Evangelista et al v. Federal Bureau of Prisons et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Wayne Evangelista,
Plaintiff,
v.
Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Warden
of F.P.C. Duluth,
Defendants.
Case No. 25-cv-00778 (JMB/SGE)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 22).
Plaintiff Wayne Evangelista is proceeding pro se and Defendants are represented by
Assistant United States Attorney Ana Voss. This action has been referred to the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Rule 72.1. For the reasons stated below, the Court
recommends that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be granted and that this action be
dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Evangelista filed the Complaint in this action on March 3, 2025. (Dkt. 1.) At
that time, he was an inmate at the Federal Prison Camp in Duluth, Minnesota (“FPC-
Duluth”). (See id. at 6.1) He sought to bring this lawsuit on behalf of himself and a proposed
1 Because the Complaint has no page numbers, the Court cites it with the page numbers
assigned by this District’s CM/ECF electronic-filing system.
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class of “the prisoners of [FPC-Duluth].” (Id. at 1.) The Complaint listed two defendants:
the Federal Bureau of Prisons (which runs FPC-Duluth) and the “Warden of [FPC-
Duluth].” (Id. at 2.) Because the Complaint did not state whether it sued the FPC-Duluth
Warden in his official capacity, individual capacity, or both, the Court construed the
Complaint as suing him in both capacities. (See Dkt. 12 at 2 n.3.)
The Complaint raised two types of claims. First, the Complaint raised claims
regarding alleged toxic exposures at FPC-Duluth. Specifically, the Complaint alleged,
“Plaintiffs have been forced to reside in condemned buildings that pose significant risks to
their health and safety due to deteriorated conditions” and that the “facilities housing
Plaintiffs have been contaminated with asbestos and lead paint, black mold, [which] are
substances known to cause serious health issues, thereby exposing Plaintiffs to an
unjustifiable risk of harm.” (Dkt. 1 at 2–3.) The Complaint further alleged that Defendants
have “failed to undertake adequate measures to remediate these conditions” despite
receiving numerous complaints, and that “Plaintiffs have repeatedly been denied timely
and effective medical care.” (Id. at 3.) In addition to the toxic exposure claims, the
Complaint also alleged that the Federal Bureau of Prisons mishandles earned-time credits
awarded under the First Step Act (“FSA”) and placement in residential reentry centers as
governed by the Second Chance Act (“SCA”). (Id. at 3–4.)
The Complaint sought three forms of relief: (1) a declaration that Defendants’
actions are unlawful; (2) an injunction ordering safe, toxin-free housing, lifelong medical
care for exposed FPC-Duluth inmates, accurate earned-time credit calculations, and proper
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residential reentry center placement decisions; and (3) compensatory damages of $100,000
a prisoner per year. (See id. at 5–6.)
When he filed the Complaint, Mr. Evangelista also applied to proceed in forma
pauperis. (See Dkts. 2–3.) On June 3, 2025, the Court issued an Order and Report and
Recommendation granting the IFP Application but recommending that several claims and
parties included in the Complaint be dismissed. (Dkt. 12 at 11–12, see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2) (“the court shall dismiss [an IFP matter] at any time if the court determines
that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted [or] seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”).) Specifically, the
Court recommended that the Complaint be dismissed to the extent that Mr. Evangelista, as
a pro se plaintiff, sought to bring class claims; that the Complaint be dismissed as
duplicative of Mr. Evangelista’s other federal case2, “to the extent it challenges earned-
time credits under the First Step Act and placements in residential reentry centers under
the Second Chance Act”; that Defendant “Warden of [FPC-Duluth],” as sued in his
individual capacity, be dismissed; and that the Complaint be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, “to the extent it (a) asserts claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, or (b)
seeks monetary damages under the Eighth Amendment.” (Dkt. 12 at 11–12.) The Court
recommended that Mr. Evangelista’s case be allowed to go forward only on Counts I and
III, and only to decide whether Mr. Evangelista is entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief
for alleged Eighth Amendment violations. (Dkt. 12 at 10.)
2 Evangelista v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Case no. 25-cv-0777 (KMM/JFD) (D. Minn. Mar. 3,
2025).
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On July 23, 2025, the District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation (Dkt.
17.) Thus, the only claims remaining at this time are Mr. Evangelista’s request for
injunctive or declaratory relief for alleged Eighth Amendment violations against the
Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Warden in his official capacity. (See id. at 6.)
On August 29, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the remaining claims.
(Dkt. 22.) Defendants assert that, because Mr. Evangelista was transferred from FPC-
Duluth to FCI-Ashland on July 22, 2025, his claims are now moot and the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over this case. (Dkt. 23 at 1–2.) On September 2, 2025, the Court
issued a briefing order requiring Mr. Evangelista to file any responsive memorandum on
or before September 22, 2025. (Dkt. 29.) In response to a letter from Mr. Evangelista, the
Court extended his deadline to December 19, 2025. (Dkt. 31.) The Court noted that if Mr.
