Senty-Haugen v. Minnesota Department of Human Services et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Arthur Dale Senty-Haugen,
Petitioner,
v.
Minnesota Department of Human Services and
Minnesota Sex Offender Program,
Respondents.
Case No. 25-cv-3377 (KMM/DJF)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Arthur Dale Senty-Haugen is a prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution-
Sherdan in Sheridan, Oregon. (ECF No. 1 at 1.) His present term of incarceration is the result of
a federal tax fraud scheme he devised during his civil detention in the Minnesota Sex Offender
Program (“MSOP”)1. (See ECF No. 9 at 64-67, 78-84, 112.) After a federal court sentenced Mr.
Senty-Haugen to 120 months’ imprisonment for that crime (id. at 112-19), MSOP transferred him
to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). (Id. at 158-59.) As part of the MSOP-
BOP custody transfer, MSOP sent a detainer letter to the BOP instructing it to transfer Mr. Senty-
Haugen back into MSOP custody upon his release. (Id. at 161.)
This matter is before the Court on Mr. Senty-Haugen’s Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No.
1) (“Petition”). The Petition asks the Court to order the State of Minnesota to “remove” MSOP’s
detainer and further order that, because Minnesota “voluntarily relinquished primary custody” over
Mr. Senty-Haugen, he should be “releas[ed] from any further obligation” under the April 1996
civil-commitment order that led to his detention at MSOP. 	(See id. at 5.) 	Mr. Senty-Haugen
1 MSOP is Minnesota program intended to “provide specialized sex offender assessment,
diagnosis, care, treatment, supervision, and other services to civilly committed sex offenders.”
Minn. Stat. § 246C.13.
CASE 0:25-cv-03377-KMM-DJF Doc. 12 Filed 02/12/26 Page 1 of 10

2
asserts two2 grounds for this relief: (1.) the State of Minnesota voluntarily relinquished primary
custody of him when they transferred him into BOP custody, therefore, under the primary
jurisdiction doctrine, MSOP’s detainer letter is legally invalid (id. at 1–2, 5); and (2.) the State of
Minnesota’s invalid detainer amounts to a denial of due process because it is delaying his release
from BOP custody by restricting his eligibility for earlier release under the First Step Act (id. at
3). For the reasons stated below, the Court recommends denying the Petition and dismissing this
action.
I. 	Applicable Habeas Statute
Mr. Senty-Haugen’s Petition does not expressly invoke either of the federal habeas statutes,
28 U.S.C. § 2241 or 28 U.S.C. § 2254, for relief. 	(ECF No. 1.) 	The Court therefore considers
which statute best aligns with Mr. Senty-Haugen’s intent, and which statute is legally viable.
Section 2241 is “the general habeas corpus statute” that a federal prisoner may use to
challenge “the legality of his detention without attacking the validity of his sentence.” Jones v.
Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465, 469, 475 (2023). 	Section 2254 is the exclusive means for a prisoner to
bring a challenge in federal court to his conviction or its execution when his detention is the
product of a state court judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Crouch v. Norris, 251 F.3d 720, 723
(8th Cir. 2001) (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662 (1996)); Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d
1018, 1023 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 	Therefore, if Mr. Senty-Haugen seeks to challenge the
BOP’s decision to deny the application of First Step Act credits due to the MSOP’s detainer, his
Petition arises under Section 2241. On the other hand, if he seeks to challenge the validity of his
civil commitment or MSOP’s detainer, then the Petition arises under Section 2254.
2 The Petition states a third ground premised on due process and equal protection, but Mr.
Senty-Haugen has withdrawn that argument. (See ECF No. 1 at 3; ECF No. 11 at 1.) The Court
therefore does not address it.
CASE 0:25-cv-03377-KMM-DJF Doc. 12 Filed 02/12/26 Page 2 of 10

