Indian Motorcycle International, LLC v. Eguia et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
INDIAN MOTORCYCLE
INTERNATIONAL, LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
ARTURO EGUIA and INDIAN BIKE
WEEK LLC,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-cv-1958 (LMP/SGE)
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO VACATE
DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Paige S. Stradley and Michael A. Erbele, Merchant & Gould P.C., Minneapolis, MN;
and Alana LeFebvre, Merchant & Gould P.C., Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.
Terrance C. Newby and Dany Berbari, Maslon LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Indian Motorcycle International, LLC (“IMI”) brought this action against
Defendants Arturo Eguia and Indian Bike Week, LLC (“IBW”), asserting claims of breach
of contract; trademark infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act; and
deceptive trade practices and unfair competition under Minnesota state law. 	ECF No. 1
¶¶ 67–106. Defendants actively participated in the litigation initially, but after their counsel
withdrew, they did not secure replacement counsel and ceased meaningfully participating
and appropriately defending themselves in this case. 	ECF No. 101 at 11–14. 	With the
Court’s leave, IMI filed an amended complaint, ECF No. 69, but Defendants did not file
an answer, ECF No. 101 at 12–13. 	IMI then moved for entry of default judgment, ECF
No. 78, but Defendants failed to substantively respond to IMI’s motion despite being
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afforded multiple opportunities to do so, ECF No. 101 at 13–14. 	The Court took IMI’s
motion for default judgment under advisement and, on September 5, 2025, granted the
motion and directed that judgment be entered against Defendants on all of IMI’s claims.
Id. at 19–39. 	Notably, the Court granted IMI’s request for a permanent injunction and
ordered Defendants to file an affidavit certifying their compliance with the injunction by
October 20, 2025. Id. at 36–39.
On October 17, 2025, new counsel appeared on Defendants’ behalf. ECF No. 105.
On October 20, 2025, Defendants filed a declaration certifying their partial compliance
with the permanent injunction, ECF No. 111, and a motion to vacate the default judgment
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), ECF No. 106. Upon consideration of all
the relevant circumstances, the Court declines to set aside the default judgment.
ANALYSIS1
Relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary remedy “which
may be granted only upon an adequate showing of exceptional circumstances.” Williams
v. York, 891 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Relevant here, a district court
may grant relief from a default judgment under Rule 60(b) because of a party’s “excusable
neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). “The determination of excusable neglect ‘is at bottom
an equitable one, taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s
1 	The Court incorporates the factual background set forth in the order granting IMI’s
motion for default judgment. See ECF No. 101 at 2–11. The Court need not traverse those
facts for purposes of resolving Defendants’ motion to set aside the default judgment.
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omission.’” Feeney v. AT & E, Inc., 472 F.3d 560, 562–63 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Pioneer
Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)).
Defendants contend that their failure to actively or meaningfully participate and
appropriately defend themselves in this case was due to excusable neglect, which warrants
vacating the default judgment and reopening this matter. See ECF No. 107 at 9–21. For
the reasons discussed below, the Court disagrees.
I. 	Excusable Neglect
Securing a default judgment is a two-step process. First, the party seeking default
judgment must apply for entry of default from the Clerk of Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
Second, “[o]nly after an application is made, and granted under Rule 55(a), can a plaintiff
seek a Default Judgment” under Rule 55(b). 	Armstrong v. Astrue, 569 F. Supp. 2d 888,
895 n.6 (D. Minn. 2008).
Notably, Rule 55(c) provides that a district court may set aside the initial entry of
default “for good cause,” but may only “set aside a final default judgment under
Rule 60(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). And while “the same factors are typically relevant” in
deciding whether to set aside an entry of default under Rule 55(c) and a default judgment
under Rule 60(b), “relief from a default judgment requires a stronger showing of excuse
than relief from a mere default order.” 	Johnson v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 140 F.3d 781,
783 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation modified). 	This is because “it is likely that a party who
promptly attacks an entry of default, rather than waiting for grant of a default judgment,
was guilty of an oversight and wishes to defend the case on the merits.” 	Id. 	Here,
Defendants waited until after default judgment was entered to seek any relief from the
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Court, so Defendants must make “a stronger showing of excuse” to justify setting aside the
default judgment. Id. (citation omitted).
