Allwine v. Bolin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Stephen Allwine,
Petitioner,
v.
William Bolin,
Warden MCF Stillwater,1
Respondent.
Case No. 24-cv-439 (JRT/DLM)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on pro se Petitioner Stephen Allwine’s Petition for
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 2 (Petition).) Mr. Allwine’s Petition
comes before this Court for review under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts and has been referred to the undersigned United
States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636
and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1. In his Petition, Mr. Allwine raises twelve
grounds for relief alleging various violations of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. For the following reasons, the Court recommends denying the Petition
in its entirety. Also before the Court is Mr. Allwine’s Motion to Expand the Record (Doc.
1When Mr. Allwine filed his habeas petition, he was incarcerated at Minnesota
Correctional Facility (“MCF”) Stillwater. But in July 2025, while his Petition was under
review, Mr. Allwine notified the Court that he had been transferred to MCF Rush City.
(Doc. 89.) Publicly accessible Minnesota Department of Corrections records also confirm
that Mr. Allwine is incarcerated at MCF Rush City. Minnesota Department of Corrections,
https://coms.doc.state.mn.us/publicviewer/OffenderDetails/Index/256147/Search (last
visited December 11, 2025).
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 1 of 32

2
78). Because the Court recommends that Mr. Allwine’s Petition be denied, and because he
has failed to advance any legal or factual basis to grant the motion, the Court denies the
Motion to Expand the Record without prejudice.
BACKGROUND
State court proceedings.
In 2018, Mr. Allwine was convicted in Minnesota state court of the first-degree
premediated murder of his wife Amy Allwine and sentenced to life in prison without
release. See State v. Allwine, 963 N.W.2d 178 (Minn. 2021). Following the jury’s guilty
verdict, in May 2018, Mr. Allwine filed his direct appeal with the Minnesota Supreme
Court.2 Id. at 184.The Minnesota Supreme Court then granted Mr. Allwine’s motion to stay
so that he could pursue postconviction relief in the district court. Id.
In August 2019, Mr. Allwine, through appellate counsel, filed his first petition for
postconviction relief in the state district court, submitting his supporting memorandum in
March 2020. (Docs. 55-2 (First Petition for Postconviction Relief), 55-4 (First
Memorandum of Law in Support of Postconviction Relief).) Mr. Allwine also filed a
Second (amended) Petition for Postconviction Relief in the district court in March 2020,
with his supporting memorandum following in June 2020. (Docs. 55-3 (Second Petition
for Postconviction Relief), 55-5 (Second Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner’s
Amended Petition for Postconviction Relief).)
2 In Minnesota state court, “[a] person who has been convicted of murder in the first degree
may appeal directly from the district court to the supreme court.” Minn. Stat. § 632.14.
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 2 of 32

3
Through his postconviction petition, Mr. Allwine sought relief based on three main
grounds: ineffective assistance of trial counsel, newly obtained evidence, and prosecutorial
misconduct. (Doc. 55-6 (State Court Order denying postconviction relief) at 7.) Mr.
Allwine asked the district court to vacate his conviction, grant him a new trial, or hold an
evidentiary hearing to investigate the claims in his petition. (Id.) The state district court
denied Mr. Allwine’s postconviction petition in its entirety. (Id. at 20.) After his first
postconviction petition to the district court was denied, Mr. Allwine filed three motions to
reconsider, all of which were also denied. Allwine, 963 N.W.2d at 185. Mr. Allwine then
appealed the denial of his postconviction petition to the Minnesota Supreme Court. See
generally id.
In December 2020, the Minnesota Supreme Court consolidated Mr. Allwine’s
stayed direct appeal with his postconviction appeal. Allwine, 963 N.W.2d at 185. Mr.
Allwine presented four arguments on direct appeal. First, he argued that the evidence was
insufficient to support the jury’s verdict that he is guilty of first-degree premeditated
murder. Id. at 182. Second, he alleged that the state committed prosecutorial misconduct.
Id. Third, he claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Id. And finally,
he sought an evidentiary hearing to review the opinions of two experts whose affidavits
were submitted with his motions to reconsider, to determine whether a new trial was
warranted. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that Mr. Allwine’s claims had “no
merit,” affirmed his conviction, and affirmed the district court’s decision to deny
postconviction relief. Id.
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 3 of 32

4
After Mr. Allwine’s consolidated postconviction petition and direct appeal and were
denied, he filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief in the state district court. (Doc.
55-11 (Petition for Postconviction Relief).) Mr. Allwine advanced two main grounds for
relief. First, he claimed jury misconduct in violation of Minnesota Rules of Criminal
Procedure and state law. (Id. at 11.) Second, he claimed that his appellate counsel was
ineffective for missing certain court-imposed deadlines, and for bringing meritless claims
while omitting other meritorious issues. (Id. at 11-12.) The state district court denied Mr.
Allwine’s pro se petition in full. (Doc. 55-12 (State Court Order denying pro se
postconviction petition) at 17.)
After the state district court denied his pro se postconviction petition, Mr. Allwine,
still pro se, appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court once again. (Doc. 55-13
(Memorandum of Law in Support of Appeal of Denial of Motion Discovery (sic) and
Petition for Postconviction Relief).) Mr. Allwine made several arguments on appeal
including multiple claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise
certain claims in his consolidated direct appeal; that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied a motion to compel discovery and a motion for a hearing on juror
misconduct; and that the district court abused its discretion when it denied an evidentiary
hearing on Mr. Allwine’s pro se postconviction petition. (Id. at 2.) The Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Mr. Allwine’s pro se postconviction petition
on July 19, 2023. (Doc. 55-16 (Minnesota Supreme Court Opinion affirming denial of pro
se postconviction petition) at 18.)
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 4 of 32