Evangelista did not file a response, the motion would be taken under advisement without
oral argument, and no further extensions would be granted. (Id.) As of the date of this
Report and Recommendation, Mr. Evangelista has not filed a response. Accordingly, the
Court took the motion under advisement on December 19, 2025.
ANALYSIS
I. 	Legal Standards
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction authorized to adjudicate only cases
or controversies permitted by the Constitution or federal statute. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
578 U.S. 330, 337–38 (2016); Marine Equip. Mgmt. Co. v. United States, 4 F.3d 643, 646
(8th Cir. 1993). “A motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(1) challenges the Court’s subject
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matter jurisdiction and requires the Court to examine whether it has the authority to decide
the claims.” Damon v Groteboer, 937 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1063 (D. Minn. 2013).
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
A court considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion must first determine whether the motion
presents a “facial attack” or a “factual attack.” Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729
n.6 (8th Cir. 1990) (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th
Cir. 1980)). “In a facial challenge to jurisdiction, all of the factual allegations concerning
jurisdiction are presumed to be true and the motion is successful if the plaintiff fails to
allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction.” Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590,
593 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Eaton v. Dorchester Dev., Inc., 692 F.2d 727, 731–32 (11th Cir.
1982)). For a factual attack, in contrast, a court “considers matters outside the pleadings,
and the non-moving party does not have the benefit of 12(b)(6) safeguards.” Davis v.
Anthony, Inc., 886 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6)).
“If the asserted basis of federal jurisdiction is patently meritless, then dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction is appropriate.” Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 407 F.3d 905, 907 (8th
Cir. 2005). This procedure under Rule 12(b)(1) “enables the court to resolve a threshold
jurisdictional issue without the need for trial, unless the issue is so bound up with the merits
that a full trial on the merits may be necessary to resolve the issue.” Disability Support All.
v. Heartwood Enters., LLC, 885 F.3d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).
Here, Defendants’ 12(b)(1) motion is a factual challenge to subject matter
jurisdiction, as it relies on facts outside the pleadings, namely, the fact that Mr. Evangelista
is no longer incarcerated at FPC-Duluth. Thus, Mr. Evangelista does not have the benefit
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of 12(b)(6) safeguards for the purpose of this motion. Further, when considering a factual
Rule 12(b)(1) motion, “the Plaintiff will have the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in
fact exist.” Osborn, 918 F.2d at 730 (quoting Mortenson v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n,
549 F.2d 884, 891 (3rd Cir. 1977)); see also Buckler v. United States, 919 F.3d 1038, 1044
(8th Cir. 2019) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence of subject matter
jurisdiction.”). Thus, Mr. Evangelista bears the burden to prove that jurisdiction exists.
B. Mootness
Defendants’ challenge to subject matter jurisdiction is based on mootness. “Article
III of the Constitution only allows federal courts to adjudicate actual, ongoing cases or
controversies.” POET Biorefining - Hudson, LLC v. United States Env’t Prot. Agency, 971
F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Potter v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 329 F.3d 608, 611
(8th Cir. 2003)). “A case fails to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement when ‘an
intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the
lawsuit’ and makes it ‘impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief.’” Id. at 805
(quoting Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153, 161 (2016)). An action that no
longer satisfies the case or controversy requirement is moot. Id. If an action is moot, it must
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Ali v. Cangemi, 419 F.3d 722, 724 (8th
Cir. 2005).
II. 	Mr. Evangelista’s Claims for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief Related to
Housing Conditions at FPC-Duluth Are Moot.
Mr. Evangelista’s only remaining claims are for injunctive or declaratory relief.
(Dkt. 17 at 6.) Specifically, Mr. Evangelista seeks a declaratory judgement stating that
Defendants’ practices violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and an injunction requiring
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Defendants to (1) “[i]mmediately remediate condemned housing facilities to ensure safe
and habitable conditions free of hazardous asbestos, lead paint, and black mold” and (2)
“[p]rovide free government-sponsored healthcare for the rest of their lives to all affected
inmates or potentially affected inmates ever housed at F.P.C. Duluth.” (Dkt. 1 at 5.)
Defendants argue that Mr. Evangelista has received the relief he sought because he is no
longer subject to the allegedly unsafe conditions at FPC-Duluth. (Dkt. 23 at 4.)
