Benedict v. Wetherille et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Christine Benedict,
Plaintiff,
v.
Kevin J. Wetherille, in his individual and
official capacity; Courtney Sebo Savica, in
her individual and official capacity; Allen
Uhlir, 	in 	his 	individual 	capacity; 	the
Honorable 	Patrick 	H. 	Goggins, 	in 	his
individual 	official 	capacity; 	Jeffrey 	A.
Timmerman, 	in 	his 	individual 	capacity;
Keith Ellison, in his official capacity as
Attorney General of Minnesota; James P.
Conway, Moriarty & Wetherille, P.A.; and
Jaspers, Moriarty & Wetherille, P.A.,
Defendants.
No. 25-cv-2446 (KMM/SGE)
ORDER
Plaintiff Christine Benedict brought this case under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985
and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), alleging that Defendants, who were involved in a probate
proceeding that resulted in a determination adverse to her, participated in a “civil RICO
conspiracy” that deprived Ms. Benedict of her constitutional rights. (Dkt. 10.) The matter
is before the Court on the following motions: Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Dkts. 19,
27, 34, and 66),1 Ms. Benedict’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and
1 Defendants Keith Ellison, the Honorable Patrick H. Goggins, and Jeffrey A.
Timmerman jointly filed a motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 19.) Defendants James P. Conway,
Kevin J. Wetherille, and the law firm of Jaspers, Moriarty & Wetherille jointly filed a
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 1 of 19

2
Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 3), and Defendant Allen Uhlir’s Motion for Sanctions (Dkt.
76).
For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss,
denies Ms. Benedict’s Motion for Injunctive Relief, and denies Mr. Uhlir’s Motion for
Sanctions. The matter is dismissed with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from an underlying state-court probate proceeding, which is briefly
summarized for context. In 2023, following the death of Ms. Benedict’s and Mr. Uhlir’s
father (“decedent”), Mr. Uhlir sued Ms. Benedict in state court, alleging that she had
“misappropriated funds, [and] coerced and/or unduly influenced Decedent into transferring
probate property directly to her while serving as Decedent’s caretaker, and engaged in
fraud in so doing.” (Dkt. 14-3 (Probate Order) at 3, ¶ 4.2) Mr. Uhlir was represented by
Defendant Courtney Sebo Savica, and the Honorable Patrick H. Goggins, who is also a
named defendant in this case, presided over the proceeding. Ms. Benedict cross-filed a
petition seeking to be appointed as the personal representative of decedent’s estate, but
motion 	to 	dismiss. 	(Dkt. 	34.) 	Defendants 	Allen 	Uhlir 	and 	Courtney 	Sebo 	Savica
individually filed motions to dismiss. (Dkts. 27, 66.)
2 The incorporated state-court documents are from In re Estate of James Uhlir, No.
40-PR-23-836 (Le Sueur Cnty. Dist. Ct. 2023). Citations to “Court Index” refer to the
docket in that matter. See Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir.
1999) (citation and quotations omitted) (stating that while courts generally “must ignore
materials outside of the pleadings” when considering a motion to dismiss, courts “may
consider some materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict the complaint,
. . . as well as materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings[]”). Consideration
of such materials does not require a court to convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment. See Mattes v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003).
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 2 of 19