5
Federal habeas proceedings.
On February 12, 2024, Mr. Allwine timely filed this federal Petition for a writ of
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 2.) Mr. Allwine attacks the validity of his
conviction and sentence on 12 grounds.
GROUND 1: Mr. Allwine contends that the prosecution presented insufficient trial
evidence to meet its burden of proof, in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. (Id. at 7.)
GROUND 2: Mr. Allwine alleges that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
were infringed when the prosecutors withheld exculpatory and impeachment
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland3 and United States v. Bagley4and when
the district court denied Mr. Allwine’s postconviction motion to compel discovery.
(Id. at 40.)
GROUND 3: Mr. Allwine argues that the state district court violated his due
process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by denying a
postconviction evidentiary hearing in violation of Townsend v. Sain5, and by
denying him the opportunity to submit a supporting memorandum of law. (Id. at
58.)
GROUND 4: Mr. Allwine contends that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights were violated by the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and
appellate counsel. (Id. at 79.)
GROUND 5: Mr. Allwine claims that the prosecution violated his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by introducing “prior bad acts” evidence.
(Id. at 96.)
GROUND 6: Mr. Allwine alleges that various instances of prosecutorial
misconduct infringed his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Id.
at 99.)
GROUND 7: Mr. Allwine argues that the prosecution violated his Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights derived from Brady v. Maryland and the
Confrontation Clause by denying him access to his electronic devices. (Id. at 112.)
3 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
4 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
5 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 5 of 32

6
GROUND 8: Likewise, Mr. Allwine contends that his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment Compulsory Process rights were violated by denying him access to his
electronic devices. (Id. at 115.)
GROUND 9: Mr. Allwine maintains that the trial court violated his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights when it denied his in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) request to access funds for electronic evidence. (Id. at 118.)
GROUND 10: Mr. Allwine claims that the Minnesota Supreme Court violated his
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights
when it denied his request for an oral argument and for counsel to represent him at
oral argument. (Id. at 120.)
GROUND 11: Mr. Allwine argues that the state district court violated his Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury by denying a hearing to
investigate jury misconduct. (Id. at 125.)
GROUND 12: Mr. Allwine alleges that the cumulative effects of the errors at his
trial violated his right to a fair trial. (Id. at 131.)
Based on these claims, Mr. Allwine asks this Court to reverse and vacate his state
conviction. (Id. at 137.)
Respondent contends in his Answer (Doc. 55 (Answer)) that Mr. Allwine’s federal
habeas Petition should be denied in its entirety because he failed to fairly present his claims
in state court and thus failed to exhaust state remedies. Respondent also argues that to the
extent Mr. Allwine was aware of any federal claims when he filed his direct appeal, but
failed to raise them, he is procedurally barred from doing so now. Finally, Respondent
asserts that even if some of Mr. Allwine’s claims could withstand § 2254’s exhaustion
requirement, he has either failed to allege a federal legal or constitutional violation, or that
the Minnesota Supreme Court unreasonably applied federal law, such that any exhausted
claim still warrants dismissal. In Mr. Allwine’s Reply brief, self-styled as a memorandum
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 6 of 32

7
in support of his petition (Doc. 59 (Reply)), Mr. Allwine insists that he has properly filed
his federal habeas Petition and “correctly highlights the Constitutional violations that
occurred in [his] case.” (Id. at 2.)
While his habeas petition was still under the Court’s consideration, Mr. Allwine
submitted, without the Court’s permission, a Letter to District Judge (Doc. 92) and a Letter
to Magistrate Judge (Doc. 93), both of which make new arguments in support of his
petition. Respondent objected to the Court’s consideration of any new arguments in Mr.
Allwine’s letters without him obtaining the Court’s leave to submit supplemental briefing.
(Doc. 94.) To the extent that any argument Mr. Allwine raises in his out-of-turn letters is
relevant to the Court’s disposition of his habeas Petition, the Court addresses those
arguments below.
ANALYSIS
I. MR. ALLWINE’S HABEAS PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY.
Section 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”) of 1996, governs federal court review of habeas petitions filed by people in
state (as opposed to federal) prison custody. Under § 2254, “[a] district court may grant a
writ of habeas corpus only if the petitioner ‘is in custody in violation of the Constitution or
laws or treaties of the United States.’” Barnes v. Segal, No. 23-cv-939 (JRT/DLM), 2024
WL 418695, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 16, 2024) (quoting Blocher v. Eischen, No. 22-cv-678
(PJS/DTS), 2022 WL 1740649, at *3 (D. Minn. Nov. 3, 2022)), R. & R. adopted, 2024 WL
416400 (D. Minn. Feb. 5, 2024); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A prisoner in the custody
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 7 of 32

8
of a state court may (with rare exceptions not relevant here) seek federal habeas relief only
on the grounds that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). “It is not the province of a federal habeas court to
reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Cocuzzi v. Reimann, No. 24-
cv-2876 (PJS/DLM), 2024 WL 4426181, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 5, 2024), R. & R. adopted,
2024 WL 4419607 (D. Minn. Oct. 4, 2024) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-
68 (1991)). Because federal courts are limited to deciding whether a habeas petitioner has
been convicted or sentenced in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States, federal habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in the interpretation or
application of state law. Snell v. Beard, No. 12-cv-7021 (GAF/AJW), 2014 WL 1289782,
at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2014), R. & R. adopted, 2014 WL 1291934 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28,
2014) (citing Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011)). To obtain habeas relief under
§2254 requires:
(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 8 of 32

