Butler v. U.S. Bancorp

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Christopher Butler, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. Bancorp,
Defendant.
Case No. 24-CV-03700 (JMB/SGE)
ORDER
Charles D. Moore, Reese LLP, Minneapolis, MN; Michael R. Reese (pro hac vice), Reese
LLP, New York, NY; and Daniel Tomascik (pro hoc vice), Laukaitis Law LLC, San Juan,
PR, for Plaintiff Christopher Butler.
Todd A. Noteboom and William Thomson, Stinson, LLP, Minneapolis, MN; and Jay T.
Ramsey (pro hoc vice), Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for
Defendant U.S. Bancorp.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant U.S. Bancorp’s (U.S. Bank) Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff Christopher Butler’s First Amended Complaint (FAC). 	(Doc. No. 30.)
For the reasons explained below, the Court grants U.S. Bank’s motion and dismisses this
action without prejudice for lack of standing.
BACKGROUND
A. 	Butler Interacts with U.S. Bank’s Website
U.S. Bank is a national financial services provider with a principal place of business
in Minnesota. 	(Doc. No. 25 [hereinafter FAC] ¶¶ 2, 14.) 	The allegations in this case
concern U.S. Bank’s website and mobile applications, such as the U.S. Bank Mobile App
CASE 0:24-cv-03700-JMB-SGE Doc. 47 Filed 03/31/26 Page 1 of 12

2
(collectively, the Website), which U.S. Bank customers may use to access information
about their U.S. Bank accounts. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 19.) Specifically, U.S. Bank allegedly elected
to integrate Meta Pixel (Pixel)—a “unique string of code businesses can embed on their
websites” to track real-time user activity and to obtain user data—into the Website. 	(Id.
¶¶ 19–24.) Pixel captures website-user data such as pages visited, information entered by
users into product applications, how users interact with the website, how much time users
spend viewing pages, and other actions. 	(Id. ¶¶ 21–28.) 	Pixel also transmits data to
Meta/Facebook. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 30.) The information Pixel collects is valuable both to Meta
and to the businesses like U.S. Bank who choose to integrate it into their websites. 	(Id.
¶¶ 26, 28, 40–43.) 	For instance, Pixel allows Meta “to build detailed profiles about a
website’s users as those users browse the web in order to serve targeted advertisements to
those users.” (Id. ¶ 24; see also id. ¶ 28.) Therefore, when a U.S. Bank consumer enters
certain information on U.S. Bank’s website, Pixel shares it with Meta, both for the benefit
of Meta and U.S. Bank. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 29.)
Butler is a resident of California. (Id. ¶ 13.) He alleges that he has used both U.S.
Bank’s Website and Facebook. 	(Id. ¶¶ 13, 63.) 	Butler has, at some unspecified time,
“previously applied for a credit card on U.S. Bank’s website.” (Id. ¶ 66.) While applying
for the credit card, he inputted certain unspecified “personal information” into the Website.
(Id. ¶ 67.) 	Butler alleges that he visited U.S. Bank’s Website “to provide and receive
personal and financial information using the same browser that he uses to log in to
Facebook, including while he was logged-in to Facebook.” 	(Id. ¶ 65.) 	Butler does not
allege one way or another whether he is a current U.S. Bank account holder. Butler asserts
CASE 0:24-cv-03700-JMB-SGE Doc. 47 Filed 03/31/26 Page 2 of 12

