Blanc v. LVNV Funding LLC et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Roseline Pierre Blanc, pro se.
Derrick N. Weber, Messerli & Kramer, P.A., Plymouth, MN, for Defendants LVNV
Funding LLC and Messerli & Kramer, P.A.
This case arises from a prior debt-collection case in Hennepin County Conciliation
Court. In that case, LVNV Funding LLC, represented by its counsel, Messerli & Kramer,
P.A., obtained a judgment in the amount of $1,194.16 against Roseline Pierre Blanc. Ms.
Blanc responded by filing this action. Representing herself, Ms. Blanc claims that LVNV
and Messerli’s filing of, and conduct in, the prior conciliation-court case was unlawful.
She asserts claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Fair Credit Reporting
Act, the Federal Constitution, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, and she asserts common law abuse-of-process and negligence claims.
Defendants seek the case’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). They argue that Ms. Blanc’s claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
Roseline Pierre Blanc,
Plaintiff,
v.
LVNV Funding LLC, A Foreign Limited
Liability Company, and Messerli &
Kramer, P.A.,
Defendants.
File No. 25-cv-2171 (ECT/SGE)
OPINION AND ORDER
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or, alternatively, claim preclusion principles. Failing those contentions, Defendants argue
that this case’s “sovereign citizen” character justifies dismissal. Defendants’ motion will
be denied for the most part. 	The Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires dismissal of Ms.
Blanc’s request to “vacate” the conciliation court’s judgment, but nothing else. 	Though
claim preclusion principles may bar Ms. Blanc’s claims to some extent, that is not apparent
on the face of the Complaint. And this case is not grounded in sovereign-citizen orthodoxy
to the degree warranting dismissal on just that basis.
The Familiar Rule 12(b)(6) Standards
In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a
court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable
inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. 	Gorog v. Best Buy Co., 760 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir.
2014) (citation omitted). Although the factual allegations need not be detailed, they must
be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 	Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 	The complaint must “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Courts
must not presume the truth of legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Hager v.
Ark. Dep’t of Health, 735 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
Considering “matters outside the pleadings” generally transforms a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion into one for summary judgment, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), but not when the relevant
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materials are “necessarily embraced” by the pleadings. 	Zean v. Fairview Health Servs.,
858 F.3d 520, 526 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Enervations, Inc. v. Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co.,
380 F.3d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 2004)). “In general, materials embraced by the complaint
include documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no
party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleadings.” 	Id. (citation
modified). Courts “additionally consider matters incorporated by reference or integral to
the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items appearing
in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint whose authenticity is
unquestioned.” Id. (citation modified); see Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab’y, Inc., 688
F.3d 928, 931 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012). 	When a complaint is based on, and refers to, a prior
court case, records from that prior case may be considered in adjudicating a motion to
dismiss. Fredin v. Miller, No. 19-cv-3051 (SRN/HB), 2020 WL 3077708, at *5 (D. Minn.
June 10, 2020) (“Given that [the] Complaint refers directly to other cases, the Court finds
that the filings in those cases are matters embraced by the pleadings, as well as matters of
public record.”), aff’d, 840 F. App’x 61 (8th Cir. 2021) (per curiam); see also Leonardo v.
MSW Cap., LLC, No. 16-cv-3845 (PAM/FLN), 2017 WL 2062852, at *2 (D. Minn. May
12, 2017) (recognizing that the defendants’ exhibits were “a quintessential example of
materials that are ‘necessarily embraced by the pleadings’” because the complaint
“repeatedly references the state-court action”).
The Pro Se Plaintiff “Liberal Construction” Rule
Because she is pro se, Ms. Blanc’s operative Complaint is entitled to liberal
construction. 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). 	“[H]owever
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inartfully pleaded,” pro se complaints are held “to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 	Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014)
(quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94). “[I]f the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then
the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim
to be considered within the proper legal framework.” 	Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777,
787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004)). “Although
pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, pro se litigants are not excused from failing
to comply with substantive and procedural law.” Burgs v. Sissel, 745 F.2d 526, 528 (8th
Cir. 1984); see Sorenson v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., No. 12-cv-1336 (ADM/AJB), 2012 WL
3143927, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 2, 2012). A pro se complaint must contain sufficient facts
to support the claims it advances. Stone, 364 F.3d at 914.
