Traylor v. Minnesota Dept of Corrections et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Rayco DelShaune Traylor,
Plaintiff,
v.
Minnesota Dep’t of Corrections, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 24-cv-1275 (JWB/SGE)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Nathan Milender’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Dkt. 49), and DOC Defendants’1 Motion for Summary Judgment
(Dkt. 78). These motions have been referred to the undersigned for a report and
recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and D. Minn. LR 72.1. For the reasons
discussed below, this Court recommends GRANTING the Motions for Summary
Judgment (Dkts. 49, 78) and DISMISSING the Complaint.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of Rayco DelShaune Traylor’s (“Plaintiff”) assertion that
medical staff and corrections staff at the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Oak Park
Heights (“MCF-OPH”) violated his constitutional rights. (See Dkt. 1.)2
1 DOC Defendants include the Minnesota Department of Corrections, Minnesota
Correctional Facility-Oak Park Heights, Travis Binkley, Lisa Connors, Jamison Doeden,
Lucus Evenson, Kathy Halvorson, Browne Jayee, Teresa Kincannon, Ryan Klok, Brian
Louis, Traci McNamara, Seth Olive, Chris Pawelk, Adam Perry, Kevin Tran, and Nick
Witter.
2 Page number citations to materials filed on the docket are citations to the CM/ECF
pagination, unless otherwise noted.
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I. Undisputed Facts3
A. First Incident on January 3, 2024
On January 3, 2024, Mr. Traylor was housed in Complex 5 at MCF-OPH (Dkt. 93,
Pawelk Decl. ¶ 4.) Health services providers visit individuals incarcerated in Complex 5
only once a week, and inmates are generally limited to discussing only the issue the
appointment is scheduled for. (Dkt. 96, Louis Decl. ¶¶ 12, 13.) If an individual is
uncooperative or argumentative, the provider may end the visit. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Traylor had a scheduled medical provider appointment on the morning of January
3, 2024. (Id. ¶ 12.) Defendants Seth Olive and Brian Louis escorted Traylor up one short
set of stairs to the visiting room for his appointment. (Id. ¶ 14; Dkt. 98, Olive Decl. ¶ 5.)
Traylor’s appointment was with nurse practitioner Nathan Milender for chronic pain and
dermatological issues. (Louis Decl. ¶ 15; Dkt. 53, Novak Ex. A at 294.) Milender had
requested that security staff remain nearby because Traylor was known to deviate from the
issue an appointment was scheduled for, and Milender was prepared to end the visit early
if Traylor did so. (Louis Decl. ¶ 15.) Because of Milender’s request, Olive and Louis
remained outside the visiting room during Traylor’s visit. (Id. ¶17, Olive Decl. ¶ 5.)
During the medical visit, Milender asked Traylor about his dermatological concerns
and to describe his rash. (Milender Ex. A at 294.) Traylor refused to describe the rash and
3 Facts cited herein come from sealed filings—mostly medical records or prison incident
reports. Because Traylor has put his medical status and treatment at issue with his claims,
the Court does not redact any of the facts referenced in this Report and Recommendation,
nor seal all or part of this Report and Recommendation. The sealing of the underlying
filings will be addressed via separate order.
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stated that his concerns should be in the chart. (Id.) Milender then asked if he could see the
rash, and Traylor vehemently refused. (Id.) Milender again asked if Traylor could describe
the rash, and Traylor refused, instead demanding a dermatology consult. (Id.) Milender
explained to Traylor that he could not authorize a consult for a rash that he could not see
or describe. (Id.) Traylor then asked off topic questions that Milender considered
inappropriate, and Milender subsequently ended the visit. (Id.; Olive Decl. ¶ 6.)
Once the visit ended Louis and Evenson entered the visiting room and gave Traylor
verbal directives to stand up. (Louis Decl. ¶ 18; Dkt. 86, Evenson Decl. ¶ 6.) Traylor did
not stand up and continued yelling at Milender, insisting that he would not leave the visit.
(Id.) Louis then placed his hand underneath Traylor’s right armpit and lifted him up from
the chair. (Louis Decl. ¶ 19; Evenson Decl. ¶ 6; Olive Decl. ¶ 8.) Evenson then tried to
grab Traylor’s left arm, but Traylor pulled it away. (Evenson Decl. ¶ 8.) Louis walked
Traylor out of the room, and upon exiting the room Olive took control of Traylor’s left
arm. (Olive Decl. ¶ 8; Louis Decl. ¶ 21.) As Traylor, Olive, and Louis were walking away
from the visiting room, Traylor remained noncompliant and argumentative. (Louis Decl. ¶
21; Olive Decl. ¶9.) Traylor turned his face towards Louis and was verbally directed to
face forward, but he did not comply. (Evenson Decl. ¶ 9; Louis Decl. ¶¶ 20, 23; Olive ¶ 9.)
Louis then used his hand to block Traylor from potentially spitting on him and pushed his
face forward, keeping his hand there to prevent Traylor from turning towards him. (Louis
Decl. ¶ 23, Evenson Decl. ¶10; Dkt. 94-4, Pawelk Ex. 8 at 00:03-00:07.))
Olive and Louis continued escorting Traylor towards his cell, but when they reached
the top of the stairs, Olive and Louis lost their hold on Traylor, and Traylor slid down the
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stairs on his buttocks. (Id.; see also Dkt. 1 at 8.) At this point Evenson activated an Incident
Command System (“ICS”) call. (Evenson Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. 1.) Louis reached Traylor at the
bottom of the stairs and attempted to take control of his arm, but he resisted. (Louis ¶ 28.)
Louis then pinned Traylor on the ground flat, with the right side of Traylor’s face against
the ground and Louis’s forearm across the side of Traylor’s face to hold his head in place.
(Id. ¶ 29; see also Dkt. 94-5, Pawelk Ex. 9 at 00:04-2:13; Dkt. 94-6, Pawelk Ex. 10 at
00:00-00:32.) While Louis took control of Traylor’s upper body, Olive tried to prevent
Traylor from kicking his legs. (Olive Decl. ¶ 12.) After Traylor was restrained, he stopped
physically resisting. (Louis Decl. ¶ 29, Olive Decl. ¶ 13.)