3
Judge Goggins denied the petition and appointed Defendant Kevin J. Wetherille instead.
(Probate Order at 3, ¶ 6.)
After lengthy litigation, Judge Goggins issued an order on June 4, 2025 directing
entry of judgment against Ms. Benedict. (See Court Index No. 70.) Judge Goggins found
that the factual submissions in Mr. Wetherille’s Petition to Void Transfer on Death Deeds
and Power of Attorney Executed April 22, 2022 (Court Index No. 44) was “proven by clear
and 	convincing 	evidence[.]” 	(Court 	Index 	No. 	70 	at 	4, 	¶ 	9.) 	Relying 	largely 	on
Mr. Wetherille’s Petition, Judge Goggins determined that the transfer of death deed
initiated by Ms. Benedict “created a significant and unexpected deviation in the Decedent’s
testamentary wishes that inured” significant financial benefit to Ms. Benedict, and her
actions “resulted in changes to other financial asset disposition” to her benefit. (Id. at 33,
¶¶ 15–16.) Based on his conclusion that the legal documents at issue were void, Judge
Goggins granted Mr. Wetherille “the power to recover all assets identified that had
dispositional changes using” the void documents, directed him to divide the assets as set
forth in the court’s order, and instructed Mr. Wetherille to apportion “[his] fees and [Mr.
Uhlir’s] court costs and legal fees . . . solely against [Ms. Benedict’s] share of the Estate.”
(Id. at 35, ¶ 5.) Mr. Wetherille subsequently took steps to enforce the court’s order,
including by notifying Ms. Benedict that he would recover the real property she occupied
at the time. (See Dkt. 1 at 14, 37.) As of the date of this Order, Ms. Benedict has not sought
appellate review of the district court’s final judgment, and the sixty-day deadline for filing
an appeal has since passed. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 1.
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 3 of 19

4
On June 12, 2025, about one week after the entry of judgment against her in the
state-court proceeding, Ms. Benedict initiated this action, alleging that Defendants
participated in a “civil racketeering conspiracy” to bring about her “financial and
reputational destruction . . . and the seizure of estate-controlled assets through procedural
domination,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). (Dkt. 1 at 43.) She also alleged that
Defendants violated her due-process rights by seizing her property and denied her access
to a “fair and impartial tribunal” by conspiring “to obstruct justice and deprive equal
protection.” (Id. at 41–43.) She filed her Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction on the same day. (Dkt. 3.)
Ms. Benedict filed her First Amended Complaint (Dkt. 10) later that month.3 The
amended complaint added the following defendants: Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey A.
Timmerman, who had entered a notice of appearance on behalf of Judge Goggins in this
matter; Attorney General Keith Ellison, who is Mr. Timmerman’s supervisor; and James
P. Conway and his law firm Jaspers, Moriarty & Wetherille, P.A. (“Jaspers”), who
represented Mr. Wetherille as a named creditor in Ms. Benedict’s bankruptcy proceeding.4
3 Ms. Benedict also submitted a Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 14) that the
Court does not consider because it was improperly filed. Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allows a plaintiff to amend their complaint once as a matter of course, but
any additional amendments require consent from the other party or leave of the court for
additional amendments. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)–(2). There is no indication that Ms.
Benedict received consent from Defendants, nor has she sought the Court’s leave.
4 The bankruptcy proceeding is unrelated to the probate proceeding, and the details
of it are not relevant here. Separately, it appears that Ms. Benedict may have intended her
First Amended Complaint to serve as a supplement to her original complaint. This is
improper under Local Rule 15.1(a), which states that “[a]ny amended pleading must be
complete in itself and must not incorporate by reference any prior pleading.” But the Court
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 4 of 19

5
(See Dkt. 10 ¶ 7.) Throughout July and August 2025, Defendants brought the motions to
dismiss and motion for sanctions that are currently before the Court.
Also in August 2025, while those motions were pending, Ms. Benedict petitioned
the Minnesota Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to “(a)
vacate certain orders; (b) remove personal representative Kevin Wetherille; (c) order the
personal representative to disgorge all fees and costs he received related to this estate; (d)
assign a different judge to the case; and (e) conduct an evidentiary hearing on certain
matters,” and sought expedited consideration of the petition. (Court Index No. 123 at 1, ¶ 1
(Order, No. 25-1297 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2025)) (cleaned up).) The court denied the
petition. (Id. at 2–3.)
DISCUSSION
I. 	Motions to Dismiss
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
allegations to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Smithrud v. City of St.
Paul, 746 F.3d 391, 397 (8th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted). The facts alleged in the
complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Though pro se complaints are to
notes that even if it were to consider the allegations across all of the pleadings together, the
result would not change.
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 5 of 19