The Complaint’s Factual Allegations and Legal Theories
The following facts are recounted in accordance with the just-described Rule
12(b)(6) standards and pro se plaintiff liberal-construction rule. “In or around late 2022,”
LVNV and Messerli & Kramer began attempting to collect a $1,119 debt they alleged Ms.
Blanc owed to LVNV. 	Compl. [ECF No. 1] at 3 ¶¶ 9, 10.1 	The “alleged debt [was]
originally issued by Credit One Bank, N.A.” Id. at 3 ¶ 9. Credit One “purportedly sold”
the debt “to Sherman Originator III, LLC,” and “then transferred [it] to LVNV.” Id. at 3
1 	Page cites are to pagination assigned by the court’s CM/ECF system appearing in a
document’s upper right corner, not to a document’s original pagination. It is necessary to
include citations to both the Complaint’s page and paragraph numbers because the
document’s paragraphs are not sequential. See, e.g., Compl. at 4–5 (going from paragraph
“19” to paragraph “14”).
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¶ 10. 	Ms. Blanc disputed the debt. 	See id. at 3 ¶ 12. 	Her primary contention was that
LVNV failed to prove it owned the debt. See id. at 3 ¶¶ 10, 11.2
On November 12, 2024, LVNV, represented by Messerli, filed suit against Ms.
Blanc in Hennepin County Conciliation Court. 	Compl. at 3 ¶ 12; ECF No. 13-2. 	In its
Statement of Claim, LVNV alleged that Ms. Blanc owed $1,119.16 on a credit card account
originally issued by Credit One. ECF No. 13-2 at 2. LVNV alleged it was the “successor
in interest to Credit One.” Id. In addition to the debt amount, LVNV sought to recover its
$70 filing fee “plus an e-filing fee of $5.00, for a total of $1,194.16.” Id.
Ms. Blanc counterclaimed. 	Compl. at 4 ¶ 13; ECF No. 13-3. 	She alleged that
LVNV lacked proof of the account’s creation, of the debt’s amount, and of LVNV’s
2 	Ms. Blanc may have other reasons for disputing the debt, but they are difficult to
discern. Ms. Blanc alleges:
Plaintiff timely disputed the alleged debt in writing, including
a formal dispute sent to Credit One Bank in 2022 asserting her
status as trustee, beneficiary, and claimant, along with a notice
terminating 	any 	contractual 	obligations; 	[sic] 	and 	further
supplemented by privacy and identity theft disputes submitted
to the credit reporting agencies and the CFPB in 2023, all prior
to 	or 	contemporaneous 	with 	Defendant’s 	[sic] 	collection
efforts.. [sic]
Compl. at 3 ¶ 12. Ms. Blanc does not explain why her status as a “trustee, beneficiary, and
claimant” might have relieved her of the obligation to pay the debt. 	The same is true of
Ms. Blanc’s allegation regarding a “privacy” dispute. 	Ms. Blanc does not describe how
her privacy was violated. She does not identify who violated her privacy. And she does
not indicate why a privacy violation might excuse her from paying the debt. Ordinarily, I
would understand Ms. Blanc’s reference to “identity theft” as suggesting the debt was
incurred by some third party who misappropriated Ms. Blanc’s identity to obtain the funds.
Here, however, this one reference is all we have, and Ms. Blanc does not allege that identity
theft (or Defendants’ failure to recognize that she was the victim of identity theft) holds
any relevance to her claims.
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ownership of the debt. See ECF No. 13-3 at 3 ¶ 2. She claimed that LVNV “ha[d] violated
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by initiating court proceedings without proper
validation of the debt” and by “[f]iling an unsubstantiated claim.” Id. at 3 ¶ 4. She sought
dismissal of LVNV’s claim and damages from LVNV. Id. at 3 ¶ 5.
Following a remote hearing on April 29, 2025, the conciliation court referee entered
judgment awarding LVNV the full amount of its claim, or $1194.16. ECF No. 13-6 at 2.
The referee rejected Ms. Blanc’s counterclaim. 	Id. 	Specifically, the referee checked the
box on a form order indicating that Ms. Blanc “ha[d] not demonstrated an entitlement to
relief” and ordered that she recover nothing. Id. The referee stayed the entry of judgment
until May 23, 2025, to allow time for an appeal. 	Id. 	Ms. Blanc did not appeal, and the
judgment was docketed on June 10, 2025. See ECF No. 13-1 at 2; see also ECF No. 13-7
at 2–4.