Courts consider several factors when determining whether a defaulting party’s
neglect is sufficiently excusable to set aside a default judgment, including: (1) the danger
of prejudice to the non-moving party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact
on judicial proceedings; (3) whether the moving party acted in good faith; and (4) the
reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the moving
party. 	In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 496 F.3d 863,
866 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs., 507 U.S. at 395). 	These factors “do not
carry equal weight; the reason for delay is a key factor in the analysis.” U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Kratville, 796 F.3d 873, 896 (8th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
In addition, “the existence of a meritorious defense” is a relevant factor. 	Giles v. Saint
Luke’s Northland-Smithville, 908 F.3d 365, 368 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted).
A. 	Danger of Prejudice to IMI
Prejudice generally “may not be found from delay alone or from the fact that the
defaulting party will be permitted to defend on the merits.” 	Johnson, 140 F.3d at 785.
Rather, the nonmoving party must be prejudiced “in a more concrete way, such as loss of
evidence, increased difficulties in discovery, or greater opportunities for fraud and
collusion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
Strictly as it relates to issues in discovery, the Court believes there is little danger of
prejudice to IMI. 	IMI is understandably exasperated by Defendants’ conduct during
discovery in this case, see ECF No. 112 at 9–10, but the Court does not discern any
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substantial risk that evidence has been or would be lost. 	Further, Defendants, “now
represented by counsel,” represent that they “fully plan” to correct their prior discovery
deficiencies if the Court sets aside the default judgment. ECF No. 107 at 11. IMI asserts
that “[s]ignificant discovery will be required, including numerous depositions,” ECF
No. 112 at 15, but it is not apparent that IMI would face greater difficulties in discovery if
Defendants remedied their previous discovery deficiencies.
IMI argues, however, that it is also prejudiced because Defendants’ infringing
conduct has continued despite the Court ordering Defendants to cease such conduct. See
ECF No. 112 at 14; see also ECF No. 111 at 3. The Court shares IMI’s concern. Although
the Eighth Circuit in Johnson rejected “expectations concerning the judgment” as a
standard for assessing prejudice, 140 F.3d at 785, it did so in the context of determining
whether to set aside an entry of default, not a default judgment, id. at 783. Importantly, the
Eighth Circuit determined that the defaulting party in Johnson was “entitled to the more
lenient ‘good cause’ standard” under Rule 55(c), not the “more stringent standard” for
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). Id. at 784. Given that framing, the Eighth Circuit
explained that “[e]ntry of default raises no protectable expectation that a default judgment
will follow” because “a party’s belief in the integrity of the system must include, to be
reasonable, knowledge that a system of integrity makes exceptions ‘for good cause
shown.’” Id. at 785.
In contrast, by the time Defendants filed their Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the
default 	judgment 	here, 	IMI 	certainly 	had 	reasonable 	expectations 	concerning 	the
judgment’s finality and operation. Defendants did not timely appeal the default judgment.
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See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Nor did Defendants file a motion under Rule 59(e) to alter
or amend the judgment, which would have “suspend[ed] the finality” of the judgment for
purposes of appeal. Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 508 (2020) (citation omitted). It is,
therefore, reasonable for IMI to have believed the judgment was and would remain final
and effective, even if Defendants later sought relief from the judgment, as they do here.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(2) (stating that the filing of a motion under Rule 60(b) “does not
affect the judgment’s finality or suspend its operation”). Further, Defendants waited to file
their Rule 60(b) motion until the date on which they were to certify their compliance with
the permanent injunction entered by this Court as part of the judgment. See ECF No. 101
at 38; ECF No. 111. But Defendants have not fully complied with the permanent injunction
and, in fact, openly declare their intention not to fully comply with the injunction until the
Court rules on their Rule 60(b) motion. 	See ECF No. 111 at 3. 	Defendants do so
notwithstanding the language of Rule 60(c)(2). 	That alone constitutes prejudice to IMI.
See P.S. Prods., Inc. v. Unique Cutlery, Inc., No. 4:09-cv-00664 SWW, 2010 WL 728978,
at *3 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 25, 2010) (finding prejudice and declining to grant relief from default
judgment where defaulting party “continue[d] to offer illegal copies of plaintiffs’ product
for sale” after judgment was entered).
The Court might be persuaded that this factor weighs in Defendants’ favor if the
potential prejudice to IMI consisted only of discovery issues and concern that Defendants
would be permitted to defend themselves on the merits. See Johnson, 140 F.3d at 785. But
that is not the case here. It would be prejudicial to IMI to reopen this matter and require
IMI to continue prosecuting a case it reasonably believed had concluded, especially
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considering Defendants’ admitted noncompliance with the very judgment from which they
seek relief. See P.S. Prods., 2010 WL 728978, at *3.
