Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Cedrick H.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Frank Bisignano,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cv-1190-JWB-EMB
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final administrative decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The District Court referred this matter to me for a Report and
Recommendation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(c).
I’ve considered the matter based on the parties’ briefs. (See Pl. Br., Dkt.
No. 9; Def. Br., Dkt. No. 12.) See Supplemental Rules for Social Security
Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), R. 5. For the reasons discussed below, I
recommend that Plaintiff’s request for relief be DENIED, and the Complaint
be DISMISSED with prejudice.
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I. 	Background.
On September 14, 2022, Plaintiff Cedric H.1 filed an application for
supplemental security income. (Admin. R. (Dkt. No. 7) at 228–30.)2 Plaintiff
alleged that he became disabled on January 1, 2018, due to depression,
attention deficit / hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), post-traumatic stress
disorder (“PTSD”), anxiety, memory loss, suicide attempts, childhood trauma,
abuse, sexual assault, and trust issues. (Id. at 233, 265; see also id. at 97.)
An individual is considered disabled for purposes of Social Security
disability benefits if he is “unable to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). In addition, an individual is disabled “only
if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that
he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A). “[A]
1 This District has adopted the policy of using only the first name and last
initial of any nongovernmental parties in Social Security-related orders.
2 All page numbers to record citations refer to the ECF-created numbers at
the top of each page.
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physical or mental impairment is an impairment that results from
anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are
demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques.” Id. § 423(d)(3).
The Commissioner has established a sequential, five-step evaluation
process to determine whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4). At step one, the claimant must establish that he is not
engaged in any “substantial gainful activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If the
claimant satisfies this step, the analysis proceeds to step two.
At step two, the claimant must establish that he has a severe medically
determinable impairment or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant establishes impairment(s) at step two, the
analysis proceeds to step three.
At step three, the claimant must show that his impairment meets or
equals an impairment listed in the regulations. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii) (citing 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1).) This is a
determination of “medical severity,” id. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), and therefore is
based strictly on medical evidence, see Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 525
(1990); Cockerham v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 492, 496 (8th Cir.1990). “A claimant
whose impairments meet or equal the listings is presumptively disabled
without regard to any vocational factors.” Jacobson v. Shalala, No. 93–4033,
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1994 WL 525055, at *2 (8th Cir. Aug. 17, 1994). If the claimant is not
disabled at this step, the analysis proceeds.
As a precursor to step four, the claimant must establish his residual
functional capacity (“RFC”). Then, at step four, the claimant must show that
he cannot perform any past relevant work given his RFC. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); see also Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1069 n.5 (8th Cir.
2000).
If the claimant proves that he cannot perform any past relevant work,
the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish step five: that the
claimant can perform other work existing in a significant number of jobs in
the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); see also Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). If the claimant can perform such work,
the Commissioner will find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v).
Plaintiff’s application for benefits was denied initially (Admin. R. at
101) and on reconsideration (id. at 113–14, 119.)
On January 26, 2024, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a
video hearing on Plaintiff’s application. (Admin. R. at 44–96.) Plaintiff
testified and was represented by an attorney at this hearing. (Id. at 44, 53–
85.) The ALJ also took testimony of Eric Pruitt, a vocational expert. (Id. at
86–91.)
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After the hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable written
determination. (Admin. R. at 15–43.)
At step one, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s disability onset date
was January 1, 2018, and that he had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity for the past twelve months. (Admin. R. at 18, 21.)
At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had several severe
impairments: antisocial personality disorder, PTSD, polysubstance use
disorder (PCP and cannabis), which were in early remission. (Admin. R. at
21–27.) The ALJ also found that “if the claimant stopped the substance use,
the remaining limitations would cause more than a minimal impact on the
claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities; therefore, the claimant
would have a severe impairment or combination of impairments.” (Id. at 27.)
