USA v. Alm, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
John Michael Duffy,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cr-00289-LMP-EMB-2
ORDER AND
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court are three motions filed by Defendant John Michael
Duffy: a Motion to Suppress Search and Seizure Evidence (Dkt. No. 137), a
Motion for Disclosure of Informants and Cooperating Defendants (Dkt. No.
138), and a Motion for Franks Hearing (Dkt. No. 139). The Government filed
an omnibus response to those motions. (See Dkt. No. 155.) I held a hearing
on the motions on January 13, 2026. (See Dkt. No. 171.) The Government
introduced four exhibits, which were admitted without objection.1 After the
hearing, Mr. Duffy filed a supplemental brief (Dkt. No. 177) and the
Government filed a supplemental response (Dkt. No. 180).
1 These exhibits were provided to the Court at the hearing, but neither party
attached the exhibits to their briefing or otherwise filed them in the record.
Exhibits 1 and 2 are attached to this Order and Report and Recommendation.
Exhibit 3, which is an audio file, and Exhibit 4 are not relevant to Mr. Duffy’s
motion.
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The motion to suppress has been referred to me for a report and
recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and District of Minnesota Local
Rule 72.1. I recommend that motion be DENIED.
The other two motions, which are nondispositive, are DENIED. See
United States v. Lafriniere, 24-CR-00244(1)(2) (JMB/LIB), 2025 WL 3564627,
at *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 12, 2025) (recognizing motion requesting disclosure of
informants’ identities as nondispositive); United States v. Green, No. 19-CR-
103 (MJD/ECW), 2020 WL 6337705, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 29, 2020)
(recognizing motion for Franks hearing as nondispositive).
I. Introduction
On January 30, 2025, officers executed a search warrant at Mr. Duffy’s
residence on Viking Boulevard in Nowthen, Minnesota. (Gov’t Ex. 2 at 15; see
also Gov’t Ex. 1 at 15–17.) During that search, agents found 1.5 pounds of
methamphetamine packaged into separate bags, a loaded firearm, a digital
scale, and cash, among other items. (Dkt. No. 162 at 3.) That warrant led to
nine additional search and tracking warrants related to Mr. Duffy’s residence
and electronic devices. Mr. Duffy challenges the fruits of all these warrants
on the grounds that the initial warrant was invalid. (Dkt. No. 177 at 2.)
Mr. Duffy was subsequently charged with one count of conspiracy to
distribute methamphetamine (Count 1), three counts of possession with
intent to distribute methamphetamine (Counts 4, 7, 9), and one count of
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possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking (Count 5). (Dkt. No.
97.) He now raises several challenges related to the warrant that authorized
the initial search of his home.
II. Factual Background
On January 28, 2025, Judge Dyanna Street signed a search warrant
authorizing officers to search Mr. Duffy’s Viking Boulevard residence for:
Controlled substances including but not limited to
methamphetamine, items indicative of drug sales such as
packaging materials, scales, distribution materials, cutting
agents, US currency in the presence of controlled substances,
documents including letters, ledgers, financial transaction
statements, indicia of occupancy and ownership, proof of residency,
cell phones, storage locker keys, and permission to photograph and
record the scene.
(Gov’t Ex. 1 at 15.) Judge Street’s finding of probable cause was rooted in the
January 27 affidavit sworn by Special Agent (“SA”) Jeffrey Douglas Amey.
(Id. at 1–14.)
SA Amey is a member of the Paul Bunyon Drug Task Force. (Id. at 2.)
He “believed [Mr. Duffy] to be currently residing at” the Viking Boulevard
address, which both Mr. Duffy and codefendant Action Jack Simon listed as
their current address through the Minnesota Department of Vehicle Services
(“DVS”). (Id. at 4, 9, 11.) The task force had “received information from
human sources on numerous occasions and over an extended period of time”
indicating Mr. Duffy distributed methamphetamine—which was then
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trafficked to communities in Minnesota outside the Twin Cities metro area—
from his Viking Boulevard residence. (Id.) Many of Mr. Duffy’s arguments
relate to the confidential informants (“CIs”) and cooperating defendants
(“CDs”) discussed in SA Amey’s affidavit. But, as explained below, most (if
not all) of the information provided by the CIs and CDs is not necessary to
the finding of probable cause to search the Viking Boulevard residence.
Accordingly, I first discuss the facts immediately preceding the search at
issue—beginning with a tip from CD-2—which independently give rise to a
finding of probable cause. I then turn to the older contextual information
provided by the remaining CIs and CDs.
A. December 2024 to January 2025
During the week of December 29, 2024, CD-2 provided information to
SA Amey and another agent. (Gov’t Ex. 1 at 7.) At this time, the task force
was investigating Mr. Simon and Megan Preston, codefendants in this case
who were both “believed to be trafficking large amounts of methamphetamine
to outstate Minnesota, including Beltrami County.” (Id.) CD-2, who had
“numerous convictions for crimes of deception,” provided information in
exchange for consideration on pending criminal charges. (Id.) Law
enforcement officers independently corroborated the information CD-2
provided, which included “a phone number, residential descriptions,
identities and vehicle descriptions of individuals involved in controlled
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substance crimes.” (Id. at 8.) CD-2 had also previously provided information
that “led to the arrest of an individual with an outstanding warrant and the
seizure of quantities of controlled substances.” (Id.) CD-2 told investigators
that Mr. Simon and Ms. Preston were “trafficking large quantities of
methamphetamine to northern Minnesota” from the Twin Cities area, and
that Mr. Duffy was their source of supply. (Id.) CD-2 had previously
purchased methamphetamine from Ms. Preston (most recently on December
24, 2024) and gave investigators the phone number used to contact her. (Id.)
