Gordon-Greenwood v. United States of America et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Kurtis Lavonte Gordon-Greenwood,
Plaintiff,
v.
United States of America, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-2474 (JWB/SGE)
REPORT &
RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on two motions to dismiss the complaint—one filed
by Defendant Jill Brisbois (Dkt. 14), and another filed by Defendants United States of
America, U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, the Honorable Douglas L.
Micko, the Honorable Donovan W. Frank, Assistant U.S. Attorney Thomas Hollenhorst,
First Assistant U.S. Attorney Lisa Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Attorney Andrew Luger, Clerk
of Court Kate Fogarty, and U.S. Marshal Eddie Frizell (the “Federal Defendants”) (Dkt.
19). Plaintiff Kurtis Lavonte Gordon-Greenwood filed the Complaint in this matter in
Ramsey County in Minnesota State Court on May 14, 2025. (Dkt. 1-1.) The matter was
removed to this Court on June 13, 2025, (Dkt. 1), and Defendants filed their motions on
July 15, 2025. (Dkts. 14, 19.) The matter was referred to the undersigned by United States
District Judge Jerry W. Blackwell for report and recommendation under 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1.
For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends that Defendants’ motions be
granted.
CASE 0:25-cv-02474-JWB-SGE Doc. 38 Filed 01/26/26 Page 1 of 11

2
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff was charged by indictment with Conspiracy to Distribute Fentanyl in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846; Attempted Possession with intent
to Distribute Fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846; and being
a Felon in Possession of a Firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8).
See United States v. Kurtis Lavonte Gordon-Greenwood et al., Case no. 23-cr-339
(DWF/DLM), Dkt. 1. Judge Frank and Magistrate Judge Micko were assigned to preside
over this prosecution, and Defendant Brisbois was appointed counsel to represent Plaintiff.
See id., Dkt. 3. Defendant Hollenhorst was the criminal prosecutor assigned to Plaintiff’s
case. See generally United States of America v. Kurtis Lavonte Gordon-Greenwood, et al.,
Case no. 23-cr-339 (DWF/DLM) (D. Minn.). Defendants Kirkpatrick (First Assistant
United States Attorney), Fogarty (Clerk of Court), and Frizell (U.S. Marshal) were in their
respective positions at the time of Plaintiff’s trial in April 2025. U.S. Attorney Rosen is
substituted for former U.S. Attorney Andrew Luger and former Acting U.S. Attorney
Joseph Thompson pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed pro se. See id., Dkt. 100.
Magistrate Judge Micko held a hearing on the motion on June 12 and 21, 2024, and he
1 Courts may consider “matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject to
judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and
exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is unquestioned” in resolving a motion to
dismiss without converting it into a motion for summary judgment. Miller v. Redwood Toxicology
lab., Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff’s previous criminal prosecution is a
matter of public record and the putative basis for Plaintiff’s claims. As such, the Court will consider
the orders and events in his previous criminal prosecution in resolving this motion.
CASE 0:25-cv-02474-JWB-SGE Doc. 38 Filed 01/26/26 Page 2 of 11

3
issued an order on June 25, 2024, granting the motion. Id., Dkt. 118. The matter proceeded
to trial, and a jury found Plaintiff guilty on April 10, 2025. Id., Dkt. 240.
On May 2, 2025, Plaintiff filed a civil complaint in Ramsey County Court. (Dkt. 1-
1.) Plaintiff’s Complaint provides:
On January 24, 2024 I furnished to the Defendants security to answer
for the recovery/discharge/return/release of the property (i.e. a human
being, of which I has priority thereto) bound and held under the
Defendant’s obligation (see attached copy), and such security was
accepted, kept and ais retained by Defendants without said
recovery/discharge/return/release.
Accordingly, to the extend of value given the Defendants on account
thereof, I hereby pray for judgment and order for said
recovery/discharge/return/release, in my favor, with interest accruing
upon the Defendant’s obligation, in the amount of $6,300,000 per
annum, and court costs, as provided by law.
(Dkt. 1-1, at 5-6.) Plaintiff attached various documents to his Complaint, including a
“Demand for Release,” copies of arrest warrants, and a copy of the indictment from United
States v. Kurtis Lavonte Gordon-Greenwood et al., Case no. 23-cr-339 (DWF/DLM). (See
Dkt. 1-1.)
Plaintiff served the Federal Defendants “by and through the United States attorney
(attorney for the defendants collectively in this case), on May 02, 2025.” (Dkt. 13.) The
Federal Defendants removed the complaint to this Court on June 13, 2025. (Dkt. 1.)
Defendant Brisbois and the Federal Defendants filed their respective motions to dismiss on
CASE 0:25-cv-02474-JWB-SGE Doc. 38 Filed 01/26/26 Page 3 of 11