9
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). But before the Court can reach this analysis on a petitioner’s claims,
it must first determine whether that petitioner “has exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
Exhaustion requires more than just pursuit of a claim generally; a petitioner must
have “fairly presented federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the
opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.”
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275 (1971)) (cleaned up and emphasis added). This makes sense because “[i]f
state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal
rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under
the United States Constitution.” Id. at 365-66; see also Picard, 404 U.S. at 276 (“Only if
the state courts have had the first opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated in
a federal habeas proceeding does it make sense to speak of the exhaustion of state
remedies.”). “To ‘fairly present’ his claim, a petitioner must present the same facts and
legal theories to the state courts that he later presents to the federal courts. This allows the
state court to apply the controlling legal principles to the facts that constitute the federal
claim.” Jones v. Jerrison, 20 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Rust v. Hopkins, 984
F.2d 1486, 1491 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967, (1993) (further citation omitted).
The fair opportunity requirement does not mean that “[a] state prisoner seeking
federal habeas relief” must have “spelled out every nuance of [their] federal constitutional
claims to the state courts,” but it does mean they must have provided “the state courts fair
notice that there is indeed a federal constitutional dimension to [their] claims.” Carney v.
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 9 of 32

10
Fabian, No. 5-cv-538 (RHK/JSM), 441 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 (D. Minn. 2006), aff’d,
487 F.3d 1094 (8th Cir. 2007). “In order to fairly present a claim, a petitioner is required
to refer to a specific federal constitutional right, a particular constitutional provision, a
federal constitutional case, or a state case raising a pertinent federal constitutional issue.”
Nash v. Russell, 807 F.3d 892, 898 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d
1155, 1161-62 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc)) (cleaned up). It is not enough to leave the state
courts to infer a petitioner has asserted a federal right. Id.; see also Duncan, 513 U.S. at
366 (“If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial
denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say
so, not only in federal court, but in state court.”). A petitioner’s “federal legal theory or
theories must plainly appear on the face of the petitioner’s state-court briefs.” Jones, 20
F.3d at 854 (citing McDougald v. Lockhart, 942 F.2d 508, 510 (8th Cir. 1991)).
If a petitioner has failed to fairly present their claim in state court and a state
procedural rule precludes further litigation of that claim, the claim is procedurally
defaulted. Hamilton v. Roehrich, 628 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1045 (D. Minn. 2009) (citing Sloan
v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1371, 1381 (8th Cir. 1995)). In Minnesota state court, once a defendant
has taken their direct appeal “all matters raised [in that appeal], and all claims known but
not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”
unless the claim is novel, or the interests of fairness and justice warrant relief. Zenanko v.
State, 587 N.W.2d 642, 644 (Minn. 1998) (quoting State v. Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741
(1976)); see also Washington v. State, 675 N.W.2d 628, 630 (Minn. 2004) (“The primary
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 10 of 32

11
exceptions to the Knaffla rule are where a novel legal issue is presented, or the interests of
fairness require relief.”).
Consequently, claims that Mr. Allwine could have raised on direct appeal, but failed
to raise, are procedurally defaulted under Minnesota’s Knaffla rule. Murphy v. King, 652
F.3d 845, 849-50 (8th Cir. 2011). When claims are procedurally defaulted, federal habeas
review is barred “unless the [petitioner] can demonstrate cause for the default and actual
prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to
consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). To show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice
will result, a petitioner must “present new evidence that affirmatively demonstrates that he
is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted.” Murphy, 652 F.3d at 850 (quoting
Abdi v. Hatch, 450 F.3d 334, 338 (8th Cir. 2006)).
The Court turns now to each of Mr. Allwine’s grounds for habeas relief.
A. Ground 1 should be dismissed because Mr. Allwine failed to fairly present it in
state court and it is procedurally defaulted.
In Ground 1 of his federal habeas corpus Petition, Mr. Allwine claims that the state
presented insufficient evidence at trial to convict him beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus
violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 2 at 7.) Respondent
contends this claim must be dismissed because Mr. Allwine failed to fairly present it in
state court before raising the claim in his federal habeas petition and thus failed to exhaust
state remedies. In his Reply, Mr. Allwine counters that the “core substance of this issue is
the same argument that [he] has been claiming throughout trial, appeal, and postconviction:
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 11 of 32

12
Petitioner is innocent, and the evidence demonstrates he is innocent . . . the evidence is not
sufficient to prove him guilty . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Doc. 59 at 10.)
Reviewing Mr. Allwine’s consolidated direct appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court
examined Mr. Allwine’s sufficiency of the-evidence-challenge under state law. (Docs. 55-
7 at 22-29; 55-10 at 8-9.) But Mr. Allwine did not fairly present any federal dimension of
this claim to the state courts, and the “mere similarity between his state law claim and his
federal habeas claim is insufficient to satisfy the fair presentation requirement.” Turnage
v. Fabian, 606 F.3d 933, 940 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Carney, 487 F.3d at 1097 (cleaned
up).
Under Minnesota law, a heightened scrutiny standard applies to convictions based
on circumstantial evidence. State v. Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469,473 (Minn. 2010).
Heightened scrutiny requires that the circumstances proved are “consistent with a
hypothesis that the accused is guilty and must be inconsistent with any other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.” Id. (quoting State v. Bias, 419 N.W.2d 480, 484 (1988)).
But the federal due process standard requires only that the evidence—direct or
circumstantial— “reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” without
need to “rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 326 (1979). These are different standards, and Mr. Allwine
chose to pursue relief based on the state standard in earlier proceedings. Because Mr.
Allwine failed to fairly present any federal dimension of Ground 1 of his habeas petition
to the state courts (Docs. 55-7 at 22-29; 55-10 at 8-9), his claim for relief cannot be
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 12 of 32