SA Amey then listened to a January 2, 2025, jail call between
Ms. Preston and an inmate in the Minnesota Department of Corrections.
Ms. Preston made the call from the phone number CD-2 provided. (Id. at 8.)
During this call, Ms. Preston confirmed she was making money but explained
she was becoming paranoid and felt like “it’s going to happen soon.” (Id.)
Ms. Preston also implied she would be federally charged if she was caught,
stating “when I grab it’s like 6,” which the agent understood to mean six
pounds of methamphetamine. (Id. at 9.)
As a result of this call, another agent applied for and received a Pen
Register and Trap and Trace (“PRTT”) warrant for the phone number
Ms. Preston had used to call the inmate. (Id.) Officers began receiving
location and call data from Verizon on January 8, 2025. (Id.) On January 13,
officers tracked Ms. Preston’s phone to a hotel in Baxter, Minnesota. (Id.)
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While conducting physical surveillance, they saw Mr. Simon “drive [a] vehicle
within the [hotel] parking lot.” (Id.) While officers were surveilling the
couple, Ms. Preston’s phone was in contact with a phone number tied to
Mr. Duffy’s CashApp account. (Id.)
Later that evening, Ms. Preston’s phone pinged on Viking Boulevard.
(Id.) On January 13, officers tracked her phone as it continued to move
around the Minneapolis-St. Paul area and Hastings. (Id.) On January 17,
Ms. Preston’s phone pinged near another “residence belonging to an associate
of Preston and Simon in Bloomington.” (Id.) While Ms. Preston’s phone was
at the Bloomington address, an officer conducting physical surveillance
spotted a car registered to Mr. Duffy near that location. (Id.)
On January 23, Ms. Preston’s phone again registered near Mr. Duffy’s
residence on Viking Boulevard. (Id.) Around 5:30 am on January 25, the
phone left Nowthen heading north. (Id.) Officers began travelling in the
same direction. (Id.) A couple of hours later, officers spotted Ms. Preston and
Mr. Simon (who had an active arrest warrant) in a black Dodge Durango
registered to a holding company. (Id. at 10.) An officer with the Hubbard
County Sheriff’s Department initiated a stop and conducted a high-risk PIT
maneuver after the Durango fled. (Id.)
Both occupants were arrested after the vehicle stopped. (Id.)
Ms. Preston, who had been driving, admitted she’d used methamphetamine
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that morning. (Id.) The resulting search of the vehicle turned up six pounds
of methamphetamine, $3,600 in cash, and 15 ounces of psilocybin
mushrooms. (Id. at 11.) Officers also located scales, a drug ledger, and
ammunition in the Durango. (Id.) Mr. Simon also had methamphetamine on
his person in a quantity “consistent with sales rather than personal use.”
(Id.)
SA Amey listened to a January 26, 2025, jail call between Mr. Simon,
Ms. Preston, and two other individuals “known to be involved in controlled
substance crimes.” (Id.) During that call, one of the individuals asked
Mr. Simon how “[his] dad” already knew about the arrest. (Id. at 12.)
Mr. Simon explained that his “dad” knew how long it would take Mr. Simon
and Ms. Preston to get home, and that he’d be expecting them to call when
they made it back. (Id.) One of the two individuals then asked Mr. Simon:
“So do I get to get one of them things when I go see him now or what?” (Id.)
SA Amey “believe[d] this individual was talking about obtaining a pound of
controlled substances from Duffy.” (Id.)
B. Contextual Information in the Affidavit
SA Amey’s affidavit also laid out Mr. Duffy’s history of possessing and
selling controlled substances. (Gov’t Ex. 1 at 3–4.) As set forth in the
affidavit, Mr. Duffy had been the subject of several investigations related to
the possession and sale of controlled substances across different states and
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dating back to 1989. (Id. at 3.) Mr. Duffy had been convicted in California in
1993 for possessing controlled substances. (Id.) Since Mr. Duffy moved to
Minnesota in the mid-1990s, human sources have “continuously identified”
him “as an individual supplying others with methamphetamine for use and
further distribution in outstate Minnesota.” (Id.) During a 2006 traffic stop
of Mr. Duffy’s vehicle, officers found six bags containing “a common
distribution amount” of methamphetamine and “a large sum of currency in
mixed denominations.” (Id.) Mr. Duffy was arraigned for possession but
those “[c]harges were later dismissed on appeal related to an expansion
argument.” (Id. at 4.)
SA Amey’s affidavit included information he had previously learned
from a series of CIs and CDs. CI-1 provided information to the task force on
March 16, 2010. (Id.) That CI told officers that Mr. Duffy and his wife were
trafficking methamphetamine from the Twin Cities area to Beltrami County.
(Id.) Law enforcement spotted the Duffys in the vehicle CI-1 had described,
traveling along the route CI-1 had anticipated. (Id.) Officers eventually
recovered 9 ounces of methamphetamine with a wholesale value of $10,000.
(Id.) Ms. Duffy was convicted of first-degree sale of a controlled substance
and sentenced to 86 months in the Minnesota Department of Corrections.
(Id.) Mr. Duffy was convicted of second-degree sale of a controlled substance
and sentenced to 81 months in the Minnesota Department of Corrections.