B. 	Length of Delay and Impact on Proceedings
Defendants characterize their delay as “brief” and contend their “prompt filing” of
their Rule 60(b) motion “weighs against a finding of excusable neglect.” 	ECF No. 107
at 11–12. The Court strongly disagrees. 	More than seven months passed between when
Defendants’ initial counsel withdrew and when the Court took IMI’s motion for default
judgment under advisement. ECF No. 101 at 11–14. In that time, Defendants refused to
participate in discovery, failed to answer IMI’s amended complaint, failed to respond or
object to the Clerk’s entry of default, failed to respond to IMI’s motion for default
judgment, and failed to meaningfully respond to two separate orders of this Court to show
cause why default judgment should not be entered. Id. This case effectively stalled from
the start, and Defendants “watched the litigation from afar for over seven months,
apparently without any intention of . . . defending the action in a legally cognizable
manner.” Hall v. T.J. Cinnamon’s, Inc., 121 F.3d 434, 435 (8th Cir. 1997). Only once the
consequences for Defendants’ failure to participate in this litigation were imminent did
Defendants obtain counsel, ECF No. 105—almost one year after IBW was expressly
ordered to do so, ECF No. 41—and file their Rule 60(b) motion. Accordingly, the Court
finds that Defendants’ conduct and delays substantially impacted these proceedings.
C. 	Whether Defendants Acted in Good Faith
Generally, “excusable neglect” is “understood to encompass situations in which the
failure to comply with a filing deadline is attributable to negligence.” Union Pac. R.R. v.
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Progress Rail Servs. Corp., 256 F.3d 781, 782 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs.,
507 U.S. at 394). 	“To be excusable, however, the neglect must be accompanied by a
showing of good faith and some reasonable basis for not complying with the rules.” Noah
v. Bond Cold Storage, 408 F.3d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
Defendants plainly have not acted in good faith over the course of this litigation.
For example, nearly two months after Defendants missed the deadline to respond to IMI’s
interrogatories, counsel for IMI met and conferred with Eguia (who was then acting pro
se) and corresponded with Eguia afterwards to memorialize their discussion, including
counsel’s understanding that Eguia would respond to the interrogatories that day. 	ECF
No. 82-7 at 5–6. The next day, despite having been served the interrogatories nearly three
months earlier, Eguia responded that he needed the interrogatories “streamlined a bit
better” like he was “3 years old,” that he did not “need the lawyer talk,” and that IMI should
“only send [him] questions and or requests [it] still need[ed] answers to.” 	Id. at 4–5.
Counsel for IMI declined to rewrite the interrogatories but identified the specific requests
Defendants either had not answered or to which Defendants’ previous answers were
deficient. Id. at 3. Rather than provide answers, Eguia responded, “Why not just set up a
deposition then?” Id. at 2. In other words, Eguia understood his discovery obligations and
promised to remedy the deficiencies in his discovery responses, then refused to do so. In
fact, 	after 	his 	initial 	counsel 	withdrew, 	Eguia 	never 	provided 	responses 	to 	IMI’s
interrogatories or to any other outstanding discovery requests, nor did he ever attempt in
good faith to remedy his discovery deficiencies. See ECF No. 82 ¶¶ 14, 21.
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Not only did Defendants fail to meaningfully respond to IMI, but they also failed to
meaningfully engage with the Court. 	First, Defendants failed to respond to either the
Clerk’s entry of default or to IMI’s motion for default judgment. ECF No. 101 at 13. Then,
on July 2, 2025—more than two months later—the Court made “a last-ditch effort to secure
[Defendants’] participation” by specifically ordering Defendants to “show cause as to why
the Court should not grant IMI’s motion for default judgment.” ECF No. 95 at 3. Three
days after the deadline to respond passed, Eguia submitted an email citing a family
emergency as the reason for his untimely response. 	ECF No. 97. 	But that family
emergency, by Eguia’s own admission, did not arise until after the Court’s July 2 order,
meaning that it could not in any way explain Eguia’s lack of meaningful participation in
the litigation over the preceding eight months. See ECF No. 101 at 13. In short, Eguia’s
email provided no rationale that would explain why the Court should not enter default
judgment. That is to say nothing of the continuing neglect of IBW to secure counsel.