At step three, the ALJ found that if Plaintiff stopped substance use, he
would not have an impairment medically equaling one of the listed
impairments. (Admin. R. at 27–30.) The ALJ found that if Plaintiff stopped
substance use, he would have a residual functional capacity to perform a full
range of work at all exertional levels and with certain nonexertional
limitations. (Id. at 30–36.)
At step four, the ALJ determined that if Plaintiff stopped substance
use, he would be able to perform past relevant work as a commercial cleaner,
construction laborer, kitchen helper, and mail sorter. (Admin. R. at 36–37.)
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The ALJ determined that this work was not precluded by the RFC that the
ALJ determined at the previous step. (Id. at 36.)
At step five, the ALJ made an alternative finding that there were other
jobs existing in the national economy that Plaintiff was able to perform.
(Admin. R. at 37–39.)
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s
decision, and this lawsuit followed based on Plaintiff’s administratively
exhausted claims. (Admin. R. at 9.)
II. 	Standard of review.
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to
determining whether that decision is “supported by substantial evidence on
the record as a whole,” McKinney v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000),
or whether the ALJ’s decision resulted from a legal error, Nash v. Comm’r,
Soc. Sec. Admin., 907 F.3d 1086, 1089 (8th Cir. 2018); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). “Substantial evidence . . . is more than a mere scintilla.” Biestek v.
Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). This “threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Id.
The court must look to the entire administrative record to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s decision, examining
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both evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s decision and evidence that
supports it. See Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002).
The court must uphold any finding for which substantial evidence exists even
when the ALJ failed to explain the basis of their finding, see Garrett ex rel.
Moore v. Barnhard, 366 F.3d 643, 649 (8th Cir. 2004), and even if substantial
evidence also supports a contrary outcome, see Nash, 907 F.3d at 1089. In
other words, if it’s possible to draw two different conclusions from the
evidence and one of those conclusions is the same as the ALJ’s, then the court
must affirm the ALJ’s decision. See Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 838
(8th Cir. 1992); Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 2012)
(quotation omitted).
III. 	Discussion.
Plaintiff mounts two challenges to the ALJ’s analysis. First, he
challenges the ALJ’s finding that substance use was material to the analysis
of listed impairments at step three. Second, he challenges the ALJ’s
assessment of his noncompliance with treatment recommendations. I address
each argument in turn.
A. 	Materiality of substance use.
When there is record evidence of drug or alcohol addiction, the ALJ
must first determine whether the claimant meets one of the listed
impairments. See Brueggemann v. Barnhart, 348 F.3d 689, 694–95 (8th Cir.
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2003). As relevant here, the listed impairments include certain personality
and impulse-control disorders. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.08.
A claimant meets these listed impairments if their disorders create an
“extreme” limitation in one or a “marked” limitation in two of the following
relevant functional areas: (1) understand, remember, or apply information;
(2) interact with others; (3) concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and
(4) adapt or manage oneself. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1,
§ 12.00(A)(2)(b).
If the ALJ finds that a claimant meets the listed impairment when
using substances, then the ALJ must determine whether the addiction is
material to the claimant’s disability. See Brueggemann, 348 F.3d at 694–95
(8th Cir. 2003); Mittlestedt v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2000); see also
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.935(a) & 404.1535(a). If the ALJ finds that the claimant
does not have at least one extreme or two marked limitations in these
functional areas when sober, then substance use is deemed a factor material
to the determination of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 416.935(b)(2)(i). But if the ALJ
finds that the claimant still experiences the requisite limitations in these
areas even without substance abuse, then the ALJ must deem the claimant
disabled, and the analysis ends in claimant’s favor. See Estes v. Barnhart,
275 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2002); 20 C.F.R. § 416.935(b)(2)(ii).
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The claimant bears the burden of proving that substance abuse is not
material to the finding of disability. See Vester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 888
(8th Cir. 2005). The ALJ’s decision must be supported by substantial
evidence. See Brueggemann, 348 F.3d at 694.