4
July 15, 2025. (Dkts. 14, 19.) The parties have briefed the issues, (Dkts. 16, 21, 29, 31, 32),
and the issues presented are ripe for review.2
LEGAL STANDARD
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), litigants must
properly plead their claims under Rule 8 and contain a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 588
F.3d 585, 594 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
Although the federal pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it
requires “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint “must contain sufficient factual allegations to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Smithrud v. City of St. Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 397
(8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell Atl. 550 U.S. at 547). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[T]he
plausibility standard, which requires a federal court complaint to state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face, . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Ritchie v. St. Louis Jewish Light, 630 F.3d 713, 717 (8th Cir. 2011)
(cleaned up). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
2 Plaintiff requests a hearing so that he can “explain further [his] entitlement, constitutional claims,
prove [his] rights to the property and secure [his] interest in accordance with the law[.]” (Dkt. 29
at 2.) After careful consideration, the Court determines that it can resolve the motions before it
without a hearing. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for oral argument is denied.
CASE 0:25-cv-02474-JWB-SGE Doc. 38 Filed 01/26/26 Page 4 of 11

5
will, . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its own
judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679 (citation omitted).
The Eighth Circuit explained this standard:
While a plaintiff need not set forth “detailed factual allegations,”
Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at 1964, or “specific facts” that describe the
evidence to be presented, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct.
2197, 2200 (2007) (per curiam), the complaint must include sufficient
allegations to provide the grounds on which the claim rests. Twombly,
127 S.Ct. at 1965 n.3. A district Court, therefore, is not required “to
divine the litigant’s intent and create claims that are not clearly raised,”
Bediako, 354 F.3d at 840, and it need not “conjure up unpled
allegations” to save a complaint. Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417,
421 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted).
Gregory v. Dillard’s, Inc., 565 F.3d 464, 473 (8th Cir. 2009). The Eighth Circuit has also
interpreted the “face” of the complaint as including public records and materials embraced
by the complaint as well as materials attached to the complaint. C.H. Robinson Worldwide,
Inc. v. Lobrano, 695 F.3d 758, 764 (8th Cir. 2012).
Finally, pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, but they must still allege
sufficient facts to support a claim for relief. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.
2004).
ANALYSIS
I. 	Defendant Brisbois’ Motion to Dismiss
In her Motion, Defendant Brisbois argues that the Complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. She argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint “is devoid of facts
or legal theory to support any claim against her” and that, “[a]s best as can be divined,
Plaintiff’s claims are based on sovereign citizen ideology and principles.” (Dkt. 16 at 9.)
CASE 0:25-cv-02474-JWB-SGE Doc. 38 Filed 01/26/26 Page 5 of 11

6
She also argues that Plaintiff’s claims against her should be dismissed for insufficient
service of process.
This Court agrees that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state any claim against
Defendant Brisbois that would entitle Plaintiff to any relief. The Complaint states that
Plaintiff “furnished” the Defendants—including Defendant Brisbois, apparently—some
amorphous “security” that was “bound and held under the Defendant’s obligation” and
Plaintiff wants that “security” returned. The Complaint fails to set forth any facts that
Defendant Brisbois took possession of any “security” from Plaintiff, what she allegedly
did with said “security,” or what obligations she might have with respect to its handling or
disposition.
Plaintiff’s response frames Defendant Brisbois’ appointment as an effort “to recover
judgment on a debt that is an amount owing to the Unite States on account of a[n]
assessment, penalty, interest tax or other source of indebtedness to the Unite[d] States
pursuant to 28 USC 3003 (1)(B)&(3)(B)”. (Dkt. 29 at 1.) But Defendant Brisbois was
appointed to serve as Plaintiff’s counsel in a criminal matter, not to collect a debt under the
Fair Debt Collections Procedures Act. See United States v. Kurtis Lavonte Gordon-
Greenwood, Court File 23-cr-339 (DWF/DLM), Dkt. 23 (appointing Defendant Brisbois
as counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A). Nothing in Plaintiff’s Complaint states a claim for
which relief can be granted, and Defendant Brisbois’ motion to dismiss should be granted
on that basis. Because this Court recommends the Complaint be dismissed for failing to
state a claim, it need not address Defendant Brisbois’ argument that there was insufficient
service of process.
CASE 0:25-cv-02474-JWB-SGE Doc. 38 Filed 01/26/26 Page 6 of 11

7
II. 	Federal Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
The Federal Defendants also move to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing
that (1) the claims Plaintiff asserts are official capacity claims that are barred by sovereign
immunity, and (2) Judge Frank and Magistrate Judge Micko are entitled by judicial
immunity.
A. Sovereign Immunity
Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks compensatory and punitive damages from the Federal
Defendants, but this Court must first address whether those claims are against the Federal
Defendants in their individual or official capacities.
1. Official Capacity Claims
Where a plaintiff pleads claims against government officials, the claim must contain
a “specific pleading” stating whether the defendant is being sued in his individual or
official capacity. Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989). If a complaint is silent
as to which capacity claims against government officials are brought, courts interpret the
complaint “as including only official-capacity claims.” Egerdahl v. Hibbing Comm. Coll.,
72 F.3d 615, 619 (8th Cir. 1995).
The Complaint in this matter is silent as to whether any claims—whatever they may
be—are brought against the Federal Defendants in their individual or official capacities.
(See Dkt. 1 at 5-6.) Because the Complaint does not specifically and clearly state whether
Plaintiff asserts claims against the Federal Defendants in their personal or official
capacities, this Court determines that Plaintiff’s claims against the Federal Defendants are
official-capacity claims.
CASE 0:25-cv-02474-JWB-SGE Doc. 38 Filed 01/26/26 Page 7 of 11