Nevertheless, the Court entered a second order to show cause on July 21, 2025,
explained to Eguia that his response was insufficient, and offered Eguia a second
opportunity to meaningfully respond to the Court’s order. 	ECF No. 98 at 1–2. 	Eguia
responded—again after the Court’s deadline passed—citing the same family emergency,
adding that he was busy planning an unspecified event, and stating that he could resume
his participation in the litigation after August 18, 2025. 	ECF No. 99. Again, this email
offered no explanation for his previous failure to engage in the litigation. And as to Eguia’s
assertion that he could only begin to participate with this litigation on August 18, 2025, the
Court notes that Defendants’ 2025 “Indian Bike Week” event was scheduled to conclude
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on that date. 	See Indian Bike Wk., https://perma.cc/Z7LF-AMNG. 	It appears Eguia
effectively asked the Court to stay the litigation so he could continue to focus all his efforts
on planning and putting on a motorcycle rally that is at the heart of IMI’s allegations of
trademark infringement.2 	Eguia does not attempt to explain why the family emergency
that, as he represented to the Court, prevented him from participating in this litigation
during the months of July and August did not also prevent him from planning and
participating in his August 2025 “Indian Bike Week” event.
More compellingly, Defendants waited to file their Rule 60(b) motion until the date
on which they were ordered to certify their compliance with the permanent injunction
entered by this Court, which required, among other things, that Defendants “destroy or
remove all advertisements or promotional materials” that use “the name ‘Indian Bike
Week.’” 	ECF No. 101 at 38. 	Despite this clear order, Eguia filed a declaration on
Defendants’ behalf in which he states: “Defendants continue to use the phrase ‘Indian Bike
Week’ because the settlement agreement between the parties allowed Defendants to use the
phrase ‘Indian Bike Week,’ and IMI had previously approved a logo that used the phrase
‘Indian Bike Week,’ which the Court specifically noted in its order.” ECF No. 111 at 3
(emphasis in original). Eguia further stated that Defendants will continue to use the name
“Indian Bike Week” until Defendants’ motion to vacate the judgment is resolved. 	Id. 	In
other words, despite being ordered to stop using the infringing phrase, Eguia continues to
2 	Eguia personally attended the hearing on Defendants’ motion to vacate the default
judgment. When the Court asked Defendants’ counsel if Defendants’ 2025 “Indian Bike
Week” rally was the unspecified event referenced in Eguia’s email, ECF No. 99 at 2, Eguia
nodded in the affirmative.
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do so because he does not believe the Court should have made such an order. 	That is
plainly not within Eguia’s power to decide, and the filing of a motion under Rule 60(b)
“does not affect the judgment’s finality or suspend its operation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(2)
(emphasis added). Further, Eguia’s legal reasoning, which he appears to believe supersedes
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court’s express order, is fundamentally
flawed. 	Eguia conspicuously neglects to mention that the Court found him to have
breached the settlement agreement on which he relies, see ECF No. 101 at 19–20, and “it
is elementary that a breach of a contract by one party excuses performance by the other,”
Soderbeck v. Ctr. for Diagnostic Imaging, Inc., 793 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010)
(citation modified). 	In essence, Eguia wants IMI to honor its obligations under the
settlement agreement even though he utterly failed to honor his obligations under the same
agreement. That is not how contracts work. See id. Defendants, by their own admission,
are in violation of the permanent injunction entered by this Court.
In sum, Defendants never formally sought a stay of this litigation. Defendants never
informed the Court of any circumstances that could justify their lack of participation in this
case until ordered to do so (and then offered only inadequate excuses). Defendants did not
appeal the judgment entered in this matter. And Defendants now openly flout an order of
this Court. It should go without saying that this conduct does not demonstrate an effort to
act in good faith. Quite the opposite. Defendants have shown themselves to be dismissive,
disrespectful, and defiant toward both the Court and to IMI. And the fact that Eguia was
represented by counsel when he submitted his declaration of “compliance”—in which he
proclaims, based on a specious legal theory, that Defendants have not complied and will
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not comply with the plain terms of the injunction until their motion is decided—is deeply
troubling and weighs heavily against a finding of good faith or excusable neglect. See P.S.
Prods., 2010 WL 728978, at *3.
D. 	Reason for Delay
Defendants’ argument as to the reason for their delay—the “most important factor,”
Giles, 908 F.3d at 369—fares no better. Defendants cite Eguia’s financial issues, various
family emergencies, and his previous pro se status as “good reason” for the delays which
stalled this case in its infancy. 	ECF No. 107 at 12. 	None of those reasons adequately
explains Defendants’ conduct in this case.