Ms. Blanc filed the Complaint in this case on May 20, 2025, see Compl. at 1, though
she did not serve it until August 4, 2025, see ECF No. 9-1. Ms. Blanc’s Complaint includes
seven counts (though two are numbered “V”). 	(1) She claims Defendants violated
numerous subsections of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692 et seq. 	Compl. at 5 ¶¶ 14–16. 	(2) She claims Defendants violated numerous
subsections of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Compl.
at 5–6 ¶¶ 17–19. (3) She claims Defendants committed the common-law tort of abuse of
process and perpetrated a fraud on the Hennepin County Conciliation Court. Id. at 6 ¶¶ 20–
22. (4) She claims Defendants violated the Gram-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et
seq. Compl. at 6–7 ¶¶ 24–25. (5) Through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Ms. Blanc claims Defendants
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violated her due process rights under the Federal Constitution. 	Compl. at 7 ¶¶ 24–25.
(6) She claims Defendants were negligent and made negligent misrepresentations. Id. at 7
¶¶ 26–27. 	(7) She claims Defendants violated “UCC § 9-210” because they failed to
demonstrate LVNV’s ownership of the debt with evidence of “an unbroken chain of title
and enforceable legal rights.” Compl. at 7–8 ¶¶ 28–33.
The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Defendants argue that some of Ms. Blanc’s claims should be dismissed under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The doctrine is the starting point because it implicates a federal
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
In the two decisions for which the doctrine is named, Rooker
v. Fidelity Trust Co., [263 U.S. 413 (1923)], and District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, [460 U.S. 462 (1983)],
the [Supreme] Court established the narrow proposition that
with the exception of habeas corpus proceedings, the inferior
federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over “cases
brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court 	judgments 	rendered 	before 	the 	district 	court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and
rejection of those judgments.”
In re Athens/Alpha Gas Corp., 715 F.3d 230, 234 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). “This conclusion follows
from 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which grants to the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction over
appeals from state-court judgments.” 	Id. at 234; see Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283
(“Federal 	district 	courts 	. . . 	are 	empowered 	to 	exercise 	original, 	not 	appellate,
jurisdiction.”). In Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court noted that inferior federal courts had
sometimes applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine too broadly, “overriding Congress’
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conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts,
and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738,”
the Full Faith and Credit Act. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 283. To check the lower federal
courts’ enthusiasm for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Supreme Court made clear that
the doctrine applies only to cases filed in federal court by the losing party in state court
“complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment” that “call[] upon the District
Court to overturn an injurious state-court judgment.” Id. at 291–92. Importantly, the Court
also explained that § 1257 does not “stop a district court from exercising subject-matter
jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to litigate in federal court a matter previously
litigated in state court.” 	Id. at 293. 	“If a federal plaintiff ‘present[s] some independent
claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to
which he was a party . . . , then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the
defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.’” 	Id. (alterations in original) (quoting
GASH Assocs. v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)).
In circumstances where a plaintiff alleges fraud, misconduct, or some constitutional
violation in prior state court proceedings, the pivotal question is whether the plaintiff seeks
relief from the state court judgment or seeks some other relief for the misconduct or
violation. See Hageman v. Barton, 817 F.3d 611, 614–15 (8th Cir. 2016); MSK EyEs Ltd.
v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 546 F.3d 533, 539 (8th Cir. 2008). For example,
[i]f a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly
erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state
court judgment based on that decision, Rooker-Feldman bars
subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court. 	If, on the
other hand, a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an
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allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-
Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.
Wells Fargo, 546 F.3d at 539 (quoting Riehm v. Engelking, 538 F.3d 952, 965 (8th Cir.
2008)). In other words, Rooker-Feldman “does not bar jurisdiction over actions alleging
independent claims arising from conduct in underlying state proceedings,” Hageman, 817
F.3d at 614, but rather precludes “claims assert[ing] an injury caused by the state court
judgments,” 	such 	as 	“claim[s] 	that 	the 	state 	court 	judgments 	themselves 	are
unconstitutional,” McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 392 (6th Cir. 2006); see
Kvalvog v. Park Christian Sch., 66 F.4th 1147, 1151–52 (8th Cir. 2023) (holding the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar claim for relief based on defendants’ allegedly illegal
actions in prior state court proceedings even though the claim “denie[d] a legal conclusion
that a state court has reached”).