A short time later, staff responded to the ICS call and another officer took over for
Louis. (Louis Decl. ¶ 31.) Defendant Browne Jayee, one of the responding officers, took
control of Traylor’s right foot to prevent him from kicking, but then stopped to record the
response. (Dkt. 94-1, Pawelk Ex. 5 at 3; see also Pawelk Ex. 10.) Defendant Adam Perry
also responded to the ICS call to supervise, and upon arriving talked with Traylor to
deescalate the situation. (Dkt. 100, Perry Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.) Perry placed Traylor on a
disciplinary status that required him to be moved to a different cell. (Id. ¶ 9.) Perry
explained this to Traylor, and he agreed to comply. (Id.) However, before transferring
Traylor to a new cell, he was placed in leg restraints. (Olive Decl. ¶ 14.) Traylor was then
walked slowly to the new cell and allowed to sit in a chair along the way to rest. (Olive
Decl. ¶ 16-17; Perry Decl. ¶ 15; Pawelk Decl. Ex. 10, 00:55-06:00; Pawelk Ex. 8 at 3:19-
4:13.) While walking, Traylor was seen limping. (Perry Decl. ¶ 14; Pawelk Ex. 8 at 3:19-
4:13.) Upon arriving at the new cell, a nurse evaluated Traylor, noting swelling on his
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forehead and a laceration to his right check. (Perry Decl. ¶ 16; Pawelk Ex. 5 at 6; Dkt. 93-
3, Ex. 15 at 12.) The nurse ordered an ice pack and Tylenol for Traylor, and Jayee took
photographs of his face. (Pawelk Decl. Ex. 5 at 3; Dkt. 1-1 at 5-7.)4 Staff ended the ICS
response after the photographs were taken and Traylor was secured in the cell. (Olive Decl.
¶ 18.)
B. Second Incident on January 3, 2024
A few hours following the first incident, another ICS call was made because Traylor
was found lying on the floor not responding. (Dkt. 93-1, Pawelk Ex. 6 at 6.) Another team
responded to this ICS call, including Defendant Kincannon. (Id.; Dkt. 90, Kincannon Decl.
¶ 5.) Nurse Kincannon saw Traylor on the ground when she arrived at the cell, and he did
not respond to her questions. (Kincannon Decl. ¶ 7.) Kincannon had been informed that
Traylor complained of having a seizure but was unaware of him having any seizure-related
diagnoses, and she did not observe signs of seizure such as bleeding or loss of bowel or
bladder control. (Id.) Traylor also moved his eyes, hands, and lips indicating he was
conscious. (Id.) Because Traylor would not respond to directives to come to the cell door
to be restrained, Perry directed staff to enter his cell and restrain him so that Kincannon
could more closely evaluate him. (Pawelk Ex. 6 at 3; Kincannon Decl. ¶ 8.)
Once in the cell, Kincannon asked Traylor multiple questions, but he was
argumentative and uncooperative. (Kincannon Decl. ¶ 8.) Kincannon observed that his
speech was coherent, not slurred or mumbled, and that he did not show signs of fatigue.
4 DOC Defendants did not submit the photographs taken by Browne Jayee. The Court
assumes the photographs submitted by Traylor are those taken by Jayee.
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(Id.) Kincannon tried to take Traylor’s blood pressure but was only able to obtain a systolic
blood pressure because he was uncooperative. (Id. ¶ 9.) His systolic blood pressure was
slightly elevated, but Kincannon determined it was not at a concerning level considering
his cell had been entered and he had been placed in restraints. (Id.) Kincannon also
observed that Traylor’s pupils were equal and reactive to light. (Id.) Ultimately, Kincannon
determined, based on her assessment, that Traylor had no head trauma, concussion, or
lingering effects of a seizure, and that Traylor was medically stable and did not need urgent
medical care. (Id. ¶ 12.)
C. Third Incident on January 3, 2025
In the evening of January 3, 2024, an individual near Traylor’s cell reported that he
was having a seizure. (Dkt. 88, Greschner Decl. ¶ 4; Dkt. 88-1, Greschner Ex. 1.) Staff
approached his cell and Traylor responded coherently. (Id.) Staff requested a nurse to check
on Traylor a short time later. (Id.) Before the nurse arrived, staff conducting another round
saw Traylor on the floor shaking and immediately made an ICS call. (Greschner Decl. ¶
6.) Again, staff directed Traylor to come to the cell door to be restrained, and he did not
respond, though he was breathing regularly and there were no signs of blood, urine, feces,
or vomit, and his body was not misaligned. (Dkt. 93-1, Pawelk Ex. 7; Dkt. 93-3, Pawelk
Ex. 15; Dkt 94-9, Pawelk Ex. 13; Dkt. 94-10, Pawelk Ex. 14.) Defendant Binkley then
authorized staff to enter the cell and restrain Traylor so that a nurse could conduct another
assessment. (Binkley Decl. ¶¶ 12-17.) The nurse observed that Traylor’s speech was a
normal tone, volume, and rate, and clear and articulate. (Pawelk Ex. 15 at 8.) Traylor was
also able to accurately recount events that took place earlier in the day, and he had no
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difficulty with balance. (Id.) The nurse observed no signs that Traylor had lost sensation in
his extremities, and his eyes exhibited normal movement, his pupils were equal and
reactive to light. (Id.) The nurse determined based on his assessment that there was no need
for emergency medical treatment and scheduled Traylor for a precautionary visit the next
morning. (Id.; Binkley Decl. ¶ 17.) The ICS call was ended. (Binkley Decl. ¶ 18.)
D. Review of January 3, 2024 Incidents
On January 4, 2024, Defendant Klok determined that Traylor’s refusal to comply
with staff directives and disruptive behavior on January 3, 2024, violated facility rules.
(Dkt. 92, Klok Decl. ¶ 9.) Klok served Traylor with a copy of a notice of violation and a
copy of offender rights. (Id.; Dkt 92-1 at 21, Klok Ex 2; Dkt. 92-1 at 22, Klok Ex. 3.) The
notice violation informed Traylor that a discipline hearing was scheduled for January 12,
2024, at which Traylor could present information. (Klok Decl. ¶¶ 6, 11-12; Klok Ex. 3.)
The hearing was held on January 12, 2024. At the hearing, Traylor requested Klok
speak with two other inmates that he claimed were witnesses and to see the staff incident
reports. (Klok Decl. ¶ 13.) Klok denied Traylor’s request to see the incident reports because
he believed they were confidential but agreed to talk with the individuals. (Id.) Klok
answered Traylor’s questions about the video taken of the incident and noted that the
incident reports were consistent with the video. (Id.) Based on the incident reports and
video, Klok concluded that Traylor’s failure to comply with staff directive violated facility
rules and he imposed thirty days in segregation. (Id. ¶ 14.)