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(Id.) Around this same time, Mr. Duffy also pled guilty to fifth-degree
possession of a controlled substance. (Id.) “CI-1 was financially compensated
for the aforementioned information,” which “l[ed] to the seizure of
methamphetamine and arrests for controlled substances crimes.” (Id.)
CI-2 agreed to communicate with officers in the winter of 2020 for
financial compensation. (Id. at 4–5.) At that time, CI-2 had three prior
convictions involving crimes of deception, with the most recent of the three
convictions occurring over ten years prior. (Id. at 5.) Law enforcement
corroborated certain information provided by CI-2—including “names, phone
numbers, vehicles and locations of individuals involved in controlled
substances crimes”—through independent investigation. (Id.) CI-2 had
previously provided information which “led to the seizure of pound quantities
of methamphetamine and arrest for controlled substance crimes.” (Id.) That
informant “identified John Duffy as an individual distributing pound
quantities of methamphetamine to individuals for further distribution in
outstate Minnesota.” (Id.) The informant had previously “observed Duffy in
possession of large amounts of currency” and had “overheard phone
conversations between Duffy and others to arrange purchasing
methamphetamine from him.” (Id.) The information provided was against
CI-2’s penal interests. (Id.)
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CI-3 provided similar information in the spring of 2020. (Id.) Officers
independently corroborated the provided information, which “included
names, phone numbers, vehicles and residences of individuals involved in
controlled substance crimes.” (Id.) CI-3 had previously purchased
methamphetamine and other controlled substances “under the direction and
supervision of the task force.” (Id.) The CI explained that Mr. Duffy was
“their source of supply for methamphetamine.” (Id.) The CI would arrange
purchases by phone before travelling to Nowthen to complete the transaction.
(Id. at 5–6.) The informant explained Mr. Duffy had become paranoid and
stopped “distributing methamphetamine to members of the [drug trafficking
organization] from the outstate area.” (Id. at 6.) The informant advised that
Mr. Duffy would likely still distribute methamphetamine to Mr. Simon, with
whom Mr. Duffy shared a “father-son”-like relationship. (Id.) CI-3 explained
that Mr. Simon called Mr. Duffy “dad.” (Id.) This informant provided
information against his or her penal interest “for possible consideration on a
criminal offense.” (Id. at 5.) SA Amey disclosed that CI-3 had two prior
convictions for crimes of deception—one of which occurred over 10 years
earlier. (Id. at 6.)
CI-4 provided information to agents in the summer of 2021. (Id.) SA
Amey claimed this informant “did not seek any personal gain, financial or
otherwise,” but did make statements against his or her penal interests. (Id.)
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Law enforcement independently corroborated the information, which
included “individuals involved in controlled substance crimes in the Beltrami
County area . . . addresses, vehicles, phone numbers and methods of
operation.” (Id.) This informant had eleven previous convictions related to
crimes of deception, all of which were at least seven years before he or she
provided this information. (Id.) One of the convictions, which was over 10
years old, was for providing a false name to law enforcement. (Id.) This
informant identified Mr. Duffy as the individual who supplied
methamphetamine to a local drug trafficking organization. (Id.) The CI
described witnessing controlled substances crimes at Mr. Duffy’s Viking
Boulevard residence. (Id.) At that time, Mr. Duffy hadn’t yet changed his
DVS address to the Viking Boulevard residence. (Id. at 6–7.)
CD-1 consulted with law enforcement in the winter of 2022 “in
exchange for possible consideration on pending criminal charges.” (Id. at 7.)
Although this cooperator had a criminal history, none of the charges were for
crimes of deceit. (Id.) CD-1 told officers that Mr. Duffy—whom this person
had known for years—used to sell the CD-1 “distribution levels of
methamphetamine” out of his Viking Boulevard residence. (Id.) Although
CD-1 spent over a year traveling to Mr. Duffy’s residence to “obtain large
quantities of methamphetamine,” it had been over five years since the most
recent trip. (Id.) This person provided a detailed account of these trips. (See
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id. (explaining Mr. Duffy stored personal property in outbuildings on the
property, usually transacted on the second floor of the residence, and
insinuated methamphetamine was stored in vehicles on the property).)
III. Motion to Suppress (Dkt. No. 137)
A search warrant comports with the Fourth Amendment if it is
supported by probable cause. United States v. Maccani, 49 F.4th 1126, 1130
(8th Cir. 2022). “Probable cause exists when the affidavit submitted in
support of the warrant application ‘sets forth facts sufficient to create a fair
probability that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched.’”
United States v. Moore, 15-cr-11612-DWF/JSM, 2015 WL 8779926, at *3 (D.
Minn. Dec. 15, 2015) (quoting United States v. Jeanetta, 533 F.3d 651, 654
(8th Cir. 2008)), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Claybron, 716 Fed. App’x. 564
(8th Cir. 2017). “When a magistrate relies solely on an affidavit to issue the
warrant, ‘only that information which is found within the four corners of the
affidavit may be considered in determining the existence of probable cause.’”
United States v. Farlee, 757 F.3d 810, 819 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Etheridge,
165 F.3d at 656).
“A reviewing court should give ‘great deference’ to a magistrate judge’s
probable cause determination, and simply ensure the issuing judge ‘had a
substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.’” United States
v. Hart, CR 23-293 (JWB/ECW), 2024 WL 893335, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 1,
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2024) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 238–39 (1984)). In
determining whether probable cause existed, the Court may “draw
reasonable inferences from the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citing
United States v. Alexander, 574 F.3d 484, 490 (8th Cir. 2009)).
