Sierra-Serrano v. Warden, FCI Sandstone

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Edgar Manuel Sierra-Serrano,
Petitioner,
v.
Warden, FCI Sandstone,
Respondent.
Case No. 25-CV-2274-KMM-EMB
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Edgar Manuel Sierra-Serrano is currently serving a 200-month
sentence imposed in this District for conspiracy to distribute a controlled
substance.1 See United States v. Sierra-Serrano, No. 19-CR-0061(2)-ECT-KMM
(D. Minn.).
Sierra-Serrano likely will not serve a full 200 months in prison. That’s
because most federal prisoners, including Sierra-Serrano, are eligible to earn
various credits that effectively shorten their overall custodial term. Prisoners
serving a term of imprisonment of more than one year but less than life “may
receive credit toward the service of the prisoner’s sentence of up to 54 days for each
year of the prisoner’s sentence imposed by the court, subject to determination by the
1 The conviction imposed in Sierra-Serrano’s 2019 case violated the conditions of
supervised release in 2006 criminal matter, and the Court consequently revoked
supervised release and imposed a sentence of 60 months in that matter. See United
States v. Sierra-Serrano, No. 08-CR-0028(1)-JRT-JSM, Dkt. No. 176 at 2 (D. Minn.
Feb. 2, 2020). The 60-month term imposed on revocation of supervised release was
ordered to run concurrently with the 200-month term of imprisonment imposed in
the 2019 criminal matter. Id.
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Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has displayed exemplary
compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1).
Earning good-time credits under § 3624(b)(1) would allow Sierra-Serrano to shave
about three years off his sentence.
Other statutes permit a person to spend some amount of their custodial
sentence outside prison walls. For example, under the Second Chance Act (“SCA”),
the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) must, “to the extent practicable,” transfer
prisoners for a portion of the final months of their term of imprisonment (up to
twelve months) to confinement other than prison, such as a halfway house or home
confinement. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1). Unlike the § 3624(b)(1) good-time credits
described above, the SCA does not actually shorten the prisoner’s term of
imprisonment. But it can shorten the time that a prisoner spends in prison (as
opposed to a less restrictive facility).
Another statute, the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”), combines elements of
both schemes described above. Eligible federal prisoners who “participate in and
complete evidence-based recidivism reduction programs” earn time credits toward
reducing their sentence, with the rate of accrual depending on the prisoner’s risk of
reoffending upon release. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d). Up to twelve months of FSA credits
may be applied towards shortening the prisoner’s overall sentence, similar to the
good-time credit system of § 3624(b)(1). See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3). Any remaining
FSA credits beyond that cannot be used to shorten the prisoner’s sentence but may
be applied towards accelerating the date on which the prisoner would otherwise be
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eligible for prerelease custody—that is, a transfer out of prison and into a
residential reentry center or home confinement, as with the SCA. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3632(d)(4)(C).
Sierra-Serrano’s case raises issues at the intersection of these various
custodial statutes. Sierra-Serrano believes that he is entitled to be transferred to
prerelease custody sooner than the BOP is currently projecting. He has filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus asking the Court to direct the BOP to transfer
him to prerelease custody on July 2, 2026, the date that he has calculated. (See
generally Pet. at 2 (Dkt. No. 1); Pet. Add. ¶ 19 (Dkt. No. 1-1).) The BOP denies that
it is making any mistakes in calculating Sierra-Serrano’s eligibility for prerelease
custody. (Gov’t Resp., Dkt. No. 12 at 1–2, 26–28.) The BOP also contends that
Sierra-Serrano lacks standing to bring his claim because it is unripe. (Id. at 22–24.)
This Court agrees with the second argument and therefore does not reach the
first. Sierra-Serrano lacks standing to bring the claim raised in his habeas petition.
The petition should therefore be denied without prejudice.
A plaintiff establishes Article III standing by demonstrating that he has
“(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of
the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). An injury-in-fact is “‘an invasion of
a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 339 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Standing is a jurisdictional requirement, and
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an action brought by a party lacking standing must be dismissed. See, e.g., City of
Clarkson Valley v. Mineta, 495 F.3d 567, 569–70 (8th Cir. 2007).