Traylor appealed Klok’s determination. Defendant Pawelk the Assistant Warden,
granted Traylor’s appeal on grounds Klok should have allowed Traylor to review incident
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reports and should not have relied on witnesses. (Id. ¶ 15; Dkt. 92-1 at 24, Klok Ex. 5.) The
matter was then remanded for a new hearing. (Id.) On January 22, 2024, Klok issued a
second notice of violation with a new hearing scheduled for January 24, 2024. (Klok Decl.
¶ 16; Dkt. 92-1 at 25, Klok Ex. 6.) At the second hearing, Traylor was allowed to review
the incident reports and Klok did not speak with witnesses. (Klok Decl. ¶¶ 16-17) Klok
again answered Traylor’s questions and again concluded that Traylor had violated the
facility’s rules imposing thirty days of segregation. (Id. ¶ 17; Dkt. 92-1 at 26, Klok Ex. 7.)
Traylor appealed Klok’s decision, and Pawelk upheld Klok’s decision. (Klok Decl. ¶ 17;
Dkt. 91-2 at 27, Klok Ex. 8.)
In addition to Klok’s review, Defendants Binkley and Connors reviewed the ICS
call response as part of routine procedure by examining the staff incident reports and video
footage. (Dkt. 82, Binkley Decl. ¶¶ 7-10; Dkt. 84, Connors Decl. ¶18.) Both Binkley and
Conners determined that the staff response during the morning incident was reasonable,
appropriate, and consistent with DOC policies and training. (Id.) Connors also received a
kite5 from Traylor alleging that during the incident staff used a racial slur and excessive
force. (Connors Decl. ¶ 30; Dkt. 84-4, Connors Ex. 4.) Connors conducted another review
and found Traylor’s allegations unsupported. (Id. ¶¶ 30-35.) Connors concluded that
Louis’s use of force was reasonable despite injuries on the right side of Traylor’s face as a
result of Louis pressing his face against the ground onto a metal seam in the doorway.
(Connors Decl. ¶ 33; Louis Decl. ¶ 34; Olive Decl. ¶ 24; Evenson Decl. ¶¶ 7, 17; Perry
5 A kite is a written form of communication that incarcerated individuals use to
communicate with staff. (Connors Decl. ¶ 30.)
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Decl. ¶ 12; Binkley Decl. ¶ 9.)
Lastly, the morning incident was reviewed again by Defendant Doeden in response
to a grievance filed by Traylor. (See Dkt. 1-1 at 1-2.) Doeden also determined, based on
his review of the January 3, 2024 incidents that Traylor’s allegations of misconduct were
unfounded. (Id.)
E. Post Incident Medical Assessments
Traylor had several medical appointments following the January 3, 2024 incidents.
On January 4, 2024, Traylor attended his weekly mental health services appointment,
where he expressed frustration and irritability about his psychiatric medication
management. (Dkt. 54, Novak Ex. B at 57.) He did not mention the January 3, 2024
incidents, nor did he mention them at any of his subsequent weekly meetings. (Id. at 53,
55, 57.)
On January 9, 2024, Traylor was examined by Dr. Wagner for complaints of
difficulty walking. (Dkt. 53, Novak Ex. A at 279.) The doctor determined that Traylor’s
complaint was due to antalgic gate, not a serious underlying condition. (Id.) The doctor
also declined to renew Traylor’s gabapentin prescription. (Id.) No mention of the January
3, 2024 incident was made and Traylor did not mention any trauma or injury. (Id.)
Following this appointment, Traylor made several complaints about his pain, which were
assessed by medical staff. (Id. at 273-279.)
A few weeks later on January 17, 2025, Traylor had another appointment with
Defendant Milender. (Id. at 273.) At this meeting, Traylor reported a headache that had
been bothering him since January 3, 2025, and complained of nerve pain. (Id.) Traylor did
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not provide specifics on his complaints and asked why he had not been prescribed Lyrica.
(Id.) Milender recommended that he continue taking Tylenol for his pain. (Id.) Following
his January 17, 2025 appointment, Traylor attended various medical appointments and
submitted several medical requests and complaints, all of which were addressed. (See
generally id. at 1-272.)
On February 15, 2024, Traylor attended a dentist appointment with Defendant Tran.
(Dkt. 103, Tran. Decl. ¶ 10; Dkt. 103-1, Tran Ex. 2.) During the appointment, Traylor told
Tran that he had lost a tooth filling during his “arrest” on January 3, 2024, and he wanted
Tran to fill it. (Id.; see also Dkt. 53, Novak Ex. A at 247.) Tran asked Traylor if he was in
pain, but Traylor was uncooperative and responded with his own questions. (Id.) Tran
examined the tooth that Traylor identified and determined that it was a primary cavity, in
other words, a newer cavity that had not been filled. (Id. ¶ 12.) Tran obtained x-rays and
determined that the cavity was too large and deep to fill. (Id. ¶ 15.) Tran informed Traylor
of his assessment and provided him with other options such as removing the tooth or having
a crown placed. (Id. ¶ 16; see also Novak Ex. A. at 243; Dkt 1-1 at 3.) Despite Tran’s
assessment, Traylor has repeatedly requested that the cavity be filled. (Tran Decl. ¶ 17;
Novak Ex. A at 104, 113, 125, 132, 168, 192, 194, 208, 240.)
ANALYSIS
A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Although pro se pleadings are entitled to a liberal construction,
they must still satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. See Quam
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v. Minnehaha Cnty. Jail, 821 F.2d 522, 522 (8th Cir. 1987). “[T]he mere existence
of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment” so long as there is no genuine dispute of material
fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A fact is material if it
will affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable law. Id. at 248; Erickson v.
Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 31 F.4th 1044, 1048 (8th Cir. 2022). “An issue is genuine if the
evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Schilf v. Eli Lilly & Co., 687 F.3d 947, 948 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted).
The “moving party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Enter. Bank v. Magna
Bank of Missouri, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). “If the movant does so, the nonmovant
must respond by submitting evidentiary materials that set out ‘specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042
(8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)). “The
nonmovant ‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to
the material facts,’ and must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.’” Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87, (1986)). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
“[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be
drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
I. DOC Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Traylor sues seventeen DOC defendants. He sues Defendants Binkley, Connors,
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Evenson, Halvorson, Jayee, Kincannon, Klok, Louis, Olive, Perry, and Witter in their
individual capacities. (Dkt. 1 at 6.) He sues Defendants Doeden, McNamara, Pawelk, and
Tran in their official and individual capacities. (Id. at 6-7.) And he sues the Minnesota
Department of Corrections and MN-OPH in official capacities. (Dkt. 1 at 6.) The Court
first considers Traylor’s individual capacity claims.