6
be construed liberally, they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.
Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
In applying this standard, courts must assume that all factual allegations in the
complaint are true and construe all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Cole v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 105 F.4th 1110, 1113
(8th Cir. 2024). But courts “need not accept as true a plaintiff’s conclusory allegations or
legal conclusions drawn from the facts.” Ingram v. Ark. Dep’t of Corr., 91 F.4th 924, 927
(8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Glick v. W. Power Sports, Inc., 944 F.3d 714, 717 (8th Cir. 2019)).
In short, there must exist “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
A. 	Defendants Ellison, Timmerman, and Judge Goggins
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants Keith Ellison, the Honorable Patrick J.
Goggins, and Jeffrey A. Timmerman (collectively “State Defendants”) argue that Ms.
Benedict’s claims against them must be dismissed because they are entitled to immunity.
(Dkt. 62.) The Court agrees.
First, the claims brought against Judge Goggins are dismissed because he is
protected by judicial immunity. “[G]enerally, a judge is immune from a suit[.]” Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per curiam) (collecting cases). More specifically, “a judge is
absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is
flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.” Scheffler v. Trachy, 821 F. App’x
648, 652 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978)) (cleaned
up). Even “[a]llegations of malice or corruption do not defeat judicial immunity.” Hamilton
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 6 of 19

7
v. City of Hayti, 948 F.3d 921, 925 (8th Cir. 2020) (citing Stump, 435 U.S. at 355–56).
Exceptions to judicial immunity include “nonjudicial actions,” or “actions not taken in the
judge’s judicial capacity,” and “actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete
absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (quotation omitted). In this context, the scope of a judge’s
jurisdiction is construed “broadly.” Schottel v. Young, 687 F.3d 370, 373 (8th Cir. 2012).
“[W]hether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one” turns on “the nature of the act itself, i.e.,
whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the
parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at
362.
All of Ms. Benedict’s allegations against Judge Goggins pertain to actions he took
as part of “function[s] normally performed by a judge.” Id. They include “adopt[ing]
findings,” “den[ying] post-trial relief without hearing,” and “dismiss[ing] constitutional
objections as ‘baseless[.]’” (Dkt. 1 at 3.) Even her more serious, but nevertheless vague,
allegations that Judge Goggins “permitted fiduciary alignment with adverse counsel, and
ignored sworn allegations of fraud upon the court,” engaged in “judicial entrenchment[]
and procedural sabotage,” and was biased cannot bypass judicial immunity. (Id. at 12–13.)
Therefore, Ms. Benedict’s claims against Judge Goggins in both his official and personal
capacity are dismissed. See Greene v. Gassman, No. 11-cv-0618 (PJS/TNL), 2012 WL
748374, at *4 (D. Minn. Mar. 6, 2012) (“[The] proposed personal-capacity claims against
the Judge Defendants are barred by absolute judicial immunity[.]”) (citing Glasspoole v.
Albertson, 491 F.2d 1090, 1091 (8th Cir. 1974)), aff’d, 489 F. App’x 997 (8th Cir. 2012).
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 7 of 19

