Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Jacob V.,1
Plaintiff,
v.
Frank Bisignano,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
Case No. 24-cv-4097 (JRT/DJF)
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff Jacob V. (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of the
Commissioner of Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) final decision denying his application for
supplemental security income (“SSI”) (“Decision”). This matter is before the Court on the parties’
briefs. Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse and remand the ALJ’s decision on the ground that the
ALJ failed to adequately consider his inability to function independently. (See ECF No. 9 at 12.)
The Commissioner asks that the Decision be affirmed in its entirety. 	(ECF No. 12.) 	For the
reasons given below, the Court recommends the Decision be affirmed.
BACKGROUND
I. 	Plaintiff’s Claim
Plaintiff applied for SSI on January 8, 2022 (see Soc. Sec. Admin. R. (“R.”) 231).2 At that
time, he was 21 years old (id.), with an eighth-grade level of education (R. 260). He had previous
1 This District has adopted a policy of using only the first name and last initial of any
nongovernmental parties in court filings in Social Security matters.
2 The Social Security administrative record (“R.”) is filed at ECF No. 7. For convenience
and ease of reference, the Court cites to the record’s pagination rather than the Court’s ECF and
page numbers.
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work experience as a bagger and cleaner, but he only held each job for a few months (R. 260).
Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of September 22, 2010 (R. 231), resulting from autism
spectrum disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), generalized anxiety
disorder, avoidant/restrictive food intake disorder, panic disorder, and gastroesophageal reflux
disease (“GERD”) (R. 259).
II. 	Regulatory Background
An individual is considered disabled for purposes of Social Security disability benefits if
he is “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 	42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3)(A). In addition, an individual is disabled “only if his physical or mental impairment
or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). “[A] physical
or 	mental 	impairment 	is 	an 	impairment 	that 	results 	from 	anatomical, 	physiological, 	or
psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(D).
The Commissioner has established a sequential, five-step evaluation process to determine
whether an individual is disabled. 	20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). 	At step one, the claimant must
establish that he is not engaged in any “substantial gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i).
The claimant must establish at step two that he has a severe, medically determinable impairment
or combination of impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). At step three, the Commissioner
must find the claimant is disabled if the claimant has satisfied the first two steps and the claimant’s
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impairment meets or is medically equal to one of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, App’x 1 (“Listing of Impairments” or “Listing”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii).3 If
the claimant’s impairment does not meet or is not medically equal to one of the impairments in the
Listing, the evaluation proceeds to step four. The claimant then bears the burden of establishing
his residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and proving that he cannot perform any past relevant
work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv); Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1069 n.5 (8th Cir. 2000). If
the claimant proves he is unable to perform any past relevant work, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to establish at step five that the claimant can perform other work existing in a
significant number of jobs in the national economy. 	Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5
(1987). If the claimant can perform such work, the Commissioner will find that the claimant is
not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v).
III. 	Procedural History
The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application for SSI initially (R. 120) and on
reconsideration (R. 131). On August 30, 2023, at Plaintiff’s request (R. 144), an Administrative
Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing on Plaintiff’s application (R. 34-72). An attorney represented
Plaintiff during the hearing, and Plaintiff and a Vocational Expert (“VE”) testified. (Id.) The ALJ
issued her Decision on November 24, 2023. (R. 12-28.)
The ALJ determined at step one of the sequential analysis that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the application date, January 6, 2022. (R. 17.) At step two, the
ALJ found Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: anxiety disorder with panic attacks;
autism spectrum disorder; depressive disorder; ADHD; cognitive dysfunction; and avoidance
3 The Listing of Impairments is a catalog of presumptively disabling impairments
categorized by the relevant “body system” affected. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1.
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restrictive food intake disorder with low body mass index (“BMI”). 	(Id.) 	The ALJ also found
Plaintiff had received treatment for dermatitis, COVID-19, dental problems, and asthma with
allergies, but deemed these impairments non-severe. (R. 18.) At step three, the ALJ concluded
that none of Plaintiff’s impairments individually or collectively met or medically equaled any
impairment in the Listing. (R. 18-20.)