A. Individual Capacity Claims
“Suits against officials in their individual capacity seek to impose personal liability
upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law.” Handt v. Lynch,
681 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)
(quotation marks omitted)). To establish liability against officials in their individual
capacity, “the plaintiff must show that the official, acting under color of state law caused a
deprivation of a federal right.” Id. (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 166); see also Mayorga v.
Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Liability under section 1983 requires a
causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights.”) (quoting Madewell
v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990)). In other words, “[t]o prevail on a §
1983 claim, a plaintiff must show each individual defendant's personal involvement in the
alleged violation.” White v. Jackson, 865 F.3d 1064, 1081 (8th Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted).
1. Defendants Jayee, Olive, Evenson, Perry, Louis
Traylor claims generally that Defendants Jayee, Olive, Evenson, Perry, and Louis,
used excessive force when they escorted him out of the appointment with Milender and
failed to intervene to prevent excessive use of force. (Dkt. 1 at 11.)
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An Eighth Amendment violation occurs when a defendant uses physical force
“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm” rather than “in a good-faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992); see Wilkins v. Gaddy,
559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam). “To distinguish between the two,” courts “consider
multiple factors, including the ‘objective need for force, the relationship between any such
need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the correctional
officer[ ], any efforts by the officer[ ] to temper the severity of [his] forceful response, and
the extent of the inmate's injury.’” Fisherman v. Launderville, 100 F.4th 978, 980 (8th Cir.
2024) (quoting Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 2006)).
a. Defendant Louis
Traylor alleges that Defendant Louis utilized excessive force in two instances: (1)
when Louis removed him from the appointment with Milender, and (2) after Traylor fell
down the stairs. (Dkt. 1 at 8-9.) Traylor alleges that Louis punched him in the face and
called him a racial slur as he removed Traylor from the appointment with Milender. (Dkt.
1 at 8.) Traylor also alleges that after falling down the stairs, Defendant Louis pinned him
face down and slammed his head against the ground repeatedly, at which time he lost a
tooth filling. (Dkt. 1 at 9.) The only support that Traylor has produced for his claims are
the allegations in his Complaint and his response to DOC Defendants’ motion. DOC
Defendants have submitted declarations, incident reports, and video to support their
motion. The record contradicts Traylor’s allegations.
Although the record shows that Louis did use some force, the record does not
support Traylor’s allegations that as Louis removed Traylor from the appointment, he
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punched Traylor in the face.6 Rather, the record shows that Louis verbally directed Traylor
to stand after Milender ended the appointment early, and when Traylor did not comply,
Louis used his hand to lift Traylor. (Dkt. 96, Louis Decl. ¶ 18; Dkt. 86, Evenson Decl. ¶ 6-
7.) Defendants Evenson and Olive both were present and did not witness Louis punch
Traylor as Louis removed him from the appointment with Milender. (Evenson Decl. ¶ 7-9;
Dkt. 98, Olive Decl. ¶¶ 8-11.) Louis grabbing Traylor to remove him from the appointment
was objectively reasonable given Traylor’s agitated state, his non-compliance with
directives, and his discipline history. Traylor v. Buck, No. 24-cv-57 (NEB/LIB), 2025 WL
521139, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2025) (“Manipulating an individual's arms, hands, and
wrists is not per se excessive force.”) (citing McReynolds v. Schmidli, 4 F.4th 648, 655 (8th
Cir. 2021)).
Next, Traylor alleges that Louis’s use of his hand to direct Traylor’s face away to
prevent Traylor from spitting on him was not reasonable force. Traylor argues that Louis’s
concern was not justified because he did not verbally threaten to spit on Louis, unlike in
6 Traylor also alleges that Louis used a racial slur during the incident. But use of a racial
slur does not itself constitute a constitutional violation. See Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961
F. 2d 1374, 1378-79 (8th Cir 1992) (finding allegations that police officer using
racial slur and threating to knock arrestee's teeth was not a cognizable § 1983 claim);
Barrera v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 07-cv-3879 (JNE/SRN), 2009 WL 825787,
at * 9 (D. Minn. Mar. 27, 2009) (“Use of a racial slur is reprehensible and cannot be
condoned. Use of a racial slur, however, does not in itself constitute a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.”) (citation omitted); Haggins v. City of St. Paul, No. 09-cv-537
(DWF/RLE), 2010 WL 1380134, at * 10 n.5 (D. Minn. Mar. 1, 2010) (“The Plaintiff's
allegation, that Radke swore at him, and employed racial slurs, does not support a claimed
constitutional violation.”) R&R adopted as modified, 2010 WL 1379913 (D. Minn. Mar.
31, 2010).
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Traylor v. Buck, No. 24-cv-0057 (NEB/LIB), 2025 WL 521139, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 18,
2025), where he did threaten to spit on an officer.7 (Dkt. 126 at 14.) Here, Louis’s concern
about Traylor spitting on him was objectively reasonable considering his knowledge of
Traylor’s disciplinary history, his own work history seeing inmates spitting on officers,
Traylor’s non-compliance with directives, and Traylor’s agitated state. (Louis Decl. ¶¶ 22-
23.) Louis’s use of his hand to redirect Traylor’s face did not injure Traylor, nor was it
excessive given the potentially serious threat that spit can cause officers. 8 The Court finds
Louis’s action was done “in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” not
“maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
Lastly, Traylor tries to manufacture a genuine issue of fact by alleging the video
footage did not capture Louis repeatedly slamming his head on the ground after Louis
pinned him because it did not capture the incident from all angles. (Dkt. 126 at 14.) The
Court has reviewed the video and disagrees. The video shows the point at which Louis pins
Traylor’s face to the ground facing to the left and when he is removed from the ground.
(Pawelk Ex. 9 at 00:03-00:38; Pawelk Ex. 10 at 00:00-00:32.) At no point after Louis
pinned Traylor to the ground did he slam Traylor’s face into the ground repeatedly. (Id.)
When one party’s version of events is contradicted by video evidence, the Court should
7 Traylor does not appear to dispute that Louis was using his hand to move Traylor’s face
to prevent spitting. The Court notes that any dispute would fail because video evidence
shows that as Traylor was walking out of the appointment, he paused, and Louis raised his
hand to redirect Traylor’s face away from him. (Pawelk Ex. 8 at 00:03-00:07.)
8 Additionally, Evenson believed that when Traylor turned his head that he was going to
spit on Louis because he has witnessed Traylor spit on someone before. (Evenson Decl. ¶
9.)