8
The claims against Attorney General Ellison and Assistant Attorney General
Timmerman are likewise dismissed. Ms. Benedict points to an email that Mr. Timmerman
sent to her as Judge Goggins’s attorney in this matter, in which he allegedly “attempted to
coerce [her] into withdrawing her federal claims by suggesting her litigation support was
improper[.]” 	(Dkt. 	10 	at 	10; 	Dkt. 	23-1 	(email).) 	Ms. 	Benedict 	claims 	that 	the
communication was “a deliberate extrajudicial act designed to chill Plaintiff’s exercise of
her right to petition the government[.]” (Id.) Further, she alleges that Mr. Ellison is liable
for Mr. Timmerman’s conduct under a supervisory-liability theory because he was on
notice of such conduct, which reflected larger “institutional” issues, and failed to take
adequate remedial steps. (Id. at 8–9.)
The Court need not reach the issue of whether those claims can survive a motion to
dismiss because Mr. Ellison and Mr. Timmerman are entitled to absolute prosecutorial
immunity from these claims. “Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from civil
liability under § 1983 when they are engaged in prosecutorial functions that are ‘intimately
associated with the judicial process.’” Schenk v. Chavis, 461 F.3d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir.
2006) (quoting Anderson v. Larson, 327 F.3d 762, 768 (8th Cir. 2003)). That immunity
covers any actions taken as part of “advocacy on behalf of the government.” Id.; see also
Murphy v. Morris, 849 F.2d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir. 1988) (“[A] state assistant attorney
general’s function as a government advocate entitles him . . . to absolute immunity from
suit for damages.”); Tweeton v. Frandrup, No. 06-cv-1130 (PAM/JSM), 2006 WL
3627010, at *8 (D. Minn. Dec. 12, 2006) (“A government attorney who defends a civil suit
is entitled to absolute immunity.”) (citing Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 572–73
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 8 of 19

9
(2d Cir. 1986); Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832, 837 (9th Cir. 1991)), aff’d, 287 F. App’x
541 (8th Cir. 2008). The challenged conduct of Mr. Timmerman and Mr. Ellison falls
squarely within the prosecutorial immunity they are entitled to. It also extends to the claims
against Mr. Timmerman in his personal capacity. See Nelson v. Ellison, No. 23-cv-2122
(JRT/LIB), 2024 WL 714149, at *2 n.1 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2024) (concluding that claims
brought against the attorney general in their individual capacity would also be barred by
immunity) (citing Sample v. City of Woodbury, 836 F.3d 913, 916 (8th Cir. 2016)).
Ms. Benedict’s claims against the State Defendants are therefore dismissed with
prejudice. Milliman v. County of Stearns, No. 13-cv-136 (DWF/LIB), 2013 WL 5426049,
at *16 (D. Minn. Sept. 26, 2013) (stating that claims barred by prosecutorial immunity
“must be dismissed with prejudice as they fail at the outset as a matter of law”) (citing
Trendle v. Campbell, 465 F. App’x 584, 585 (8th Cir. 2012)).
B. 	Defendant Uhlir
The Court turns next to Mr. Uhlir’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 27). Put simply, Ms.
Benedict alleges that Mr. Uhlir brought the probate action against her for improper reasons
and engaged in a conspiracy with the other defendants in furtherance of those improper
motives. Specifically, Ms. Benedict claims that Mr. Uhlir “initiated a contested probate
action seeking to void . . . documents” that designated Ms. Benedict as the “sole grantee”
of Decedent’s property and ultimately “redirect the estate,” “made materially false
representations 	about 	Decedent’s 	intent” 	and 	“withheld 	exculpatory 	admissions”
throughout the state-court proceedings, and “benefitted financially from the [state] court’s
final judgment.” (Dkt. 1 at 12.) According to Ms. Benedict, Mr. Uhlir’s conduct, “paired
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 9 of 19