To be clear, the circumstances Eguia describes relating to his family emergencies
are serious, see ECF No. 117, and the Court does not intend to minimize them. 	But the
Court already explained that the emergencies were an insufficient excuse for why
Defendants ceased defending themselves in an appropriate and legally cognizable way in
the months before they arose. 	ECF No. 101 at 17. 	Indeed, even now, Eguia offers no
reason (other than his pro se status) why he refused to substantively respond to IMI’s
discovery requests beginning in January 2025, did not answer IMI’s amended complaint in
March 2025, and did not respond to the Clerk’s entry of default in the almost one month
between when it was entered and when IMI filed its motion for default judgment. 	And
IBW, for its part, offers no explanation (other than Eguia’s personal financial difficulties)
for why it did not secure counsel as ordered in January 2025.
At best, Eguia’s explanations illuminate his failure to respond to IMI’s motion for
default judgment. 	But even so, he offers no plausible reason why he did not raise these
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issues much sooner or seek a stay of this litigation to attend to them. See Trs. of Minn. &
N.D. Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers Fringe Benefit Funds v. E & R Masonry Constr.,
Inc., No. 05-cv-54 (DSD/SRN), 2006 WL 2571270, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 5, 2006) (“Even
assuming defendants’ naivete in attending to legal matters, they failed to make the simplest
of inquiries or respond to clear orders of the court.”). It was not until after the Court issued
two separate orders to show cause why default judgment should not be entered against
Defendants that Eguia even hinted at the idea of staying the litigation. 	See ECF No. 99.
And as noted, Eguia conspicuously requested that the litigation be delayed until after the
exact date on which Defendants’ 2025 “Indian Bike Week” event was scheduled to
conclude. The Court cannot overlook that suspect timing.
The fact that Eguia was acting pro se does not excuse him from complying with the
Court’s orders and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 	Ackra Direct Mktg. Corp. v.
Fingerhut Corp., 86 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 1996). 	And Rule 60(b)(1) does not permit
Eguia to “evade the consequences” of his “litigation strategies,” Kratville, 796 F.3d at 896
(citation omitted).3 	As the Court previously stated, “Defendants’ conduct extend[ed]
beyond mere ‘marginal failure[s] to comply with time requirements’ and venture[d] into
‘willful violations of court rules, contumacious conduct, [and] intentional delays.’” ECF
3 	It is worth noting that Eguia is no stranger to litigation. Indeed, another of his solely
owned companies was a represented party in a separate matter decided by this very Court
while this matter was pending. 	See El Camino, LLC v. City of South Saint Paul,
No. 23-cv-3011 (LMP/DLM), 2025 WL 1615695, at *1–5 (D. Minn. June 6, 2025); see
also Thompson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 760 F.3d 913, 918 (8th Cir. 2014) (“A district
court may properly take judicial notice of items in the public record, such as judicial
opinions.”).
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No. 101 at 17–18 (second alteration in original) (quoting Ackra Direct, 86 F.3d at 856).
Despite asking this Court for relief from the judgment entered in this case, Defendants’
noncompliance continues to this day. For these reasons, the Court concludes that this factor
weighs strongly in IMI’s favor.
E. 	Existence of a Meritorious Defense
Whether a meritorious defense exists is determined by examining “whether the
proffered evidence would permit a finding for the defaulting party.” 	Stephenson v.
El-Batrawi, 524 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation
omitted). 	The Court, however, “must have before it more than mere allegations that a
defense exists,” and “simple assertions unsupported by specific facts or evidence” are
insufficient to satisfy the burden of showing why a default judgment should be set aside.
Id. (citation omitted). The “underlying concern” is whether there is some possibility that
the “result achieved by the default” would be contrary to the outcome “after a full trial” on
the merits. Id. (citation omitted).
Defendants’ assertion that they have a meritorious defense is based generally on
(1) evidence that they contend shows there is no likelihood of confusion between IMI’s
and Defendants’ marks, and (2) legal argument concerning the Court’s analysis of the
likelihood-of-confusion factors for IMI’s Lanham Act claims. See ECF No. 107 at 13–21.
Neither argument is persuasive.
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1. 	Evidentiary Argument
a. 	IMI’s Relationship with Adam Sandoval
Defendants cite a YouTube video posted on September 15, 2025, by Adam
Sandoval, a social media influencer who attended Defendants’ 2025 “Indian Bike Week”
rally.4 	ECF No. 107 at 3–4, 16–17. 	Citing various statements made by Sandoval in the
video, Defendants assert that “IMI corporate provided a motorcycle to Adam Sandoval so
that he could attend the 2025 IBW event” as a representative of IMI. 	Id. at 16–17.