Here, the ALJ found that, when using substances, Plaintiff had marked
limitations in two of the four functional areas (interacting with others and
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace) and moderate limitations in
the remaining two. The ALJ then found that if Plaintiff maintained sobriety,
he would have no marked limitations in any of the functional areas. Instead,
he would have only moderate limitations. (Admin. R. at 27–30.) Thus, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s substance use was material to the analysis,
such that Plaintiff did not qualify as disabled at step three.
Plaintiff complains that the ALJ’s determination was not based on
substantial evidence. (Pl. Br. at 16–17.) Specifically, he argues that the ALJ’s
finding of “marked” limitations, when including substance use, relied on
medical records during times of sobriety. (Id. at 16.) Thus, Plaintiff contends,
he has these marked limitations without substance abuse, so the ALJ erred
in determining that substance use was material to the analysis.
First, Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s finding of marked limitation
in interacting with others when using substances based on two cited
sources. (Pl. Br. at 16–17.) The first citation that concerns Plaintiff is a
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therapy record from July 21, 2020. (Admin. R. at 599–600). The therapist’s
notes state that he had a one-hour teletherapy session with Plaintiff, during
which Plaintiff “denied any current drug or alcohol use.” (Id. at 600.) The
notes also state:
The client reports attending outpatient treatment 3 days a week.
The client does appear to present as using drug of choice on
occasions in [sic] which is not appropriate considering the
seriousness of his drug of choice. The client seems to be irrigable
[sic], depression [sic], lacks interest when he is around his
significant other reporting that she is a ‘control person’ and like
[sic] to be in control over him. This behavior may be due to the
client [sic] impulsive and unpredictable decisions to use
drug of choice and the behaviors he presents when using.
Most of this session was based around the client gaining control
of his drug using and make a commitment to a lifestyle of
recovery. The client is encouraged to continue addressing
treatment plan goals and objectives.
(Id. (emphasis added).) This record was not generated during a time of
sobriety. And the ALJ is wholly reasonable in finding the provider’s opinion
more credible than the Plaintiff’s denial of current drug use.
The second record Plaintiff calls out is a set of progress notes from
March 11, 2022. (Admin. R. at 646–48.) Plaintiff is correct that this record
describes impairments and does not note any current drug use at the time of
the appointment. (Id. at 642.) Yet the ALJ referenced the March 11, 2022,
record—along with seven other records—in determining that Plaintiff had a
marked limitation in interacting with others when using substances. (Id. at
22–23.) The ALJ found:
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Treatments documented contacts with law enforcement when he
was using substances. He also was aggressive/agitated towards
medical providers and had conflicts with his girlfriend, sister,
and others in the community. Indeed, he was beat up by 5–10
individuals on one occasion. He stays in a relationship with his
girlfriend even though it was unhealthy toward his recovery
because he did not think he could live independently given his
substance use. His mental status exams revealed he was
irritable, needly [sic] slightly agitated, and had rambling speech
when using a substance. Therefore, given the record as a whole,
the undersigned found the claimant had marked limitations in
interactions with others when he used substances. (1F20, 2F3, 6,
12, 3F116–1117 [sic], 124–125, 162–64, and 172[.]3)
(Id. at 22–23.) The ALJ cited sufficient evidence to support the conclusion
that Plaintiff has a marked limitation in interacting with others associated
with his substance use.
Second, Plaintiff points to two records cited by the ALJ when he found
a marked limitation in concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace
when using substances that Plaintiff alleges were during periods of sobriety.
(Pl. Br. at 16.) One of these is the same set of notes from the July 21, 2020,
appointment discussed above that indicates ongoing substance use. (Admin.
R. at 599–600.) The second citation that concerns Plaintiff is a therapy record
from October 8, 2020. (Id. at 614.) This record does not mention either the
presence or absence of substance use on its face. (Id.) But again, the ALJ
referenced the October 2020 record—along with eight other records—in
3 The ALJ’s citations correspond to the following pages of the Administrative
Record: 351, 471, 474, 480, 600–01, 608–09, 646–48, and 656.
