Miller Manufacturing Company v. HerculesAG LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Miller Manufacturing Company,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant,
v.
HerculesAG LLC,
Defendant/Counterclaim-Plaintiff, and
Foshan Shoumei Animal Husbandry
Equipment Co., Ltd., d/b/a Farmates Electrics
Limited,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cv-113 (JMB/DJF)
ORDER
Plaintiff Miller Manufacturing Company filed an Unopposed Motion for Alternative Service
on Defendant Foshan Shoumei Animal Husbandry Equipment Co., Ltd., D/B/A Farmates Electrics
Limited and to Amend the Scheduling Order (“Motion”) (ECF No. 56) on January 27, 2026. The
Motion asks the Court to use its authority under Rule 4(f)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to allow Plaintiff to serve Chinese Defendant Foshan Shoumei Animal Husbandry Equipment Co.,
Ltd., d/b/a Farmates Electrics Limited (“Farmates”) using alternative methods in lieu of the
procedures prescribed by the Hague Convention, including: (1.) delivering the Amended Complaint
and Summons to two different attorneys in the United States who are assisting Farmates with two
distinct trademark filings with the United States Patent and Trademark Office; and (2.) serving
process on Farmates via email using an address Plaintiff found on Farmates’ website that
purportedly belongs to Farmates’ sales manager. (ECF No. 56 at 2, 4.) In addition to seeking the
Court’s leave to effectuate alternative service of process, the Motion seeks to amend the pretrial
schedule to provide Plaintiff adequate time to serve process on Farmates. (ECF No. 56 at 2.)
CASE 0:25-cv-00113-JMB-DJF Doc. 69 Filed 02/24/26 Page 1 of 11

After reviewing the Motion, the Court ordered Plaintiff to submit additional evidence to
support its Motion and attempt to contact Farmates’ U.S. counsel one last time. 	(ECF No. 59.)
Plaintiff fully complied with the Court’s order and amended its Motion to identify a second email
address associated with Farmates that Plaintiff seeks to use to serve process. (ECF No. 62 at 1; ECF
No. 63 at 4-7.) Based on the entire record and for the reasons stated below, the Court grants the
Motion in part and denies the Motion in part.
I. 	Alternative Service
A. 	Legal Standards
Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Procedure prescribes the methods for service of process
outside the United States, which includes, “by other means not prohibited by international
agreement, as the court orders.” This option is “as favored” as the other methods prescribed by the
Rule and it is “neither a last resort nor extraordinary relief.” Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Intern.
Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Patrick’s Rest., LLC v. Singh, No. 18-cv-764
(ECT/KMM), 2019 WL 121250, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 7, 2019) (affirming magistrate judge’s
conclusion that alternative service under Rule 4(f) does not require exhaustion of other service
methods). Though the Rule suggests international agreements are the only limitations on the Court’s
discretion, due process also requires that any court-ordered method “supply notice of the pendency
of a legal action, in a manner and at a time that affords the defendant a fair opportunity to answer the
complaint and present defenses and objections.” Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 672
(1996); see also Global Air Charters Inc. v. Mayfair Jets DWC-LLC, No. 24-cv-3862 (LMP/SGE),
2024 WL 5039907, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 9, 2024). Courts may also deny requests for alternative
service when it appears the movant filed its motion “whimsically.” Global Air Charters Inc., 2024
WL 5039907, at *2 (quoting Convergen Energy LLC v. Brooks, No. 20-cv-3746 (LJL), 2020 WL
CASE 0:25-cv-00113-JMB-DJF Doc. 69 Filed 02/24/26 Page 2 of 11