A. Staleness
Mr. Duffy first argues the evidence obtained from the execution of the
warrant should be suppressed because the supporting affidavit relied on stale
information.2 “There is no fixed formula for determining when information
has become stale.” United States v. Smith, 266 F.3d 902, 904 (8th Cir. 2001)
(citing United States v. Koelling, 992 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1993)). In
making this determination, the Court considers “the circumstances of the
case, including the nature of the crime under investigation.” Id. at 904–05.
Where, as here, the investigation involves an ongoing narcotics operation,
“intervals of weeks or months between the last described act and the
2 This portion of Mr. Duffy’s brief relies entirely on out-of-circuit caselaw,
which is not binding on this Court. (See Dkt. No. 177 at 8–10 (citing United
States v. Spikes, 158 F.3d 913, 923 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Hammond, 351 F.3d 765, 771 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Frechette, 583
F.3d 374, 378 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Middleton, 595 F. Supp. 3d
1277 (N.D. Ga. 2022); United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1342 (11th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Barnes, 749 F. Supp. 3d 822, 825 (E.D. Mich.
2024); United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 516 (3d Cir. 2010).)
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application for a warrant [does] not necessarily make the information stale.”
Id. at 905 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Formaro, 152 F.3d
768, 771 (8th Cir. 1998)).
Mr. Duffy argues that information about his “past indiscretions was
clearly meant to taint the [reviewing] judge.” (Dkt. No. 177 at 10.) He claims
that details “about [his] past that end[] in 2022 [are] too remote to be
considered as a basis to why he may be involved in a drug trafficking
conspiracy in 2025.” (Id.) Finally, he suggests that his relationship to Mr.
Simon isn’t enough to establish that Mr. Duffy was involved in the
underlying conspiracy. (Id.)
None of these arguments are persuasive. As the Government points
out, Mr. Duffy’s staleness challenge turns a blind eye to the evidence
stemming from the December 2024 investigation into Mr. Simon and
Ms. Preston. CD-2 told investigators that Mr. Duffy supplied
methamphetamine to the pair. Ms. Preston’s January 2, 2025, jail call
corroborated the cooperator’s claim that she and Mr. Simon were involved in
trafficking large quantities of methamphetamine. Ms. Preston’s phone
records show she was in contact with Mr. Duffy on January 13, and her
phone travelled to his residence on Viking Boulevard later that evening.
Investigators saw a car registered to Mr. Duffy near the location where
Ms. Preston’s phone pinged in Bloomington on January 17. Her phone
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returned to the Viking Boulevard residence on January 23 and remained
there until she and Mr. Simon left in the Durango. After police initiated a
high-risk stop, they located six pounds of methamphetamine in the car.
Mr. Simon’s address listed with DVS was the Viking Boulevard residence.
SA Amey swore his affidavit on January 27, Judge Street signed it on
January 28, and the search occurred on January 30. Setting aside the older
contextual information in the affidavit, these facts suffice to support Judge
Street’s finding of probable cause to search the Viking Boulevard residence.
I also agree with the Government that the older information in the
affidavit does not invalidate the details recited above. To the contrary, it
suggests a yearslong pattern of methamphetamine trafficking. Judge Street
reasonably concluded that there was a fair probability that evidence of
methamphetamine trafficking would be found at the Viking Boulevard
residence. Considering the nature of the crime charged, the information
contained within the four corners of the affidavit, and the deference owed to
the signing judge, Mr. Duffy’s staleness argument is unconvincing.
B. Uncorroborated Informants and Cooperators
When a supporting affidavit relies “on information from an informant,
the informant’s reliability, veracity, and basis of knowledge are relevant to
whether the affidavit provided probable cause to support the search.” United
States v. Solomon, 432 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v.
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LaMorie, 100 F.3d 547, 553 (8th Cir. 1996)). “The reliability of a confidential
informant can be established if the person has a history of providing law
enforcement officials with truthful information.” United States v. Wright, 145
F.3d 972, 975 (8th Cir. 1998). “[A] ‘deficiency’ in either the informant’s
reliability or his basis of knowledge ‘may be compensated for, in determining
the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some
other indicia of reliability.’” United States v. Petruk, 929 F.3d 952, 960 (8th
Cir. 2019) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 233).
First and foremost, the probable cause at issue for the challenged
search warrant is probable cause to search the Viking Boulevard residence,
not probable cause to arrest Mr. Duffy. Mr. Simon was arrested with six
pounds of methamphetamine in his vehicle. He lists his address as the Viking
Boulevard residence with DVS. And based on cellphone tracking of his
partner’s phone, he was known to have come and gone from that residence
twice in the two weeks before the arrest. These facts, established
independently without CI or CD information, create probable cause to search
the residence without even reaching the CIs and CDs.
To the extent any of the CIs or CDs is necessary to Judge Street’s
probable cause finding, there is ample information in SA Amey’s affidavit to
establish the reliability of the CIs and CDs.
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CI-1’s information led directly to the 2010 traffic stop, during which
investigators found significant quantities of methamphetamine on Mr. Duffy
and his wife.
CI-2 had previously provided information that led to arrests and the
seizure of methamphetamine. See United States v. Faulkner, 826 F.3d 1139,
1144 (8th Cir. 2016) (recognizing reliability can be established if the
informant has a “track record of providing trustworthy information”). This
CI also had firsthand knowledge that Mr. Duffy possessed large amounts of
cash and prearranged methamphetamine purchases by phone. See United
States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993) (giving more credence to
“information [] based on the informant’s first-hand observations, not merely
from rumor or innuendo”).