Mr. Evangelista’s claims are moot if his transfer from FPC-Duluth has deprived him
of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and made it impossible for the Court to
grant any effectual relief. See Campbell-Ewald, 577 U.S. 161–62. The Eighth Circuit has
stated that “a prisoner’s claim for injunctive relief to improve prison conditions is moot if
he or she is no longer subject to those conditions.” Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337
(8th Cir. 1985); see also Owens v. Isaac, 487 F.3d 561, 564 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curium)
(concluding that a prisoner’s transfer to another facility rendered moot his requests for
injunctive relief arising from any conditions-of-confinement claims); Goff v. Clements, 138
F. App’x 851, 851 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curium) (“[Petitioner] is no longer subject to the
conditions he complains about in his complaint. Because he sought only injunctive relief,
his case is therefore moot.”). Likewise, the Eighth Circuit has concluded that claims for
declaratory relief related to prison conditions are mooted by a prisoner’s transfer to another
facility. See Smith v. Hundley, 190 F.3d 852, 855 (8th Cir. 1999) (collecting cases).
Mr. Evangelista’s claim for an injunction to “[i]mmediately remediate condemned
housing facilities to ensure safe and habitable conditions free of hazardous asbestos, lead
paint, and black mold” is moot under this well-established precedent. Because Mr.
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Evangelista is no longer present in the housing facilities at issue, the Court cannot grant
him any effectual relief. The Court will consider, however, whether any exception to the
mootness doctrine applies to that claim.
Courts have recognized several exceptions to the mootness doctrine. One such
exception exists when a defendant voluntarily ceases a challenged practice. Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). Another
exception exists when a controversy is “capable of repetition, yet evading review,”
Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 170 (2016) (quoting Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998)). Neither exception applies here.
Under the voluntary cessation exception, a defendant’s “voluntary cessation of a
challenged practice will moot a case only if the defendant can show that the practice cannot
reasonably be expected to recur.” FBI v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234, 241 (2024) (cleaned up).
Defendants argue that the voluntary cessation exception does not apply here because Mr.
Evangelista was transferred to FCI-Ashland for correctional security purposes and will not
be transferred back to FPC-Duluth before his projected release date. (Dkt. 23 at 5.)
Specifically, Defendants assert that “the FPC Duluth Warden submitted [Mr. Evangelista]
for a transfer to a greater security facility to provide required monitoring of his
communication for correctional security reasons” because “[i]nmates on required
monitoring cannot be housed in camp setting.” (Dkt. 24 ¶ 5.) Mr. Evangelista has not
contested these facts. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the voluntary cessation
exception to mootness does not apply in these circumstances. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422
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U.S. 395, 402 (1975) (concluding that a prisoner’s transfer to another facility was not a
mere voluntary cessation of challenged conduct).
Next, the Court considers whether Mr. Evangelista’s housing complaints are
“capable of repetition, yet evading review.” See Kingdomware, 579 U.S. at 170. This rule
applies “only in exceptional situations” where the challenged action is “in its duration too
short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration,” and there is “a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.”
Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17 (citation modified). The Eighth Circuit has declined to apply this
exception to mootness resulting from a prisoner’s transfer out of the challenged facility.
Smith, 190 F.3d at 855. In Smith v. Hundley, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the “mere
possibility” that the prisoner would be transferred back to the facility at issue was
insufficient to bring the claim “within the narrow exception to the mootness doctrine.” Id.
The Eighth Circuit also noted that it might have had jurisdiction over the claim “if there
was evidence of efforts on the part of defendants to evade the jurisdiction of the court by
transferring prisoners,” but there was no such evidence in the record. Id. The same is true
in this case. There is no evidence in the record that creates a reasonable expectation that
Mr. Evangelista will be subject to the conditions at FPC-Duluth again, and no evidence
that his transfer was intended to evade the Court’s jurisdiction. Accordingly, this exception
to the mootness doctrine does not apply.
Because Mr. Evangelista’s claim for injunctive relief related to housing conditions
at FPC-Duluth is moot and no exception applies, the Court recommends that this claim be
dismissed.
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III. The Complaint Does Not State a Claim Upon Which the Court Can Grant
Mr. Evangelista Free Healthcare for Life.
The Court now turns to Mr. Evangelista’s remaining claim for an injunction to
“[p]rovide free government-sponsored healthcare for the rest of their lives to all affected
inmates or potentially affected inmates ever housed at F.P.C. Duluth.” (Dkt. 1 at 5.) As an
initial matter, the Complaint has been dismissed to the extent that it asserts class claims.
(Dkt. 17 at 6.) Accordingly, the Court considers this claim for relief only as it applies to
Mr. Evangelista.
Defendants do not argue that Mr. Evangelista’s transfer from FPC-Duluth has made
it impossible for the Court to grant this relief. Instead, they argue that:
Evangelista has not alleged with any factual support any secondary or
collateral injuries that would have survived his transfer from FPC
Duluth. Though he mentions obliquely a request for ongoing medical
care, he has no factual allegations suggesting that he has suffered any
injury, suffers from any medical condition needing care, or making a
causal connection between the alleged conditions and any injury.