3
that, unbeknownst to him, Pixel shared the personal information entered into the U.S. Bank
website with Meta. 	(Id. ¶¶ 68–69, 75.) 	He alleges that, shortly after filling out an
application for an unspecified U.S. Bank product, “noted an uptick in targeted advertising
on Facebook, specifically as it related to interest rates concerning U.S. Bank’s Money
Market account products.” (Id. ¶ 70.)
B. 	This Action
In September 2024, Butler commenced this action. (Doc. No. 1.) In his Amended
Complaint, Butler, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, alleges that
the 	consumer 	information 	transmitted 	by 	U.S. 	Bank 	to 	Meta 	(via 	Pixel) 	includes
information captured by multiple “cookies” that identify individual U.S. Bank customers
(id. ¶ 30), onboarding information that is obtained by U.S. Bank when a website user begins
or completes applying for one of its financial products1 (id. ¶ 7), and other data2 (id. ¶ 31).
He alleges that this information allows Meta to link website activity to specific individuals,
such that it amounts to PIFI. 	(Id. ¶ 32.) 	Butler claims that this interception of his
unspecified PIFI by U.S. Bank and its transmission to Meta was a “highly offensive”
intrusion, and that had he known that U.S. Bank was sharing his PIFI, he would not have
interacted with their Website. (Id. ¶¶ 74, 76.)
1 The financial products for which Butler alleges U.S. Bank discloses onboarding
information are: credit card applications, money market accounts, family planning loans,
loans and credit lines, debt consolidation, home repair financing, private seller vehicle
loans, and vehicle loans. (FAC ¶ 8.)
2 Including information identifying the customer’s web browser, IP address, and browsing
behavior on U.S. Bank’s website. (FAC ¶ 31.)
CASE 0:24-cv-03700-JMB-SGE Doc. 47 Filed 03/31/26 Page 3 of 12

4
Butler brings seven claims on behalf of himself and a putative Nationwide Class
and California Subclass, including two claims for violations of the California Unfair
Competition Law (UCL), one claim for violation of the California Consumer Privacy Act
(CCPA), one claim for the tort of invasion of privacy, one claim of breach of implied
contract claim, one claim of unjust enrichment, and a claim under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2511, et seq. (See generally FAC.) He
asserts that, as a result of U.S. Bank’s conduct, he has been harmed in two ways: (1) certain
“intangible harms” due to U.S. Bank’s interception and disclosure of his “highly sensitive”
PIFI (id. ¶ 74), and (2) economic harms for the “diminution in value of [his] PIFI” (id.
¶¶ 194, 202).
DISCUSSION
U.S. Bank now moves to dismiss all of Butler’s claims for lack of standing and for
failure to state a claim. Because neither of the injuries specified in the FAC are sufficient
to confer standing, the Court grants the motion.
As a threshold matter, the Court observes that Article III of the United States
Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies. U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1; Spokeo v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 337–38 (2016). 	Standing is a jurisdictional
prerequisite; as a result, it must be established before this Court can reach the merits of
Butler’s claims. Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson, 992 F.3d 694, 699 (8th Cir. 2021);
Disability Support All. v. Heartwood Enters. LLC, 885 F.3d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 2018); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (providing that courts must dismiss any part of lawsuit over
which it lacks subject matter jurisdiction).
CASE 0:24-cv-03700-JMB-SGE Doc. 47 Filed 03/31/26 Page 4 of 12

5
When determining whether a plaintiff has sufficiently alleged standing, courts apply
“the same standard [they] apply in Rule 12(b)(6) cases,” accepting as true the factual
allegations in the complaint and determining whether these allegations “plausibly suggest
that the pleader has the right he claims (here, the right to jurisdiction), rather than facts that
are merely consistent with such a right.” 	Stalley v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d
517, 521 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Mattes
v. ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697–98 (8th Cir. 2003)). 	To meet this standard, a
plaintiff must clearly allege facts that establish three elements: (1) the plaintiff has suffered
an injury in fact; (2) the claimed injury is “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s alleged
conduct; and (3) the relief sought will redress the claimed injury. 	In re SuperValu, Inc.,
870 F.3d 763, 768 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338).
To plausibly plead facts that establish an injury in fact, a plaintiff must allege facts
that show that the injury is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.” 	Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (quotation omitted). 	“Concrete”
injuries include “traditional tangible harms, such as physical harms and monetary harms,”
as well as “intangible harms” that are closely related to traditional harms, such as
“reputational harms, disclosure of private information, and intrusion upon seclusion.”
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 425 (2021). 	While circuits have developed
different tests since Spokeo and TransUnion for determining whether a plaintiff’s injury is
concrete, “these approaches all share an important feature: they look to the specific
underlying harm experienced by the plaintiff and compare it, in detail, to a specific
common-law tort.” 	Popa v. Microsoft Corp., 153 F.4th 784, 790–91 (9th Cir. 2025)
CASE 0:24-cv-03700-JMB-SGE Doc. 47 Filed 03/31/26 Page 5 of 12