CI-3’s reliability was bolstered by the fact that he or she was a known
informant. CI-3 had previously purchased methamphetamine on behalf of
the task force. Cf. United States v. Light, 20-CR-147 (PAM/LIB), 2021 WL
1325683, at *21 (D. Minn. Jan. 15, 2021) (finding informants reliable where
they “had conducted multiple controlled purchases of controlled substances
under the direction of law enforcement” (citing United States v. Lucca, 377
F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2004))), report and recommendation adopted, CR 20-
147 (PAM/LIB), 2021 WL 1187260 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2021).
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Like CI-2, CI-4 also had a track record of providing reliable information
to police. Further, he provided Mr. Duffy’s Viking Boulevard address before
it had been updated in the DVS system. Cf. Faulkner, 826 F.3d at 1145
(finding fact that CI supplied “accurate information about verifiable details”
bolstered reliability even where “those corroborated details were not about
criminal activity”).
CD-1 provided a thorough description of Mr. Duffy’s Viking Boulevard
home and the details surrounding buys in which he or she had personally
participated. See United States v. Buchanan, 574 F.3d 554, 561 (8th Cir.
2009) (“[T]here are indicia of reliability in the richness and detail of a first
hand observation.” (quotation omitted)); see also Gates, 462 U.S. at 234
(finding an informant’s “explicit and detailed description of alleged
wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed first-hand,
entitles his tip to greater weight”).
CD-2 provided the phone number he’d used to purchase
methamphetamine from Ms. Preston. Investigators corroborated this detail
by listening to the January 2 jail call. And CD-2 provided information
leading to the arrest of an individual with an outstanding warrant, lending
additional reliability to CD-2’s information.
Similarly, investigators “independently corroborated” other specific
details provided by CD-2, CI-2, CI-3, and CI-4. See Williams, 10 F.3d at 593
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(“[I]ndependent corroboration bolsters the reliability and credibility of the
informant’s information, and thus, the finding of probable cause.”). Several
of the CIs and CDs also provided statements against their penal interests,
which further enhances their credibility. See Light, 2021 WL 1325683, at *22
(citing United States v. LaMorie, 100 F.3d 547, 553 (8th Cir. 1996)).
Mr. Duffy points out that several of the informants and cooperators
have criminal records—including for crimes of dishonesty—or “motive[s] to
lie.” (Dkt. No. 177 at 12.) But, “[p]robable cause may be found . . . in hearsay
statements from confidential informants corroborated by independent
investigation . . . .” Walden v. Carmack, 156 F.3d 861, 870 (8th Cir.1998)
(internal citations omitted). That is the circumstance here, where the
affidavit contains ample corroboration. Indeed, the more recent information
in the affidavit didn’t rely on CIs or CDs. Instead, it involved physical
surveillance, the PRTT warrant for Ms. Preston’s phone, and the search of
the Durango.
Mr. Duffy’s remaining arguments are similarly unpersuasive. For
example, he claims the “the alleged information regarding Duffy provided
after 2022 is sparce [sic] and there is no specific time reference.” (Dkt. No.
177 at 12.) CD-2 is the only CI/CD who provided information after 2022, and
the affidavit states he met with SA Amey and SA Newhouse “[d]uring the
week of December 29, 2024.” (Id. at 7.) That cooperator told investigators
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Mr. Duffy supplied methamphetamine to Ms. Preston and Mr. Simon and
explained that Mr. Duffy would often require several days between payment
and distribution.
Mr. Duffy also suggests that the CIs/CDs’ information relied on
hearsay, but he provides no specific examples of such statements. Similarly,
Mr. Duffy claims the affidavit is “void of corroboration for the baseless
assertions of the CI’s and CD’s.” (Dkt. No. 177 at 14.) But, as detailed above,
that statement is not accurate.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, SA Amey’s affidavit
provided a substantial basis for Judge Street to find probable cause.
C. Good-Faith Exception
Finally, the Government argues that even if probable cause was
lacking, suppression isn’t warranted because officers had a good-faith belief
in the validity of the warrant. (Dkt. No. 179 at 15 (citing United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).) Under Leon’s good-faith exception, “evidence
seized pursuant to a search warrant later determined to be invalid, will not
be suppressed if the executing officer’s reliance upon the warrant was
objectively reasonable.” United States v. Jackson, 784 F.3d 1227, 1231 (8th
Cir. 2015).
“The good-faith inquiry is confined to the objectively ascertainable
question whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that
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the search was illegal despite the issuing judge’s authorization.” United
States v. Norey, 31 F.4th 631, 635 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v.
Williams, 976 F.3d 807, 809 (8th Cir. 2020)). In making this determination,
the Court considers “the totality of the circumstances, including information
known to the officer but not presented to the issuing judge.” Id. (quoting
United States v. Fiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 345 (8th Cir. 2011)). Leon recognized
four circumstances when an officer’s reliance on the warrant isn’t in good
faith:
(1) when the affidavit or testimony supporting the warrant
contained a false statement made knowingly and intentionally or
with reckless disregard for its truth, thus misleading the issuing
judge; (2) when the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial
role in issuing the warrant; (3) when the affidavit in support of the
warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) when
the warrant is so facially deficient that no police officer could
reasonably presume the warrant to be valid.