With one exception, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar jurisdiction over this
action. 	In this case, Ms. Blanc seeks relief from allegedly illegal actions she claims
Defendants undertook in bringing and prosecuting the Hennepin County Conciliation
Court case. 	She claims Defendants lacked grounds to file the case. 	These include, for
example, the absence of evidence essential to establishing Ms. Blanc’s liability. See, e.g.,
Compl. at 4 ¶ 15. 	And Ms. Blanc claims Defendants pursued the case with insufficient
evidence and through litigation tactics designed to deprive her of a meaningful opportunity
to respond to or defend against the claim. See, e.g., id. at 4 ¶¶ 14–16. In Ms. Blanc’s view,
these actions independently violated the Federal Constitution, federal statutes, and state
common law—regardless of how the Hennepin Conciliation Court might have resolved the
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case. Consistent with this understanding of Ms. Blanc’s claims here, the Complaint seeks
damages arising, not from the conciliation court’s judgment, but from Defendants’ conduct
in the conciliation-court case.
The one exception is Ms. Blanc’s request to have the conciliation court’s judgment
vacated. This request appears more than once in the Complaint. See id. at 6 ¶ 22; see also
id. at 9 ¶ D. If Rooker-Feldman is obvious in any respect, it is that a federal district court
lacks judicial power to overturn or vacate a state-court judgment. The Complaint will be
dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to the extent it seeks this
remedy.3
Claim Preclusion
Defendants argue that Ms. Blanc’s claims are barred by claim preclusion based on
the Hennepin County Conciliation Court judgment. When applying claim preclusion, also
known as res judicata, “[t]he law of the forum that rendered the first judgment controls.”
Ashanti v. City of Golden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Laase v.
County of Isanti, 638 F.3d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 2011)). 	“In Minnesota, conciliation court
3 	In addition to Rooker-Feldman, there is another problem with Ms. Blanc’s request
to vacate the Hennepin County Conciliation Court judgment. As authority for the request,
she cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Compl. at 6 ¶ 22; see also id. at 9 ¶ D.
Rule 60(b) does not give a federal district court authority to vacate a state-court judgment.
Jones v. Minnesota, No. 11-cv-2501 (JNE/AJB), 2011 WL 4947647, at *6 (D. Minn. Sep.
28, 2011) (“Rule 60(b) authorizes a civil litigant to file a motion seeking relief from a
judgment that has been entered in a federal civil case.” (emphasis added)), R. & R. adopted,
2011 WL 4957369 (D. Minn. Oct. 18, 2011), order vacated and R. & R. adopted, 2011
WL 5248086 (D. Minn. Nov. 3, 2011); Sternberg v. Warneck, No. 2:23-cv-01466-APG-
EJY, 2024 WL 4805021, at *1 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2024) (noting that a plaintiff “cannot do
an end run around Rooker-Feldman by resort to Rule 60(b)”), aff’d, No. 24-7206, 2025
WL 1202218 (9th Cir. Apr. 25, 2025).
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judgments are also accorded res judicata effect.” Livingston v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp.,
795 F. Supp. 921, 924 (D. Minn. 1992) (citing Mattsen v. Packman, 358 N.W.2d 48 (Minn.
984)). A later claim is barred under Minnesota law “where ‘(1) the earlier claim involved
the same set of factual circumstances; (2) the earlier claim involved the same parties or
their privies; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits; (4) the estopped party had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the matter.’” 	St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Compaq
Comput. Corp., 539 F.3d 809, 821 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686
N.W.2d 829, 840 (Minn. 2004)). “Res judicata applies to all claims that could have been
litigated in the earlier action in addition to those claims that actually were litigated.” 	Id.
(emphasis added) (citing Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 840). In other words, claim preclusion
does not depend on the legal theories identified in the earlier action, rather, “[a] claim or
cause of action is ‘a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing.’”
Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 840 (quoting Martin ex rel. Hoff v. City of Rochester, 642
N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2002)). Claim preclusion is not “rigidly applied.” Johnson v. Consol.
