Acker v. Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
William Wade Acker,
Plaintiff,
v.
Bridgecrest 	Acceptance 	Corporation;
Bridgecrest 	Lending 	Auto 	Securitization
Trust 	2024-4; 	Computershare 	Trust
Company, 	N.A.; 	and 	Bridgecrest 	Auto
Funding, LLC,
Defendants.
File No. 25-CV-1340 (JMB/EMB)
ORDER
William Wade Acker, Forest Lake, MN, self-represented.
Natalia S. Kruse, Husch Blackwell LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants Bridgecrest
Acceptance 	Corporation; 	Bridgecrest 	Lending 	Auto 	Securitization 	Trust 	2024-4;
Computershare Trust Company, N.A.; and Bridgecrest Auto Funding, LLC.
This 	matter 	is 	before 	the 	Court 	on 	Defendants 	Bridgecrest 	Acceptance
Corporation’s (Bridgecrest),1 Bridgecrest Lending Auto Securitization Trust 2024-4’s,
Computershare Trust Company, N.A.’s, and Bridgecrest Auto Funding, LLC’s (together,
Defendants) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 	(Doc. No. 40.) 	For the reasons
explained below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion.2
1 Bridgecrest notes that it is incorrectly named as “Bridgecrest Acceptance Corporation”
and should instead be called “Bridgecrest Credit Company, LLC.”
2 Additionally, Plaintiff William Wade Acker has filed a Motion to Supplement Pleadings.
(Doc. No. 63.) The Court grants this Motion and considers the supplemental material when
ruling on Defendants’ motion.
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BACKGROUND
In November 2024, Acker entered into an agreement with Carvana LLC to purchase
a vehicle to be financed through Bridgecrest. 	(Doc. No. 1-1 ¶¶ 12.) 	In December 2024,
Acker sent Defendants a letter “enclosing a payment instrument . . . as tender of payment
in full, payable to BRIDGECREST (“Payee”) in the amount of Fifty-Thousand-Ninety-
Four dollars and Eighty-Eight cents ($50,094.88) for the obligation associated with [the
vehicle].” (Id. at 5, 24–25.) The enclosed document, however, was not itself a valid form
of currency nor a conventional check or other form of payment. Instead, the document was
titled “DEMAND DRAFT,” purported to be a payment made pursuant to a federal statute,
and stated the following:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, pay BRIDGECREST, or order, the
exact sum of:
Fifty-Thousand-Ninety-Four dollars and Eighty-Eight cents
Amount: $50,094.88
Drawn on the account of the United States pursuant to 50 U.S.
Code § 4305 (b)(2) as authorized under 50 U.S. Code § 4305
(b)(3).
PAYMENT IN FULL
(Id. at 25.) 	Acker’s letter purported that Defendants had “received payment in full” and
that “[a]ny and all contracts pertaining to this transaction, including but not limited to the
security agreement, are hereby acknowledged as settled as agreed.” 	(Id. at 24.) 	Acker
asked Defendants to “respond with a letter of acknowledgment that the Account is settled
as paid-in-full within fourteen (14) days from the receipt of this notice.” (Id.)
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Defendants responded to Acker’s letter, marking the Demand Draft as “REFUSED”
and conveying the following:
Despite your protests, you continue to be bound by the
agreements that you have with Bridgecrest, and you thus owe
all amounts still due and owing on your retail installment
contract. 	Your letter has no legal impact on the binding
agreement you entered into with Bridgecrest. 	We require all
payments to be made in United States currency.
(Id. at 27–28.) In February 2025, Acker sued Defendants in Washington County District
Court. 	(Id. at 8.) 	The Complaint alleged eight counts of civil wrongdoing: unjust
enrichment, breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, recoupment, defamation,
fraudulent concealment, failure to release lien, and invalid security interest. (Id. at 8–15.)
Defendants were served with the Complaint on March 18, 2025. 	(Doc. No. 1 ¶ 5.) 	On
April 9, 2025, Defendants removed the action from state court to federal court under 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a) based on federal question jurisdiction. (Id. ¶ 6–7.)
DISCUSSION
Defendants have moved for judgment on the pleadings. Because the claims asserted
in the Complaint are not supported by law, the Court grants Defendants’ motion.
As a threshold matter, the Court notes that the standard for motions under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) also applies to motions for judgment on the pleadings
brought under Rule 12(c): courts accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and grant
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. E.g., Spagna v. Phi Kappa Psi,
Inc., 30 F.4th 710, 715 (8th Cir. 2022) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). 	Courts, however, need not accept as true wholly conclusory allegations or
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legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Hager v. Ark. Dep’t of Health, 735 F.3d
1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2013). Moreover, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	The allegations must be
sufficiently detailed to give the opposing party fair notice of the claims it will have to
defend itself against. 	Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th
Cir. 2014).
Judgment 	on 	the 	pleadings 	is 	not 	granted 	unless 	the 	moving 	party—here,
Defendants—shows “that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 	Porous Media
Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999). When considering a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, the court generally must ignore materials outside the pleadings,
but it may consider some materials that are part of the public record or do not contradict
the complaint, as well as materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings. 	Id.
