USA v. Lopez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Rebecca Kline, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 300 South Fourth
Street, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55415, for Plaintiff.
Jordan S. Kushner, LAW OFFICE OF JORDAN S. KUSHNER, 431 South
Seventh Street, Suite 2446, Minneapolis, MN 55415, for Defendant.
Defendant Isabel Lopez faces three counts of assaulting, resisting, and impeding
certain officers under 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and one count of obstruction of law
enforcement during civil disorder under 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3). Counts 1 through 3 of the
Indictment allege that on June 3, 2025, Lopez assaulted and obstructed law enforcement
officers as they executed a search warrant at a restaurant in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
which was part of an investigation into a suspected drug-trafficking conspiracy linked to
certain transnational criminal organizations. 	Count 4 alleges that Lopez assaulted,
resisted, and impeded certain officers during her arrest on June 9, 2025 for her alleged
conduct on June 3, 2025. Lopez filed a Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State
an Offense as to Counts 2 and 3 of the Indictment and a Motion to Dismiss Count 3 as
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
ISABEL LOPEZ,
Defendant.
Crim. No. 25-230 (JRT/DJF)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
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Unconstitutional. On November 25, 2025, United States Magistrate Judge Dulce J. Foster
issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the Lopez’s motions to
dismiss be denied. Lopez timely objected. After de novo review, the Court will overrule
Lopez’s objections, adopt the R&R, and deny Lopez’s motions to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
I. 	FACTS
On June 3, 2025, federal agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA),
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and Homeland
Security Investigations (HSI) executed search warrants at eight locations in the Twin Cities.
(Aff. of Monica Evans (“Evans Aff.”) ¶ 4, June 9, 2025, Docket No. 1-1.) 	The search
warrants were executed as part of criminal investigation into a suspected conspiracy by a
drug trafficking organization. (Id.)
On or around 10:00 a.m., federal agents began executing a search warrant at the
Cuatro Milpas restaurant, located at 1526 East Lake Street in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
(Id. ¶ 9.) While federal agents were executing the warrant, a crowd of about 100 people
formed to protest. (Id. ¶ 10.) Federal agents reported that the crowd mistakenly believed
the agents were there to arrest individuals for immigration violations. 	(Id. ¶ 11.)
Recognizing the perceived misunderstanding, the officers explained to the protesters that
the warrant was not related to immigration. (Id.) As the crowd size increased and became
more agitated, the federal agents called for backup. (Id. ¶ 13.) Additional federal agents,
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Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office (HCSO) deputies, and Minneapolis Police Department
(MPD) officers responded to the scene. 	(Id. ¶ 13.) 	The crowd members allegedly
assaulted both federal and local law enforcement officers. (Id. ¶¶ 12–14.)
Following the incident, federal agents reviewed body-camera footage and open-
source video and determined that Lopez was among the individuals who assaulted the
officers during the protest. (Id. ¶ 15.) In the footage, Lopez was observed attempting to
hit at least one of the FBI SWAT agents “with her arms and/or closed fist.” 	(Id. ¶ 18.)
Members of the crowd restrained her, but while being restrained, Lopez allegedly kicked
an FBI SWAT officer and resisted other officers. (Id.) Lopez then broke free of the crowd
members that were restraining her and allegedly pushed another FBA SWAT officer with
her arms. (Id. ¶ 19.)
Roughly six minutes after the first incident, footage shows that Lopez was standing
on a trash can in the middle of the street. (Id. ¶ 20.) At that time, members of the crowd
used trash cans to block law enforcement vehicles by placing them in the street and
standing on them to prevent their removal. 	(Id.) 	At one point, federal officers
approached Lopez to attempt to get her down from the trash can. (Id. ¶ 21.) Lopez then
slipped and fell onto the trash can, and as officers attempted to help Lopez off the trash
can, Lopez allegedly pushed and kicked the officers. (Id.)
Later, as federal officers and local police were departing, footage shows that Lopez
targeted officers who were directing pedestrians away from the departing vehicle convoy.
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(Id. ¶ 22.) Lopez allegedly threw “a softball or other ball-shaped object” at the officers,
including a HCSO deputy and ATF Task Force Officer. (Id. ¶ 23.) After throwing the ball
at the officers, Lopez retrieved it and threw it again at another HCSO deputy. (Id. ¶ 24.)
II. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 9, 2025, the Government charged Lopez through a Complaint. 	(See
Compl., June 9, 2025, Docket No. 1.) That same day, Lopez was arrested, and during the
arrest, she allegedly punched an FBI agent in the ear while holding a soda can. (See Gov’t’s
Response at 5, Sept. 22, 2025, Docket No. 46; Indictment at 2–3, June 10, 2025, Docket
No. 9.) 	She further attempted to flee the agents’ vehicle after her arrest. 	(Gov’t’s
Response at 5.)
Lopez was indicted on June 10, 2025, and charged with three counts (Counts 1, 2,
and 4) of assaulting, resisting, and impeding certain officers in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 111(a)(1) for her alleged assaults against the FBI SWAT officer and the HCSO deputy on
June 3 and her assault against the FBI agent during her arrest on June 9. (Indictment at
1–3.) Lopez was also charged with Obstruction of Law Enforcement During Civil Disorder
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) stemming from her alleged conduct on June 3. (Id. at
2; see also Gov’t’s Response at 5.)
Lopez moves to dismiss Counts 2 and Count 3 for failure to state an offense. (Mot.
to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State Offense, Sept. 4, 2025, Docket No. 41.) Lopez
also moves to dismiss Count 3 on the basis that 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) is unconstitutional,
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arguing that the statute violates Lopez’s free speech rights under the First Amendment
and her due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. (Mot. to Dismiss Count 3 as Unconstitutional, Sept. 5, 2025, Docket
No. 42.)
On November 25, 2025, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R recommending that
Lopez’s motions be denied. (R&R, Nov. 25, 2025, Docket No. 62.) Lopez timely objected
to the R&R, incorporating the arguments previously presented to the Magistrate Judge.
(Objs., Dec. 9, 2025, Docket No. 63.)
DISCUSSION
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
After a magistrate judge issues an R&R, “[a] party may file and serve specific
written objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations . . . .”
D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(1). 	“The objections should specify the portions of the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation to which objections are made and provide a basis for
those objections.” Mayer v. Walvatne, Civ. No. 07–1958, 2008 WL 4527774, at *2 (D.
Minn. Sept. 28, 2008). 	For dispositive motions, the Court reviews de novo “properly
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objected to” portions of an R&R.1 D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3).
II. 	ANALYSIS
Because Defendant’s motions to dismiss are dispositive, the Court will review the
Magistrate Judge’s determinations de novo. See D. Minn. LR 72.1(a)(3)(A), 72.2(b)(3).
A. 	Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State an Offense
An indictment “must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1). The indictment
must state “the statute, rule, regulation, or other provision of law that the defendant is
alleged to have violated.” Id. A defendant can move to dismiss an indictment if it fails to
state an offense. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v). “An indictment is legally sufficient on its
face if it contains all of the essential elements of the offense charged, fairly informs the
defendant 	of 	the 	charges 	against 	which 	he 	must 	defend, 	and 	alleges 	sufficient
information to allow a defendant to plead a conviction or acquittal as a bar to a
subsequent prosecution.” United States v. Carter, 270 F.3d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 2001). “An
indictment will ordinarily be held sufficient unless it is so defective that it cannot be said,
1 In the civil context, “[o]bjections which are not specific but merely repeat arguments
presented to and considered by a magistrate judge are not entitled to de novo review, but rather
are reviewed for clear error.” Montgomery v. Compass Airlines, LLC, 98 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1017
(D. Minn. 2015). It is unclear whether this rule applies in the criminal context. See United States
v. Chopra, Crim. No. 19-305, 2021 WL 347415, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2021). Because the Eighth
Circuit has not weighed in on the proper standard of review and because Defendant’s objections
fail under either standard, the Court will review the R&R de novo.
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by any reasonable construction, to charge the offense for which the defendant was
convicted.” United States v. Fleming, 8 F.3d 1264, 1265 (8th Cir. 1993). An indictment is
usually considered sufficient so long as it tracks the language of the governing statute.
United States v. Sewell, 513 F.3d 820, 821 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974)). Lopez contends that Counts 2 and 3 of the Indictment should
be dismissed for failure to state an offense. The Court will address each Count in turn.
1. 	Count 2
Count 2 of the Indictment alleges that Lopez assaulted, resisted, and impeded
certain officers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) after allegedly assaulting an HCSO
deputy who was assisting federal agents. (Indictment at 2–3.) Lopez argues that Count 2
must be dismissed for failure to state an offense because the Indictment fails to specify
“what federal officer or employee said deputy was assisting in [the] performance of their
official duties” and so, “there is no way to determine if and how the sheriff deputy was
assisting a federal officer in performance of official duties as required for this charge to
apply to conduct towards a non-federal officer.” (Mot. to Dismiss Indictment for Failure
to State Offense at 1–2.) 	The Court disagrees.