3
Mr. Senty-Haugen’s Petition suggests Section 2254 is the intended procedural vehicle. The
Petition appears to identify the 1996 state court judgment that underlies his civil commitment as
the decision he seeks to challenge.3 (Id. at 1.) The Petition also asks the Court to order Minnesota
officials to “remove” the MSOP detainer and “releas[e] [him] from any further obligation” under
the 1996 commitment. (Id. at 5.) This indicates that Mr. Senty-Haugen intends to challenge the
judgment of a state court.
Mr. Senty-Haugen’s arguments in the context of his past litigation also support the
conclusion that he is challenging the judgment of a state court. While he was federally incarcerated
in Hazelton, West Virginia in 2020, Mr. Senty-Haugen filed a habeas petition in the Northern
District of West Virginia challenging the same MSOP detainer at issue here.4 (ECF No. 9 at 173-
86.) In that case, Mr. Senty-Haugen characterized his petition as arising under Section 2241. But
the court explained that the “proper jurisdictional basis for a challenge to a state detainer is a
[Section] 2254 petition,” and that any such challenge must be brought in the district where the
detainer originated, i.e., the District of Minnesota, after Mr. Senty-Haugen exhausted state
remedies. 	See Senty-Haugen, 2021 WL 4974051, at *6. 	While Mr. Senty-Haugen disputes
exhaustion and the lawfulness of the detainer on the merits in his Petition before this Court,
nowhere does he contest the Northern District of West Virginia’s conclusion that this case should
proceed under Section 2254 rather than Section 2241. 	Nor does Mr. Senty-Haugen contest
3 For purposes of federal habeas corpus review, a state court order of civil commitment is
treated as a state court judgment under Section 2254. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176
(2001).
4 The court denied the petition on the grounds that it lacked “jurisdiction to resolve a
detainer lodged by the State of Minnesota” and that Mr. Senty-Haugen lacked standing to
challenge whether Minnesota or the United States held primary custody of him. See Senty-Haugen
v. Adams, No. 20-cv-47 (TSK/MJA), 2021 WL 4443066, at *2-3 (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 28, 2021).
The Fourth Circuit affirmed that ruling. 	See Senty-Haugen v. Adams, No. 21-7431, 2022 WL
898492, at *1 (4th Cir. Mar. 28, 2022) (per curiam).
CASE 0:25-cv-03377-KMM-DJF Doc. 12 Filed 02/12/26 Page 3 of 10

4
Respondents’ premise that Section 2254 is the governing habeas framework. (See ECF No. 8 at
5-6.).
These considerations are not dispositive, since the characterization of an action turns on its
substance, not the label the litigants use. See, e.g., Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 1074 n.1
(8th Cir. 1996). 	But the substance of the Petition also points to Section 2254 as the correct
procedural vehicle. Both counts of the Petition hinge on the legality of MSOP’s detainer: Count
One argues the detainer is invalid because Minnesota “voluntarily relinquished” Mr. Senty-
Haugen when it remanded him to the BOP; Count Two claims the detainer is improperly
preventing his release from BOP custody because it affects his ability to receive the benefits of the
First Step Act. (See ECF No. 1 at 1-3.)
Moreover, a detainer constitutes “custody” for habeas jurisdiction with respect to a future
state sentence, even while the petitioner is held elsewhere. 	See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488,
493–94 (1989); Thompson v. Missouri Board of Parole, 929 F.2d 396, 398 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding
federal prisoner subject to state detainer is a “person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court” for Section 2254 purposes). 	This is so, because the petitioner is challenging the future
execution of a state order of detention. Mr. Senty-Haugen’s detainer-centered theory is therefore
a challenge to his detention “pursuant to the judgment of a State court” within the meaning of §
2254(a), even though he is presently in federal custody. 	His requested relief, if granted, would
deprive Minnesota of any legal basis to reclaim him under the state civil-commitment order and
the detainer lodged to enforce that future confinement. Because the Petition attacks the existence
and enforceability of state custody, Mr. Senty-Haugen can only proceed under Section 2254, and
the Court construes the Petition accordingly.
CASE 0:25-cv-03377-KMM-DJF Doc. 12 Filed 02/12/26 Page 4 of 10

