USA v. Lopez

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Isabel Lopez,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cr-230 (JRT/DJF)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Isabel Lopez’s Motion to Compel Disclosure
of Evidence Favorable to Accused (ECF No. 38), Motion for Discovery (ECF No. 39), and Motion
for Disclosure Relating to Law Enforcement Officers (ECF No. 40). Based on the Motions, the
Government’s Response (ECF No. 46), the letters from counsel (ECF Nos. 51, 52, 59, 61), and the
entire file, the Court enters the following Order.
I. MOTION FOR BRADY MATERIALS
Ms. Lopez’s Motion to Compel Disclosure of Evidence Favorable to Accused (ECF No.
38) seeks an order compelling the Government to disclose any evidence that may be favorable to
the defense pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Court has already ordered
the Government to disclose such evidence on at least three prior occasions. (ECF Nos. 6, 7, 14 at
3.) The Government acknowledges it has an affirmative and ongoing obligation to disclose Brady
evidence. (ECF No. 46 at 6.) This motion does not identify any particular Brady evidence Ms.
Lopez believes the Government has improperly withheld or advance any argument as to why the
Court’s previous orders are insufficient. This motion (ECF No. 38) is therefore DENIED as moot.
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II. MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
Ms. Lopez’s Motion for Discovery (ECF No. 39) includes 27 separate discovery requests.
The majority of these requests are boilerplate demands, which were previously addressed in the
Court’s Scheduling Order (see ECF No. 14 at 2-4) or seek materials the Government has already
produced (see ECF Nos. 46 and 51). Except for law enforcement officer employment and
misconduct records, discussed in greater detail below, Ms. Lopez has neither identified any
particular discovery materials she believes the Government has failed to produce in response to
her discovery requests, nor advanced any argument as to why she believes the Scheduling Order
is insufficient. (See ECF No. 59.) Requests 1-6, 18, 21 and 23-25 are DENIED as MOOT for
these reasons.
A. Request 7 (Searches)
Request 7 seeks information regarding searches and related search warrants. The
Government states that only one search warrant was executed in this case, which authorized a
search for data from Ms. Lopez’s phone. (ECF No. 46 at 9.) The Government stated it planned to
disclose the search warrant and phone data extraction by October 3, 2025. (ECF No. 51 at 2; ECF
No. 52 at 1.) Therefore, the Government likely has already fully responded to this request.
However, since neither party has confirmed the disclosure on the record, Request 7 is GRANTED
to the extent these materials have not already been disclosed.
B. Requests 8-11 (Witness Information)
Request 8 seeks the names and addresses of witnesses whom the Government intends to
call at trial. This request is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE as premature. The Court will
not require either party to produce a witness list at this time.
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Request 9 seeks the names and addresses of all witnesses to the incident whom the
Government does not intend to call at trial. To the extent Ms. Lopez seeks disclosures required
under Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), the Court has already entered an order
regarding such disclosures (see ECF No. 14 at 4) and the request is DENIED as moot. This request
is otherwise DENIED on the ground that it exceeds the scope of the Government’s disclosure
obligations.
Request 10 seeks statements from both testifying and non-testifying witnesses no later than
twenty working days before trial. To the extent Ms. Lopez seeks statements from testifying
witnesses pursuant to the Jencks Act, the Court has already entered an order addressing the timing
of disclosure of such information (see ECF No. 14 at 3) and the request is DENIED for the reasons
previously stated. This request is otherwise DENIED on the ground that it exceeds the scope of
the Government’s disclosure obligations.
Request 11 seeks arrest and conviction record information related to testifying Government
witnesses. This request is GRANTED insofar as this information must be disclosed pursuant to
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). To the extent Ms. Lopez seeks immediate disclosure
of this information, her request is DENIED. See, e.g., United States v. Jeanpierre, 636 F.3d 416,
422 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding the Government’s disclosure obligations are satisfied if impeachment
materials are produced in sufficient time for the defendant to use them for impeachment).
C. Requests 12 and 13 (Grand Jury Materials)
Requests 12 and 13 seek the names and addresses of Grand Jury witnesses and the minutes
and transcripts of Grand Jury proceedings. To the extent Ms. Lopez seeks Grand Jury statements
from Government witnesses who will testify at trial, the Court has already entered an order
addressing the disclosure of Jencks Act information (see ECF No. 14 at 3) and the request is
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DENIED as moot. To the extent Ms. Lopez seeks Grand Jury materials related to other witnesses,
the request is DENIED on the ground that it exceeds the scope of the Government’s disclosure
obligations. It is a “well-established rule” that “grand jury testimony is generally not discoverable
on pretrial motion.” United States v. Pelton, 578 F.2d 701, 709 (8th Cir. 1978). Parties seeking
disclosure of grand jury testimony must show a “particularized need” for it. United States v.