(Dkt. 23 at 5 n.2.) The Court understands Defendants’ argument to be that Mr. Evangelista
has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).3
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Rule 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim
3 Even if Defendants had not raised this argument, the Court could recommend dismissal
on this basis sua sponte. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (“the court shall dismiss [an IFP
matter] at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.”)
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upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, courts “assume all facts in the complaint to be true, and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” Zink v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1089, 1098 (8th
Cir. 2015). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient facts which,
when accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). To meet this standard, a complaint must provide more
than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Id. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. Although the factual allegations in a complaint need not be detailed, they must raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In assessing a complaint by a pro se plaintiff, the Court applies “less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). “[I]f the essence of an allegation
is discernible,” then the court, in applying a liberal construction to pro se complaints,
“should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered
within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir.
2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). Despite the liberal
construal of such complaints, pro se plaintiffs “still must allege sufficient facts to support
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the claims advanced.” Stringer v. St. James R-1 Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir.
2006) (quoting Stone).
Here, the Complaint alleges that the housing facilities at FPC-Duluth “have been
contaminated with asbestos and lead paint, black mold, [which] are substances known to
cause serious health issues, thereby exposing Plaintiffs to an unjustifiable risk of harm”
and that “[d]espite numerous complaints and indications of hazardous living conditions,
Defendants have failed to undertake adequate measures to remediate these Conditions.”
(Dkt. 1 at 3.) The Complaint also alleges that “Plaintiffs have repeatedly been denied timely
and effective medical care.” (Id.) The Complaint alleges that “Defendants are responsible
for the maintenance and management of FPC Duluth, and have deliberately neglected their
duty to ensure safe, healthy, and dignified living conditions for all inmates” and that
“Plaintiffs have sustained severe and ongoing harm as a result of these failures, entitling
them to comprehensive relief.” (Id. at 5.) Specifically, the Complaint seeks relief in the
form of an injunction requiring Defendants to provide “free government-sponsored
healthcare for the rest of [Mr. Evangelista’s] li[fe].” (Id.) While the Complaint does not
identify the specific legal basis for this claim, the Court understands this claim to invoke
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments.” See U.S. Const.
amend. VIII.
Defendants argue that the Complaint is insufficient in that it lacks “factual
allegations suggesting that [Mr. Evangelista] has suffered any injury, suffers from any
medical condition needing care, or making a causal connection between the alleged
conditions and any injury.” (Dkt. 23 at 5 n.2.) As an initial matter, a prisoner does not
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necessarily have to allege an injury in order to state an Eighth Amendment claim based on
the conditions of their confinement. In Helling v. McKinney, the Supreme Court concluded
that a prisoner stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that prison officials,
“with deliberate indifference, exposed him to levels of [environmental tobacco smoke] that
pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health.” 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
In this case, the problem is not that the Complaint does not allege the elements of an Eighth
Amendment violation. Rather, the Complaint fails to allege that Mr. Evangelista is entitled
to the relief that he seeks.
The Eighth Amendment entitles Mr. Evangelista to humane conditions of
confinement and adequate medical care while incarcerated. See id. at 31–32. It does not
create an entitlement to “free government-sponsored healthcare” for the rest of his life. The
Complaint does not set forth any factual or legal basis from which the Court could infer
that Mr. Evangelista is entitled to that relief.4 Accordingly, the Court recommends that Mr.
Evangelista’s claim for an injunction requiring Defendants to provide him with “free
government-sponsored healthcare” for the rest of his life be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.
RECOMMENDATION
Therefore, based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings
herein, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
4 To the extent that Mr. Evangelista is seeking compensation for medical costs that he has
incurred or will incur in the future as a result of the alleged Eighth Amendment violations,
this claim is barred by federal sovereign immunity for the reasons outlined in the Court’s
prior Report and Recommendation. (See Dkt. 12 at 7–9.)
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1. 	Plaintiff Wayne Evangelista’s claim for an injunction requiring
Defendants to “[i]mmediately remediate condemned housing
facilities to ensure safe and habitable conditions free of hazardous
asbestos, lead paint, and black mold” be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE, for lack of jurisdiction.
2. 	Plaintiff Wayne Evangelista’s claim for an injunction requiring
Defendants to “[p]rovide free government-sponsored healthcare for
the rest of their lives to all affected inmates or potentially affected
inmates ever housed at F.P.C. Duluth” be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Date: January 20, 2026 	s/Shannon G. Elkins
SHANNON G. ELKINS
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
The Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the District Court and is
therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific
written objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within
14 days after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may
respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. D.
Minn. LR 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line
limits set for in D. Minn. LR 72.2(c).
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