13
considered on the merits in this action because it has not first been exhausted in the state
courts.
Mr. Allwine could have raised a constitutional challenge related to Ground 1 on his
direct appeal, but failed to do so, and neither Knaffla exception applies here. Mr. Allwine
has shown neither that cause and prejudice for the default, nor that failure to consider the
federal dimension of his claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ground
1 is therefore procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Ground 1
be dismissed with prejudice.
B. Ground 2 should be dismissed because Mr. Allwine failed to exhaust state
remedies, and the claim is procedurally defaulted.
In Ground 2 of his Petition, Mr. Allwine alleges that his Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were infringed when prosecutors withheld exculpatory and
impeachment evidence in violation of Brady and Bagley, and when the state district court
denied Mr. Allwine’s postconviction motion to compel discovery. (Doc. 2 at 40.)
Respondent counters that Ground 2 should also be dismissed because Mr. Allwine has
failed to fairly present this claim before the state courts. In his Reply, Mr. Allwine, insists
that “[t]his issue has been clearly presented to the State courts in a postconviction petition
to the district court . . . on appeal . . . in Petitioner’s reply brief. . . and Petitioner gave the
Minnesota Supreme Court and additional chance to resolve it at his ‘Rehearing.’” (Doc. 59
at 18.)
This Court’s review of state court record reveals that Mr. Allwine indeed alleged
Brady violations against prosecutors in his first petition for postconviction relief but failed
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 13 of 32

14
to press the argument further. (Doc. 55-4 at 8.) In his Memorandum of Law in Support of
his Amended Petition for Postconviction Relief, Mr. Allwine abandoned his Brady claim
against the state prosecutors and instead argued that prosecutors’ conduct violated
Minnesota’s Rules of Criminal Procedure and the American Bar Association’s Rules of
Professional Conduct. (Doc. 55-5 at 2-7.) Then, on appeal from the denial of his pro se
postconviction petition, Mr. Allwine alleged that his appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise a Brady violation against the state. (Doc. 55-13 at 30-36.) So, while Mr.
Allwine referenced federal caselaw in state court proceedings in relation to Ground 2, he
still failed to fairly present his claim before the state court because he failed to present the
same facts and legal theories to each level of the state courts that he now presents in his
federal habeas petition. Jones, 20 F.3d at 854 (“to ‘fairly present’ his claim a petitioner
must present the same facts and legal theories to the state courts that are later presented to
the federal courts”). As a result, Ground 2 cannot be considered on the merits in this action
because it has not first been exhausted in the state courts.
Although Mr. Allwine could have raised a federal constitutional challenge on direct
appeal as to Ground 2 but failed to do so, he is barred from raising it now in his federal
habeas Petition. Murphy, 652 F.3d at 849 (quoting Cooper, 745 N.W.2d at 190-91);
Knaffla, N.W.2d at 741. Nor has Mr. Allwine shown that any exception to this procedural
bar applies to allow this Court to consider the merits of Ground 2. He is therefore barred
from bringing unraised federal claims related to Ground 2 of his petition because Ground
2 is procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the Court recommends Ground 2 is be dismissed
with prejudice.
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 14 of 32

15
C. Ground 3 should be dismissed because Mr. Allwine has failed to allege a
violation of a federal law or Constitutional right.
Next, in Ground 3, Mr. Allwine alleges that his due process rights under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when the “Postconviction Court” denied him
an evidentiary hearing, and the opportunity to submit a memorandum of law and provide
oral argument in support of his claims. (Doc. 2 at 58.) Respondent argues that Ground 3
should be dismissed because there is no federal constitutional right to a postconviction
evidentiary hearing or to submit a memorandum in support of one’s postconviction claims,
thus Mr. Allwine may not obtain habeas relief in the first instance. But even if habeas relief
were available to Mr. Allwine on Ground 3, it should still be dismissed, says Respondent,
because Mr. Allwine has failed to fairly present the claim in state court. In reply, Mr.
Allwine asserts that he has raised the “core substance of this issue” all along, giving the
state court a full opportunity to resolve the constitutional issues, and therefor he “should
be granted an evidentiary hearing to complete the record for appeal.” (Doc. 59 at 24.)
“A state prisoner does not have a constitutional or other federal right to post-
conviction proceedings in state court.” Andersen v. Minnesota, No. 14-cv-779 SRN/LIB,
2015 WL 632156, at *7 (D. Minn. Feb. 12, 2015) (citing Lackawanna Cnty. Dist. Att’y v.
Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 402 (2001) (“each State has created mechanisms for both direct appeal
and state post-conviction review, even though there is no constitutional mandate that they
do so”); see also Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (“States have no
obligation to provide [discretionary postconviction relief].”) Mr. Allwine asks the Court to
review the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision applying Minnesota state law to affirm
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 15 of 32

16
the denial of an evidentiary hearing in state postconviction proceedings. Because Mr.
Allwine fails to identify a violation of his constitutional rights beyond the general
invocation of “due process,” his claim the that “Postconviction Court” wrongfully denied
him an evidentiary hearing necessarily fails. Anderson, 2015 WL 632156, at *7.
But even if Mr. Allwine raised a claim for habeas relief in Ground 3, he failed to
fairly present it in state court, “since in the Minnesota Supreme Court the petitioner sought
an evidentiary hearing as a matter of state law.” Turnage, 606 F.3d at 940. “While [Mr.
Allwine] now asserts that federal law required the state court to grant the requested hearing,
asking for the same relief on different grounds does not retroactively convert the state law
claim presented in the petitioner’s brief to the Minnesota Supreme Court into a federal
claim.” Id. Accordingly, the Court concludes that even if Mr. Allwine presented a claim
for habeas relief, Ground 3 cannot be considered on the merits in this action because it has
not been fairly presented in the state courts.
Even so, because Mr. Allwine has failed to allege a violation of a federal law or
Constitutional right, no habeas relief is available on this ground. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The
Court therefore concludes that Ground 3 should be dismissed with prejudice.
D. Ground 4 should be dismissed because Mr. Allwine failed to present this claim
in state court, and it is procedurally defaulted.
Turning to Ground 4, Mr. Allwine alleges violations of his due process rights under
the Fifth the Fourteenth Amendments based on the ineffective assistance of both his trial
counsel and his appellate counsel. As with Mr. Allwine’s other claims, Respondent argues
that Ground 4 should be dismissed because Mr. Allwine has failed to fairly present the Fifth
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 16 of 32