The ALJ then determined Plaintiff’s RFC. She found that:
[Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: no exposure to
hazards such as moving machinery or unprotected heights. [Plaintiff] can perform
simple routine tasks involving only simple work-related decisions and routine
workplace changes. 	[Plaintiff] can have no interaction with general public.
[Plaintiff] can have occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors, but no
tandem tasks with coworkers. 	[Plaintiff] can perform no fast-paced production
requirements, defined as work requiring hourly or more frequent production quotas.
(R. 20.)
In reaching this determination, the ALJ reviewed the record in detail, taking into
consideration the medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings in the record,
Plaintiff’s medical testing, examination and treatment history, his testimony regarding his
symptoms and abilities, his employment history, and his activities of daily living. (R. 20-26.)
After determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found at step four of the sequential analysis
that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. 	(R. 26.) 	Relying on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ
determined at step five that, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,
there are other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can
perform, including: store laborer (DOT 922.687-058, with around 46,000 jobs in the national
economy); cleaner 2 (DOT 919.687-014, with around 55,000 jobs in the national economy); and
marker (DOT 209.587-034, with around 60,000 jobs in the national economy). (R. 26-27.) Based
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on these findings, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. 27.) The Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision (R. 1), and this lawsuit followed.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s Decision on the sole ground that the ALJ’s RFC
determination does not adequately address Plaintiff’s inability to function independently. Plaintiff
argues the Decision was thus unsupported by substantial evidence. (See ECF No. 9 at 12.)
I. 	Standard of Review
The Court’s review of the Commissioner’s Decision is limited to determining whether the
Decision is “supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” McKinney v. Apfel, 228
F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2000). When “[c]onsidering the record as a whole, [the Court] must take
into account record evidence that fairly detracts from the ALJ’s decision.” Grindley v. Kijakazi,
9 F.4th 622, 627 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). “Substantial evidence … is more than a mere
scintilla.” 	Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citation modified). 	It is “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 	Id.
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). This “threshold … is not high.”
Id. “If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions
from the evidence and one of those positions represents the [ALJ’s] findings, the court must affirm
the [ALJ’s] decision.” Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).
Even if the Court disagrees with how the ALJ weighed the evidence, the Court may not substitute
its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. 	Johnson v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 1067, 1069-70
(8th Cir. 2004).
Remand is warranted when the ALJ’s opinion contains insufficient factual findings that
“considered in light of the record as a whole, are insufficient to permit [the] Court to conclude that
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substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision.” Scott ex rel. Scott v. Astrue, 529 F.3d
818, 822 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Chunn v. Barnhart, 397 F.3d 667, 672 (8th Cir. 2005)
(remanding because the ALJ’s factual findings were insufficient for meaningful appellate review).
At minimum, the ALJ must build a logical bridge between the evidence and the RFC she creates.
She does so by “includ[ing] a narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each
conclusion.” Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7. “[T]he [ALJ] must
also explain how any material inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case record
were considered and resolved.” Id.; see also Lee R. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-cv-1989 (BRT), 2022 WL
673259, at *4 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2022) (finding ALJ failed to create a “logical bridge” between the
evidence and his conclusions); Weber v. Colvin, No. 16-cv-332 (JNE/TNL), 2017 WL 477099, at
*26 (D. Minn. Jan. 26, 2019) (same). 	If the ALJ has adequately explained her analysis and
substantial evidence supports the Decision, then the Court must affirm it.
II. 	The ALJ’s RFC Determination
Upon carefully reviewing Plaintiff’s testimony, medical records, treatment history,
examination records, activities of daily living, and the opinions of the state agency medical
consultants, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could
reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” But the ALJ also determined Plaintiff’s
“statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not
entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record ... Specifically, the
location, duration, frequency, and intensity of his symptoms are inconsistent with a claim for
disability.” (R. 24.)