Before turning to Sierra-Serrano’s claim, it is necessary to clarify what
Sierra-Serrano is not claiming when he asserts that the BOP erred in executing his
sentence. Sierra-Serrano does not allege that the BOP has made any mistakes when
calculating the overall length of his sentence. Sierra-Serrano does not believe that
he is in danger of not being awarded good-time credit that he is lawfully due under
§ 3624(b)(1). He contends, and the BOP acknowledges, that he has already earned
the maximum 365 days’ worth of FSA time credits that can be applied towards
shortening his sentence. The BOP has calculated that Sierra-Serrano’s sentence is
expected to end, barring unforeseen circumstances, on July 30, 2032. (See
Declaration of Jade Beyer (“Beyer Decl.”) ¶ 13 (Dkt. No. 13).) Sierra-Serrano does
not suggest in his habeas petition that this date on which his custodial term is
projected to end was incorrect. He did not avail himself of the opportunity to file a
reply responding to the government’s answer contesting that date. And the Court
discerns no reason to believe that this date is incorrect. In short, the habeas petition
does not relate to the length of Sierra-Serrano’s overall custodial term.
Instead, the petition concerns how much of Sierra-Serrano’s custodial term
he will spend in prison rather than in a less restrictive arrangement. Sierra-
Serrano believes that he should be transferred to prerelease custody on July 2,
2026, or more than six years before his custodial release date. (Pet. Add. ¶ 19.)
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The BOP has offered different calculations of when it projects Sierra-Serrano
will be transferred to prerelease custody. (See Beyer Decl. ¶ 21.) The BOP now
states that Sierra-Serrano will first be eligible for transfer to prerelease custody in
March 2029, with up to an additional year of placement under the SCA for a
potential transfer date of March 2028. (See Beyer Decl. ¶ 42.) The BOP believes an
assessment around August 2027—roughly 19 months before Sierra-Serrano’s
projected March 2029 FSA conditional release date—is appropriate to determine an
SCA-eligible release date. (Id.)
But, the BOP emphasizes, the date of Sierra-Serrano’s eligibility for
prerelease custody can only be speculative this far from the end of his sentence. His
transfer to prelease custody will eventually be carried out under both the SCA and
the FSA.
As stated, the SCA allows the BOP to transfer a prisoner to prerelease
custody up to one year before his custodial release date. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(c).
Transfer is not mandatory. Instead, the SCA gives the BOP full discretion to decide
whether to transfer a prisoner to less restrictive custody at all. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(c)(4); Seets v. Warden, FCI Sandstone, No. 25-CV-3456-JWB-DJF, 2025
WL 3519146, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 19, 2025). For that reason, the BOP claims that
it cannot accurately predict what Sierra-Serrano’s release date will be. Because his
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potential SCA transfer date is such a long way off, the BOP simply has not decided
yet whether or when to transfer him under that statute.2 (See Beyer Decl. ¶ 42.)
Unlike the SCA, prisoners earn time credits under the FSA at a specific rate,
not solely at the discretion of the BOP. But this does not make Sierra-Serrano’s
release date certain at this juncture. As an initial matter, “unlike good-time credit
accumulated under § 3624(b), [FSA credits] are not a general entitlement.”
Fiorito v. Fikes, No. 22-CV-0749-PJS-TNL, 2022 WL 16699472, at *6 (D. Minn. Nov.
3, 2022). A prisoner must earn FSA credits by participating in “evidence-based
recidivism reduction programming or productive activities.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3632(d)(4)(A). Whether, and to what extent, Sierra-Serrano will continue to earn
FSA credits by participating in evidence-based recidivism reduction programming
or productive activities is speculative. Indeed, in many ways, it is outside the
control of either the BOP or Sierra-Serrano. “For example, a prisoner who is
temporarily transferred from the custody of the BOP to a non-BOP facility to testify
at trial . . . would be unable to successfully participate in BOP recidivism-reduction
programming during the time that the prisoner remained outside the custody of the
BOP[.]” Fiorito, 2022 WL 16699472, at *6 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 523.41(c)(4)(iii)). “The
same would be true of a prisoner who is transferred to a hospital for extended
treatment of a serious medical need.” Id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 523.41(c)(4)(ii)). No
one—not the Court, the BOP, or Sierra-Serrano himself—can predict the extent to
2 A claim that the BOP should transfer a prisoner to prerelease custody sooner
under the SCA is not cognizable on habeas review. See, e.g., Moreno v. Eischen,
No. 25-CV-0209-JMB-JFD, 2025 WL 791219, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 12, 2025).