17
and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims in state court and therefore failed to exhaust
state court remedies. Mr. Allwine counters in his Reply brief that the “core substance of this
issue” has been fairly presented in both his direct appeal and postconviction petition that
both his trial and appellate counsel were “ineffective in violation of his constitutional rights
and federal law.” (Doc. 59 at 27.)
But there was no mention of Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment due process violations
in relation to Mr. Allwine’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel asserted in his
direct appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court. (See Doc. 55-7.) And save for two fleeting
references to the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee to effective assistance of counsel for
an of-right appeal in state court in Mr. Allwine’s Pro Se Memorandum of Law in Support
of Appeal of Denial of Motion Discovery (sic) and Petition for Postconviction Relief to the
Minnesota Supreme Court (Doc. 55-13 at 8, 20), there was no substantive presentment of a
due process violation under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments in relation to Mr.
Allwine’s ineffective appellate counsel claim in his pro se postconviction petition to the
district court. (See Doc. 55-11.) And these two references do not suffice; it is not enough
for Mr. Allwine to simply “make a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee as broad as
due process” Turnage, 606 F.3d 933, 936 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518
U.S. 152, 163 (1996)). He must do more to fairly present a habeas claim in state court. “To
exhaust available state remedies petitioner must fairly present” the full substance of their
claim “in each appropriate state court.” Dahir, 2025 WL 3027462, at *4 (citing Baldwin v.
Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)). Because Mr. Allwine failed to present substantive Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims related to Ground 4 in each appropriate state court before
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 17 of 32

18
presenting his federal habeas claim, this Court concludes that Ground 4 cannot be
considered on the merits in this action because it has not first been exhausted in the state
courts.
Mr. Allwine could have raised his federal habeas challenge in his direct appeal, but
failed to do so, and neither Knaffla exception applies here. Mr. Allwine has shown neither
that cause and prejudice for the default, nor that failure to consider the federal dimension
of his claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ground 4 is therefore
procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Ground 4 be dismissed
with prejudice.
E. Ground 5 should be dismissed due to Mr. Allwine’s failure to exhaust state
remedies and because it is procedurally defaulted.
In Ground 5 of his federal habeas petition, Mr. Allwine claims that the state violated
his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights when it admitted “Prior Bad Acts”
evidence “contrary to State and Federal rules of evidence.” (Doc. 2 at 96.) Respondent, for
his part, argues that Mr. Allwine “never argued to the state court that his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment [rights] were allegedly violated by the district court admitting
evidence of prior bad acts.” (Doc. 55 at 33-34.) Mr. Allwine responds that the “lower courts
understood the claim that was being made,” insisting that “the Minnesota Supreme Court
acknowledge[d] his argument . . . that the district court improperly admitted Spreigl6
evidence of his prior affairs.” (Doc. 59 at 36 (citing Doc. 55-16 at 15).)
6State v. Spreigl, 488 N.W.2d 167 (1965).
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 18 of 32

19
While Mr. Allwine raised claims regarding the admission of allegedly improper
Spreigl evidence in his pro se postconviction petition before the district court and the
Minnesota Supreme Court (Docs. 55-11 at 12; 55-13 at 48), at no point did he assert a
federal right, constitutional provision, federal constitutional caselaw, or a state case raising
a federal constitutional issue, related to that claim. In Minnesota state court, Spreigl
evidence—evidence of a defendant’s other crimes—may be admissible at trial under
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b) as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake. But Spreigl is a state case that establishes
and pertains to a state rule. And the Minnesota Supreme Court decided the Spreigl issues
in Mr. Allwine’s pro se petition applying state law. In his federal habeas petition, Mr.
Allwine argues that “[t]he Minnesota State Rule of Evidence 404 is substantially similar to
Federal Rule Evidence regarding the use ‘Prior Bad Acts.’” (Doc. 2 at 96.) That may be
true, but “[m]ere similarity between . . . state law claims and . . . federal habeas claims is
insufficient” to satisfy the fair presentation requirement.” Turnage, 606 F.3d at 936.
Because Mr. Allwine failed to present a federal claim in state court, he has not satisfied the
fair presentation requirement in Ground 5 of his habeas petition. Consequently, this Court
concludes that Ground 5 cannot be considered on the merits in this action and should be
dismissed.
Mr. Allwine failed to raise a constitutional challenge on his direct appeal, and so
unless an exception applies, may not do so now. Mr. Allwine has shown neither that cause
and prejudice for the default, nor that failure to consider the federal dimension of his claim
would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. So no Knaffla exception applies, and
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 19 of 32