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view the facts as depicted on the video. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007); see
also Terry v. Arnett, No. 22-2849, 2023 WL 1773880, at *1 (8th Cir. Feb. 6,
2023) (concluding “that the district court properly relied on the facts depicted by the
surveillance video”). A reasonable jury could not conclude from the video that Louis
repeatedly slammed Traylor’s face into the ground or that he acted “maliciously or
sadistically to cause harm” as Louis was holding Traylor on the ground. Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 7; Schilf, 687 F.3d at 948.
Even absent the video evidence, the record contradicts Traylor’s allegation that
Louis repeatedly slammed his face into the ground. Defendants Evenson, Olive, and Perry
observed the incident and did not see Louis slam Traylor’s head into the ground. (Evenson
Decl. ¶ 16.; Olive Decl. ¶ 21; Perry Decl. ¶ 11.) Moreover, medical records contradict
Traylor’s claim that he lost a tooth filling due to Louis slamming his face on the ground.
Defendant Tran examined Traylor’s tooth and determined that it had never been filled
before. (Tran. Decl. ¶ 12.)
In sum, viewing “the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party”
Traylor has not “submitted competent, admissible evidence that rebuts the [defendants’]
version of events.” Zubrod v. Hoch, 907 F.3d 568, 577 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Thompson v.
Hubbard, 257 F.3d 896, 899 (8th Cir. 2001)). Because Traylor has provided no evidence
to support his assertions that Louis acted “maliciously and sadistically,” the Court
recommends granting summary judgment on Traylor’s claim of excessive force against
Louis.
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b. Defendants Jayee, Olive, Evenson, and Perry
Traylor generically alleges that Defendants Jayee, Olive, Evenson, and Perry used
excessive force or failed to intervene in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Dkt. 1 at 11.)
The Court recommends granting summary judgment for Defendants Jayee, Olive,
Evenson, and Perry for two reasons.
First, as noted above, the Court determined that Traylor has not produced evidence
demonstrating that Defendant Louis used excessive force, and a “a failure-to-intervene
claim may not prevail in the absence of a showing of excessive force.” Zubrod v. Hoch,
907 F.3d 568, 580 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing Hicks v. Norwood, 640 F.3d 839, 843 (8th Cir.
2011)).
Second, even if the Court had determined that Luis used excessive force, Traylor
has not shown “each individual defendant's personal involvement in the alleged
violation.” White, 865 F.3d at 1081 (citing Dahl v. Weber, 580 F.3d 730, 733 (8th Cir.
2009); Wilson v. Northcutt, 441 F.3d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 2006)). Traylor merely alleges that
Jayee, Olive, Evenson, and Perry either used excessive force against him or failed to
intervene. (Dkt. 1 at 11.) The affidavits DOC Defendants submitted demonstrate that Jayee
briefly helped control one of Traylor’s legs and videoed the incident (Pawelk Decl. Ex. 5
at 3), Evenson radioed updates during the ICS call (Evenson Decl. ¶¶ 12-14, Ex. 1), Olive
also took control of Traylor’s legs while Louis took control of his upper body (Olive Decl.
¶¶ 12-13, 22), and Perry supervised. (Perry Decl. ¶¶ 7-9.) Traylor did not allege specific
facts regarding the personal involvement of Jayee, Olive, Evenson, and Perry in any
constitutional violation, and he has adduced no evidence to support a claim against Jayee,
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Olive, Evenson, and Perry.
In his response, Traylor argues that it is a “reasonable inference” that Defendants
Olive and Evenson failed to intervene because they were with Defendant Luis throughout
the incident. (Dkt. 126 at 23-24.) He did not provide additional argument regarding
Defendants Jayee and Perry. (See generally Dkt. 126.) That Defendants Olive and Evenson
were with Louis during the incident is not alone sufficient to establish a failure to intervene,
and in any event, the Court determined Louis did not engage in excessive force, and absent
excessive force, a failure to intervene claim cannot succeed. Zubrod, 907 F.3d at 580. It is
Traylor’s burden to come forward with specific facts showing each defendant’s personal
involvement in each alleged violation, Traylor has not met his burden here. White, 865 F.3d
at 1081. Consequently, the Court recommends granting summary judgment for Defendants
Jayee, Olive, Evenson, and Perry.
2. Binkley, Connors, Halverson, Klok, Witter, Pawelk, and Doeden
Traylor alleges that Defendants Binkley, Connors, Halverson, Klok, Witter, Pawelk,
and Doeden violated his due process rights by failing to sufficiently review subordinate
staff actions during the January 3, 2024 incident and by failing to provide fair and impartial
disciplinary proceedings.
Traylor brought claims against Binkley and Connors for “determin[ing] plaintiff’s
allegations [were] unfounded.” (Dkt. 1 at 6.) Traylor does not identify the allegations at
issue and has alleged no facts or produced any evidence on how Binkley or Connors were
personally involved in any constitutional violation. White, 865 F.3d at 1081. Traylor
brought a claim against Doeden for “investigat[ing] the incident” and “clos[ing] the
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grievance appeal.” (Dkt. 1 at 6, 8-11.) Traylor does not even allege in his Complaint how
Doeden’s actions violated his right to due process, nor has he produced any evidence as to
how Doeden was personally involved in a constitutional violation. Traylor claims that
Defendants Halverson, Witter, and Pawelk violated his right to due process by failing to
investigate and supervise the disciplinary proceedings. (Dkt. 1 at 11.) Traylor alleges that
Halverson failed to “oversee, discipline and correct inequities of subordinate staffs
misconduct” (Dkt. 1 at 12), that Witter is “responsible for conducting disciplinary
proceedings,” (Id. at 6), and that Pawelk is in “charge of review of disciplinary appeals”
(Id.). Again, Traylor has not alleged facts or produced any evidence as to how Halverson,
Witter, and Pawelk were personally involved in any constitutional violation. Traylor admits
in his response that these Defendants “may not have been personally involved with the
incident . . . .” (Dkt. 126 at 23.) Binkley, Connors, Doeden, Halverson, Witter, and Pawelk
were involved insofar as they reviewed the actions of staff involved in the January 3, 2024
incident, confirmed that no excessive use of force was used, and determined that Traylor’s
actions warranted disciplinary action. Traylor has not established how their review of staff
actions personally violated a constitutional right.