10
with the aligned fiduciary and legal strategies of the [other] Defendants[,] forms a critical
link in the civil RICO conspiracy and the deprivation of protected property rights.” (Id.) In
addition to depriving her rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, Ms. Benedict asserts
that the conduct also constituted a RICO violation under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
As an initial matter, the § 1983 claim must be dismissed because Mr. Uhlir is a
private party. See Carlson v. Roetzel & Andress, 552 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Only
state actors can be held liable under Section 1983.”) (quotation omitted). It is true that in
some cases, “a private party may be held liable on a § 1983 claim if ‘he is a willful
participant in joint action with the State or its agents.’” Mershon v. Beasley, 994 F.2d 449,
451 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)). But Ms. Benedict
does not allege with any specificity, as she must, “at the very least, that there was a mutual
understanding, or a meeting of the minds, between the private party and the state actor[s].”
Id.
Her § 1985 conspiracy claim, which cites subsections (2) and (3) “for conspiracy to
intimidate and injure a party-in-interest engaging in protected legal action,” is also
inadequately pled. (Dkt. 1 at 9.) “At a minimum, the complaint must state some way in
which the named defendants participated in the alleged conspiracy to take away the . . .
rights of the plaintiff[].” Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 840 (8th Cir. 1975). Moreover,
“a complaint under 42 U.S.C. [§] 1985(3) must allege facts to show that intentional or
invidious discrimination was the object of the conspiracy.” Id. Here, however, Ms.
Benedict merely lists conduct that Mr. Uhlir allegedly took on his own and tethers it, in a
rather conclusory fashion, to the conduct of the other defendants. (See Dkt. 1 at 12
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 10 of 19

11
(claiming that Mr. Uhlir’s individual conduct amounted to a conspiracy when “paired with
the aligned fiduciary and legal strategies of the [other] Defendants”).) Otherwise, the
complaint is devoid of any specific, factual allegations to support Ms. Benedict’s claim
that Mr. Uhlir illegally conspired with others to take away her rights. Despite her
statements to the contrary, it appears that Ms. Benedict’s actual grievance is her loss in the
state-court proceeding. But “merely resorting to the courts and being on the winning side
of a lawsuit does not make a party a co-conspirator or a joint actor with the judge.” Dennis
v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980).
Also insufficiently pled is the RICO claim. For a RICO violation, Ms. Benedict must
allege “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.”
UMB Bank, N.A. v. Guerin, 89 F.4th 1047, 1053 (8th Cir. 2024) (quoting Crest Constr. II,
Inc. v. Doe, 660 F.3d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 2011)). “’Racketeering activity’ consists of the
commission of a predicate act, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).” Id. (citing Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985)). Moreover, “[a] civil RICO plaintiff
must show injury ‘by reason of’ a RICO violation, that is, injury ‘both factually and
proximately caused’ by the violation.” Id. (quoting Regions Bank v. J.R. Oil Co., LLC, 387
F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 2004)). “Failure to present sufficient evidence on any one element
of a RICO claim means the entire claim fails.” Craig Outdoor Advert., Inc. v. Viacom
Outdoor, Inc., 528 F.3d 1001, 1028 (8th Cir. 2008).
Ms. Benedict alleges generally that Defendants engaged in “pattern acts of mail
fraud (invoicing), wire fraud (email threats), obstruction of justice (omitted evidence,
ghostwritten 	findings), 	and 	retaliation 	(property 	seizure 	attempts 	post-judgment),”
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 11 of 19

12
ultimately “conspir[ing] to use the color of judicial authority to extract, recapture, and
reallocate property that was lawfully designated to Plaintiff under Minnesota non-probate
transfer statutes.” (Dkt. 1 at 21.) But again, her allegations lack the specificity required to
survive a motion to dismiss and amount to “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements[.]” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Even
“construed liberally,” as this Court does when considering a pro se pleading, Ms.
Benedict’s complaint does not “allege sufficient facts to support the claims advanced.”
Stone, 364 F.3d at 914. For these reasons, the claims against Mr. Uhlir are dismissed.
C. 	Defendants Wetherille, Conway, and Jaspers
Next, the Court addresses the motion to dismiss brought by Mr. Wetherille, Mr.
Conway, and Jaspers (collectively “Wetherille Defendants”). (Dkt. 34.) They argue that
Ms. Benedict fails to plausibly allege that they violated her constitutional rights and the
RICO Act, and her claims must therefore be dismissed for failure to state a claim. (Id. at
1.)
The § 1983 claims must be dismissed because the Wetherille Defendants, like Mr.
Uhlir, are not state actors. Mr. Conway is a private attorney whose only connection to these
matters was that he entered a notice of appearance on behalf of Mr. Wetherille, who was a
named creditor in Ms. Benedict’s bankruptcy proceeding. (See Dkt. 10 ¶ 7.) See Dubose v.
Kelly, 187 F.3d 999, 1003 (8th Cir. 1999) (“The defendants . . . are private citizens, and
although they are attorneys, the conduct of counsel generally does not constitute action
under color of law.”); Dunn v. Hackworth, 628 F.2d 1111, 1112–13 (8th Cir. 1980) (“The
actions of privately retained counsel are not considered state action and therefore cannot
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 12 of 19