18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) prohibits the assault of “any person designated in [18 U.S.C.
§ 1114] while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties.” Section
1114 covers federal officers and employees as well as “any person assisting such an
officer or employee in the performance of such duties or on account of that assistance.”
(emphasis added).
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Here, Count 2 of the Indictment tracks the statutory language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 111(a)(1) and is therefore sufficient on its face. 	See Sewell, 513 F.3d at 821. 	More
importantly, the Indictment contains all of the essential elements of the charged offense
by alleging that Lopez assaulted an HCSO deputy who was assisting federal officers who
were performing their official duties. 	As the Magistrate Judge noted, Lopez cites no
authority, and the Court has found none, requiring an indictment to identify the specific
federal officer or to describe how the state officer was allegedly assisting a federal officer.
(See R&R at 5.) Because Count 2 of the Indictment contains the essential elements of the
charged offense, fairly informs Lopez of the charges, and alleges sufficient information to
allow Lopez to plead double jeopardy as a bar to future prosecution, the Court finds that
the Indictment satisfies Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(c) and will overrule Lopez’s
objection as to Count 2. See Fleming, 8 F.3d at 1265.
2. 	Count 3
Count 3 of the Indictment charges Lopez with Obstruction of Law Enforcement
During Civil Disorder under 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3). (Indictment at 2.) Lopez argues that the
Indictment fails to state an offense because the Indictment fails to sufficiently allege
“whether or how there was a civil disorder, that law enforcement was lawfully responding
to that civil disorder, that Ms. Lopez knowingly committed an act to obstruct and impede
law enforcement, and [the] nature of the federally protected function she was allegedly
interfering with.” (Mot. to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State Offense at 2.) 	This
argument fails.
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Like Count 2, Count 3 of the Indictment tracks the statutory language of 18 U.S.C.
§ 231(a)(3). See Sewell, 513 F.3d at 821. Moreover, contrary to Defendant’s assertion,
an indictment need not allege every fact constituting the offense. United States v. Hance,
501 F.3d 900, 906 (8 th Cir. 2007) (“Typically an indictment is not sufficient only if an
essential element of the offense is omitted from it.”); United States v. Afremov, Crim. No.
6-196, 2007 WL 3237630, at *13 (D. Minn. Oct. 30, 2007) (“Indictments need not
exhaustively recount the facts surrounding the crime’s commission.”). Because Count 3
sets forth the essential elements of the offense, fairly informs Lopez of the charge, and
provides 	sufficient 	detail 	to 	permit 	a 	double-jeopardy 	defense 	in 	a 	subsequent
proceeding, the Court concludes that the Indictment is sufficient under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 7(c) and will overrule Lopez’s objection as to Count 3. See Fleming, 8
F.3d at 1265.
B. Motion to Dismiss as Unconstitutional
Lopez also moves to dismiss Count 3 (Obstruction of Law Enforcement During Civil
Disorder in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3)) as unconstitutional under the First, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. 	(Docket No. 42.) 	Lopez first argues that 18 U.S.C.
§ 231(a)(3) is unconstitutionally overbroad because it infringes on her rights of free
speech and assembly under the First Amendment. 	Lopez also asserts that the statute
violates her due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
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1. 	Overbreadth Under First Amendment
Section 231(a)(3) makes it illegal to “obstruct, impede, or interfere” with a law
enforcement officer who is “lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of his official
duties incident to and during the commission of a civil disorder,” where that act
“obstructs, delays, or adversely affects . . . the conduct or performance of any federally
protected function.” 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3). 18 U.S.C. § 232(1) defines “civil disorder” as
“any public disturbance involving acts of violence by assemblages of three or more
persons, which causes an immediate danger of or results in damage or injury to the
property or person of any other individual.” 	Lopez asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3)
violates her First Amendment rights, arguing that the statute is overbroad. 	(Mot. to
Dismiss Count 3 as Unconstitutional at 1–3.)
Lopez’s argument fails at the threshold because Eighth Circuit has squarely held
that § 231(a)(3) does not implicate the First Amendment. United States v. Mechanic, 454
F.2d 849, 852–853 (8 th Cir. 1971). 	The statute, the Eighth Circuit explained, has “no
application to speech, but applies only to violent physical acts.” Id. Because § 231(a)(3)
does not cover speech, the First Amendment is not implicated.