20
Ground 5 is therefore procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the Court recommends that
Ground 5 be dismissed with prejudice.
F. Ground 6 should be dismissed because Mr. Allwine failed to fairly present his
claim in state court and it is procedurally defaulted.
The Court now comes to Ground 6. Here, Mr. Allwine claims that his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights were violated by “numerous and varied
instances” of prosecutorial misconduct. (Doc. 2 at 99.) Respondent maintains that Mr.
Allwine has again failed to fairly present any federal dimension of this claim in state court,
and he has thus failed to exhaust state remedies and so Ground 6 should be dismissed.
Respondent also argues that because the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct Mr.
Allwine presents now in his federal habeas petition were not included in his direct appeal,
those claims are procedurally defaulted. Mr. Allwine, for his part, insists that the “core
substance” of this claim is the same argument he advanced in his postconviction
proceedings. (Doc. 59 at 40.)
Mr. Allwine indeed challenged his conviction due to alleged prosecutorial
misconduct in state court. (Docs. 55-2 through 55-11.) But he failed to fairly present his
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claim to the state court. Although Mr.
Allwine presented his prosecutorial misconduct claim, none of his state petitions or briefs
contain any reference to his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
concerning his allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. Sees Abdullah v. Groose, 75 F.3d
408, 412 (8th Cir. 1996) (petitioner failed to fairly present Sixth Amendment claim where
only Fourteenth Amendment due process claim raised in state court). As a result, Mr.
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 20 of 32

21
Allwine deprived the Minnesota state courts of the first opportunity to address his Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment due process claim related to his prosecutorial misconduct
allegations. The Court concludes that Mr. Allwine failed to fairly present his Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment claim to the state courts and thus Ground 6 should be dismissed.
Because Mr. Allwine could have raised a constitutional challenge on his direct
appeal, but failed to do so, he is barred from raising such a challenge now unless an
exception applies. Mr. Allwine has shown neither that cause and prejudice for the default,
nor that failure to consider the federal dimension of his claim would result in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice, so no Knaffla exception applies. Ground 6 is therefore procedurally
defaulted. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Ground 6 be dismissed with prejudice.
G. Grounds 7 and 8 should be dismissed because of Mr. Allwine’s failure to
exhaust state remedies and because they are procedurally defaulted.
Mr. Allwine claims, in Grounds 7 and 8, that state prosecutors violated his Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they allegedly denied him access to
electronic evidence. (Doc. 2 at 112-118.) In Mr. Allwine’s view, the state’s failure to
provide him “access to his electronic evidence” amounts to a Brady violation, a
Confrontation Clause violation, and a violation of his Compulsory Process rights. (Id.)
Respondent argues that these claims should be dismissed because Mr. Allwine failed to
exhaust state remedies when he failed raise a Brady or Confrontation Clause claim against
the state in his direct appeal. In his reply, Mr. Allwine circuitously counters that he has
been trying to gain access to his electronic evidence “from the very beginning of the case,
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 21 of 32

22
throughout appeal and postconviction” but fails to directly address Respondent’s position.
(Doc. 59 at 45.)
The Court’s careful review of the record in this case shows that Mr. Allwine failed
to raise a Brady, Confrontation Clause, or Compulsory Process challenge under the Fifth,
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments in his direct appeal. (See Docs. 55-7; 55-10.) As a
result, because he failed to invoke a “one complete round of the [s]tate’s established
appellate review process” related to Grounds 7 and 8, the Court concludes he has failed to
exhaust all state remedies, and therefore Grounds 7 and 8 cannot be considered on the
merits in this action and should be dismissed. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845
(1999); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).
Mr. Allwine could have raised a constitutional challenge on his direct appeal, but
failed to do so, and neither Knaffla exception applies here. Mr. Allwine has shown neither
that cause and prejudice for the default, nor that failure to consider the federal dimension
of his claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Grounds 7 and 8 are
therefore procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Grounds 7 and
8 be dismissed with prejudice.
H. Ground 9 should be dismissed because Mr. Allwine did not fairly present his
federal habeas claim to the state courts and it is procedurally defaulted.
Turning to Ground 9, Mr. Allwine claims violations of his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection rights because the state district court denied his in forma
pauperis (“IFP”) request for funds to obtain mirror image copies of electronic evidence
from the state’s computer expert. (Doc. 2 at 118-120.) According to Mr. Allwine, a state
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 22 of 32

23
district court had determined him to be indigent and granted his IFP funding request for a
medical examiner. (Id.) But when Mr. Allwine requested IFP funding for the electronic
evidence, a different district court judge denied the request, concluding that Mr. Allwine
was not indigent because he had not been deemed indigent before trial. (Id.)
On direct appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Mr. Allwine argued that “IFP
funding needs to be approved for a DNA expert” because denying him access to experts
violated his Confrontation Clause rights. (Doc. 55-7 at 43-47.) But Mr. Allwine failed to
fairly present his federal habeas claim in two ways. First, while he challenged the denial of
his IFP funding request for a DNA expert, nothing in the record suggests that his appeal
included an IFP request for funds to obtain copies of electronic evidence from the state’s
computer expert. (See Docs 55-7; 55-10 at 13 n.22.) Second, although Mr. Allwine invoked
his Confrontation Clause right related to IFP funding for experts, he failed to present a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim to the state courts, thus depriving the state
courts of the opportunity to first address his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim
related to Ground 9. See Abdullah, 75 F.3d at 412 (petitioner failed to fairly present Sixth
Amendment claim where only Fourteenth Amendment due process claim raised in state
court). Accordingly, Ground 9 should be dismissed.
Mr. Allwine could have raised a Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
challenge on his direct appeal, but failed to do so, and neither Knaffla exception applies
here. Mr. Allwine has shown neither that cause and prejudice for the default, nor that failure
to consider the federal dimension of his claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 23 of 32