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ pointed to Plaintiff’s initial function report, his hearing
testimony, and mental status reports supporting a finding that Plaintiff’s mental disabilities
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included “severe anxiety, depression, and ADHD.” 	(Id.) 	The ALJ stated, however, that this
finding did not necessarily suggest his conditions were disabling. 	(Id.) 	At a July 2021 mental
health appointment, Plaintiff appeared “agitated, anxious and easily distracted, with poor eye
contact. However, he was alert and oriented despite chronically poor sleep; his thought process
and content were both unremarkable; and he showed at least fair insight and good judgment.” (R.
24, 529-31.) Other medical records indicated “his outward appearance was usually alert, oriented
and pleasant.” 	(R. 24, 1007.) 	The ALJ found that though Plaintiff’s mental health treatment
records reflected social anxiety, “slight” depression and inattention as issues, the treatment he
received was “generally routine and conservative.” (R. 24.)
Plaintiff has a history of noncompliance with any pharmacological treatment for his
symptoms, which the ALJ acknowledged could be explained by Plaintiff’s restrictive food intake
disorder. (Id.) The ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s noncompliance disabling, however, because she
determined that Plaintiff is “able to function well even without pharmacological assistance.” (Id.)
The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff’s ability to perform activities of daily living was
“inconsistent with a claim for disability.” (R. 25.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was able to: (1.)
“live alone with some assistance”; (2.) go on vacation; (3.) care for a pet; (4.) “stay in his apartment
even if his mother (his primary caregiver) moved away to Florida”; and (5.) “work a part-time job,
which involved limited interaction with coworkers and supervisors.” (Id.)
For these reasons, the ALJ found that the record does not illustrate marked functional
deficits that would meet a listing or preclude all work. (Id.) The ALJ thus did not find Plaintiff’s
hearing testimony about his limitations to be persuasive. (Id.)
The ALJ further considered the opinions of several medical providers who evaluated
Plaintiff’s mental impairments. 	Kathleen Feil, Ph.D., a state agency psychological consultant,
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opined that Plaintiff “had mild limitations with regard to understanding, remembering or applying
information; and moderate limitations with regard to interacting with others; concentration,
persistence, and pace; and adaption and managing oneself.” 	(R. 25, 115.) 	She also found that
Plaintiff’s ability to “carry out routine, repetitive tasks with adequate persistence and pace would
be intact”, “but markedly impaired for detailed and complex tasks.” 	(R. 25, 118.) 	She further
determined that he was able to “cope with co-workers and handle the public … for brief and
superficial contact”; “handle ordinary levels of supervision found in a customary work setting”;
and “handle the routine stresses of a routine, repetitive work setting.” 	(R. 25, 118-19.) 	Mera
Kachgal, Ph.D., another state agency psychological consultant, affirmed Dr. Feil’s opinion. (R.
25, 123-32.) The ALJ found these opinions generally persuasive based on a review of the record
and because the opinions “are consistent with the B criteria and the functioning noted in the record
corresponded to the residual functional capacity limitations generally.” (R. 25-26.)
The ALJ also considered opinions provided by the Minnesota Department of Health State
Medical Review Team (“MRT”) and found them to be unpersuasive. (R. 26.) The MRT concluded
that Plaintiff qualified for state disability benefits based on his autistic disorder and ADHD
diagnoses. (R. 26, 967-68.) According to the ALJ, though the MRT relied on “some sources of
evidence, neither diagnosis is supported by objective medical evidence. 	Further, [the MRT’s
opinions are] not entirely consistent with the claimant’s subjective statements … mental health
records… or prior administrative findings … since the claimant’s Social Security application
date.” 	(Id.) 	Having rejected the MRT’s opinions and adopted the state agency psychological
consultants’ view that Plaintiff’s impairments are not disabling, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff
has the RFC “to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels” with non-exertional
limitations to accommodate his mental conditions. (R. 20.)