8
2. Sovereign Immunity Bars Official Capacity Claims
An action against a public official in his official capacity is really an action against
the official entity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Elder-Keep v.
Aksamit, 460 F.3d 979, 986 (8th Cir. 2006). Because his claims against the Federal
Defendants are official capacity claims, Plaintiff ultimately seeks to recover compensatory
and punitive damages from the United States.
The United States enjoys immunity from civil lawsuits except where it has
specifically waived that immunity. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212
(1983). The United States has not waived its sovereign immunity for general claims that
its employees have violated the United States Constitution. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S.
471, 477-78 (1994) (examining sovereign immunity waiver in Federal Tort Claims Act);
see also Hartje v. F.T.C., 106 F.3d 1406, 1408 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that a Bivens action
“is only available against federal officers, not government entities”). Thus, sovereign
immunity bars all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Rosen, Hollenhorst, Kirkpatrick,
Fogarty, and Frizell in their official capacities, and those claims should be dismissed under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction.
As to Plaintiff’s claims against the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota, the Administrative Procedures Act prohibits recovery of money damages cause
by agency action. See 5 U.S.C. § 702. Plaintiff’s Complaint requests $6.3 million “per
annum” in compensatory and punitive damages, which is quintessential money damages.
See Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 900-01 (1988). The United States has not
CASE 0:25-cv-02474-JWB-SGE Doc. 38 Filed 01/26/26 Page 8 of 11

9
waived its sovereign immunity against Plaintiffs’ official capacity money damages claim,
and accordingly, it should also be dismissed.
B. Judicial Immunity
Finally, as to Judge Frank and Magistrate Judge Micko, nothing in the Complaint
asserts that the claims are filed against them in their individual capacity, and no facts
alleged any actions on the part of either that falls outside the scope of judicial immunity.
Judicial officers are entitled to absolute immunity for judicial acts. See Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347-54 (1871). This immunity is “grounded in a general principle of
the highest importance, that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him,
shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal
consequences to himself.” Hamilton v. City of Hayti, Missouri, 948 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir.
2020) (cleaned up). This immunity applies “however erroneous the [judicial] act may have
been, and however injurious in its consequences [the judicial act] may have proved to the
plaintiff.” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199-200 (1985). The Supreme Court has
described immunity as subject to a two-step analysis:
Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an
immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.
Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad
faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved
without engaging in discovery and eventual trial. Rather, our cases
make clear that the immunity is overcome in only two sets of
circumstances. First a judge is not immune from liability for
nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s official
capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial
in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.
CASE 0:25-cv-02474-JWB-SGE Doc. 38 Filed 01/26/26 Page 9 of 11

10
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Thus, where a judge performs the type of act
normally performed only by judges and does so in the judge’s capacity as a judge,
absolutely judicial immunity protects that judge from suit. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349, 362 (1978).
The Court determines that Judge Frank and Magistrate Judge Micko are entitled to
absolute judicial immunity for their actions in Plaintiff’s criminal case. Their actions and
decisions in that case were performed in their capacities as judicial officers. Additionally,
the judicial decisions Judge Frank and Magistrate Judge Micko made in administering
Plaintiff’s earlier criminal case fell within their broad authority. See Mireles, 502 U.S. at
11-12; Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. Plaintiff admits in his response that Judge Frank and
Magistrate Judge Micko “are entitled to judicial and sovereign immunity,” (Dkt. 29 at 2),
but asserts that he is suing them in their personal capacities. (Id.) Nothing in the Complaint
or in Plaintiff’s response provides any factual basis for claims against either judge in their
personal capacity. Plaintiff has sued Judge Frank and Magistrate Judge Micko for judicial
acts that fell within their broad authority, and absolute judicial immunity protects them
from suit.
CASE 0:25-cv-02474-JWB-SGE Doc. 38 Filed 01/26/26 Page 10 of 11

11
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendant Brisbois’ Motion (Dkt.
14) and the Federal Defendants’ Motion (Dkt. 19) be GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s
Complaint be DISMISSED.
Dated: January 26, 2026
s/ Shannon G. Elkins
SHANNON G. ELKINS
United States Magistrate Judge
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. LR 72.2(b)(2). All
objections and responses must comply with the word limits set forth in LR 72.2(c).
Under Advisement Date: This Report and Recommendation will be considered under
advisement 14 days from the date of its filing. If timely objections are filed, this Report
and Recommendation will be considered under advisement from the earlier of (1) 14 days
after the objections are filed, or (2) from the date a timely response is filed.
CASE 0:25-cv-02474-JWB-SGE Doc. 38 Filed 01/26/26 Page 11 of 11