Freightways, Inc., 420 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Minn. 1988). It is a “flexible” doctrine, and “the
focus is on whether its application would work an injustice on the party against whom
estoppel is urged.” Id. at 613–14. Claim preclusion is an affirmative defense, meaning it
supports a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal only if its applicability is apparent on the face of the
complaint or from “public records and materials embraced by the complaint.” 	C.H.
Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Lobrano, 695 F.3d 758, 764 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Noble
Sys. Corp. v. Alorica Cent., LLC, 543 F.3d 978, 983 (8th Cir. 2008)).
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Messerli was not a party to the earlier state-court case, and the better answer on this
record is that it was not in privity with LVNV for that suit’s purposes. For claim preclusion
purposes, the concept of privity recognizes that “in certain circumstances persons who are
not parties to an action but who are connected with it in their interests are affected by the
judgment with reference to interests involved in the action, as if they were parties.”
Margo-Kraft Distribs., Inc. v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 200 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Minn. 1972)
(quoting Restatement (First) of Judgments § 83 cmt. a (A.L.I. 1942)). 	“‘Privies’ to a
judgment are those who are so connected with the parties in estate or in blood or in law as
to be identified with them in interest, and consequently to be affected with them by the
litigation.” Rucker v. Schmidt, 794 N.W.2d 114, 118 (Minn. 2011) (quoting Hentschel v.
Smith, 153 N.W.2d 199, 206 (Minn. 1967)). “[C]ourts will find privity to exist for ‘those
who control an action although not parties to it,’ ‘those whose interests are represented by
a party to the action,’ and ‘successors in interest to those having derivative claims.’” 	Id.
(quoting Margo-Kraft Distribs., 200 N.W.2d at 47–48). Additionally, privity may also be
present “when a person is otherwise ‘so identified in interest with another that he represents
the same legal right.’” 	Id. (quoting McMenomy v. Ryden, 148 N.W.2d 804, 807 (Minn.
1967)). 	Ultimately, 	however, 	the 	inquiry 	“requires 	a 	careful 	examination 	of 	the
circumstances of each case.” 	Id. 	Under Minnesota law, an attorney-client relationship
alone does not establish privity. Id.; Worley v. Engel, No. 17-cv-1105 (PAM/SER), 2017
WL 4862766, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 26, 2017) (“[T]he Minnesota Supreme Court has
concluded that the existence of an attorney-client relationship does not, by itself, create
privity for the purpose of asserting res judicata.”). 	It is true that an “attorney and client
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necessarily have a common interest . . . in obtaining a favorable outcome for the client.”
Rucker, 794 N.W.2d at 119. 	But that common interest, on its own, “is not the kind of
estate, blood, or legal interest that would give rise to privity.” 	Id. 	“Something more” is
needed. Id. Here, it is not apparent from the face of the Complaint that Messerli had any
interest in the conciliation-court proceedings beyond obtaining a favorable outcome for
LVNV. For these reasons, claim preclusion cannot bar Ms. Blanc’s claims against the law
firm at this motion-to-dismiss stage.4
LVNV does not contend that claim preclusion bars this case entirely. It seeks only
the dismissal of Ms. Blanc’s FDCPA, abuse-of-process, negligence, and UCC-based
claims. 	ECF No. 14 at 10–12. 	This cause-of-action-based approach seems somewhat
inconsistent with claim preclusion’s basic nature—again, “[a] claim or cause of action is
‘a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing.’” Hauschildt, 686
N.W.2d at 840 (quoting Martin ex rel. Hoff, 642 N.W.2d at 9). In other words, applying
claim preclusion doesn’t involve comparing the causes of action a plaintiff asserted in a
prior case with the causes of action she asserts in a later case. It involves comparing the
4 	As Defendants correctly observed, some cases from this District have found that
lawyers are in privity with their clients for claim preclusion’s purposes. For two reasons,
these cases do not justify reaching that holding here. First, some of the cases reaching this
result were decided prior to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Rucker. See, e.g.,
Seaworth v. Messerli, No. 09-cv-3437 (RHK/LIB), 2010 WL 3613821 (D. Minn. Sep. 7,
2010), aff’d, 414 F. App’x 882 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Second, though other cases
reaching this result were decided after Rucker, I understand these cases to have found
privity based on fact-specific considerations not present here. See, e.g., Hasan v. Bank of
Am., N.A., No. 16-cv-2990 (JRT/SER), 2017 WL 1373327, at *7 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 2017)
(finding “that a mutual legal interest in the foreclosure proceeding outcome is sufficient to
establish privity between” the lawyer and client), R. & R. adopted, 2017 WL 1373260
(D. Minn. Apr. 13, 2017).