24
of justice. Ground 9 is therefore procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the Court
recommends that Ground 9 be dismissed with prejudice.
I. Ground 10 should be dismissed because Mr. Allwine has failed to allege a
violation of a federal law or Constitutional right.
Mr. Allwine alleges in Ground 10 that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights to due process and equal protection were violated when the Minnesota Supreme
Court denied him counsel and oral argument during his second appeal. (Doc. 2 at 120.)
Respondent argues that Ground 10 must be dismissed because Mr. Allwine has failed to
allege a cognizable claim under § 2254 since he has alleged no violation of his federal
constitutional rights. In his Reply, Mr. Allwine concedes that “oral arguments are not
guaranteed by the Constitution” but argues that this should “not allow the State to
arbitrarily not allow Petitioner to not have an oral argument[.]” (Doc. 59 at 46-67.)
There is no federal constitutional right to an oral argument. FCC v. WJR, The
Goodwill Station, 337 U.S 265, 279 (1949). Likewise, there is no federal constitutional
right to counsel on a second subsequent appeal. Riley v. A.L. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 421, 423
(8th Cir. 1984) (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)). The Court therefore concludes,
Ground 10 should be dismissed because Mr. Allwine has failed to allege a violation of a
federal law or constitutional right, and thus no habeas relief is available on this ground. 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a). Accordingly, Ground 10 should be dismissed with prejudice.
J. Ground 11 should be dismissed because Mr. Allwine failed to fairly present this
claim in state court and because it is procedurally defaulted.
In Ground 11, Mr. Allwine claims that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
to an impartial jury were infringed because the district court judge denied him a Schwartz
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 24 of 32

25
hearing to investigate alleged juror misconduct. (Doc. 2 at 125.) Respondent counters that
because Mr. Allwine “never mentioned the Sixth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, or
the right to an impartial jury” in his pro se postconviction petition, Ground 11 must be
dismissed because Mr. Allwine “failed to fairly present these alleged U.S. Constitutional
violations to the state court.” (Doc. 55 at 42.) In reply, Mr. Allwine does not address
Respondent’s argument directly, but only insists that the Sixth Amendment guarantees,
through the Fourteenth Amendment, a “public trial by an impartial jury.” (Doc. 59 at 47.)
This Court’s review of the record shows that Mr. Allwine alleged juror misconduct
for the first time in his pro se postconviction petition to the state district court, which he
filed after the Minnesota Supreme Court denied his consolidated direct appeal. In this pro
se petition, Mr. Allwine asserted juror misconduct based only on violations of Minnesota
Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03, subd. 19(6) and Minnesota Statute § 631.09. (Doc. 55-
11 at 11.) Relying only on state law grounds, the state district court denied Mr. Allwine’s
pro se petition. (Doc. 55-12 at 8, 9.) The district court also concluded that because Mr.
Allwine “fail[ed] to allege when he learned of his claim of juror misconduct, if [he learned
of it] before his appeal, it is Knaffla-barred.” (Doc. 55-12 at 9.)
Then in his pro se Memorandum of Law in Support of Appeal of Denial of Motion
Discovery (sic) and Petition for Postconviction Relief to the Minnesota Supreme Court,
Mr. Allwine asserted that the district court “abused its discretion by denying a Schwartz
hearing on jury misconduct[.]” (Doc. 55-13 at 45.) Mr. Allwine amended his claim to
mention the United States Constitution’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment and the Minnesota
Constitution’s Article 1 requirement “that a court conduct a fair and public trial . . . held
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 25 of 32

26
by an impartial jury.” (Doc. 55-13 at 45-46.) But despite the newly added reference to the
federal and state constitutions, Mr. Allwine’s claim still primarily relied on Minn. R. Crim.
Pr. 26.03, subd. 19(6), and Minn. Stat. § 631.09, to demand a Schwartz hearing—and no
other hearing—based on the district judge’s alleged “abuse of discretion[.]” (Id.)
In Minnesota state court, “[a] Schwartz hearing is a procedure in which a trial court
may investigate alleged juror misconduct by summoning a juror for questioning about the
alleged misconduct in the presence of counsel for both parties.” Martin v. State, 969
N.W.2d 361, 363 n.1 (Minn. 2022) (citing Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 258
Minn. 325, 104 N.W.2d 301, 303 (1960)). Schwartz is a state case that establishes, and
pertains to, a state procedure. The Minnesota Supreme Court, applying only state law,
decided that the district court had not abused its discretion, and Mr. Allwine was not
entitled to a Schwartz hearing. And like the state district court, the Minnesota Supreme
Court concluded that if Mr. Allwine had discovered the alleged juror misconduct before
his direct appeal the issue was Knaffla-barred. (Doc. 55-16 at 16.)
Now, in his federal habeas petition, Mr. Allwine argues that his Sixth Amendment
and—for the first time—his Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury were
violated when he was denied a Schwartz/Remmer7 hearing. Mr. Allwine’s pro se
7“In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or
indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious
reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the
court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full
knowledge of the parties.” Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 26 of 32

27
postconviction petition to the state district court advanced no constitutional arguments
concerning a Schwartz hearing. Although his pro se Memorandum of Law in Support of
Appeal of Denial of Motion Discovery (sic) and Petition for Postconviction Relief to the
Minnesota Supreme Court generally referenced due process and fair trial guarantees of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, Mr. Allwine relied on those amendments because they
correspond with Sections 6 (Rights of the accused in criminal prosecutions) and 7 (due
process; prosecution; double-jeopardy; self-incrimination; bail; habeas corpus) of Article
1 of the Minnesota Constitution, not because they raised any distinct federal rights. Rather,
Mr. Allwine’s Schwartz claim was based on state law. Although Mr. Allwine now invokes
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in his habeas petition, “asking for the same relief
on different grounds does not retroactively convert the state law claim presented in the
petitioner’s brief to the [state courts] into a federal claim.” Brown v. Bolin, No. 24-cv-398
(SRN/SGE), 2025 WL 705725, at *6 (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2025) (quoting Turnage, 606 F.3d
at 940), certificate of appealability denied, No. 25-1860, 2025 WL 3085011 (8th Cir. May
27, 2025).)
Because Mr. Allwine failed to fairly present a constitutional claim related to Ground
11 to the state courts, this claim is procedurally defaulted. See id. This is especially true
considering the Minnesota Supreme Court’s conclusion that his claim for a Schwartz
hearing is Knaffla-barred if Mr. Allwine discovered the alleged juror misconduct before
his direct appeal. Mr. Allwine has presented no evidence to the contrary. Because Mr.
Allwine could have raised a constitutional challenge on direct appeal, but did not, he may
not do so now. He has shown neither that cause and prejudice for the default, nor that
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 27 of 32