To the extent that Traylor attempts to bring a supervisor liability claim against
Binkley, Connors, Witter, Pawelk, Doeden, and Halverson for their review of staff actions
on January 3, 2024, that claim fails. “[E]ach Government official, his or her title
notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d
993, 1001 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009)). Thus, a
supervisor “is not ‘accountable for the misdeeds of [her] agents' under a theory such as
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respondeat superior or supervisor liability.’” Wagner v. Jones, 664 F.3d 259, 275 (8th Cir.
2011) (quoting Whitson v. Stone Cnty. Jail, 602 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir.2010)). A
supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if she “(1) had notice of a pattern of unconstitutional
acts committed by subordinates; (2) was deliberately indifferent to or tacitly authorized
those acts; and (3) failed to take sufficient remedial action; (4) proximately causing injury
to [plaintiff].” Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340, 355 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Andrews v.
Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir. 1996)) (quotation marks omitted). Here, Traylor has
alleged no facts and produced no evidence to establish that Binkley, Connors, Witter,
Pawelk, Doeden, or Halverson knew of a constitutional violation or pattern of violations
and tacitly authorized or deliberately disregarded it. See id. And to the extent that Traylor
endeavors to attach personal liability to Warden Halverson because of her role as the
Warden of MCF-OPH, “a general responsibility for supervising the operations of a prison
is insufficient to establish the personal involvement required to support
liability.” Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Ouzts v.
Cummins, 825 F.2d 1276, 1277 (8th Cir. 1987)).
Traylor does provide factual allegations regarding Klok’s personal involvement.
Traylor asserts that Klok violated his right to due process by failing to conduct a fair and
impartial proceeding. (Dkt. 1 at 11.) Traylor also takes issue with Klok’s refusal to allow
him to review incident reports before his January 12, 2024 hearing. (Id. at 9-11.)9 It appears
9 Traylor also argues that Klok should not have dismissed his contention that he never
accused officers of pushing him down the stairs. This fact is not material, as Traylor would
have been found guilty of disorderly conduct whether he made the statement or not. (Klok
¶ 18.)
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that Traylor is arguing that the DOC disciplinary procedures are constitutionally inadequate
because Klok refused to allow him to review the incident reports, and the DOC policy
differentiates between “minor” and “major” hearings. (Dkt. 1 at 11, 13.)
“Prisoners held in lawful confinement have their liberty curtailed by definition, so
the procedural protections to which they are entitled are more limited than in cases where
the right at stake is the right to be free from confinement at all.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545
U.S. 209, 225 (2005) (citations omitted). Thus, “a transfer to administrative segregation
requires only informal, nonadversary due process procedures . . . .” Spann v. Lombardi, 65
F.4th 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2023) (citations omitted). The Eighth Circuit has explained that:
Informal due process requires only some notice of the reasons for the
inmate's placement and enough time to prepare adequately for the
administrative review. An inmate must be given an opportunity to present his
views to a neutral decisionmaker but is not entitled to a hearing with the
inmate present. If the prison chooses to hold hearings, inmates do not have a
constitutional right to call witnesses or to require prison officials to interview
witnesses.
Id. (cleaned up).
Here, Klok provided Traylor with a Notice of Violation on January 4, 2024. (Klok
Decl. ¶ 9; Klok Ex. 3.) It is not disputed that Klok refused to allow Traylor to review the
incident reports before the January 12, 2024 hearing. (Klok Decl. ¶¶ 11, 13.) Traylor
successfully appealed Klok’s refusal, and during the second hearing on January 22, 2024,
Klok allowed Traylor to review the incident reports. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16; Dkt. 1 at 10.) The
procedures afforded Traylor before he was ultimately transferred to segregation far surpass
the informal procedures the Eighth Circuit articulated in Spann. Traylor was afforded
“some notice” of the reasons for the discipline and a hearing to “present his views” even
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though he was not entitled to one. See Bakambia v. Ghebre, No. 24-cv-3653 (LMP/DJF),
2025 WL 2528591, at * 8-9 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2025) (noting that Plaintiff challenging
“minor” charge “was not even entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of
constitutional due process”). In summary, the record simply does not support Traylor’s
claims that the disciplinary procedures were constitutionally suspect.
Therefore, the Court recommends granting summary judgment for Binkley,
Connors, Witter, Pawelk, Doeden, Halverson, and Klok on Traylor’s due process claims.
3. Kincannon, McNamara, and Tran
Traylor asserts that nurse Kincannon, nurse McNamara, and dentist Tran were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. DOC Defendants move for summary
judgment on Traylor’s claims against Kincannon, McNamara, and Tran on the ground that
Traylor failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison
conditions under section 1983 . . . by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a). To properly exhaust administrative remedies, an inmate must “pursue[]
the prison grievance process to its final stage and receive[] an adverse decision on the
merits.” Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hammett v. Cofield,
681 F.3d 945, 947-48 (8th Cir. 2012) (per curiam)). The requirement of administrative
exhaustion may not apply where the administrative remedy was not made available to the
inmate. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643-45 (2016). “[D]ismissal is mandatory” where a
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plaintiff fails to exhaust administrative remedies before filing an action in court. Johnson
v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 2003).
The MCF-OPH grievance process as set forth in DOC Policy 303.100 requires an
inmate send a kite related to a medical complaint to the nurse staff. (Dkt. 106, Wolff Decl.
¶¶ 3, 9; Dkt. 107-1, Wolff Ex. 1 at 2.) If the inmate is dissatisfied with a kite response, he
must send another kite to the RN supervisor, then the Director of Clinical Operations.
(Wolff Decl. ¶ 9; Wolff Ex. 1 at 2.) If the inmate has exhausted the chain of command and
is still not satisfied with the resolution of the complaint, he must submit a formal grievance
form to the Associate Director of Nursing within thirty days of when the issue occurred.
(Wolf Decl. ¶¶ 6, 9; Wolff Ex. 1 at 3.) The Associate Director of Nursing is the facility
grievance coordinator, who receives and responds to all grievances. (Wolff Decl. ¶¶ 2, 9.)
An inmate is limited to bringing one issue per grievance form. (Wolff Decl. ¶ 9; Wolff Ex.