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determining that Plaintiff had a marked limitation in concentrating,
persisting, or maintaining pace when using substances:
The claimant . . . appeared confused with anhedonia, attention
that waxed and waned, impaired cognition, paranoia regarding
others and persecution, poor concentration, struggled with
organization [sic], and thought processes that were distracted,
rambling, and tangential. At times, he also had auditory
hallucinations in the form of the devil saying negative things to
him. His original psychotherapist noted the claimant was so
easily distracted during individual sessions that he would benefit
from face-to-face contact rather than telemedicine appointments
and he would benefit from more intensive services than he was
receiving. Accordingly, the undersigned concluded the claimant
had marked limitation in concentrating, persisting, or
maintaining pace when he used substances. (1F20, 2F3, 5, 12,
3F116, 130, 162–63, 168–69, and 172)[.]4)
(Id. at 23.)
According to Plaintiff, the July and October 2020 and March 2022
records “do not support [the ALJ’s] conclusions regarding the materiality of
drug use on [Plaintiff’s] symptomatology” because Plaintiff denied “current
drug use” in the first and made “no reference to ongoing drug use” in the
second and third. (Pl. Br. at 16–17.)
There are two problems with Plaintiff’s argument.
First, the records do not indicate that Plaintiff was experiencing any
type of sustained sobriety in 2020 or 2022. The first states only that Plaintiff
4 The ALJ’s citations correspond to the following pages of the Administrative
Record in this case: 351, 471, 473, 480, 600, 646–47, 652–53, and 656.
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was not under the influence of substances during his one-hour meeting with
the therapist. (Admin. R. at 599–600.) The second states that Plaintiff was in
treatment but is silent as to whether he was using substances on or around
the date of the meeting. (Id. at 614.) And the third notes a history of
substance abuse and addiction treatment. (Id. at 647–48.)
Courts typically consider periods of sustained sobriety in determining
whether substantial evidence supported an ALJ’s materiality analysis. See,
e.g., Vouk v. Berryhill, No. 17-cv-3257-DWF-LIB, 2018 WL 7572494, at *8 (D.
Minn. July 23, 2018).5 Plaintiff does not argue that these three records
describe a period of sustained sobriety. Indeed, other record evidence also
describes Plaintiff’s drug use around the time of the 2020 records. (Admin. R.
at 334 (describing drug use on May 20, 2020), 339 (describing drug use on
May 18, 2020), 345 (same), 357 (same), 589 (describing drug use on June 9,
5 See also Paulette M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 23-cv-04668-HG,
2025 WL 383656, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2025) (considering evidence of
sustained sobriety in reviewing ALJ materiality analysis); Johnson v.
Berryhill, No. 17-cv-6436P, 2018 WL 4275985, at *15 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 7,
2018) (same); Lohmeier v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-02247-TUC-BPV, 2016 WL
825850, at *13 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2016) (same); Casteel v. Colvin, No. 4:15-cv-
683-SPM, 2016 WL 4990497, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 19, 2016) (same); Kroeger
v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-05254-SI, 2015 WL 2398398, at *10 (N.D. Cal. May 19,
2015) (finding materiality analysis should consider whether limitations are
severe enough to be disabling after “maintaining sustained sobriety”); Suitt v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CIV S-09-1847-CMK, 2010 WL 4880671, at *1 (E.D.
Cal. Nov. 23, 2010) (noting lack of evidence of sustained sobriety relevant to
materiality analysis).
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2020, 657 (September 2021 record indicating Plaintiff had used substances
three weeks earlier).
Second, and most significantly, the ALJ didn’t base his decision that
Plaintiff’s drug use had a material impact on these three records alone, but
on many records. For example, the ALJ cited emergency department records
from May 20, 2020, showing that Plaintiff was admitted with suicidal
ideation and reported being intoxicated with PCP and having a history of
PCP use. (Admin. R. at 23 (citing Admin. R. at 351).) The ALJ cited a therapy
record from September 8, 2020, describing Plaintiff’s “continued PCP use.”