4038353, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2020)).
B. 	Analysis
First, the Court considers whether any of the alternative service methods Plaintiff requests
violate a known international agreement. The relevant agreement here is the Hague Service
Convention. The Court concludes that they do not. Many courts have concluded that “service on a
foreign defendant through its U.S. counsel” does not violate the Hague Convention. See 1025 W.
Addison St. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Grupo Cinemex, S.A. de C.V., No. 20-cv-6811 (MEA), 2021
WL 2136073, at *7 (N.D. Ill, May 26, 2021) (collecting cases). 	The mere fact that judicial
documents may be transmitted eventually to China does not mean that the Hague Convention must
be followed. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 707 (1988). The
Hague Convention’s requirements and prohibitions are only triggered when “the internal law of the
forum state defines the applicable method of serving process as requiring the transmittal of
documents abroad.” Id. at 700. Here, service would occur “entirely within the United States” (ECF
No. 56 at 6), therefore, the Hague Convention is not implicated. See 1025 W. Addison, 2021 WL
2136073, at *7. Service by email is also not contrary to the Convention. Article 10 of the Hague
Convention authorizes the delivery of judicial documents through postal channels, unless the state of
destination objects. Though China has objected to Article 10, courts generally have not interpreted
the Article to apply to email. 	See AMTO, LLC v. Bedford Asset Mgmt., LLC, No. 14-cv-9913
(KMK), 2015 WL 3457452, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2015) (collecting cases); Keith Allen Lind v.
Triton Canada Inc., No. 23-cv-698 (PJS/LIB), 2025 WL 4236159, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 25, 2025).
The Court also concludes that Plaintiff did not move for alternative service whimsically.
Plaintiff has retained the services of a of an international process server, Viking Advocates
(“Viking”). (ECF No. 56 at 3.) Viking identified the Chinese name and address for Farmates. (Id.)
CASE 0:25-cv-00113-JMB-DJF Doc. 69 Filed 02/24/26 Page 3 of 11

Viking has experience serving Chinese parties and estimates that service through China’s Central
Authority will take approximately six to twelve months. (Id. at 3-4.) Plaintiff’s retention of Viking
shows it has acted diligently in pursuing service through the procedures outlined by the Hague
Convention. 	Moreover, a delay of six to twelve months is an adequate justification for seeking
alternative service. 	See In GLG Life Tech Corp. Sec. Litig., 287 F.R.D. 262, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (concluding six to eight month delay due to Hague Convention service justified alternative
service); Stream SICAV v. Wang, 989 F. Supp. 2d 264, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (concluding six to
eighteen month delay due to Hague Convention service justified alternative service).
Having concluded that the Court is not barred by the Hague Convention from authorizing the
alternative service methods Plaintiff requests and that alternative service is justified under the
circumstances, the Court must consider whether the requested methods otherwise comport with Rule
4(f) and the requirements of due process.
1. 	U.S. Counsel Service
There are several problems with Plaintiff’s request to serve process via Farmates’ U.S.
counsel. First, service on U.S. counsel does not appear to be allowed under Rule 4(f). The Rule
states that it applies when a plaintiff seeks to serve an individual “at a place not within any judicial
district of the United States.” As the text makes clear, Rule 4(f) applies based on where service is
effectuated, not where the defendant is necessarily located. Cf. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft
v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 707 (1988) (concluding Hague Convention was not implicated when state
law dictated service was effectuated when plaintiff served process on German defendant’s American
subsidiary). Plaintiff admits that service on Farmates’ U.S. counsel would be “effectuated entirely
within the United States.” (ECF No. 56 at 6.) Some courts have allowed service of foreign entities
via U.S. counsel under the auspices of Rule 4(f) based on the notion that U.S. counsel is merely a
CASE 0:25-cv-00113-JMB-DJF Doc. 69 Filed 02/24/26 Page 4 of 11