Materials embraced by the pleadings include documents whose contents are alleged in a
complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached
to the pleading. Yang v. City of Minneapolis, 607 F. Supp. 3d 880, 890 (D. Minn. 2022)
(citing Kushner v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 317 F.3d 820, 831 (8th Cir. 2003)).
Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, but they still must allege sufficient
facts to support the claims advanced. 	See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.
2004). 	Moreover, “a court is under no obligation to repeatedly accept baseless filings,
particularly those of the sovereign citizen fashion.” Siruk v. Minnesota, No. 20-CV-2373
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(WMW/KMM), 2021 WL 1581242, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb 22, 2021) (citing cases), report
and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1577681 (D. Minn. Apr. 22, 2021).
Even liberally construing the Complaint, the Court concludes that Acker has not
asserted any cognizable claim. Acker’s central claim is that the “Demand Draft” satisfied
his debt. However, the “Demand Draft” is not a valid form of currency—nor does Acker
provide any authority to the contrary. 	Instead, the “Demand Draft” is “an unintelligible
document that does not state any facts that would support its acceptance as a valid
negotiable instrument.” Connell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 10-CV-3133 (MJD/FLN),
2011 WL 4359979, at *2 (D. Minn. Sep. 19, 2011). 	“[C]ourts in numerous jurisdictions
have clearly ruled that documents that purport to release debtors from their obligations
under redemption and reservation of rights theories are not valid and have dismissed . . .
such claims as frivolous.” 	Id.; see also Knapp v. Wings Credit Union, No. 24-CV-434
(DWF/ECW), 2024 WL 4774537, at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 8, 2024) (citing cases) (“[T]his
theory has been consistently rejected by federal courts in this District and across the
country as frivolous and nonsensical.”). 	Because Acker’s claims for unjust enrichment,
breach of contract, and failure to release lien all rely on the mistaken belief that the
“Demand Draft” constitutes valid currency, the Court dismisses these claims.
Acker’s other claims are likewise not cognizable. 	The claims for invalid security
interest, fraudulent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment essentially allege that
Bridgecrest did not disclose to Acker that the credit application and retail installment
contract comprised a collateral security, and that Acker could not have validly granted a
security interest in the car. 	However, Acker cites no authority to support the validity of
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these claims. 	As other courts have noted, “[t]here is nothing inherently unlawful about
securitization, nor is it a particularly uncommon practice.” Est. of Byas v. Wells Fargo
Home Mortg., No. 4:19-CV-257 RWS, 2020 WL 7240352, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2020)
(“Securitization is not illegal and failure to disclose that a loan is securitized is not per se
unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous.”). 	The Court is not aware of any legal authority
that suggests that the securitization of a debt relieves the debtor of the obligation to repay,
and Acker cites no authority that suggests otherwise. See Montoya v. Branch Banking &
Tr. Co., No. 1:11-CV-01869-RWS, 2012 WL 826993, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2012).
Acker’s defamation claim is preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)
and the Complaint does not include sufficient factual allegations to state a defamation claim
under the FCRA. See Groettum v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 2020 WL 788945, at *2 (D.
Minn. Feb. 18, 2020). 	As a threshold matter, to plead an FCRA claim, a plaintiff must
allege that reported information is inaccurate. See Peoples v. SunTrust Bank, No. 17-CV-
4235 (WMW-HB), 2018 WL 7020229, at *5 (D. Minn. Apr. 18, 2018) (“[W]hen a plaintiff
cannot show that the disputed debt information is inaccurate . . . the plaintiff cannot prevail
on a FCRA claim . . . .”). Additionally, to state a claim under section 1681s-2(b), a plaintiff
must allege that: (1) he notified a consumer reporting agency (CRA) that it was reporting
inaccurate information; (2) the CRA relayed the plaintiff’s dispute to the furnisher of
information (here, Bridgecrest); and (3) the furnisher of information failed to conduct a
reasonable investigation to correct its reporting. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1); Remis v.
Trans Union LLC, No. 22-CV-2306 (DWF/DJF), 2023 WL 2652478, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar.
27, 2023). 	Here, Acker does not allege that he notified a CRA that it was reporting
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inaccurate information, nor does Acker make the requisite showing that the reported
information was inaccurate. The Complaint, therefore, fails to state a defamation claim.
Finally, Acker’s recoupment claim fails because “[r]ecoupment is a defensive action
that operates to diminish the plaintiff’s recovery rather than to assert affirmative relief.”
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Val-U Const. Co. of S.D., Inc., 50 F.3d 560, 562 (8th Cir. 1995).
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Plaintiff William Wade Acker’s Motion to Supplement Pleadings (Doc. No.
63) is GRANTED.
2. 	Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 40) is
GRANTED.
3. 	Plaintiff William Wade Acker’s Complaint (Doc. No. 1-1) is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 24, 2026 	/s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
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