Fiorito, 640 F.3d at 345 (quoting United States v. Perry, 531 F.3d 662, 665
(8th Cir. 2008)). As I explain in the context of Mr. Duffy’s motion for a
Franks hearing, the first scenario is not present here. And, as I’ve detailed
above, none of the remaining three scenarios apply. Because there is no basis
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to suppress the January 28, 2025, warrant, I recommend this motion (Dkt.
No. 137) be DENIED.3
IV. Motion for Disclosure (Dkt. No. 138)
Mr. Duffy next asks the Court to order the Government to produce the
identities of the confidential informants and cooperators involved in this case.
(Dkt. No. 177 at 17–19.) Alternatively, he asks the Court to either conduct
an “in-camera proceeding” or to provide additional information about the
CIs/CDs’ backgrounds. (Id. 18–19.)
The Government has a limited privilege not to disclose the identities of
individuals “who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged
with enforcement of that law.” Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59
(1957). But if “the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of
his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is
essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way.” Id.
at 60–61. “However, ‘[i]n cases involving “tipsters” who merely convey
information to the government but neither witness nor participate in the
offense, disclosure is generally not material to the outcome of the case and is
therefore not required.’” United States v. Reed, 24-CR-38 (JRT/JFD), 2024
3 Mr. Duffy makes no independent arguments for suppression of the nine
subsequent search warrants. Thus, the Court does not address or recommend
suppression of those warrants.
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WL 4298143, at *6 (D. Minn. Sept. 26, 2024) (quoting United States v.
Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 1991)).
Mr. Duffy “has the burden of showing that the need for disclosure
outweighs the government’s privilege to withhold the identity of its
confidential informants.” United States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 1005 (8th
Cir. 2004). To meet this burden, he must “establish beyond mere speculation
that the informant’s testimony will be material to the determination of the
case.” United States v. Oliver, 950 F.3d 556, 562 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting
United States v. Harrington, 951 F.2d 876, 877 (8th Cir. 1991)); see also
United States v. Lapsley, 334 F.3d 762, 764 (8th Cir. 2003) (recognizing the
most important factor in determining whether disclosure is required is
whether the informant’s “information is material to the defense”).
Materiality in this context means a “reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” United States v. Lindsey, 284 F.3d 874, 877 (8th Cir.
2002) (quoting Harrington, 951 F.2d at 878). Mr. Duffy has not met his
burden here.
As an initial matter, the Government represents that it does not intend
to call any of the informants or cooperators at trial. (Dkt. No. 155 at 18.)
This fact cuts against disclosure. See United States v. Penaloza-Romero, 19-
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cr-1303-PAM-SER, 2019 WL 4052442, at *2 (D. Minn. Aug. 28, 2019) (citing
United States v. Hollis, 245 F.3d 671, 674 (8th Cir. 2001)).
Nevertheless, Mr. Duffy claims disclosure is required because CIs/CDs
are “alleged to have engaged directly with Duffy through [] communications
for controlled substances” and “are alleged to have participated in the
offense.” (Dkt. No. 177 at 18.) Although CI-2 witnessed large amounts of
cash at Viking Boulevard and CI-4 saw drugs there, those observations are
not enough to require disclosure of those informants’ identities. Cf. United
States v. Roberson, 439 F.3d 934, 940 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding informant
“who claimed to have witnessed [defendant] possessing crack cocaine, but did
not claim to have witnessed a drug transaction” was a tipster).
Although CD-1 purchased methamphetamine from Mr. Duffy, he or she
last did so in or around 2017. Mr. Duffy is not charged with any conduct
occurring before January 1, 2025. Accordingly, Mr. Duffy hasn’t met his
burden to show that the cooperator’s testimony would be material to the
pending charges. Cf. United States v. Davison, 415-CR-544-JAR-JMB, 2017
WL 6999850, at *12 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 6, 2017) (denying motion to disclose CI’s
identity because the informant “was a witness only to antecedent events, but
not to the charged crime”), report and recommendation adopted, 4:15-cr-544
JAR, 2018 WL 488941 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 19, 2018). Similarly, CI-3 purchased
methamphetamine from Mr. Duffy in 2020 with the intention of distributing
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it in outstate Minnesota. Like CD-1, CI-3 could not offer any testimony about
the more recent charged conduct.
However, CI-3 told investigators that Mr. Duffy had become paranoid
and stopped selling methamphetamine to individuals from the outstate area.
Despite its age, this testimony, viewed in isolation, could arguably be helpful
to Mr. Duffy’s defense. But CI-3 qualified that statement by noting Mr. Duffy
would likely sell to Mr. Simon, who is one of the co-defendants in the present
indictment. Because Mr. Simon is an alleged co-conspirator, CI-3’s potential
testimony is not materially helpful to Mr. Duffy on the current charges.
Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 59–61 (explaining an informant’s identity should be
disclosed where a defendant shows the testimony would be “relevant and
helpful”).
Similarly, CD-2 provided information that he or she purchased
methamphetamine from Ms. Preston, not Mr. Duffy. CD-2 provided the most
recent information, and CD-2 is the only confidential source that could even
plausibly be a witness related to the present charges. But Mr. Duffy hasn’t
shown that disclosure of this person’s identity is material. Based on CD-2’s
information, investigators were able to obtain a PRTT warrant for
Ms. Preston’s phone. Officers tracked her phone and used physical
surveillance to connect Ms. Preston and Mr. Simon with the Viking
Boulevard address and, eventually, the six pounds of methamphetamine
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found in the Durango. CD-2 therefore is a tipster, not a direct participant in
the charged offenses, and his or her testimony is not material to Mr. Duffy’s
defense.