6
(emphasis in original); see also Feldman v. Star Tribune Media Co. LLC, 659 F. Supp. 3d
1006, 1014–15 (D. Minn. 2023) (comparing plaintiff’s “intangible harm associated with
the nonconsensual sharing of his private information” with the common law tort for
invasion of privacy).
Here, Butler claims that U.S. Bank injured him in two ways. First, Butler generally
alleges intangible harm due to U.S. Bank’s interception and disclosure of his “highly
sensitive” PIFI. (FAC ¶ 74.) Second, Butler alleges economic harms for the “diminution
in value of [his] PIFI.” (Id. ¶ 202.) The Court addresses each claimed harm in turn.
A. 	Intangible Harms
Intangible harms may constitute concrete injuries if they bear a “close relationship
to 	harms 	traditionally 	recognized 	as 	providing 	a 	basis 	for 	lawsuits 	in American
courts.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425. Here, because Butler’s alleged intangible injuries
stem from U.S. Bank’s disclosure of his PIFI without his knowledge or consent, the Court
looks to the traditionally recognized torts of intrusion of seclusion and public disclosure of
private facts, both of which require interference or disclosure 	of highly offensive
information. See e.g., Popa, 153 F.4th at 791 (concluding that the plaintiff lacked Article
III standing because the intangible injury stemming from the use of browser-tracking
technology on a website she interacted with did not involve the kind of “embarrassing,
invasive, or otherwise private” information that constitutes highly offensive information);
see also Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652B, cmt. A (1977) (explaining that intrusion
of seclusion “consists solely of an intentional interference with [plaintiff’s] interest in
solitude or seclusion, either as to his person or as to his private affairs or concerns, of a
CASE 0:24-cv-03700-JMB-SGE Doc. 47 Filed 03/31/26 Page 6 of 12

7
kind that would be highly offensive to a reasonable [person]”), 652D (explaining that
disclosure of private facts requires disclosure of information concerning “the private life
of another” that is “highly offensive to a reasonable person” and “not of legitimate concern
to the public”). Cf. Semien v. PubMatic Inc., No. 25-CV-03164 (SI), 2026 WL 216333, at
*2, 4–5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2026) (distinguishing Popa and concluding plaintiffs had
Article III standing where the information included “sensitive information like health status
and treatment, travel plans, political affiliation, sexual orientation, and more”).
Turning to the allegations in the FAC, the Court concludes that Butler has not
plausibly alleged sufficient facts to establish a concrete injury for intangible harms because
the allegations concerning Butler’s PIFI do not implicate specific “highly offensive”
information. Butler alleges that at some point in the past, he “applied for a credit card on
U.S. Bank’s website” (FAC ¶ 66), but the FAC includes no allegations that U.S. Bank had
integrated Pixel into its website at that time.3 	Likewise, Butler alleges he inputted
“personal information” in the Website (id. ¶ 67), but he does not allege what information
he entered4 or that he actually completed and submitted the application.5 	Absent any
3 Indeed, even in Butler’s Response to the motion to dismiss, Butler conspicuously does
not assert that U.S. Bank had integrated Pixel into its website prior to the date when he
applied for their financial product. (See generally Doc. No. 22.)
4 The Court notes that in the legal memorandum opposing the motion, Butler asserts that
U.S. Bank distributed his Social Security number to Meta. 	(Doc. No. 41 at 30.) 	This
allegation, however, is not included in the FAC, and the Court does not consider it.
5 Butler also alleges that shortly after filling out “this application” he noted an “uptick in
targeted advertising on Facebook, specifically as it related to interest rates concerning U.S.
Bank’s Money Market account products.” (FAC ¶ 70.) In his Response, Butler states that
this itself is a “concrete harm.” (Doc. No. 41 at 23.) Setting aside that it remains unclear
CASE 0:24-cv-03700-JMB-SGE Doc. 47 Filed 03/31/26 Page 7 of 12