Wilkinson, 124 F.3d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1997). Ms. Lopez has demonstrated no such particularized
need.
D. Request 14 (Request for In Camera Review)
Ms. Lopez asks the Court to review the Government’s entire case file in camera to
determine whether any withheld materials are Brady materials that must be disclosed. Ms. Lopez
cites no authority or grounds for such extraordinary relief and this request is therefore DENIED.
E. Requests 15-17 and 20 (Informant Information)
Requests 15-17 and 20 seek information related to confidential informants. Government
counsel states that she is not aware of any confidential informants used in this case. (ECF No. 46
at 13.) Moreover, to the extent Ms. Lopez seeks disclosures required under Rovario v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), the Court has already entered an order regarding such disclosures (see
ECF No. 14 at 4) and the requests are DENIED as moot. These requests are otherwise DENIED
on the ground that they exceed the scope of the Government’s disclosure obligations and Ms.
Lopez has failed to identify any legal authority or particularized need for the information.
F. Requests 19, 22, 26, and 27 (Additional Materials)
Ms. Lopez makes various requests that the Government opposes on grounds that they are
overbroad and fall outside the Government’s disclosure obligations. Request 19 seeks information
concerning other arrests, searches or actions that are related to this case. Requests 22, 26 and 27
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seek policies and procedures: (1.) used in connection with any testing or examination of seized
items; (2.) related to the law enforcement presence during the incident; and (3.) related to her
arrest. These requests are DENIED. “Criminal defendants do not have a general constitutional
right to discovery.” United States v. Johnson, 228 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 2000) (citing
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977)). “In most circumstances, then, a defendant must
point to a statute, rule of criminal procedure, or other entitlement to obtain discovery from the
government.” Johnson, 228 F.3d at 924. Ms. Lopez has neither explained how these materials
might be material to preparing her defense under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(a)(1)(E)(i), nor advanced any other argument as to why they are discoverable under any
applicable case precedent or rule. In the absence of any obvious ground or asserted disclosure
requirement, the Court finds these materials fall outside the scope of the Government’s discovery
obligations.
III. LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER INFORMATION
The Indictment charges Ms. Lopez with assaulting and impeding law enforcement officers
during a civil disorder on June 3, 2025 and during her arrest on June 9, 2025. (ECF No. 9; see
also ECF No. 45 at 5.) Ms. Lopez’s Motion for Disclosure Relating to Law Enforcement Officers
(ECF No. 40) requests information on all law enforcement officers who came into physical contact
with her during either of these incidents. (See also ECF No. 59.) Her motion (ECF No. 40) is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as further set forth below.
A. Request 1 (Identifying Information)
Request 1 seeks, for each officer who came into physical contact with Ms. Lopez, the
officer’s name, agency, task force (if any), assignment, and “a description of the nature and
substance of their encounter(s) with Ms. Lopez.” (ECF No. 40 at 1.) The Government states that
it has already disclosed all the reports and body camera footage from the incidents, which “should
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readily allow Ms. Lopez to identify the officers that were involved in these incidents, including
their employers, roles, and the nature of their interactions with Ms. Lopez.” (ECF No. 46 at 17.)
Ms. Lopez’s demand seeks to impose a burden on the Government that exceeds its
disclosure obligations. Ms. Lopez has not pointed to any specific officer or officers on the video
footage whose identifying information she has been unable to find in the reports and other
materials previously disclosed. Rather, she demands a comprehensive summary derived from
information she likely already has. The Court will not require the Government to cull through
evidence that is already in Ms. Lopez’s position and prepare work product for her benefit. See
Odem v. Hopkins, 192 F.3d 772, 777 (8th Cir. 1999) (declining to “impose a duty on the
prosecution to do the defense’s work”). Request No. 1 is therefore DENIED to the extent Ms.
Lopez seeks a summary of identifying information related to all officers who came into physical
contact with her during the incidents. However, to the extent Ms. Lopez is unable to identify any
specific officer based on a thorough, good faith review of the information disclosed, she must
propound a request for information related to that specific officer and the Government shall
produce the requested identifying information for that officer. Request No. 1 is therefore
GRANTED to that extent.
B. Request 2 (Disciplinary Record Information)
Request 2 seeks disciplinary record information for all officers who came into physical
contact with Ms. Lopez during the incidents, including complaints, employment actions,
investigations, legal actions, or adjudications of dishonesty. (ECF No. 40 at 1-2; ECF No. 59.)
Ms. Lopez argues this information must be disclosed pursuant to Brady and Giglio. (ECF No. 59.)
Under Brady, the Government must produce all material evidence favorable to the accused.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). Material evidence is that kind of evidence
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which, if present at trial, creates a reasonable probability that the result in the proceedings would
be different. Id. Such material evidence can include both exculpatory evidence and impeachment
evidence, that is, “evidence affecting credibility.” Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. Giglio requires the
Government to produce evidence that “might be valuable in impeaching government witnesses”
such as law enforcement officers. United States v. Pou, 953 F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1992).