conduit for the transmission of service. See Bazarian Int’l Fin. Assocs. v. Desarrollos Aerohotelco,
168 F. Supp. 3d 1, 14-15 (D.C.C. 2016); 1025 W. Addison, 2021 WL 2136073, at *7. 	Though
characterizing U.S. counsel as a conduit may be accurate, it is entirely contradictory to say in one
breath that such service is completed entirely in the United States in order to avoid application of the
Hague Convention, and in the next breath say that the service is not within the United States to
secure the benefits of Rule 4(f)(3). 	The Court declines to adopt a contradictory analysis to
circumvent an international treaty that is the “supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. Art. VI.
Second, the Court is not adequately assured that service on Farmates’ U.S. counsel will
provide adequate notice to Farmates. When parties request alternative service via U.S. counsel,
courts have required some evidence that U.S. counsel will likely inform the party of the lawsuit. See
AMTO, LLC, 2015 WL 3457452, at *5-6. 	Specifically, courts have asked for evidence that the
lawyer: (1.) has filed a notice of appearance in a relevant action; (2.) has “knowledge of the
underlying facts of the case”; (3.) or has a “special relationship” with the defendant, such as a long
history of representation. Id. The mere fact that a particular attorney represents the defendant in
some capacity unrelated to the relevant action is not enough. Id. at *6; see also Juka Innovations
Corp. v. Uxoz Direct, No. 18-cv-3511 (ADS/AYS), 2020 WL 13680679, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 20,
2020). Here, Plaintiff has identified two attorneys who have assisted Farmates with trademark work
that is unrelated to this matter. (ECF No. 56 at 2, 4.) One of these attorneys no longer represents
Farmates (ECF No. 63 at 7), and the other has not responded to any of the emails Plaintiff has sent to
him (ECF No. 56 at 5; ECF No. 63 at 7). 	Plaintiff is also “not aware of a special relationship
between Farmates and its U.S. based counsel beyond the attorney-client relationship in connection
with Farmates’ trademark applications.” (ECF No. 63 at 8.) This is not enough to assure the Court
that the dictates of due process will be satisfied via this method of service.
CASE 0:25-cv-00113-JMB-DJF Doc. 69 Filed 02/24/26 Page 5 of 11

2. 	Email Service
Service of process by email is not a method that exceeds the scope of Rule 4(f). See Keith
Allen Lind, 2025 WL 4236159; AMTO, LLC, 2015 WL 3457452, at *8. 	But the plaintiff must
provide “some facts indicating that the person to be served would be likely to receive the summons
and complaint at the given email address.” 	AMTO, LLC, 2015 WL 3457452, at *8 (citation
modified). To do so, the plaintiff must show that the email inbox is checked on a regular basis. See
id.; Keith Allen Lind, 2025 WL 4236159, at *4; Global Air Charters Inc., 2024 WL 5039907, at *3;
Patrick’s Rest., LLC, 2019 WL 121250, at *3. Plaintiff seeks to serve process on Farmates using
two different email addresses: ivy@farmates.com and ivan@farmates.com. The Court finds that
service using either or both email addresses will adequately apprise Farmates of this lawsuit.
Plaintiff offers several pieces of evidence to support its contention that Farmates regularly
monitors the ivy@farmates.com email address. (ECF No. 63 at 2-4.) The best piece of evidence
comes from Defendant HerculesAG’s co-owner’s deposition on February 12, 2026. (ECF No. 63 at
2-3; ECF No. 64.) During the deposition, Defendant’s co-owner stated that she communicates with
Farmates concerning purchase orders and shipping via email. (ECF No. 64 at 24.) She further stated
that she: (1.) communicates with a person at Farmates named “Ivy”; (2.) emails Ivy “once or twice a
month”; (3.) uses “the Ivy at Farmates email address” to send emails; and (4.) last corresponded with
Ivy earlier this month, February 2026. (Id. at 25-26.) This evidence provides sufficient assurance
that service via the ivy@farmates.com email address will notify Farmates of this lawsuit. 	See
Global Air Charters Inc., 2024 WL 5039907, at *3 (authorizing email service based on sworn
testimony that plaintiff’s CFO regularly corresponded with one of defendant’s directors via email);
Patrick’s Rest., LLC, 2019 WL 121250, at *3 (authorizing email service partly based on evidence
that defendant “frequently received business correspondence related to this matter at that email
CASE 0:25-cv-00113-JMB-DJF Doc. 69 Filed 02/24/26 Page 6 of 11