8
specific description of what information Butler inputted, the Court cannot conclude that
the harm Butler alleges reaches the level of highly offensive disclosures required for a
finding of injury in fact.6 See, e.g., Popa, 153 F. 4th at 791 (dismissing complaint for lack
of standing because the plaintiff identified no “embarrassing, invasive, or otherwise private
information” collected by the defendant); Adams v. PSP Grp., LLC, 691 F. Supp. 3d 1031,
1035, 1041–42 (E.D. Mo. 2023) (concluding that plaintiff lacked Article III standing in
case concerning defendant’s use of browser-tracking technology on website because the
complaint did not “specify what information [the plaintiff] shared on the website, if any”
or describe “what information she typed or entered into the website’s data fields”).
Moreover, other courts have found that plaintiffs who fail to specifically allege facts
to establish the disclosure of highly sensitive data lacked standing to sue defendants using
the same Pixel technology at issue in this case. 	For example, In re BPS Direct, LLC
involved the use of the “Facebook Tracking Pixel,” which “compel[ed] a user’s browser to
what application Butler applied for, if he applied for a single product or multiple products,
and if so, when he applied for them, Butler points to no caselaw, and this Court is not aware
of any, suggesting that an uptick in targeted advertisements is a concrete harm. 	In fact,
related caselaw suggests the opposite. 	See also Prestby v. A&A Services, 8:24-CV-204,
2026 WL 26128, at *9 (D. Neb. Jan. 5, 2026); Johnson v. Yuma Reg’l Med. Ctr., 769 F.
Supp. 3d 936, 950 (D. Ariz. 2024) (holding that receiving unsolicited spam emails,
messages, and calls does not constitute a cognizable injury); McCombs v. Delta Grp. Elecs.,
Inc., 676 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1074 (D.N.M. 2023) (collecting cases and concluding that a
spike in unsolicited marketing and cyber ploys received by phone, email, and messaging
applications is not an actual harm sufficient to confer standing).
6 Without more information about what specific information Butler disclosed and when he
disclosed it, the Court is also concerned that the FAC fails to plausibly plead facts to
establish that the alleged harms are fairly traceable to collecting Butler’s information
through Pixel and not to some other source.
CASE 0:24-cv-03700-JMB-SGE Doc. 47 Filed 03/31/26 Page 8 of 12

9
send cookies to Facebook when the user is visiting the [defendant’s] Websites,” and that
the defendant then disclosed information to Facebook “so it can match visitors to their
Facebook profiles.” 705 F. Supp. 3d 333, 344–45 (E.D. Pa. 2023). The court found that
the plaintiff’s allegations did not establish standing “because they do not identify the
personal information they inputted” in the defendant’s website and because the disclosure
of “basic contact information such as names, addresses, and phone numbers” does not
establish a concrete injury in fact. Id. at 347, 359 & n. 169, 170 (collecting cases); see also
Price v. Converse, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 3d 1102, 1103–05 (C.D. Cal. 2025) (concluding that
the plaintiff failed to plead a concrete injury because the allegations that tracking
technology 	on 	defendant’s 	website 	collected 	information 	that 	could 	“deanonymize
[p]laintiff” and subjected the plaintiff to “highly personalized and universally unwanted
marketing efforts” did not allege that defendant obtained or disclosed “highly sensitive”
information). These cases, and Butler’s allegations, are readily distinguishable from other
cases in which plaintiffs have standing because their complaints include specific factual
allegations that defendants captured highly offensive private information. 	See e.g., In re
Facebook, Inc. Internet Tracking Litig., 956 F.3d 589, 598–99 (9th Cir. 2020) (involving
allegations that the defendant “gained a cradle-to-grave profile without users’ consent” by
capturing users’ internet browsing history even after users “had logged off the social media
platform” and “no matter how sensitive or personal” that browsing history was); Doe v.
Tenet Healthcare Corp., 789 F. Supp. 3d 814, 827 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (involving allegations
that defendants’ use of Pixel disclosed “sensitive medical information” including the
plaintiff’s efforts to “research medical treatments, search for doctors, make appointments,
CASE 0:24-cv-03700-JMB-SGE Doc. 47 Filed 03/31/26 Page 9 of 12