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III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff’s sole argument is that the ALJ’s RFC determination failed to adequately account
for Plaintiff’s inability to function independently. 	Plaintiff’s argument largely rests on several
cases from this District involving claimants with similar disabilities. (ECF No. 9 at 12-13.)
In Blake R. v. Berryhill, No. 17-CV-4273 (KMM), 2019 WL 1229828, at *1 (D. Minn.
Mar. 15, 2019), the ALJ found the claimant suffered from autism spectrum disorder, ADHD,
depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and oppositional defiant disorder. 	Because of these
impairments, the claimant had required substantial assistance in school, never lived alone, never
worked, never managed his own finances, and had difficulty managing his own personal hygiene.
Id. at *3. 	Despite these supports, the ALJ determined that the claimant could perform routine,
repetitive work with tasks that involved a lower-than-average pace, with no more than very brief,
very superficial, and very infrequent contact with coworkers, supervisors and the public. Id. at *2.
The court concluded that this determination was not supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole. Id. at *6. The court’s conclusion was based largely on the claimant’s lack of
independence. Citing Social Security Administration policy, the court stated that “the SSA must
account for the structure and support a claimant receives when determining whether the individual
is capable of working a full-time competitive job.” 	Id. at *4 (citing SSR 96-8p, Policy
Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Assessing Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims,
1996 WL 374184, at *5 (July 2, 1996), which requires an ALJ to consider a claimant’s “need for
a structured living environment.”). Though the ALJ acknowledged the claimant’s “struggles with
some independent living skills,” the court concluded that the ALJ failed to “adequately explain
how [the claimant’s] limited functioning even within his very supportive home and school
environments translate to the ability to perform full-time, competitive work.” Id. at *5.
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In Branson A.L. v. Kijakazi, No. 23-CV-15 (MJD/DLM), 2023 WL 9111437, at *9 (D.
Minn. Nov. 7, 2023), the court addressed a similar set of facts. 	The ALJ found the claimant
suffered from autism, a learning disorder, and major depressive disorder. Id. at *1. The claimant
had received significant support in school, lived with his parents, did various chores, did not attend
social events, did not drive, did not grocery shop, did not manage his finances, created simple
meals, and struggled to manage his own personal hygiene. Id. at *6. He had previously worked
in several part-time jobs but had been fired from two of them for taking too many breaks or failing
to timely learn how to perform the job. Id. at *7. Based on these facts, the ALJ determined that
the claimant had the residual functional capacity to “carry out simple, routine instructions;
occasionally experience changes in the work setting; and engage in only brief and superficial
interactions with the public.” Id. at *1. Stating that the case presented a “close call”, the court
concluded the ALJ’s RFC decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a
whole. Id. at *9. The court noted the claimant “has had significant accommodations and support
for his daily activities … His ability to perform certain tasks at home when prompted and/or
supported—such as doing household chores, making simple meals, and maintaining personal
hygiene—occur in an environment unlike a workplace where more stressors and less support will
be the norm for 40 hours each week.” Id.
Plaintiff has certain similarities with the claimants in the above-cited cases. 	He has an
eighth-grade level of education and was on an individualized education program (“IEP”) after the
third grade. (R. 381-82.) He is also reliant on outside support: His mother is paid by the state of
Minnesota to serve as his personal care aide (“PCA”) (R. 47, 844) and spends at least 30 hours per
week helping Plaintiff clean his home, do laundry, shop for groceries, and schedule appointments.
(R. 48, 268.) Plaintiff does not have a driver’s license (R. 49-50, 380, 543), and his mother and
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grandmother drive him to places where he cannot walk. (R. 48, 881.) His mother also provides
frequent reminders concerning his personal hygiene (R. 269). Plaintiff’s ability to manage his own
finances is limited, and the only bill he is responsible for paying is his rent. 	(R. 62, 113, 852.)