(See id. at 208 (cited at Admin. R. at 23).) The ALJ cited a therapy record
from September 15, 2020, noting that Plaintiff was “struggl[ing] with
attending outpatient treatment and does have some difficulties remaining
sober.” (Id. at 609 (cited at Admin. R. at 23).) And the ALJ relied on many
records in finding that Plaintiff had only moderate limitations when sober.
(Id. at 29–31) (citing, e.g., Admin. R. at 603–05, 617, 621–22, 624–25, 627–28,
635–36, 638–39, 664, 666–72).)
Ideally, the ALJ would have set forth more clearly a chronology of
when Plaintiff was using substances, when he was sober, and when it could
not be determined from the records. Such a chronology would have made it
easier to compare the varying degrees of Plaintiff’s continually diagnosed
PTSD, anxiety, and depression. However, the legal requirement is not that
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the ALJ present his analysis in any particular way. Instead, “[o]ur task is to
consider whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence in the record as a whole.” Harris v. Barnhart, 356 F.3d 926, 928 (8th
Cir. 2004).
Here, the ALJ cited many medical records over a long period. These
records clearly demonstrated marked impairments when Plaintiff was using
illicit drugs. (See, e.g., Admin. R. at 351, 363, 473.) They also demonstrated
far fewer symptoms of PTSD and antisocial personality disorder (the severe
impairments identified by the ALJ) when Plaintiff appeared to be sober. (See,
e.g., id. at 500, 509, 547 and 550.) Indeed, antisocial personality disorder or
related behaviors are not mentioned in records where there is no apparent
concurrent drug use. This is substantial evidence that supports the ALJ’s
substance use materiality finding.
Even if some evidence might support a contrary finding, this Court
cannot re-weigh the evidence and reverse the ALJ for that reason. See Nash,
907 F.3d at 1089; Perks, 687 F.3d at 1091. A reasonable mind would find that
there is record evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s
functionality improved during periods of sobriety. I therefore recommend
affirming the ALJ’s materiality conclusion.
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B. 	Assessment of treatment non-compliance.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to engage in
“appropriate noncompliance analysis” when determining his residual
functional capacity between steps three and four. (Pl. Br. at 17–20.) Plaintiff
states that certain federal regulations and social security rulings “delineate
specific, acceptable reasons for a failure to follow prescribed treatment,”
including physical, mental, educational, and linguistic limitations; cost; and
incapacity. (Pl. Br. at 18 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1530(b) & 416.930(b) and
SSR 18-3p).) But here, he argues, the ALJ cited evidence that Plaintiff failed
to comply with drug treatment programs without “appropriately consider[ing]
[Plaintiff’s] socioeconomic status and his severe mental health impairments.”
(Id. at 17.)
Under the social security ruling that Plaintiff cites, SSR 18-3p, and as
relevant here, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant has failed to
follow prescribed treatment when: (1) the claimant would otherwise be
entitled to benefits based on disability; (2) evidence shows that the claimant’s
medical source prescribed treatment for the medically determinable
impairment upon which the disability finding is based; and (3) evidence
shows that the individual did not follow the prescribed treatment. SSR 18-3p,
2018 WL 4945641, at *2 (S.S.A. Oct. 29, 2018.) All three conditions must be
present before the obligation to determine whether the claimant did not
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follow prescribed treatment is triggered. Id.; see also Dennis Cordelle B. v.
Saul, No. 20-cv-0515-NEB-HB, 2021 WL 1321355, at *6 (D. Minn. Jan. 28,
2021), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Dennis B. v. Saul, No.
20-cv-515-NEB-HB, 2021 WL 1138304 (D. Minn. Mar. 25, 2021). If all three
conditions are present, then the ALJ should consider whether the claimant
had “good cause” for not complying with treatment recommendations. SSR
18-3p, 2018 WL 4945641, at *2.