10
and review their medical records”); Feldman, 659 F. Supp. 3d at 1015 (involving
allegations that the defendant’s use of Pixel disclosed the plaintiff’s internet “video viewing
history,” which “was his private concern” and the disclosure of which “would be offensive
to a reasonable person”); see also Salazar v. Paramount Global, 133 F.4th 642, 647 (6th
Cir. 2025) (involving allegations that defendant’s use of Pixel disclosed his “private video-
viewing history to Facebook”) cert. granted, __ S. Ct. __, No. 25-459, 2026 WL 189831
(Jan. 26, 2026).
Based on a review of these cases, the Court concludes that the FAC does not
plausibly allege facts to confer Butler with standing to sue for the his intangible harms.
B. 	Economic Harms
Butler also alleges economic harms for the “diminution in value of PIFI.” 	(Id.
¶ 202.) 	However, the Court concludes that Butler also has not sufficiently pleaded
economic harms to establish an Article III injury in fact for two reasons.
First, as previously discussed, Butler does not clearly allege what information he
entered into the credit-card application or whether U.S. Bank had integrated Pixel into its
website at the time he entered this information. Absent such specific facts, the Court is not
persuaded to adopt Butler’s general legal conclusion that the unspecified information
constitutes PIFI. 	Similarly, absent specific factual allegations, FAC cannot establish any
discernible economic value that can be diminished by the disclosure of the unspecified
information. 	Therefore, apart from general conclusory statements, the FAC does not
plausibly plead the economic injury of diminution of value.
CASE 0:24-cv-03700-JMB-SGE Doc. 47 Filed 03/31/26 Page 10 of 12

11
Second, setting aside the uncertainty around what information U.S Bank may have
disclosed, the FAC also fails to plausibly allege facts to show Butler experienced an
economic injury. 	While some courts have recognized diminution in value of personal
information is an injury in fact which could give rise to standing, courts have often held
that, to establish an injury in fact, the plaintiff must establish both the existence of a market
for their personal information and an impairment of their ability to participate in that
market. In re Google Android Consumer Privacy Litig., No. 11-MD-02264 (HSW), 2013
WL 1283236, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2013) (collecting cases); see also Pruchnicki v.
Envision Healthcare Corp., 845 F. App’x 613 (Mem.) (9th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he mere
misappropriation of personal information does not establish compensable damages.”
(quotation omitted)). Here, the FAC is devoid of any market information, any allegations
that Butler participated or intended to participate in this market, or allegations that his PIFI
has actually lost value in the market.7
For both of these reasons, Butler has not pleaded an injury in fact that would confer
standing to sue for economic harms either.8
7 To the extent that portions of Butler’s written submission argue that he has suffered a
separate economic harm through an analogy to Sequeira v. U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 722 F. Supp. 3d 996 (N.D. Cal. 2024), the Court concludes the allegation in the
FAC are distinct from those in Sequeira. The plaintiff in that case alleged that “had they
known of [defendant’s] alleged violations . . . they would not have paid [defendant] to
process the[ir] transactions.” Id. at 1008 (emphasis added). By contrast, the FAC includes
no allegations that Butler paid U.S. Bank any money for their financial services or to apply
for any financial product.
8 Because Butler is the only named plaintiff in this matter, and his claims will be dismissed,
the Court need not reach Butler’s request for certification of the putative class action.
Frank v. Gaos, 586 U.S. 485, 492 (2019) (providing that, in putative class action, “federal
CASE 0:24-cv-03700-JMB-SGE Doc. 47 Filed 03/31/26 Page 11 of 12

12
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 30) is
GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
Dated: March 31, 2026 	/s/ Jeffrey M. Bryan
Judge Jeffrey M. Bryan
United States District Court
courts lack jurisdiction if no named plaintiff has standing”); see also, e.g., In re Milk Prods.
Antitrust Litig., 195 F.3d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1999).
CASE 0:24-cv-03700-JMB-SGE Doc. 47 Filed 03/31/26 Page 12 of 12