5
II. 	Exhaustion
Applying Section 2254 to the Petition has significant procedural implications. A court can
grant a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2254 only if “the applicant has exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). 	This exhaustion requirement
rests on principles of comity and federalism. These principles ensure state courts have a “full and
fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the
federal courts.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999); see also Brende v. Young, 907
F.3d 1080, 1084 (8th Cir. 2018).
To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, a prisoner must “fairly present” each federal claim
to every appropriate state court, including the state’s highest court if it offers discretionary review.
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)
(per curiam)); see also Deck v. Jennings, 978 F.3d 578, 581 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Morris v.
Norris, 83 F.3d 268, 270 (8th Cir. 1996)). 	In Minnesota, a Section 2254 applicant must fairly
present each claim to the Minnesota Supreme Court before seeking federal relief. 	See, e.g.,
Turnage v. Fabian, 606 F.3d 933, 936 (8th Cir. 2010); Bell v. Stenseth, No. 23-cv-3881
(JWB/ECW), 2024 WL 4839826, at *4 (D. Minn. July 29, 2024) (citing Fraction v. Minnesota,
678 F. Supp. 2d 908, 916 (D. Minn. 2008)), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL
4839157 (Nov. 20, 2024). 	This exhaustion requirement applies in situations where a petitioner
challenges a state detainer. Parette v. Lockhart, 927 F.2d 366, 366–67 (8th Cir. 1991); Breeze v.
Trickey, 824 F.2d 653, 653–54 (8th Cir. 1987).
Respondents argue the Petition should be denied because Mr. Senty-Haugen has not
challenged the MSOP detainer in Minnesota court or petitioned for an MSOP discharge during his
federal incarceration, and therefore, he has failed to exhaust state-court remedies. (See ECF No.
CASE 0:25-cv-03377-KMM-DJF Doc. 12 Filed 02/12/26 Page 5 of 10

6
8 at 6-8, 12-13.) But Mr. Senty-Haugen contends “there are no state remedies available [for him]
to exhaust.” (ECF No. 11 at 1.) He specifically claims that he is not a resident of Minnesota and
that “[b]ecause [he] resides in another state, [he] cannot file a Writ in State Court.” (Id.; cf. ECF
No. 1 at 1, “There are no state remedies available to challenge the detainer filed by the state
agency.”) The Court is unconvinced by Mr. Senty-Haugen’s argument.
Under Section 2254(b)(1)(B), exceptions to the exhaustion requirement exist when: (1.)
“there is an absence of available State corrective process”; or (2.) “circumstances exist that render
such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 	The first of these exceptions is
narrow and only applies when the petitioner can show there is literally “no opportunity to obtain
redress in state court.” Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (citing Wilwording v. Swenson,
404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971)). Put differently, exhaustion is excused only when state law provides
no presently available vehicle for the relevant claim. Consistent with that framing, courts in this
District place the burden on the petitioner to prove the exception applies and reject attempts to
invoke it when an established state postconviction or similar remedial scheme could deal with the
claim being advanced. See, e.g., Solis v. Beltz, No. 25-CV-3123 (PAM/DJF), 2025 WL 3300332,
at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 30, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 3296821 (Nov.
26, 2025); Opiacha v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., No. 20-CV-1046 (DSD/KMM), 2021 WL 3621832,
at *5 (D. Minn. July 15, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 3620408 (Aug. 16,
2021).
Mr. Senty-Haugen fails to carry his burden to prove that “there is an absence of available
State corrective process.” 	He identifies no Minnesota rule that bars a person from invoking
Minnesota’s established civil-commitment review and discharge procedures because he is
physically outside Minnesota. Nor does he claim that he tried to invoke a state remedy and was
CASE 0:25-cv-03377-KMM-DJF Doc. 12 Filed 02/12/26 Page 6 of 10

7
turned away. On the contrary, Minnesota law provides structured processes for committed persons
to seek a reduction in custody, including discharge. 	Those processes include a special review
board and a judicial appeal panel, with appellate review available in the Minnesota Court of
Appeals (and exhaustion, in turn, requiring presentation through the Minnesota Supreme Court).
See Opiacha, 2021 WL 3621832, at *1-2 (discussing Minnesota procedures). Mr. Senty-Haugen’s
suggestion that he cannot avail himself of these processes to challenge MSOP’s detainer is
mistaken.
He fares no better under the ineffective process exception. 	Exhaustion may be excused
when the results of “state collateral review … have effectively been predetermined,” Castille v.
Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350 (1989), or “the corrective process is so clearly deficient as to render
futile any effort to obtain relief,” Duckworth, 454 U.S. at 3; see also, e.g., Welch v. Lund, 616 F.3d
756, 760 (8th Cir. 2010) (suggesting that courts may excuse exhaustion when “an inordinate and
unjustifiable delay renders the state’s process ineffective to protect the petitioner’s rights”). The
burden is on the petitioner to show this exception applies. Mr. Senty-Haugen has not shown that
Minnesota’s process for reviewing civil commitments would be ineffective for challenging
MSOP’s detainer. Nowhere does he suggest that the process is effectively predetermined or that
pursuing it would be futile. Therefore, this exception to Section 2254’s exhaustion requirement is
inapplicable
The Court cannot grant the Petition because, as Mr. Senty-Haugen concedes, he did not
exhaust his state court remedies before filing the Petition, and he has failed to establish that any
exception to Section 2254’s exhaustion requirement applies. The Court thus recommends denying
the Petition and dismissing this action.
CASE 0:25-cv-03377-KMM-DJF Doc. 12 Filed 02/12/26 Page 7 of 10