13
form the basis of a [§] 1983 claim.”). The same holds true for Jaspers, which is a private
entity. (See Dkt. 10 ¶ 7; see also Dkt. 38 at 8 n.7.) Cf. Dubose, 187 F.3d at 1003; Dunn,
628 	F.2d 	1112–13. 	Even 	Mr. 	Wetherille, 	who 	was 	the 	court-appointed 	personal
representative of decedent’s estate in the underlying probate proceeding, is not a state actor.
Cf. Rivera v. Gray, No. 25-cv-2215 (JWB/LIB), 2025 WL 2104518, at *1 (D. Minn. July
28, 2025) (“[I]t is well-settled that a public defender, even one who was court-appointed,
does not act under the color of law and is not a state actor for purposes of a § 1983 claim.”)
(citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318–19 (1981); Dotlich v. Kane, 497 F.2d
390, 391 (8th Cir. 1974)); Meyer v. Ekola, No. 15–cv–2564 (SRN/HB), 2017 WL 9274728,
at *7 (D. Minn. May 26, 2017) (concluding that “acceptance of the guardianship did not
transform [the court-appointed guardian] into a state actor”) (citing cases).
As for her remaining claims against the Wetherille Defendants, Ms. Benedict alleges
that they “coordinated fiduciary fraud, dual-forum forum manipulation, and obstruction of
judicial accountability under color of legal process.” (Dkt. 10 at 22.) According to Ms.
Benedict, Mr. Conway’s participation in the bankruptcy action rendered him an “active
participant[] in an enterprise-wide pattern of concealment and strategic litigation evasion—
enabling further execution of the predicate racketeering conduct[.]” (Id. at 23.) And, in
addition to breaching his fiduciary duty to the estate, Mr. Wetherille engaged in mail fraud
by “us[ing] email and billing statements to extract funds under false fiduciary pretense.”
(Dkt. 1 at 35; see also id. at 33, 35–38.) Ms. Benedict’s sweeping, conclusory claims must
be dismissed largely for the reasons explained regarding Mr. Uhlir’s motion to dismiss.
Even assuming that all of Ms. Benedict’s factual allegations are true, see Cole, 105 F.4th
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 13 of 19

14
at 1113, they do not raise “more than a sheer possibility,” let alone any possibility, that the
Wetherille Defendants acted unlawfully, Ingram, 91 F.4th at 927 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678). As the Wetherille Defendants point out, the alleged conduct was lawfully
undertaken “in the ordinary course of proceedings within the Probate Action” or a related
matter. (See Dkt. 36 at 2.) Therefore, the claims against the Wetherille Defendants are
dismissed.
D. 	Courtney Sebo Savica
Next, the Court turns to Ms. Sebo Savica’s motion to dismiss. She also argues,
among other things, that Ms. Benedict’s claims must be dismissed for failure to state a
claim. (Dkt. 69 at 7–10.)
Ms. Benedict alleges that Ms. Sebo Savica, who represented Mr. Uhlir in the state-
court proceeding, “submitted ghostwritten findings that were adopted verbatim by the
probate court, suppressed exculpatory evidence, and enabled fiduciary misconduct while
advancing a narrative that vilified [Ms. Benedict] through unsupported undue influence
claims.” (Dkt. 1 at 11–12.) Ms. Sebo Savica also allegedly “directly coordinated with [Mr.
Wetherille] on litigation planning, billing, and evidentiary tactics[]” such that “[t]heir joint
conduct blurred the statutory line between adversarial process and fiduciary neutrality.”
(Id. at 16.) Ultimately, the probate proceeding “was the opening move in a racketeering
pattern, executed through a nexus of . . . [Ms. Sabo Savica],” Mr. Wetherille, and Judge
Goggins, who “collectively formed a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(d), and further resulted in the deprivation of property without due process
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Id. at 17–18.)
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 14 of 19