The Government contends Request 2 exceeds its disclosure obligations in that it seeks
information related to non-testifying officers. The Court agrees. Because an officer who does not
testify cannot be impeached, the obligation to disclose impeachment information recognized in
Giglio “only applies to testifying officers.” United States v. Begay, No. 21-cr-119 (NEB/LIB),
2022 WL 1110195, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 6, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 21-
cr-119 (NEB/LIB), 2022 WL 683090 (D. Minn. Mar. 8, 2022) (citing cases). Furthermore, Ms.
Lopez advances no argument as to why these materials otherwise might be exculpatory under
Brady. See Begay, 2022 WL 1110195, at *4-5 (finding evidence of non-testifying officer’s
misconduct was not exculpatory); United States v. Van Brocklin, 115 F.3d 587, 594 (8th Cir. 1997)
(“Mere speculation that materials may contain exculpatory evidence is not … sufficient to sustain
a Brady claim.”) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109-110 (1976)). Because Ms. Lopez
fails to explain why disciplinary records for non-testifying officers might contain material
exculpatory evidence under Brady, and she proffers no other legal authority to support her request
for these records, the Court denies it.
The Government further opposes Request 2 on the ground that it seeks all disciplinary
records, including “unproven, unsubstantiated, or meritless complaints.” (ECF No. 61.) Evidence
must be material to the outcome to mandate its production under Brady or Giglio. See United
States v. Jeanpierre, 636 F.3d 416, 424 (8th Cir. 2011) (defendant must show “a reasonable
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probability that, had [the evidence] been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.”) (citing United States v. Garcia, 562 F.3d 947, 952 n.7 (8th Cir.2009));
see also United States v. Primm, 63 F.4th 1186, 1192 (8th Cir. 2023) (no Brady or Giglio violation
based on belated disclosure of testifying officer’s DUI conviction or failure to disclose tax returns,
which court found to be immaterial). The Government, relying on case law from other circuits,
argues that “unproven, unsubstantiated, or meritless” complaints against law enforcement officers
are immaterial per se. (ECF No. 61 at 1-2) (citing United States v. Dabney, 498 F.3d 455, 459
(7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Taylor, 417 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Amiel, 95 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir. 1996)).
This Court declines to adopt such a per se rule. There may be circumstances in which the
volume or nature complaints against an officer is so overwhelming, or the investigation of such
complaints is so deficient, that a court might find them material to the outcome notwithstanding
that the Government previously deemed them “unsubstantiated.” See U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Investigation of City of Minneapolis and Minneapolis Police Department 67 (2023),
https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-06/minneapolis findings report.pdf (U.S. Department of Justice
Report finding Minneapolis Police Department’s accountability system “fundamentally flawed …
where meritorious complaints are dismissed without investigation and often for no discernable
reason.”). The Government bears the risk in these circumstances that a conviction might be
overturned if it withholds such information and a court later finds it material.
However, without more, a general order directing the Government to disclose all
unsubstantiated complaints against every testifying officer who came into contact with Ms. Lopez
is unwarranted in this case. Ms. Lopez proffers no reason to believe such unsubstantiated
complaints will affect the outcome. And given that the Government bases its case against Ms.
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Lopez largely on video evidence (ECF No. 1-1 at 9-15), the likelihood that such complaints will
meet the materiality threshold appears to be low. Request 2 is therefore DENIED to the extent
Ms. Lopez seeks a blanket order requiring the Government to produce evidence of “unproven,
unsubstantiated, or meritless” complaints against all officers who came into physical contact with
her during the incidents.
Insofar as Ms. Lopez seeks evidence of substantiated complaints, disciplinary actions or
charges against testifying officers who came into contact with her, her request is GRANTED
pursuant to Giglio. However, to the extent Ms. Lopez seeks immediate disclosure of this
information (see ECF No. 59), her request is DENIED. The Government is under no obligation
to identify its trial witnesses at this stage in the case, and its Brady and Giglio obligations will be
met if this information is disclosed in sufficient time for Ms. Lopez to use it at trial. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jeanpierre, 636 F.3d 416, 422 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding the Government’s
disclosure obligations are satisfied if impeachment materials are produced in sufficient time for
the defendant to use them for impeachment).
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Compel Disclosure of Evidence Favorable to Accused (ECF
No. 38) is DENIED as moot;
2. Ms. Lopez’s Motion for Discovery (ECF No. 39) is GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART as set forth herein; and
3. Ms. Lopez’s Motion for Disclosure Relating to Law Enforcement Officers (ECF
No. 40) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as set forth herein.
Dated: December 19, 2025 s/ Dulce J. Foster
Dulce J. Foster
United States Magistrate Judge
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