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prior and subsequent claims’ operative facts. 	Here, the operative facts that gave rise to
LVNV’s conciliation-court claim were Ms. Blanc’s unpaid debt and LVNV’s ownership
of the debt. See ECF No. 13-2 at 2. The operative facts of Ms. Blanc’s Complaint in this
case include Defendants’ attempts to collect the debt in the state-court case. 	See, e.g.,
Compl. at 4 ¶¶ 14–16. Those are not same things. See Delgado v. Midland Credit Mgmt.,
Inc., No. 23-cv-2128 (ECT/JFD), 2024 WL 1255490, at *11 (D. Minn. Mar. 25, 2024),
aff’d, 131 F.4th 896 (8th Cir. 2025); see Fairbairn v. Kodi Acquisitions LLC, No. 14-cv-
1635 (PAM/JJK), 2014 WL 4954698, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 2, 2014) (“Claims do not derive
from the same factual predicate, however, if the right to assert each claim did not exist at
the same time.” (citing Hauschildt, 686 N.W.2d at 841)). It is true that the operative facts
underlying Ms. Blanc’s conciliation-court counterclaim concerned LVNV’s “proper
validation of the debt.” ECF No. 13-3 at 3 ¶ 4. It is difficult to conceive how that aspect
of the counterclaim will not ultimately preclude at least some of Ms. Blanc’s claims here.
Regardless, as LVNV seems to acknowledge by not seeking outright dismissal on this
ground, there is not complete overlap between the operative facts underlying Ms. Blanc’s
counterclaim and the operative facts underlying her claims in this case. 	And it is not
possible to identify the extent of the overlap from the face of the Complaint. 	For these
reasons, it is not feasible to determine the extent to which claim preclusion bars the claims
against LVNV at this motion-to-dismiss stage.
The “Sovereign Citizen” Issue
Defendants identify concerns stemming from the “sovereign citizen” character of
papers Ms. Blanc has filed in this case, and they argue that these concerns justify the
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Complaint’s dismissal. 	ECF No. 14 at 14–17. 	Defendants have a point. 	Ms. Blanc has
made the sovereign-citizen nature of her beliefs clear in just about every filing in this case.
In her Affidavit to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, for example, Ms. Blanc testified that she
had no “meaningful assets or disposable income” to cover the filing fee. ECF No. 2 ¶ 5.
But Ms. Blanc later clarified that “lawful money as prescribed by the Constitution—gold
and silver—are not reasonably obtainable to me for use as tender of payment[] nor are they
available or commonly used as a practical form of payment to satisfy the restricting
demands conditionally commanded by employees and contractors of this court.” 	ECF
No. 3 at 1. 	This statement reflects standard sovereign-citizen orthodoxy. 	See Baalim v.
United States, No. 4:19-cv-02671-HEA, 2020 WL 674004, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 11, 2020).
And Defendants are correct that federal courts often dismiss claims “based solely on
sovereign citizen ideology” because they are “inherently frivolous and . . . a waste of
judicial resources.” 	Hopper v. Addams, No. 2:24-cv-02129-TLB, 2024 WL 4730595, at
*2 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 21, 2024), R. & R. adopted, 2024 WL 4728418 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 8,
2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-3405, 2025 WL 1525407 (8th Cir. Feb. 20, 2025). This
case seems different. Here, though Ms. Blanc’s filings reflect sovereign-citizen views, the
Complaint does not appear to be derived primarily from those views. The Complaint will
not be dismissed on this ground.5 Defendants do not otherwise argue that the Complaint,
or any part of it, should be dismissed on the merits.
5 	Of course, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 governs Ms. Blanc’s litigation
conduct just as it governs any other litigant, represented or not. 	See Mills v. City of St.
Louis, No. 4:25-cv-1219-MTS, 2025 WL 3470293, at *2 n.3 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 3, 2025).
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ORDER
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 11] is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
1. 	To the extent the Complaint seeks to have the Hennepin County Conciliation
Court’s judgment vacated, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED, and the Complaint is
dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
2. 	In all other respects, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
Dated: January 5, 2026 	s/ Eric C. Tostrud
Eric C. Tostrud
United States District Court
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