15
Again, these allegations do not sufficiently state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face. See Smithrud, 746 F.3d at 397. The allegations either point to conduct that was
part of Ms. Sebo Savica’s duties as opposing counsel in the state-court proceeding or
constitute conclusory statements that amount to no more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action[.]” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, these claims are
dismissed.
* * *
In sum, the claims against Defendants are dismissed with prejudice. See Ahmed v.
United States, 147 F.3d 791, 797 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that a dismissal for failure to state
a claim should be with prejudice).
II. 	Ms. Benedict’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction
Because the Court concludes that Ms. Benedict does not state any claim on which
relief can be granted, there is no basis for granting her motion for temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction. See Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. CL Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109,
113 (8th Cir. 1981) (explaining that injunctive relief is only appropriate where movant has
demonstrated, among other things, a likelihood of success on the merits of her claims).
Therefore, the motion is denied.5
5 Ms. Benedict claims that she “does not seek appellate review of the June 4, 2025
judgment” from the probate proceeding but asks this Court to “enjoin[] Defendants from
. . . [e]nforcing or acting upon the June 4, 2025 probate judgment,” suggesting that is
precisely what she asks this Court to do. (Dkt. 3 at 3.) To the extent that Ms. Benedict
challenges the validity of the judgment, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which requires
dismissal “when the federal-court action is brought by a state-court loser complaining of
injuries caused by a state-court judgment rendered before the district court proceedings
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 15 of 19

16
III. 	Mr. Uhlir’s Motion for Sanctions
Finally, the Court addresses Mr. Uhlir’s motion for sanctions in which he asks the
Court to issue a pre-filing injunction that restricts Ms. Benedict’s ability to file additional
motions and lawsuits in this Court and to impose attorney’s fees. (Dkts. 76–77.) He
primarily seeks sanctions under Rule 11 but also appears to argue that the Court should
sanction Ms. Benedict under its inherent authority.
Courts may impose sanctions under Rule 11 when “a pleading, written motion or
other paper (1) is submitted to the court for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation”; (2) “is not supported
by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification or reversal of
existing law”; or (3) “if the allegations contained therein lack evidentiary support.”6 R&A
Small Engine, Inc. v. Midwest Stihl, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 2d 977, 978–79 (D. Minn. 2007)
(quotation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). “The primary purpose of Rule 11
sanctions is to deter attorney and litigant misconduct[.]” Vallejo v. Amgen, Inc., 903 F.3d
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of that judgment,” is applicable
here and bars this Court from granting the relief sought. Sutter & Gillham PLLC v. Henry,
146 F.4th 699, 702 (8th Cir. 2025).
6 Under the “safe harbor” provision of Rule 11, a party seeking sanctions must,
among other things, serve the motion for sanctions on the offending party prior to filing,
and wait at least 21 days after serving it to file the motion to allow the other party to
withdraw or correct the improper filing. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). This is “a strict procedural
requirement,” and failure to provide advance notice of the motion requires denial of the
request for sanctions. See Caranchini v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 97 F.4th 1099, 1102 (8th
Cir. 2024) (quoting Star Mark Mgmt., Inc. v. Koon Chun Hing Kee Soy & Sauce Factory,
Ltd., 682 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 2012)). There is no dispute that the procedural
requirements for this Court to grant the motion for Rule 11 sanctions were met here. (See
Dkt. 77 at 4.)
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 16 of 19