address”).
Plaintiff also offers various pieces of evidence to support its assertion that Farmates actively
monitors the ivan@farmates.com email (see ECF Nos. 63 at 4-7; 63-2; 63-3; 63-4; 63-5; and 64-1).
This evidence includes:
1. 	Screenshots produced by Defendant HerculesAG LLC showing a text message thread
between Defendant HerculesAG’s co-owner and an individual identified as “Ivan.”
(ECF No. 64-1.)
2. 	Screenshots from Amazon.com associated with a cattle prod vendor named
“Farmates Vetplus” that has a business name similar to Defendant Farmates’ Chinese
name and an address identical to Farmates’. (Compare ECF No. 57 at 3 and ECF
No. 57-2 at 4 with ECF No. 63-3 at 6.) These screenshots show that individuals have
made verified purchases of cattle prods from Farmates Vetplus and left reviews
attesting to their satisfaction with the products. (ECF Nos. 63-3, 63-4.) The products
also appear to still be on sale.
3. 	Email correspondence between Plaintiff’s counsel and Amazon’s counsel that
identifies ivan@farmates.com as the only email Amazon has on file for the vendor
named “Farmates Vetplus.” (ECF No. 63-2.)
4. 	An email sent by Plaintiff’s counsel to the ivan@farmates.com email address asking
the recipient to accept service on behalf of Farmates. (ECF No. 63-8.)
5. 	A signed declaration stating that counsel did not receive a response to the above-
referenced email, but that he also did not receive “a bounce-back error message,”
which would normally indicate a failed delivery. (ECF No. 63 at 7.)
These pieces of evidence individually would not demonstrate that attempted service on
CASE 0:25-cv-00113-JMB-DJF Doc. 69 Filed 02/24/26 Page 7 of 11

Farmates using the ivan@farmates.com email address would likely notify Farmates of this lawsuit.
But taken as a whole, they do. The text message thread suggests the individual named “Ivan” with
whom Defendant’s co-owner corresponded concerning the manufacture of cattle prods is the same
Ivan who is associated with the email address that starts with “ivan.” Ivan@farmates.com is also the
only email address associated with Farmates Vetplus, an Amazon vendor whose address is identical
to the address listed in Farmates’ import records. (Compare ECF No. 57 at 3 and ECF No. 57-2 at 4
with ECF No. 63-3 at 6.) Farmates VetPlus sells cattle prods, which are the kinds of products at
issue in this lawsuit. (ECF No. 42.) This vendor is actively selling these cattle prods on Amazon,
and customers have left hundreds of reviews. Twenty-seven of these reviews were submitted in the
last twelve months, and four of those were submitted in 2026. (ECF No. 63-3 at 3, 6.) Finally,
Plaintiff sent an email to ivan@farmates.com and did not receive any indication that the email is
inactive. 	Based on this information, the Court concludes that Farmates regularly uses the
ivan@farmates.com email address to conduct business. This is enough to satisfy the Court that
serving Farmates at this email address will likely inform Farmates of this lawsuit. See Patrick’s
Rest., LLC, 2019 WL 121250, at *3; Hong Kong Leyuzhen Tech. Co. Ltd. v. Individuals, Corps., Ltd.
Liab. Companies, Partnerships, & Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule “A,”, No.
25-cv-22117 (RAR), 2025 WL 2840697, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 25, 2025) (authorizing alternative
service via email when defendants conducted their businesses over the Internet and plaintiff
demonstrated defendants used particular email address to conduct that business); Natty Paint LLC v.
Individuals, Bus. Entities, & Unincorporated Assocs. Identified on Exhibit 1, No. 1:22-cv-1193
(LY), 2023 WL 3681682, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2023) (same).
For all these reasons, the Court grants the Motion in part insofar as Plaintiff may serve
process on Defendant Farmates by emailing ivy@farmates.com and ivan@farmates.com. Plaintiff’s
CASE 0:25-cv-00113-JMB-DJF Doc. 69 Filed 02/24/26 Page 8 of 11

