricted access to a public building is a fundamental right. 	Cf.
Hannemann v. S. Door Cnty. Sch. Dist., 673 F.3d 746, 757 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that, if
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the right to intrastate travel is fundamental, it does not protect “the right to access certain
public places”). And he identifies no facts that might show any Defendant’s conduct was
conscience-shocking.
6
Mr. Hoel’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable-seizure claim is not plausible. In May
2025, it was not clearly established that Defendants “seized” Mr. Hoel as that term is
defined under the Fourth Amendment. 	“A seizure occurs ‘if, in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he
was not free to leave.’” United States v. Grant, 696 F.3d 780, 784 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting
INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984)). “Only when the officer, by means of physical
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we
conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434
(1991)). The circuits are split as to whether an order “meant to convey the message that a
person is free to go anywhere else but cannot remain where he is”—a “move-on” order—
is a Fourth Amendment seizure. Johnson v. City of Ferguson, 926 F.3d 504, 509 (8th Cir.
2019) (Melloy, J., dissenting). 	The Second Circuit, for example, has held that “a person
who is ordered to leave a judge’s chambers and then escorted out of the courthouse has not
been seized because the person remains free to go anywhere else that he wishes.” Salmon
v. Blesser, 802 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Sheppard v. Beerman, 18 F.3d 147,
153 (2d Cir. 1994)). The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, has held “a person is seized not only
when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave an encounter with police, but also
when a reasonable person would not feel free to remain somewhere, by virtue of some
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official action.” 	Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 834 (6th Cir. 2005). 	The
Eighth Circuit had yet to decide the question before it issued Johnson, though district courts
within the Eighth Circuit have since understood the Circuit’s cases to say that move-on
orders are not seizures. See, e.g., Aunhkhotep v. Eberhart, No. 4:24-cv-01552, 2025 WL
3012995, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 28, 2025) (“The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that
officers do not seize a person when they simply force a person to move on.”).
Here, the Complaint describes a move-along order, not a Fourth Amendment
seizure. 	Officers stopped Mr. Hoel from recording, “surrounded” him, issued him the
Trespass Notice, and “escorted him out” of the Government Center. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 16. As
the Complaint describes the facts, Mr. Hoel was free to leave the Government Center and
go anywhere he wanted. His return to the Government Center was restricted, though not
forbidden outright. 	In May 2025, the Fourth Amendment’s applicability to this situation
was not clearly established.
Lieutenant Butler’s issuance of the Trespass Notice raises a conceivable exception.
When an officer is preparing a citation, ticket, or similar document, the individual to whom
the officer intends to issue the citation usually is not free to leave—that individual must
ordinarily wait to receive the citation. For two reasons, the possibility that Mr. Hoel was
seized for this limited purpose does not save his Fourth Amendment claim. 	First,
answering whether it is plausible that Mr. Hoel was seized during the time it took
Lieutenant Butler to prepare and deliver the Trespass Notice would require consideration
of the specific circumstances of this aspect of the encounter. The Complaint does not say
enough to permit that inquiry. It does not allege, for example, what Lieutenant Butler said
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to Mr. Hoel, whether other officers were involved in delivering the Trespass Notice, or
how long this aspect of the officers’ encounter with Mr. Hoel lasted. Second, if Mr. Hoel
were seized during this period, the question for qualified immunity’s purposes would be
whether it was clearly established that the officers’ use of force was “objectively
unreasonable.” 	Pollreis v. Marzolf, 9 F.4th 737, 747 (8th Cir. 2021). 	A court “cannot
define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Ehlers v. City of Rapid City,
846 F.3d 1002, 1012 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). On this question, the Complaint
alleges no facts plausibly showing that the officers’ use of force was unreasonable, much
more that the unreasonableness of the force was clearly established.
VI
Monell’s basic rule is “that civil rights plaintiffs suing a municipal entity under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 must show that their injury was caused by a municipal policy or custom.”
Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 30–31 (2010). 	Where the municipal
officer violated no constitutional right, the municipality cannot be liable under Monell. See
Whitney v. City of St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2018); Malone v. Hinman, 847
F.3d 949, 955 (8th Cir. 2017).