1 at 1.) If the inmate is dissatisfied with the grievance response, he may then submit an
appeal to the Director of Nursing. (Wolff Decl. ¶ 7, 11.) If he is again dissatisfied, he may
submit a final appeal to the Health Services Program Director. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Here, the facility grievance coordinator reviewed DOC records and found no record
of Traylor filing or attempting to file a grievance related to any of the events that occurred
on January 3, 2024. (Id. ¶ 19.) Although Traylor submitted multiple kites related to medical
complaints, the only health and medical grievance the coordinator received related to
events that occurred on December 13, 2023. (Id. ¶ 15; Dkt. 106-1, Wolff Ex. 2.) And the
only grievance Traylor has provided the Court was submitted to staff and relates to his
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complaints against staff for use of force on January 3, 2024, not his medical complaints.10
(See Dkt. 1-1 at 1.) In sum, the evidence submitted shows that Traylor did not exhaust the
prison grievance process before bringing his claims against Kincannon, McNamara, and
Tran. Consequently, the Court finds there is no genuine dispute about Traylor’s failure to
administratively exhaust his claims, and recommends granting summary judgment for
Kincannon, McNamara, and Tran.
B. Official Capacity Claims
Traylor brings claims against the Minnesota Department of Corrections, MN-OPH,
Doeden, McNamara, Pawelk, and Tran in their official capacities. Traylor alleges that each
defendant is an agent of the State of Minnesota, and he sues for money damages and
injunctive relief.
1. Minnesota Department of Corrections and MN-OPH
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars § 1983 claims for damages and
injunctive relief against a state or its agencies unless Congress has abrogated immunity or
the state has waived its immunity. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66
(1989) (concluding that Congress did not intend to override sovereign immunity in
enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Graham, 473 U.S. at 169 (“[A]bsent waiver by the State or
valid congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a
10 While the grievance Traylor submitted raises concerns about his health towards the end
of the document, the facility’s policy allows only one issue per grievance. (Wolff Decl. ¶
9; Wolff Ex. 1 at 1.) Thus, under the policy, Traylor was required to submit a separate
grievance detailing his medical concerns to the Associate Director of Nursing. (Wolff Decl.
¶ 9; Wolff Ex. 1 at 2.)
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State in federal court.”). Here, the State has not waived immunity and Congress has not
abrogated it. Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Traylor’s claims against the Minnesota
Department of Corrections and MN-OPH. Otto v. Schmitt, No. 21-cv-1610 (PAM/ECW),
2021 WL 4975691, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 5, 2021) (determining § 1983 claim could not be
maintained against the MNDOC) R&R adopted, 2021 WL 4973718 (D. Minn. Oct. 26,
2021); Hanks v. Hills, 373 F. Supp. 3d 1230 (D. Minn. 2017) (dismissing claim against
Minnesota Department of Corrections as barred by Eleventh Amendment), R&R adopted,
2017 WL 10243525 (D. Minn. Nov. 27, 2017).
2. Defendants Doeden, McNamara, Pawelk, and Tran
Additionally, “[a] suit against state employees in their official capacities is the
functional equivalent of a suit against the State.” Zajrael v. Harmon, 677 F.3d 353, 355
(8th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“[A] suit against a state official in
his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against
the official’s office.”) (citations omitted). Thus, sovereign immunity also bars claims for
money damages against a state’s officers. Daywitt v. Harpstead, No. 21-cv-1848
(WMW/DTS), 2022 WL 2374133, at *2 (D. Minn. June 30, 2022), aff'd, No. 22-2484,
2022 WL 16985820 (8th Cir. Nov. 17, 2022). Consequently, the Court recommends
granting summary judgment for Defendants Doeden, McNamara, Pawelk, and Tran in their
official capacities.
In limited circumstances, a plaintiff may obtain prospective injunctive relief against
officials acting in their official capacities under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56
(1908). “Under the Ex Parte Young doctrine, a private party can sue a state officer in his
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official capacity to enjoin a prospective action that would violate federal law.” 281 Care
Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 632 (8th Cir. 2011). “In determining whether this
exception applies, a court conducts ‘a straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint
alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as
prospective.’” Id. (quoting Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Maryland, 535
U.S. 635, 645, (2002)). Traylor seeks injunctive relief against Defendants Pawelk and
Halvorson, specifically requesting they be ordered to amend the DOC’s disciplinary
hearings policy. (Dkt. 1 at 13.)
“Official-capacity liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 occurs only when a
constitutional injury is caused by ‘a government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official
policy.’” Grayson v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802, 810-811 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Monell v. Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). As discussed above, the Court determined that
the disciplinary proceedings did not violate Traylor’s due process rights. Thus, because
there is no “constitutional injury,” Traylor’s due process claims against Defendants Pawelk
and Halverson in their official capacities also fail. For these reasons, the Court recommends
granting summary judgment to Defendants Pawelk and Halverson in their official
capacities.11
11 It is also unclear to the Court whether Defendants Pawelk and Halverson are even
capable of making the policy changes that Traylor requests. See Gardner v. Minnesota,
No. 16-cv-03999 (JNE/KMM), 2019 WL 1084714, at *14 (D. Minn. Jan. 15,
2019) (dismissing plaintiff’s official capacity claims seeking injunctive relief against
defendants not capable of making requested policy changes), R&R adopted, 2019 WL
1086338 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2019).
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II. Defendant Milender’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Traylor sued Milender in his individual capacity. (Dkt. 1 at 7.) Traylor alleges that
Milender was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 by refusing to provide him treatment. Defendant Milender asserts that Traylor did
not have a serious medical need and that he provided diligent medical care.12
Deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical need violates the Eighth
Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). “Proof of deliberate indifference
requires that an inmate show the following: ‘(1) he suffered from an objectively serious
medical need, and (2) defendants knew of the need yet deliberately disregarded it.’”
Rusness v. Becker Cnty., Minn., 31 F.4th 606, 614 (8th Cir. 2022) (quoting Johnson v.
Leonard, 929 F.3d 569, 575 (8th Cir. 2019)). “Deliberate indifference has both an objective
and a subjective component.” Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 345 (8th Cir. 2006). “The
objective component requires a plaintiff to demonstrate an objectively serious medical
need.” Corwin v. City of Indep., Mo., 829 F.3d 695, 698 (8th Cir. 2016) (citing Grayson,
454 F.3d at 808–09; Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 1997)). “A medical
condition is ‘objectively serious’ if the prisoner was diagnosed by a doctor or it is so
obvious that a lay person would recognize the medical need.” Saylor v. Nebraska, 812 F.3d
637, 644 (8th Cir. 2016), as amended (Mar. 4, 2016) (citing Scott v. Benson, 742 F.3d 335,
340 (8th Cir.2014)). Whether a medical need is “sufficiently obvious” is analyzed based
on background knowledge of an inmate’s medical conditions and should not be “analyzed
12 Milender does not allege that Traylor failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
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in a vacuum.” Jones v. Minn. Dept. of Corr., 512 F.3d 478, 482 (8th Cir. 2008).