Defendants also note that IMI posted a video on its Facebook page on August 29, 2025,
that features Sandoval “while he was attending IBW.”5 ECF No. 116 at 15. According to
Defendants, these videos show that Defendants’ “rally and merchandise sale does not create
confusion or divert customers,” ECF No. 107 at 16, and “suggests that IMI was
intentionally trying to capitalize on the goodwill generated by the IBW event,” id. at 4.
IMI responds that Defendants’ argument “ignores the relevant facts.” ECF No. 112
at 12. IMI cites the sworn declaration of Taylor Young, the Brand Marketing Manager at
IMI’s parent corporation, Polaris Industries Inc. (“Polaris”). ECF No. 114 ¶ 3. In that role,
Young is “responsible for marketing efforts pertaining to brand media and content
marketing strategies for the Indian Motorcycle brand,” which includes “engaging with
4 	See Adam Sandoval, EVERY Indian Rider Needs to See this NOW (YouTube,
Sept. 15, 2025), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BfHKBBS_dNA.
5 	See 	Video 	posted 	by 	Indian 	Motorcycle, 	Facebook 	(Aug. 	29, 	2025),
https://www.facebook.com/indianmotorcycle/videos/as-told-by-our-friend-adam-
sandoval-scootinamerica-125000-miles-125-days-one-mis/1851470995784576/.
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digital media content creators” like Sandoval. Id. ¶ 4. Young discusses Polaris’s “informal
relationships with motorcycle influencers,” like Sandoval, who have no contractual
relationship with Polaris and to whom Polaris “regularly loans its motorcycles” for
promotion purposes. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. As part of these informal relationships, “Polaris does not
condition its loans on what the motorcycle will be used for, where the influencer will ride
the motorcycle, or what events the influencer will attend” and “cannot control where or
how the influencer uses the motorcycle.” 	Id. ¶ 7. Young states that Sandoval contacted
her “in the early summer of 2025 requesting to borrow an Indian motorcycle,” to which
Polaris agreed. 	Id. ¶ 9. 	She further states that Polaris “did not condition the loan” on
Sandoval’s “attendance at any events” and “did not ask [him] to attend Indian Bike Week,
insinuate that he should do so, or condition the loan on [his] attendance at Indian Bike
Week.” Id. ¶¶ 9–10.
The Court finds IMI’s explanation compelling. 	Young has direct, firsthand
knowledge of IMI’s relationship with Sandoval and states unequivocally that, contrary to
Defendants’ unsupported assertion, neither Polaris nor IMI “provided a motorcycle to
Adam Sandoval so that he could attend the 2025 IBW event.” ECF No. 107 at 17 (emphasis
added). Defendants offer no direct evidence to rebut Young’s declaration—for example, a
sworn declaration from Sandoval himself contradicting Young’s account—and instead rely
on conclusory assertions based on a handful of stray remarks in Sandoval’s more than
twelve-minute-long video.6 See id. at 3–4, 16–17.
6 	Defendants also briefly assert that that the default judgment should be vacated under
Rule 60(b)(3)—which applies in cases of “fraud . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by
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Defendants’ reliance on the video IMI posted on its corporate Facebook page is also
misplaced. The Court has reviewed the video, and it contains only a discussion between
Sandoval and Patrick Cornell, who was loaned an Indian motorcycle to raise awareness for
myotonic muscular dystrophy. See supra at 15 n.5. At no point in that video does Sandoval
or Cornell ever mention Defendants’ “Indian Bike Week” rally, nor is there any other
indication in the video that they were at the rally. See id.
b. 	Affidavits by Rally Attendees
Defendants also submit and rely heavily on more than 100 “affidavits” from
attendees of their 2024 “Indian Bike Week” event to prove that there were no incidents of
actual confusion between IMI’s and Defendants’ respective goods and services. See ECF
No. 107 at 14–15; see generally ECF No. 108-1. 	But the Court already concluded that
there was no evidence of actual confusion, explained that the lack of such evidence was
not dispositive as to the issue of likelihood of confusion, and weighed that factor in
Defendants’ favor. See ECF No. 101 at 25. In other words, Defendants already received
the benefit of the fact that there was no evidence of actual confusion, but even that did not
“permit a finding” for Defendants. Stephenson, 524 F.3d at 914. Furthermore, at least six
an opposing party,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3)—because IMI did not disclose its relationship
with Sandoval to the Court, ECF No. 107 at 17. To prevail under Rule 60(b)(3), the moving
party must establish by “clear and convincing evidence” that the “adverse party engaged
in fraud or other misconduct and that this conduct prevented the moving party from fully
and fairly presenting its case.” 	Cook v. City of Bella Villa, 582 F.3d 840, 855 (8th Cir.