Here, the first condition is not present, because the ALJ did not find
Plaintiff disabled at step three, as discussed in the section above. The ALJ
thus did not err in failing to apply the “good cause” analysis under SSR 18-
3p. This distinguishes Plaintiff’s matter from the cases that he relies on. See
Aaron H. v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-670-PAM-BRT, 2022 WL 11820257, at *2 (D.
Minn. Oct. 20, 2022) (finding ALJ’s decision reflecting plaintiff’s
noncompliance with treatment played a role in ultimate determination that
plaintiff was not disabled); Brown v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 535, 541 (8th Cir.
2004) (upholding ALJ’s analysis of good cause for noncompliance with
treatment); see also Tome v. Schweiker, 724 F.2d 711, 713–14 (8th Cir. 1984)
(reversing where ALJ failed to consider good cause for claimant’s failure to
take diabetes medication). (See Pl. Br. at 18–19.)
Moreover, the ALJ did not make any findings related to Plaintiff’s non-
compliance with treatment. (Admin R. at 18–39.) True, the record is rife with
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examples of Plaintiff’s non-compliance, but that did not form the basis for the
ALJ’s decision. Further, the ALJ did not discredit Plaintiff’s subjective
statements due to noncompliance. That distinguishes this case from cases
that Plaintiff relies on. See Mashona M. v. Kijakazi, No. 21-cv-00633-HB,
2022 WL 2220918, at *11 (D. Minn. June 21, 2022) (discrediting claimant’s
subjective complaints as inconsistent with medical evidence); Kirby v.
Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1323, 1327–28 (8th Cir. 1991) (discrediting claimant’s
testimony because of an alleged history of noncompliance with prescribed
treatment without considering that her borderline intelligence with mild to
moderate memory impairment may have impacted her inability to follow a
complex drug regimen). (See Pl. Br. at 19.)
Finally, Plaintiff is factually incorrect in suggesting that the ALJ failed
to consider his mental-health conditions or socioeconomic conditions like
housing. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had “severe” mental impairments,
including antisocial personality disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder.
(Admin. R. at 21, 30.) The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff “sometimes couch
hopp[ed] but generally stayed with his sister.” (Id. at 25.) On several
occasions, the ALJ noted Plaintiff’s tumultuous relationship with his
girlfriend. (Id. at 23, 25, 29, 31, and 32.) The ALJ’s residual functional
capacity assessment reflected these concerns by including nonexertional
limitations like simple instructions, only occasional interactions with
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coworkers and supervisors, no interaction at all with the general public, and
only occasional changes in routine repetitive work setting. (Id. at 30.) Thus,
as a factual matter, Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ did not appropriately
consider his mental-health issues, socioeconomic status, or other limitations
when assessing his residual functional capacity is incorrect. That makes this
case unlike those that Plaintiff cites. See Kangail v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 627,
630–31 (7th Cir. 2006) (ALJ failed to consider possibility that “bipolar
disorder in particular” may require a complex drug regiment for treatment
and that this unique complexity may prevent the claimant from taking
prescribed medication); Prince v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-558-JDP, 2015 WL
410338, at *6–7 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 29, 2015) (remanding because ALJ
erroneously relied on the DSM-IV as substantive evidence that claimant’s
noncompliance was volitional without first submitting the evidence to
claimant for review or entering it into the record).
IV. 	Conclusion.
For the reasons discussed above, I RECOMMEND that:
1. Plaintiff’s requested relief (Dkt. 9) be DENIED; and
2. This Complaint (Dkt. 1) be DISMISSED with prejudice.
Date: January 31, 2026 	s/Elsa M. Bullard
Elsa M. Bullard
United States Magistrate Judge
CASE 0:25-cv-01190-JWB-EMB Doc. 15 Filed 01/31/26 Page 19 of 19