Attempting to sidestep Mechanic, Lopez asserts that Mechanic is distinguishable
because the Indictment here does not allege sufficiently violent acts to warrant the
application of § 231(a)(3). The Court rejects Lopez’s reading of Mechanic. As other courts
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have explained,2 § 231(a)(3) is not limited to only violent acts; the statute does not
distinguish between violent or non-violent acts. Instead, the statute applies to “any act
to obstruct, impede, or interfere.” 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) (emphasis added). The statute is
clear: Section 231(a)(3) criminalizes certain acts—violent or otherwise—not speech.
To be sure, the affidavit underlying the Complaint alleges serious physical acts,
including (1) attempting to hit an officer “with her arms and/or closed fist” (Evans Aff.
¶ 18), (2) kicking the same officer while resisting (id.), (3) pushing an FBI SWAT officer
with her arms (id. ¶ 19), and (4) throwing a “softball or ball-shaped object” at officers at
least twice (id. ¶ 23–24). Because the Eighth Circuit has held that § 231(a)(3) does not
apply to speech and the Government alleges significant physical acts, Lopez’s First
Amendment challenge fails.
2. 	Vagueness Under Due Process
A criminal statute violates due process if the statute is “so vague that it fails to give
ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes” or is “so standardless that it invites
arbitrary enforcement.” 	Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 595 (2015). 	Lopez’s
position 	is 	that 	Count 	3 	should 	be 	dismissed 	because 	18 	U.S.C. 	§ 	231(a)(3) 	is
2 See United States v. Howard, Crim. No. 21-28, 2021 WL 3856290, at *11 (E.D. Wis. Aug.
30, 2021 (declining to limit § 231(a)(3) to exclusively violent acts and explaining that “[i]t appears
that the Eighth Circuit was considering the specific ‘acts’ committed by the defendants in
[Mechanic]—throwing cherry bombs at police officers and firemen—when it referenced ‘violent
acts’”); United States v. Phomma, 561 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1068 (D. Or. 2021) (noting that
§ 231(a)(3) “reaches non-violent and violent conduct”).
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unconstitutional vague and therefore violates her due process rights under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. (Mot. to Dismiss Count 3 as Unconstitutional at 3–4.) Lopez
makes two arguments to support her position. 	First, Lopez contends that the phrase
“obstruct, impede, or interfere” is overly vague as it could be interpreted to prohibit
constitutionally protect activity (i.e., speech). 	(Id. at 3.) 	Second, she argues that the
statute is vague because “it is not clear whether a defendant must obstruct, impede, or
interfere with officers or whether the defendant must participate in the civil disorder.”
(Id. at 4.)
Again, consistent with the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Mechanic, the Court rejects
both of Lopez’s arguments. First, because § 231(a)(3) does not target speech and Lopez’s
alleged conduct can be constitutionally prohibited, the “defendant[] may not challenge it
as vague.” 	See Mechanic, 454 F.2d at 853. Second, § 231(a)(3) is also not impermissibly
vague as the statute plainly criminalizes certain acts committed “during the commission
of a civil disorder[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) (emphasis added). 	But the statute does not
criminalize the “mere presence at a civil disorder.” Mechanic, 454 F.2d at 853. According
to the Eighth Circuit, the phrase “civil disorder” does nothing more than “describe[] the
environment in which the act must be committed in order to be subject to prosecution
under § 231(a)(3).” 	Id. 	Accordingly, the Court concludes that § 231(a)(3) is not
unconstitutionally vague, and the statute therefore does not violate Lopez’s due process
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rights. 	For these reasons, as well as those stated in the R&R, the Court will overrule
Lopez’s objections and deny Lopez’s Motion to Dismiss Count 3 as Unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
As to Counts 2 and 3, the Court concludes that the Indictment does not fail to state
an offense because it contains the essential elements of the charged offense, fairly
informs Lopez of the charges, and alleges sufficient information to plead double jeopardy
in a subsequent prosecution. The Court also concludes that 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(3) is neither
overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague, and thus, the statute does not violate Lopez’s
rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 	Accordingly, the Court will
overrule Lopez’s objections, adopt the R&R, and deny Lopez’s motions to dismiss (Docket
Nos. 41 and 42).
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Defendant Isabel Lopez’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation
(Docket No. [63]) are OVERRULED.
2. 	The Report and Recommendation (Docket No. [62]) is ADOPTED.
3. 	Defendant Lopez’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment for Failure to State an
Offense (Docket No. [41]) is DENIED.
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4. 	Defendant Lopez’s Motion to Dismiss Count 3 as Unconstitutional (Docket No.
[42]) is DENIED.
DATED: January 27, 2026
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
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