17
733, 747 (8th Cir. 2018) (quotation and bracket omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4).
Such sanctions “must be limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or
comparable 	conduct 	by 	others 	similarly 	situated” 	and 	“may 	include 	nonmonetary
directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if imposed on motion and warranted for
effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of part or all of the
reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4).
Courts have the inherent authority “to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the
orderly and expeditious disposition of cases[.]” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger,
581 U.S. 101, 107 (2017) (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962)).
That power includes the ability to fashion an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses
the judicial process. Stevenson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 745 (8th Cir. 2004)
(citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991)). But this inherent authority is “very
poten[t],” and courts should “exercise[] [it] with restraint and discretion.” Schlafly v. Eagle
F., 970 F.3d 924, 936–37 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32,
44–45 (1991)). With these standards in mind, the Court addresses each type of sanction
that Mr. Uhlir requests in turn.
a. 	Pre-Filing Restrictions
First, Mr. Uhlir asks the Court to issue a “pre-filing injunction” that would restrict
Ms. Benedict’s ability to bring future lawsuits and filings but does not specify the terms of
the requested injunction. (Dkt. 77 at 8.) Regardless, the Court need not inquire further
because it declines to impose any pre-filing restrictions on Ms. Benedict at this time.
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 17 of 19

18
Notably, it appears this is the first time that Ms. Benedict has brought a case in this District.
Therefore, the dismissal with prejudice is “both a necessary and sufficient response” under
these circumstances. See Hill v. W. Publ’g Co., No. 4-96-1032 (JRT/RLE), 1998 WL
1069117, at *6 (D. Minn. Sept. 24, 1998).
b. Attorney’s Fees
Mr. Uhlir also seeks attorney’s fees. (Dkt. 77 at 9.) “[A]n award of attorneys’ fees
is permissible under a court’s inherent powers as long as the person being sanctioned has
demonstrated bad faith.” Willhite v. Collins, 459 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766–67 (1980)). A litigant acts in “bad
faith” if they “intentionally advanced a frivolous contention for an ulterior purpose, such
as harassment or delay.” Actors’ Equity Ass’n v. Am. Dinner Theatre Inst., 802 F.2d 1038,
1043 (8th Cir. 1986).
The Court determines that, while Ms. Benedict’s claims may fairly be characterized
as “frivolous,” her initiation of this lawsuit does not quite rise to the level of bad faith
required to award attorney’s fees. As the Court noted, this is Ms. Benedict’s first time
bringing a case in this federal court. And while the motions before the Court were pending,
she did not file any additional motions or otherwise create undue burdens on the Court or
on Defendants. Therefore, the Court does not believe that granting Mr. Uhlir’s request for
attorney’s fees would further the “primary purpose of Rule 11 sanctions,” which is “to
deter . . . litigant misconduct.” Vallejo, 903 F.3d at 747 (quotation omitted); see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4).
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 18 of 19

19
So, while the Court denies Mr. Uhlir’s motion for sanctions at this time, the Court
warns Ms. Benedict that “[p]ro se litigants are not exempt from the requirements of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and can be sanctioned.” Knapp v. Compass Minn., LLC,
2024 WL 3755916, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 9, 2024) (citing Carman v. Treat, 7 F.3d 1379,
1381 (8th Cir. 1993)). Should Ms. Benedict continue to bring frivolous claims, the Court
may impose sanctions as it sees fit.
ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Plaintiff Christine Benedict’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 3) is DENIED;
2. 	Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Dkts. 19, 27, 34, and 66) are GRANTED;
3. 	Defendant Allen Uhlir’s Motion for Sanctions (Dkt. 76) is DENIED; and
4. 	This matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Date: March 9, 2026 	s/Katherine M. Menendez
Katherine M. Menendez
United States District Judge
CASE 0:25-cv-02446-KMM-SGE Doc. 83 Filed 03/09/26 Page 19 of 19