Here, as discussed, the Complaint does not plausibly allege that any officer violated
Mr. Hoel’s constitutional rights. If the Complaint cleared that bar, the Monell claim would
still deserve to be dismissed because the Complaint does not plausibly allege that
Defendants’ (allegedly) unconstitutional actions resulted from a Hennepin County policy
or custom. The Complaint alleges: “Hennepin County maintains customs of (a) allowing
private security to issue trespass bans enforced by deputies; (b) ignoring judicial orders
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limiting videotape restrictions; (c) issuing trespass notices without warnings; and (d)
obstructing accountability by refusing to identify officers.” Compl. ¶ 36. I understand that
Mr. Hoel alleges these things happened to him, but identifying these actions gives no
plausible reason to think they resulted from a policy or custom. In other words, pleading
a viable Monell policy or custom claim requires a plaintiff to do more than identify the
alleged policy or custom. 	To plausibly show that an alleged “custom” triggers Monell
liability, a plaintiff must allege, among other things, “[t]he existence of a continuing,
widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity’s
employees” and “[d]eliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the
governmental 	entity’s 	policymaking 	officials 	after 	notice 	to 	the 	officials 	of 	that
misconduct.” 	Johnson v. Douglas Cnty. Med. Dep’t, 725 F.3d 825, 828 (8th Cir. 2013).
The Complaint does not address these essential elements.
VII
A
A claim under § 1985(3) requires a plaintiff to allege facts plausibly showing:
(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either
directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the
equal protection 	of the laws, 	or of equal 	privileges and
immunities under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the
conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person
or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of
the United States.
United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Loc. 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828–29
(1983). 	A claim under § 1985(3) “requires proof of a class-based animus.” 	Federer v.
Gephardt, 363 F.3d 754, 758 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,
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102 (1971)). And “[t]here can be no civil conspiracy without an underlying constitutional
violation.” 	Wolk v. City of Brooklyn Center, 107 F.4th 854, 860 (8th Cir. 2024). 	The
Complaint does not allege class-based animus. 	And, as discussed, it fails to plausibly
allege a constitutional violation.
B
“An actionable conspiracy under § 1985 is a prerequisite to a claim under § 1986
for neglect to prevent a civil rights conspiracy.” 	Carter v. Wasko, No. 4:22-CV-04103-
RAL, 2024 WL 3522017, at *5 (D.S.D. July 24, 2024) (citing Barstad v. Murray County,
420 F.3d 880, 887 (8th Cir. 2005)); see Jensen v. Henderson, 315 F.3d 854, 863 (8th Cir.
2002) (recognizing that a § 1986 claim is “dependent upon a valid § 1985 claim”). 	The
Complaint’s failure to plead a plausible § 1985 claim is thus fatal to the § 1986 claim.
VIII
Mr. Hoel’s claims under the Minnesota Constitution fail for purely legal reasons.
Section 1983 affords no cause of action for a violation of Minnesota law. See Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (noting that a § 1983 “plaintiff must allege that some
person has deprived him of a federal right”); Wax ’n Works v. City of St. Paul, 213 F.3d
1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 2000) (“It is well settled . . . that § 1983 may be an avenue for relief
only when a plaintiff asserts that violations of federal rights have occurred.”). 	And
“Minnesota courts explicitly refuse to find causes of action for damages under the Minesota
Constitution on their own unless the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized the cause
of action.” Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 969 (8th Cir. 2008) (first citing Mitchell v.
Steffen, 487 N.W.2d 896, 905 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), aff’d on other grounds, 504 N.W.2d
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198 (Minn. 1993); and then citing Bird v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 375 N.W.2d 36, 40
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985)); see Eggenberger v. West Albany Township, 820 F.3d 938, 941 (8th
Cir. 2016) 	(“There 	is 	no private cause 	of 	action for 	violations 	of the 	Minnesota
Constitution.” (citation modified)); White v. Dayton, Nos. 11-cv-3702 et al. (NEB/DJF),
2023 WL 21918, at *16 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2023) (“[T]here is no corollary to section 1983
under state law, and ‘courts have repeatedly stated that Minnesota has not recognized
private remedies for violations of the Minnesota Constitution.’” (quoting Fearing v. St.
Paul Police Dep’t, No. 02-cv-4744 (ADM/JSM), 2005 WL 914733, at *5 (D. Minn. Apr.
20, 2005))), R. & R. adopted, 2023 WL 1797830 (D. Minn. Feb. 7, 2023). Here, Mr. Hoel
cites no Minnesota Supreme Court case recognizing a damages remedy for any of the state
constitutional theories he asserts.
ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 12] is GRANTED.
2. 	The Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: February 9, 2026 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
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