Plaintiff’s social interactions are largely restricted to his mother and grandmother. (R. 52-53, 878.)
He has worked in the past, but these jobs appear to have been short-lived, and he lost them due to
repeated absences. (R. 116, 238-39, 364.)
Notwithstanding these similarities, the Court concludes that this case is distinguishable.
Unlike the claimants in the above-cited cases, Plaintiff lives in his own apartment. 	(R. 19.)
Though he receives support from the State through the personal aide services of his mother, notes
from an October 18, 2022 mental health assessment reflect that at that time his mother was
planning to move to Florida and he did not intend to move with her. (R. 113, 815.) Moreover, he
testified that he did not have a plan for anyone else to serve as his PCA if she did move. (R. 57.)
The record further reflects that he was able to perform many of his daily cares without her
assistance. He could cook simple meals (R. 48), do at least some of his own grocery shopping (R.
50), go out for walks with his grandmother (R. 53), care for a pet (R. 63), and walk to a part-time
job (R. 128). He testified that having to interact with people he does not know was what prevented
him from being able to get a job. 	(R. 53.) 	When asked whether he could do a job that did not
require him to deal with other people except “maybe a supervisor every once in a while,” he said,
“If there was a job like that, I could probably do it.” (Id.) Finally, the medical opinions on which
the ALJ relied support her RFC determination. Drs. Feil and Kachgal reviewed the evidence in
the record and they both concluded that Plaintiff’s mental disabilities only created mild or
moderate limitations in his mental functional abilities. (R. 25.) The ALJ considered their opinions
and incorporated them into Plaintiff’s RFC. (Compare id., with R. 20.) Plaintiff does not assert
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that the ALJ improperly assessed the persuasiveness of these opinions, nor does he offer any
contrary medical opinion evidence that the ALJ failed to properly consider. See Towle v. Colvin,
No. 12-cv-1239 (SAC), 2014 WL 172188, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 15, 2014) (concluding ALJ did not
err in relying on persuasive medical opinion evidence in forming RFC when plaintiff offered no
contrary medical opinion evidence).
Though the evidence in the record reasonably supports a finding of disability, the Court
cannot fairly conclude that substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s RFC determination is
lacking. The ALJ reviewed the record thoroughly, explained her analysis, and included restrictions
in her RFC determination that address his mental health limitations. (See R. 20, limiting Plaintiff
to “simple routine tasks involving only simple work-related decisions and routine workplace
changes,” 	“no 	interaction 	with 	the 	public,” 	“occasional 	interaction 	with 	coworkers 	and
supervisors, but no tandem tasks with co-workers” and “no fast-paced production requirements”.)
The ALJ had the opportunity to hear Plaintiff’s testimony and assess his demeanor; the Court did
not. See Lechner v. Barhart, 312 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1026 (E.D. Wis. June 14, 2004) (“Generally,
the court must defer to the ALJ’s credibility determination because she had the opportunity to
personally observe the claimant’s demeanor at the hearing.”) 	“It is not the role of this court to
reweigh evidence presented to the ALJ.” Loving v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 16 F.3d 967,
969 (8th Cir. 1994). Though this is a close case, the Court is not persuaded that the ALJ’s Decision
fell outside the zone of reasonable choices given the totality of the evidence in the record. 	See
Papesh v. Colvin, 786 F.3d 1126, 1131 (8th Cir. 2015). For these reasons, the Court recommends
affirming the ALJ’s decision.
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RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Plaintiff’s Request for Relief (ECF No. 9) be DENIED;
2. 	The Commissioner’s Request for Relief (ECF Nos. 11, 12) be GRANTED;
3. 	The Decision be AFFIRMED; and
4. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Dated: October 31, 2025 	s/ Dulce J. Foster
Dulce J. Foster
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being served a
copy” of the Report and Recommendation. 	A party may respond to those objections within 14
days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and
responses must comply with the word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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