8
III. 	The Primary Jurisdiction Rule
Mr. Senty-Haugen’s Petition is also meritless because he lacks standing. 	The Petition’s
legal gravamen is that the State of Minnesota voluntarily relinquished its primary jurisdiction over
Mr. Senty-Haugen through an act of “comity” when state officials handed him over to federal
authorities at his July 2018 sentencing hearing. 	(See ECF No. 3 at 8-12.) 	This argument starts
from the premise that if a sovereign with “primary jurisdiction” delivers a prisoner into the custody
of another sovereign without some court order or writ, the first sovereign has voluntarily
relinquished its primary jurisdiction. Mr. Senty-Haugen then posits that, when MSOP delivered
him into federal custody, MSOP did so voluntarily because that transfer was not compelled by any
writ or other court order. As a result, he claims, the State of Minnesota voluntarily relinquished
its primary jurisdiction—and from this, he argues that MSOP had “no legal standing for filing a
detainer” on him because “MSOP no longer retained custody for which to file a detainer.” (Id. at
12.)
It is well settled that when a person has violated the laws of two different sovereigns, the
sovereigns, not the defendant, decide the order in which they will exercise custody. See Ponzi v.
Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254, 260–61 (1922); Banks v. O’Grady, 113 F.2d 926, 927 (8th Cir. 1940)
(citing cases, including Ponzi). 	The primary-jurisdiction doctrine reflects that principle by
generally giving priority of custody to the sovereign that first arrests the individual. 	See, e.g.,
Elwell v. Fisher, 716 F.3d 477, 481 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Cole, 416 F.3d 894, 897
(8th Cir. 2005)); Tillisy v. Rardin, No. 23-cv-422 (PJS/TNL), 2024 WL 2962806, at *4 (D. Minn.
Feb. 21, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 2958438 (June 12, 2024). But that
priority is a prerogative of the sovereign, not a right belonging to the prisoner. See United States
v. McCrary, 220 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2000) (“The exercise of jurisdiction … is solely a question
CASE 0:25-cv-03377-KMM-DJF Doc. 12 Filed 02/12/26 Page 8 of 10

9
to be determined between those two sovereignties, and is not subject to attack by the prisoner.”).
Mr. Senty-Haugen therefore lacks standing to litigate the primary jurisdiction issue, and his
arguments fail to rebut this fundamental deficiency.5
IV. 	Certificate of Appealability
Section 	2254 	petitioner 	cannot 	appeal 	an 	adverse 	ruling 	without 	a 	certificate 	of
appealability (“COA”). 	See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1). 	A district court
may issue a COA only if the petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 	When, as in this case, a petition is dismissed on
procedural grounds (e.g., failure to exhaust state court remedies), a COA is warranted only if
“jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Court concludes that no reasonable
jurist would find this recommended dismissal debatable. 	The Court therefore recommends
denying a COA.
RECOMMENDATION
Based upon the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Petitioner Arthur Dale Senty-Haugen’s Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) be
DENIED.
2. 	This action be DISMISSED.
3. 	No certificate of appealability be issued.
5 The Court need not opine on Respondents’ argument that the primary jurisdiction doctrine
does not apply in situations involving civil commitment. (See ECF No. 8 at 8-9.)
CASE 0:25-cv-03377-KMM-DJF Doc. 12 Filed 02/12/26 Page 9 of 10

10
Dated: February 12, 2026 	s/ Dulce J. Foster
DULCE J. FOSTER
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District
Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a magistrate
judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a copy” of the
Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being
served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must
comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
CASE 0:25-cv-03377-KMM-DJF Doc. 12 Filed 02/12/26 Page 10 of 10