28
failure to consider the federal dimension of his claim would result in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice. Neither Knaffla exception applies here, and Ground 11 is therefore
procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Ground 11 be dismissed
with prejudice.
K. Ground 12 should be dismissed because Mr. Allwine failed to fairly present this
claim in state court and because it is procedurally defaulted.
Finally, the Court reaches Ground 12. In Ground 12, Mr. Allwine claims that his
constitutional right to a fair trial was violated by the cumulative effect of all the alleged
errors that occurred during his trial. (Doc. 2 at 131.) Respondent assumes that Mr. Allwine
raises a Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and then argues that Mr. Allwine failed to
raise such a claim in state court. As such, according to Respondent, Ground 12 should be
dismissed. Mr. Allwine does not clarify in his Reply what federal law or constitutional
right he invokes in support of his claim but simply reiterates that there is “no way [his] trial
could be deemed ‘Fair.’” (Doc. 59 at 48.)
This Court’s review of the record of Mr. Allwine’s state court proceedings shows
that the first time Mr. Allwine raised the issue of the general unfairness of his trial, before
raising the issue in his federal habeas petition, was in his pro se postconviction petition to
the district court. (Doc. 55-11 at 24.) There, without specific citation to any state or federal
law, he alleged that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge “the
overall fairness of the trial” which he claims violated his general constitutional rights. (Id.)
Then, in his pro se postconviction petition to the Minnesota Supreme Court Mr. Allwine
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 28 of 32

29
repeated his claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel based on the “Cumulative
Effects of Errors Causing an Unfair Trial.” (Doc. 55-13 at 48.)
Now, in his federal habeas petition, Mr. Allwine raises for the first time a stand-
alone challenge to the fairness of his trial. (Doc. 2 at 131-32.) Because this stand-alone
challenge, unencumbered by his claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,
presents a different legal theory than his previous claim, the Court concludes Mr. Allwine
has failed to fairly present his federal habeas claim to the state courts thus depriving the
state courts of the opportunity first address his unfair trial claim related to Ground 12. That
his previous claim is similar to his present federal habeas claim does not cure this
deficiency. See Turnage, 606 F.3d at 940 (“[M]ere similarity between his state law claim
and his federal habeas claim is insufficient to satisfy the fair presentation requirement.”)
Because Mr. Allwine changed the legal theory of his claim from state court proceedings to
his federal habeas petition, he has failed to fairly present his federal habeas claim in the
state courts and Ground 12 should therefore be dismissed. See Jones, 20 F.3d at 854 (“To
‘fairly present’ his claim, a petitioner must present the same facts and legal theories to the
state courts that are later presented to the federal courts this allows the state court to apply
the controlling legal principles to the facts that constitute the federal claim.”)
Mr. Allwine could have raised his federal habeas challenge in his direct appeal, but
failed to do so, and neither Knaffla exception applies here. Mr. Allwine has shown neither
that cause and prejudice for the default, nor that failure to consider the federal dimension
of his claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Ground 12 is thus
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 29 of 32

30
procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Ground 12 should be
dismissed with prejudice.
II. MR. ALLWINE’S MOTION TO EXPAND THE RECORD IS DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Mr. Allwine seeks to expand he record before the Court to include a “notice” he
received from an attorney related to the educational background of Mark Lanterman, an
expert witness at Mr. Allwine’s trial. (Docs. 78 (Motion); 79 (Exhibit).) A motion to
expand the record is governed by Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases
under Section 2254, which provides that if a habeas petition is not dismissed, a judge may
direct the parties the expand the record by submitting additional materials related to the
petition. Dahir, 2025 WL 3027462, at *5 (citing Mark v. Ault, 498 F.3d 775, 788 (8th Cir.
2007)). Because the Court recommends that Mr. Allwine’s petition be dismissed in its
entirety on procedural grounds, it denies the Motion to Expand the Record (Doc. 78)
without prejudice. Should Mr. Allwine’s habeas petition survive these proceedings, he may
renew before the Court his motion as he deems appropriate.
III. A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY SHOULD NOT BE ISSUED.
Finally, a habeas petitioner under § 2254 may appeal an adverse ruling on their
petition only if they are granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1). A COA may be granted when a petitioner has “made a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This may be done where
“jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Based on
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 30 of 32

31
the analysis above, the Court finds that it is unlikely jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether Mr. Allwine’s petition adequately established the violation of his constitutional
rights.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, based on all the files, records, and proceedings in this case, IT IS
RECOMMENDED that:
1. Petitioner Stephen Allwine’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 2) be DENIED;
2. This matter be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and
3. No certificate of appealability be issued.
ORDER
Accordingly, based on all the files, records, and proceedings in this case, IT IS
ORDERED that:
1. Petitioner Stephen Allwine’s Motion to Expand Record (Doc. 78) is
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Date: December 29, 2025 s/Douglas L. Micko
DOUGLAS L. MICKO
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written
objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations within 14 days
after being served with a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 31 of 32

32
A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the
objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the
word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
CASE 0:24-cv-00439-JRT-DLM Doc. 96 Filed 12/29/25 Page 32 of 32