Finally, Mr. Duffy argues disclosure is appropriate “to ascertain the
veracity of the information or if the information was actually provided to law
enforcement.” (Dkt. No. 177 at 18.) It appears Mr. Duffy is arguing “that the
informant’s past criminal record, if any, and the informant’s incentive for
supplying information were essential because the informant provided the
probable cause for issuance of the search warrant.” United States v. Bourbon,
819 F.2d 856, 859 (8th Cir. 1987). Because the affidavit contains sufficient
indicia of reliability, as explained above, disclosure is not required on that
basis. See id. (citing United States v. Skramstad, 649 F.2d 1259, 1264–65
(8th Cir. 1981)).
Accordingly, Mr. Duffy’s Motion for Disclosure of Informants and
Cooperating Defendants (Dkt. No. 138) is DENIED.
V. Motion for Franks Hearing (Dkt. No. 139)
Finally, Mr. Duffy filed a Motion for Franks Hearing (Dkt. No. 139).
An affidavit supporting a search warrant is presumed to be valid. Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). A Franks hearing gives the defendant an
opportunity “to challenge the truthfulness of factual statements in the
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application for the search warrant.” United States v. Arnold, 725 F.3d 896,
897 (8th Cir. 2013) (citing Franks, 438 U.S. 154).
But to establish his entitlement to such a hearing, the defendant must
first (1) “make[] a ‘substantial preliminary showing’ that the affiant
intentionally or recklessly included a false statement in the warrant
affidavit,” and (2) must demonstrate that “the false statement was ‘necessary
to the finding of probable cause.’” United States v. Shockley, 816 F.3d 1058,
1061 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 986 F.2d 1231, 1233–34
(8th Cir. 1993)). “Allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are
insufficient.” United States v. Mayweather, 993 F.3d 1035, 1043 (8th Cir.
2021) (quoting United States v. Williams, 477 F.3d 554, 559 (8th Cir. 2007)).
“This substantiality requirement is not met lightly and requires a
defendant to offer specific allegations along with supporting affidavits or
similarly reliable statements.” United States v. Gonzalez, 781 F.3d 422, 430
(8th Cir. 2015) (citing Williams, 477 F.3d at 558). “A mere allegation
standing alone, without an offer of proof in the form of a sworn affidavit of a
witness or some other reliable corroboration, is insufficient to make the
difficult preliminary showing.” United States v. El-Alamin, 574 F.3d 915, 925
(8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Mathison, 157 F.3d 541, 548 (8th
Cir. 1998)).
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The Court can infer reckless disregard where information is omitted
from an affidavit, but only if the defendant shows that the “omitted material
would be ‘clearly critical to the finding of probable cause.’’ Gonzalez, 781 F.3d
at 432 (citing Jacobs, 986 F.2d at 1235). “Probable cause to issue a search
warrant exists if, in light of the totality of the circumstances, there is ‘a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.’” Shockley, 816 F.3d at 1061 (quoting United States v.
Donnell, 726 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2013)).
Mr. Duffy argues SA Amey “intentionally omitted” certain information
from the affidavit. (Dkt. No. 177 at 15.) First, he claims SA Amey should
have included the fact that Mr. Simon and Ms. Preston travelled to the Twin
Cities to meet with drug supplier Tregg Bjorklund “on or about January 13,
2025.”4 In support of this argument, Mr. Duffy cites text messages between
Ms. Preston and Mr. Bjorklund which, in his view, “clearly show that Simon
and Preston were coming to the Twin Cities to obtain controlled substances
from their supplier Trigg Bjorklund.” (Dkt. No. 178 ¶ 4.)
Setting aside this overly generous characterization of those messages,
Mr. Duffy hasn’t proffered any evidence demonstrating SA Amey had access
to these text messages at the time he drafted the affidavit. Mr. Duffy cites to
4 Although Mr. Duffy calls this person Trigg, it appears his name is Tregg.
Compare (Dkt. No. 140 ¶ 9), with (Dkt. No. 178-2 at 21).
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an extraction report, which was created on May 30, 2025, (Dkt. No. 178-2 at
2), and a report created some time after that, (Dkt. No. 178-3). See also (Dkt.
No. 178-3 (indicating SA Newhouse applied for the warrant for the text
messages on March 21, 2025).) SA Amey swore his affidavit on January 27,
2025, and Judge Street signed it the following morning. (Gov’t Ex. 1 at 14–
17.) Mr. Duffy proffers nothing to suggest SA Amey knew at the time he
signed the affidavit that Mr. Simon and Ms. Preston planned to meet
Mr. Bjorklund to buy drugs. Thus, there is nothing untoward about the
agent’s failure to reference Mr. Bjorklund. Cf. El-Alamin, 574 F.3d at 925
(affirming denial of Franks hearing where defendant proffered no evidence to
suggest the officer “knew the information [provided by a CI] to be false or was
unjustified in relying on it”).
In any event, the warrant would have been supported by probable
cause even if the information about Bjorklund had been included. Mr. Duffy
argues this omitted “information is clearly relevant . . . because it would have
offered an alternative source of the controlled substances that were found in
Simon and Preston’s vehicle and on and in their person on January 25, 2025.”