motion for alternative service is otherwise denied.
II. 	Pretrial Schedule Amendments
Plaintiff requests a six-month extension of all outstanding pretrial schedule deadlines to
account for alternative service.1 	Plaintiff initially asked that this extension apply to the entire
proceeding, but when it filed amendments to the Motion, it modified the extension request so that the
amendment would only apply to proceedings involving Farmates and not Defendant HerculesAG
LLC (ECF No. 62). Defendant HerculesAG LLC objects to Plaintiff’s request to litigate this matter
on two separate tracks. (ECF No. 60 at 3.) Plaintiff and Defendant HerculesAG LLC have also filed
a Stipulation to Amend Scheduling Order (ECF No. 60) (“Stipulation”) requesting short extensions
of the fact discovery deadline and the fact discovery-related non-dispositive motion deadline.
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows modifications of the pretrial schedule
order when good cause exists. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). “The primary measure of good cause is the
movant’s diligence in attempting to meet the order’s requirements.” Sherman v. Winco Fireworks,
Inc., 532 F.3d 709, 716-17 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation modified). Plaintiff’s request is premised on the
delays associated with serving Farmates, a China-based defendant that was only added to this lawsuit
in November 2025. 	The Court finds that Plaintiff has acted diligently in following the pretrial
scheduling order and that the delays associated with serving Farmates provide good cause for
granting an extension. For this reason, the Court agrees that a six-month extension is warranted.
However, the Court will not bifurcate the pretrial schedule. Such a division would create increased
logistical burdens for the Court, complicate the discovery process, and potentially interfere with the
parties’ ability to settle the matter.
1 Plaintiff alternatively requested a one-year extension if the Court denied its request for
alternative service. (ECF No. 56 at 9.) Since the Court is granting the alternative service request, it
focuses its analysis on the six-month request.
CASE 0:25-cv-00113-JMB-DJF Doc. 69 Filed 02/24/26 Page 9 of 11

Because the Court is extending all unexpired pretrial deadlines by six months, the Stipulation
is denied as moot.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings here, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Plaintiff Miller Manufacturing Company’s Unopposed Motion for Alternative
Service on Defendant Foshan Shoumei Animal Husbandry Equipment Co., Ltd.,
D/B/A Farmates Electrics Limited and to Amend the Scheduling Order (ECF No. 56)
and Addendum and Amendment to Dkt. No. 56 Motion for Alternative Service (ECF
No. 62) are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:
A. 	Plaintiff 	may 	serve 	Defendant 	Foshan 	Shoumei 	Animal 	Husbandry
Equipment Co., Ltd., d/b/a Farmates Electrics Limited (“Farmates”) by
emailing a copy of the Summons and Complaint to ivy@farmates.com and/or
ivan@farmates.com.
B. 	The pretrial deadlines are amended as follows:
i. 	Close of fact discovery: August 17, 2026;
ii. 	Non-dipositive motions related to fact discovery: September 3, 2026;
iii. 	Disclosure of initial expert identities: September 10, 2026;
iv. 	Service of initial expert reports: October 1, 2026;
v. 	Disclosure of rebuttal expert identities and service of rebuttal reports:
November 2, 2026;
vi. 	Close of expert discovery: December 2, 2026;
vii. 	Non-dispositive motions related to expert discovery: December 9,
CASE 0:25-cv-00113-JMB-DJF Doc. 69 Filed 02/24/26 Page 10 of 11

2026;
viii. 	Dispositive motions: February 17, 2027; and
ix. 	Trial ready date: June 18, 2027.
C. 	The Motion is DENIED in all other respects.
2. 	Plaintiff Miller Manufacturing Company and Defendant HerculesAG LLC’s
Stipulation to Amend Scheduling Order (ECF No. 60) is DENIED AS MOOT.
Dated: February 24, 2026 	s/ Dulce J. Foster
Dulce J. Foster
United States Magistrate Judge
CASE 0:25-cv-00113-JMB-DJF Doc. 69 Filed 02/24/26 Page 11 of 11