“The subjective component requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant actually
knew of, but deliberately disregarded, such need.” Corwin, 829 F.3d at 698 (citations
omitted). “The subjective prong of deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard
that requires a mental state of ‘more . . . than gross negligence.’” Saylor, 812 F.3d at 644
(quoting Fourte v. Faulkner Cnty., 746 F.3d 384, 387 (8th Cir. 2014)). Deliberate
indifference may be “manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs
or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or
intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-105.
“A showing of deliberate indifference is greater than gross negligence and requires more
than mere disagreement with treatment decisions.” Gibson v. Weber, 433 F.3d 642, 646
(8th Cir. 2006) (citing Est. of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995)).
To prevail on his deliberate indifference claim, Traylor must demonstrate that he
suffered from an objectively serious medical need, and that Milender knew of and
deliberately disregarded his serious medical need. Rusness, 31 F.4th at 614. Though
Traylor does not identify a diagnosis, he alleges his nerve pain in his hand and foot, his
rash, and “adequate medication” are serious medical needs that Milender disregarded and
failed to treat.
The Court finds that Traylor’s allegations are not supported by the record. The
record shows Traylor interfered with attempts to provide him medical care. Milender
attempted on multiple occasions to examine and treat Traylor’s rash, and he refused.
(Novak Ex. A at 240, 268, 295.) In follow up appointments with other medical
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professionals, Traylor did not complain about his rash. (Id. at 98 (10/17/2024), 128
(08/22/2024); 211 (04/18/2024).)13 The record also reflects that Traylor was unhappy with
Milender for not prescribing him Lyrica several months before the January 3, 2024,
incident. (Id. at 159, 240, 302, 362, 364, 362, 364.) In any event, before and after the
incident, Milender considered Traylor’s request, reviewed his medical history, and
determined that there was no basis for him to prescribe Lyrica. (Id. at 159, 240, 362, 364,
362, 364.) Additionally, after the January 3, 2024 incident multiple medical professionals
noted Traylor’s requests for Lyrica and no Lyrica prescription was provided despite his
requests. (Id. at 85; 156, 159-160, 166, 177, 181, 190, 216, 233). Instead of his requested
Lyrica medication, Traylor was treated with Effexor, venlafaxine, and Tylenol. (Id. at 2,
240-41, 257-58, 263-64, 273.) Lastly, Traylor’s behavior following the January 3, 2024,
incident also suggested to medical staff that his medical needs were not objectively serious.
For example, Traylor was argumentative and evasive towards questioning and at times
outright refused to answer questions or allow his vitals to be taken. (Id. at 120, 124-25,
156, 166, 173, 178, 181, 184, 199, 202, 216, 227, 231, 240, 255, 269, 273, 285, 295.)
Although Traylor’s medical records demonstrate his discontent with medical
treatment, they also show that he was seen by multiple medical professionals for his
complaints, all of whom addressed his concerns and provided care. Regardless of whether
Traylor’s rash and complaints of pain constitute a serious medical need, Traylor’s
13 Traylor takes issue with Dr. Wagner’s notes for his January 9, 2025 appointment, but
Dr. Wagner is not a defendant to this case, and Traylor’s discontent with Dr. Wagner’s
treatment is not properly before the Court. (Dkt. 61 at 2.)
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disagreement with Milender’s treatment of his rash and pain does not alone establish that
Milender was deliberately indifferent. Deliberate indifference is an extremely high
standard that requires a mental state of “more ... than gross negligence.” Saylor, 812 F.3d
at 644 (citation omitted). Traylor admits that Milender tried to treat his complaints. (Dkt.
1 at 8 (“[D]efendant [M]ilender asked me to show my skin ailment . . . he then moved on
to attempt to address other concerns.”).) Though Milender declined to proscribe him
Lyrica, he did so based on his medical judgment after thorough review of the medical
records available to him and exams of Traylor. And while Milender declined to refer
Traylor to specialists for his rash, he explained to Traylor he could not authorize a
dermatologist consult without having seen the rash and without knowing more about the
rash and if it could be easily treated. (Novak Ex. A at 240-41, 295.)
“[N]othing in the Eighth Amendment prevents prison doctors from exercising their
independent medical judgment ….[, and] [p]rison officials do not violate the Eighth
Amendment when, in the exercise of their professional judgment, they refuse to implement
a prisoner's requested course of treatment.” Dantzler v. Baldwin, 133 F.4th 833, 846 (8th
Cir. 2025) (quoting Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1996)). Milender’s failure to
prescribe Lyrica and refer Traylor to a dermatologist for his rash pursuant to his requests
does not demonstrate deliberate indifference. Rather, Milender exercised his professional
judgment in denying Traylor’s requests, an act that does not violate Traylor’s Eighth
Amendment right. Id.; see also Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, No. 04-cv-1077 (ADM/JJG),
2005 WL 2917464, at * 8 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2005) (“The Eighth Amendment, while
requiring medical treatment, does not require that the precise treatment requested be
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provided, nor does it require treatment at the time of the patient's choosing. Rather, it
merely requires an absence of deliberate disregard.”), aff'd, 462 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2006).
On the record Traylor has not shown that he had a serious medical need and
deliberately disregarded them. Thus, there is no genuine dispute that Traylor received
adequate medical care from Milender. Consequently, the Court recommends granting
Milender’s motion for summary judgment.
III. STATE LAW CLAIMS
Traylor also brings a variety of state law claims against various Defendants.14
However, this Court’s jurisdiction was based on federal claims, and the Court recommends
granting the Defendants’ summary judgment motions and dismissing all of Traylor’s
federal claims.
A court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under
subsection (a) if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). When all federal claims “are dismissed before trial,
even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed
as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Andrewin v.
Abraham, No. 08-cv-5866 (DWF/JSM), 2009 WL 3428854, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 23,
2009) (declining jurisdiction over state law claims “because it ha[d] dismissed the only
claim over which it had original jurisdiction”). Therefore, the Court recommends declining
supplemental jurisdiction over Traylor’s state law claims.
14 Traylor brought claims of medical malpractice, negligence, battery, assault, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Dkt. 1 at 11-12.)
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RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing and all of the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. DOC Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 78), be GRANTED,
and Traylor’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against them be DISMISSED.
2. Defendant Milender’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 49) be
GRANTED, and Traylor’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Milender be
DISMISSED.
3. Traylor’s state-law claims against Defendants be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
Dated: November 24, 2025
s/Shannon G. Elkins
SHANNON G. ELKINS
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written objections to a
magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days after being
served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to those
objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the objections. See Local
Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the word or line limits set
forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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