(Dkt. No. 177 at 15–16.) Assuming Mr. Duffy is correct that Mr. Simon and
Ms. Preston picked up methamphetamine from Mr. Bjorklund a few days
earlier, the duo were still at the Viking Boulevard residence from January 23
to 25. They were pulled over after leaving that residence, and six pounds of
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methamphetamine was found in their vehicle. At best, the omitted
information may have suggested Mr. Simon and Ms. Preston purchased
drugs from Mr. Bjorklund. But it does nothing to dispel the inference that
there was a fair probability that some of those purchased drugs could be
found at the Viking Boulevard residence, particularly considering the recency
of Mr. Simon’s and Ms. Preston’s presence at that residence in relation to
their arrest.
Mr. Duffy also argues that the affidavit “fails to mention the only
reason that Mr. Duffy, who is known to be a father figure to Simon, had
contact with Simon and Preston, is because Simon and Preston crashed their
vehicle on the way down to meet Bjorklund,” and that “Duffy came to their
rescue towing their vehicle to his house in Nowthen, MN where he has
numerous other vehicles and works on cars.” (Dkt. No. 177 at 15.) He claims
SA Amey intentionally omitted any reference to this accident despite the fact
that it “was known to law enforcement as they claimed they surveilled Simon
and Preston and then Duffy after he arrived to help them as his presence in
Brainerd was mentioned in reports.” (Dkt. No. 140 ¶ 10.)
Other than his attorney’s statements in his sworn declaration,
Mr. Duffy provides nothing to corroborate the assertion that officers were
surveilling Mr. Simon and Ms. Preston at the time of the accident. Although
SA Amey’s affidavit states that officers observed the couple at a hotel in
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Baxter, Minnesota, (Gov’t Ex. 1 at 9), nothing in the record suggests officers
followed them from that location. To the contrary, SA Amey states that
officers relied on the location of Ms. Preston’s phone later that evening to
determine she went to Mr. Duffy’s residence. Similarly, nothing in the record
corroborates the assertion that “reports” show Mr. Duffy traveled to Brainerd
to help after the car accident. Counsel’s fleeting reference to these reports is
insufficient to meet Mr. Duffy’s high burden here. And, in any event,
Mr. Duffy has failed to explain why the omission of that information would
disturb the finding of probable cause.
Next, Mr. Duffy argues the warrant “fails to mention that Simon and
Preston, who were in the Twin Cities area from January 14 to January 25,
only stayed at Duffy’s home approximately three or four days (January 14,
15, and January 23 and 24) as they were out looking for controlled
substances.” (Dkt. No. 177 at 15.) The affidavit mentions Ms. Preston’s
phone was at the Viking Boulevard address on January 13 and again from
January 23 to 25. (See Gov’t Ex. 1 at 9.) The affidavit also specifies that the
phone pinged across the Twin Cities metro on January 16 and in
Bloomington on January 17. Because the signing judge could have drawn the
inference that the phone was not continuously at the Viking Boulevard
address during that period, this omission does not entitle Mr. Duffy to a
Franks hearing.
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Finally, Mr. Duffy claims the affidavit should have included details
about the fact that he was angry with Mr. Simon and Ms. Preston because
they borrowed one of his vehicles without proper communication. (Dkt. No.
177 at 15.) He doesn’t explain why SA Amey would have known that
information when he swore his affidavit, or how it affects the probable cause
analysis. Accordingly, it does not entitle him to a Franks hearing.5
Mr. Duffy also references the staleness of the information and the
“uncorroborated assertions” by confidential informants as justifications for a
Franks hearing. (See Dkt. No. 140 ¶ 13.) I have already addressed and
rejected those arguments above. For those reasons, they do not entitle him to
a Franks hearing.
Finally, Mr. Duffy makes an alternative request for the Court to hold “a
limited pre-Franks hearing” to “provide [Mr. Duffy] a further opportunity” to
make the necessary showing. (Dkt. No. 17 at 16.) But Mr. Duffy filed
preliminary briefing (Dkt. No. 139), had an opportunity to present further
5 In his pre-hearing brief, Mr. Duffy claimed SA Amey “misrepresent[ed] the
time frame that Duffy resided at the target address.” (Dkt. No. 140 ¶ 7.) To
the extent he has not abandoned the argument by failing to address it in his
supplemental brief, it fails. Mr. Duffy doesn’t identify a false or misleading
statement in the affidavit, doesn’t provide any information about when Mr.
Duffy in fact resided at the relevant address, and doesn’t explain why
information related to Mr. Duffy’s length of residence is necessary to the
finding of probable cause.
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argument at the January 13, 2026, hearing (Dkt. No. 171) and presented
supplemental briefing and an affidavit with exhibits on the issue (Dkt. Nos.
177 and 178). Despite having plenty of opportunity to meet his burden, Mr.
Duffy has not made the required showing. Accordingly, his Motion for
Franks Hearing (Dkt. No. 139) is DENIED.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, and upon careful consideration of the entire
record, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Mr. Duffy’s Motion for Disclosure of Informants and Cooperating
Defendants (Dkt. No. 138) is DENIED; and
2. Mr. Duffy’s Motion for Franks Hearing (Dkt. No. 139) is
DENIED.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, and upon careful consideration of the entire
record, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Mr. Duffy’s Motion to
Suppress Search and Seizure Evidence (Dkt. No. 137) be DENIED.
Date: March 19, 2026 s/Elsa M. Bullard
ELSA M. BULLARD
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or
judgment of the District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written
objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations
within 14 days after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.
A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a
copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses
must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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