2009) (citations omitted). 	Further, a finding of fraud “is justified only by the most
egregious misconduct directed to the court itself, such as bribery of a judge or jury or
fabrication of evidence by counsel.” 	In re Veg Liquidation, Inc., 931 F.3d 730, 738–39
(8 th Cir. 2019). There is no evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, that IMI
or its counsel engaged in such conduct here.
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of the affidavits submitted by Defendants show that the respondents believed Defendants’
“Indian Bike Week” events and related goods are affiliated with IMI, or that the name
“Indian Bike Week” does cause confusion as to an affiliation between IMI and IBW.7 See
ECF No. 108-1 at 60–61, 77, 87, 107, 115.
In sum, the Court concludes that none of the evidence cited by Defendants would
permit a finding in their favor or raises a meaningful possibility that they could achieve a
different outcome after a trial than the result achieved by the default. Stephenson, 524 F.3d
at 914.
2. 	Legal Arguments
The 	remainder 	of 	Defendants’ 	argument 	consists 	merely 	of 	Defendants’
disagreements with the Court’s legal analysis under the Lanham Act and weighing of the
likelihood-of-confusion factors. See ECF No. 107 at 17–21. But relief under Rule 60(b)
“is not available as a substitute for appeal,” United States v. Young, 806 F.2d 805, 806
(8th Cir. 1986), or “for other legal remedies,” Nucor Corp. v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist.,
999 F.2d 372, 374 (8th Cir. 1993). Defendants did not timely appeal the default judgment
7 	The Court also notes that statements made by some of the affiants raise significant
questions of bias and credibility. For example, one affiant who indicated she did not believe
there was affiliation between IMI and IBW or that the name “Indian Bike Week” causes
confusion between IMI and IBW’s respective goods and services wrote, “You should be
supporting this effort instead of causing trouble. 	It makes you look bad like a greedy
corporation.” ECF No. 108-1 at 54. It is reasonable to presume that “you” refers to IMI,
and “trouble” refers to this lawsuit, which suggests this affiant, and likely others, were not
acting as neutral parties for purposes of Defendants’ purported survey. 	Moreover, it is
entirely unclear who administered the survey, under what conditions the survey was
administered, what parameters were established for the survey, and, crucially, whether
other survey responses less favorable to Defendants were omitted from Defendants’
submission to the Court.
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or pursue other legal remedies, like a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment.
See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (stating a notice of appeal must be filed “within 30 days
after entry of the judgment or order appealed from”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (stating a motion
to alter or amend a judgment “must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the
judgment”). For this reason alone, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument.
In 	any 	event, 	Defendants’ 	argument 	is 	often 	self-defeating 	and 	internally
inconsistent. For example, Defendants state that IMI’s and Defendants’ “products do not
compete with each other” while acknowledging, one sentence later, that the parties’
products and services “overlap to some extent.” ECF No. 107 at 16. Defendants also argue
that they “do not intend to pass their goods as IMI’s,” id. at 20, but state elsewhere that
Defendants’ “Indian Bike Week” event “draws positive attention to IMI, enhances the
company’s visibility, and provides an opportunity to expand its customer base,” id. at 16.
If anything, that supports the conclusion that attendees of Defendants’ “Indian Bike Week”
events do, in fact, associate “Indian Bike Week” with IMI and its goods and services, and
that this false suggestion of association was, in fact, Defendants’ intention in hosting their
events under that name.
Defendants also assert that the Court “never analyzed the stand-alone phrase ‘Indian
Bike Week’” for likelihood of confusion with IMI’s trademarks. ECF No. 116 at 6. This
misrepresents the Court’s analysis. The Court made clear that Defendants’ use of “Indian
Bike Week” in association with their goods and services was the central issue in this case.
See ECF No. 101 at 23–26. And the Court concluded that “the marks used by Defendants
are remarkably similar, if not identical, in overall appearance, sound, and meaning” to
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IMI’s marks. 	See id. at 23. 	Defendants appear to suggest that because the standalone
phrase “Indian Bike Week” is not, by itself, identical to any of IMI’s trademarks, there can
be no likelihood of confusion. See ECF No. 116 at 6. That misapprehends the way courts
are to analyze likelihood of confusion. See Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Lab’ys,
Inc., 815 F.2d 500, 504–05 (8th Cir. 1987) (cautioning against “putting too much stock in
a subjective inspection done in-chambers that is devoid of market characteristics” because
a “realistic evaluation of consumer confusion must attempt to recreate the conditions in
which buying decisions are made”); accord Focus Prods. Grp. Int’l, LLC v. Kartri Sales
Co., 156 F.4th 1259, 1280–81 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (quoting Louis Vuitton Malletier v.
Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 426 F.3d 532, 538 (2d Cir. 2005)) (“[U]nder
the Lanham Act, courts are required ‘to analyze the similarity of the products in light of the
way in which the marks are actually displayed in their purchasing context.’”). And it is
well established that an alleged infringer’s mark and the trademark owner’s mark need not
be strictly identical to support a finding of infringement. See, e.g., B & B Hardware, Inc.
v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 575 U.S. 138, 144 (2015) (“The owner of a mark, whether registered
or not, can bring suit [under the Lanham Act] if another is using a mark that too closely
resembles the plaintiff’s.” (emphasis added)); SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086,
1091 (8th Cir. 1980) (“Where the products are closely related, less similarity in the
trademarks is necessary to support a finding of infringement.”).
Finally, Defendants assert that they have a meritorious defense as it relates to IMI’s
breach of contract claim because IMI authorized Eguia to use the name “Indian Bike Week”
in their prior settlement agreement. 	ECF No. 107 at 21. 	That is true insofar as IMI
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authorized Eguia to use a single design bearing the phrase “Indian Bike Week.” See ECF
No. 101 at 8. 	It is also irrelevant. 	For starters, the Court’s determination that Eguia
breached the settlement agreement was not based on his use of the name “Indian Bike
Week,” so the fact that he was at one point authorized to use that phrase on that single
design does not alter the Court’s analysis. See ECF No. 101 at 19–20. That aside, as part
of the settlement agreement, IMI agreed to release any claims relating to Eguia’s
unauthorized use of its trademarks that predated the agreement—which includes Eguia’s
use of the name “Indian Bike Week” to promote Defendants’ rallies, see ECF No. 69
at 162–65—on the condition that Eguia “complied with [his] obligations” under the
agreement, id. at 209. 	Eguia has made no effort to do so. 	See ECF No. 101 at 19–20.
Upon Eguia’s breach, IMI no longer was obligated to continue allowing Eguia to use the
design it approved or, for that matter, any other mark or design that is confusingly similar
to IMI’s marks. See Soderbeck, 793 N.W.2d at 441.
At bottom, none of the arguments and evidence raised by Defendants is sufficient
to “permit a finding” in their favor. 	Stephenson, 524 F.3d at 914. 	The Court therefore
concludes that Defendants have not demonstrated a meritorious defense that is sufficient
to warrant setting aside the default judgment. And considering the Court’s findings as to
the other relevant factors and the circumstances in this case, the Court finds that Defendants
have not demonstrated excusable neglect. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to vacate the
default judgment is denied.
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II. 	Defendants’ Noncompliance with the Permanent Injunction
As a final matter, Defendants openly acknowledge that they are in violation of the
permanent injunction entered by this Court, despite its plain terms and the clear language
of Rule 60(c)(2). See ECF No. 111 at 3. This is another example of Eguia’s noncompliance
throughout the course of these proceedings. 	Eguia’s conduct must cease immediately.
Accordingly, in addition to denying Defendants’ motion to vacate the default judgment, the
Court also orders Defendants to certify their full and unconditional compliance with the
permanent injunction entered in this case within fourteen days of the date this Order is
entered. 	If Defendants fail to certify their compliance with the Court’s order, the Court
will schedule a hearing in which Eguia will be required to personally appear and to show
cause why he and IBW should not be held in contempt for Defendants’ willful violation of
the Court’s order.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings in this matter,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Defendants’ Motion to Vacate Default Judgment (ECF No. 106) is DENIED;
2. 	Within 14 days of the date of this Order, Defendants must certify, in writing
and under penalty of perjury, their full and unconditional compliance with
the permanent injunction entered by the Court on September 5, 2025 (ECF
No. 101); and
3. 	If Defendants fail to timely certify their compliance with the permanent
injunction as set forth above, the Court will schedule a hearing in which
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Eguia will be required to personally appear and show cause why he and IBW
should not be held in contempt, including why sanctions should not be
imposed, for Defendants’ willful violation of the Court’s order.
Dated: March 18, 2026 	s/Laura M. Provinzino
Laura M. Provinzino
United States District Judge
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