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which Sierra-Serrano will participate in evidence-based recidivism reduction
programming or productive activities.
Moreover, even if anyone could know precisely how long Sierra-Serrano will
participate in “evidence-based recidivism reduction programming or productive
activities,” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A), prisoners do not earn FSA time credits at a
uniform rate. A prisoner earns 10 days of FSA credits for every 30 days spent in
programming. See 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A)(i). A prisoner “determined by the
Bureau of Prisons to be at a minimum or low risk for recidivating, who, over 2
consecutive assessments, has not increased their risk of recidivism” earns an
additional 5 days of FSA credits for every 30 days spent in programming. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3632(d)(4)(A)(ii). To date, Sierra-Serrano has earned FSA time credits mostly at
the more generous rate of 15 days per month, but there is no guarantee that his
recidivism assessment will not change or that he will remain able to participate at
the same rate.
The closer that a prisoner gets to eligibility for transfer, the less speculative
these factors become. A prisoner one month away from his potential transfer date
can raise a far more particularized and concrete claim of injury risk than a prisoner
several years away from any possible benefit.
Sierra-Serrano contends that his transfer eligibility date is fast approaching
and will arrive on July 2, 2026, and so the date on which he is entitled to transfer is
now relatively certain. (See Pet. Add. ¶ 19.) But his calculation has at least two
obvious mistakes.
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First, it appears that, in calculating his potential transfer date, Sierra-
Serrano is awarding himself one full year of community placement under the SCA.
(See Beyer Decl. ¶ 47.) But as explained above, any transfer to prerelease custody
effected under the SCA would be wholly discretionary on the part of the BOP.
Second, Sierra-Serrano is making a mistake that BOP itself once made in
calculating FSA time credits. At one time, the BOP calculated Sierra-Serrano’s
potential transfer date by multiplying the total custodial term by the number of
potential FSA credits that a prisoner could earn each month, which led the BOP to
conclude (like Sierra-Serrano does now) that he would be eligible for transfer in
July 2026. (See Beyer Decl. ¶ 21.)
But BOP eventually realized the problem with this method: After Sierra-
Serrano has been transferred to prerelease custody, he cannot logically continue
earning additional FSA credits and have those credits applied towards his transfer
to prerelease custody, since that transfer will already have occurred. (See Beyer
Decl. ¶ 21.) Any benefit from these credits would be meaningless, as the prisoner
would already have earned the sole benefit towards which those credits could be
applied. Sierra-Serrano, making the same calculation error in figuring a July 2026
transfer date: he awards himself post-transfer FSA time credits, which can be
earned only during prerelease custody.
Correcting its error, BOP now ignores any additional prerelease custody
placement time that Sierra-Serrano might receive under the SCA and calculates
that he will become eligible for transfer on March 8, 2029. (See Beyer Decl. ¶ 43.)
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Sierra-Serrano has not shown that this date is inaccurate. Importantly, this date is
still several years away. In the interim, Sierra-Serrano may or may not accumulate
FSA credits at a yet-to-be-determined monthly rate.
Accordingly, any claim of entitlement by Sierra-Serrano to transfer to
prerelease custody on a specific date, this far in advance, is necessarily “conjectural”
and “hypothetical” under the circumstances. Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 339
(quotations omitted). A litigant lacks standing to raise only conjunctural or
hypothetical claims for relief. See id.
Accordingly, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Sierra-Serrano’s habeas
petition. It is therefore recommended that the petition be denied without prejudice
and that this matter be dismissed without prejudice.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus of petitioner Edgar Manuel
Sierra-Serrano (Dkt. No. 1) be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for
lack of standing.
2. This case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Dated: January 20, 2026 s/ Elsa M. Bullard__________________
Elsa M. Bullard
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment
of the District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections
to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after
being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to
those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local
Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line
limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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