USA v. Lewis

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RYAN WAYNE LEWIS,
Defendant.
Case No. 24-CR-253 (JRT/JFD)
ORDER
and
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This case is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636 and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1 for a report and recommendation
on Defendant Ryan Wayne Lewis’s August 21, 2025 Pretrial Motions, including a Motion
for Disclosure of Government’s Intent to Use Residual Hearsay Exception (Dkt. No. 56),
a Motion to Suppress Evidence Derived from Illegal Search (Dkt. No. 57), a Motion to
Strike Enhanced Penalty (Dkt. No. 58), and a Motion for Disclosure of Government’s
Compliance with Petite Policy (Dkt. No. 59). Mr. Lewis is charged with being a Felon
(who is also an Armed Career Criminal) in Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8), and 924(e). (See Indictment, Dkt. No. 1.) The charge arises
from an alleged trespass at the Mall of America (“Mall”), where, after Mr. Lewis was
detained by Mall security for trespassing, a Bloomington Police Department Officer found
a 9mm handgun in a backpack Mr. Lewis had been carrying. (Def’s Mem. in Supp. 2, Dkt.
No. 73.)
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I. 	Motions Resolved via Order (Dkt. Nos. 56, 58, 59)
The majority of this order and report discusses Mr. Lewis’s Motion to Suppress,
which the Court recommends denying on multiple grounds. But first, the Court will address
the other three motions, which the Court disposes of via order because they are either
nondispositive or not properly before the Court. Mr. Lewis’s Motion for Disclosure of
Government’s Compliance with Petite Policy is denied because a violation (assuming that
one occurred) of an internal Justice Department policy does not entitle a criminal defendant
to relief. The Petite Policy is an internal Department of Justice policy that:
precludes the initiation or continuation of a federal prosecution, following a
prior state or federal prosecution based on substantially the same act(s) or
transaction(s) unless three substantive prerequisites are satisfied: first, the
matter 	must 	involve 	a 	substantial 	federal 	interest; 	second, 	the 	prior
prosecution must have left that interest demonstrably unvindicated; and third,
applying the same test that is applicable to all federal prosecutions, the
government must believe that the defendant's conduct constitutes a federal
offense, and that the admissible evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain
and sustain a conviction by an unbiased trier of fact. In addition, there is a
procedural prerequisite to be satisfied, that is, the prosecution must be
approved by the appropriate Assistant Attorney General.
Dept. of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-2.031. Mr. Lewis’s Motion seeks “assur[ance] that the
Government has complied with that policy,” (Hr’g Tr. 49:7–8, Dkt. No. 72), but in the
hearing, Mr. Lewis’s counsel conceded that “the Petite policy does not confer any
particularized right on a defendant.” (Id. at 49:1–3.)
Also at the hearing, the Assistant United States Attorney represented to the Court
that “the policy was followed here and a waiver was received prior to initiating
prosecution.” (Id. at 51:17–19.) Accordingly, even though the prosecutor did not need to
provide assurances that the policy was followed, they were provided, meaning that the
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“assur[ances]” that Mr. Lewis seeks have been provided. Therefore, the motion, in addition
to seeking relief that is not available, is also moot.
Even if the motion were not moot, Mr. Lewis has not provided any evidence, nor
has he alleged, that the United States has brought these charges in contravention of that
policy. (See Mot. for Disclosure, Dkt. No. 59.) He has also failed to point the Court to any
case law supporting the relief he seeks. In fact, the Policy, which was “promulgated solely
for the purpose of internal Department of Justice guidance,” (Dept. of Justice, Justice
Manual § 9-2.031(6)), confers no substantive rights on a defendant whatsoever. See United
States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); Sullivan v. United States, 348 U.S. 170 (1954).
While the Eighth Circuit has not yet taken up the issue, those circuits which have agree
with the Department of Justice’s conclusion that “a criminal defendant cannot invoke the
Department's policy as a bar to federal prosecution.” Dept. of Justice, Justice Manual § 9-
2.031(6) (collecting cases).
The remaining two motions present issues that must be raised at or before trial with
the trial judge, the Honorable John R. Tunheim, the district judge assigned to this case. The
Court therefore denies those two motions without prejudice. Mr. Lewis’s Motion for
Disclosure of Government’s Intent to use Residual Hearsay Exception (Dkt. No. 56) is an
issue regarding the evidence to be presented at trial. At this stage in this case, the Court
declines to rule on such issues.
Mr. Lewis’s Motion to Strike Enhanced Penalty on Eighth Amendment grounds
(Dkt. No. 58) is also not properly before this Court. Federal magistrate judges have no
authority over sentencing in felony cases such as this one. (See 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(a)(4)–
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(5), (e)(5).) Accordingly, the Court denies the Motion without prejudice as procedurally
improper, making no determination, recommendation, or finding as to its merits.
II. 	Mr. Lewis’s Motion to Suppress Evidence from Search (Dkt. No. 57)
A. Factual Background
The firearm which Mr. Lewis is charged with possessing, a 9mm handgun, was
found in a backpack he was carrying when he was detained by Mall of America security
personnel on April 28, 2024 for criminal trespass. Those security officers suspected Mr.
Lewis of violating an order barring him from the Mall. (See Gov. Mem. in Opp. 2, Dkt.
No. 75.) Mall security held Mr. Lewis in the Mall’s East Operations Room and searched
his person, but not his backpack, which was left out of Mr. Lewis’s reach in the room. (Id.)
Mall Security then reported their citizen’s arrest to the Bloomington Police Department,
which dispatched Officers Ian Anderson and Jai Hanson. (Id.) Officer Anderson went to
the East Operations Room, while Officer Hanson checked police databases for active
warrants for Mr. Lewis. That check yielded two active state arrest warrants, issued in
Ramsey and Dakota Counties in Minnesota (Hr’g Tr. 33:17–24.) The Bloomington Police
officers did not search Mr. Lewis or his property before confirming that the warrants were
active, information which triggered a decision to bring Mr. Lewis, in custody, to the
Hennepin County Jail1 to be processed and returned to Ramsey or Dakota counties. (Id. at
34:13–19.) 	Once that decision was made, Officer Anderson searched Mr. Lewis’s
1 Bloomington Police policy is that persons with state arrest warrants should be brought to
the Hennepin County Jail, (See Hr’g Tr. 44:12–16), and that is where Officer Hanson
initially determined to take Mr. Lewis.
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backpack and found nothing “of evidentiary value.” (Id. at 18:25–19:6.) The Court refers
to this search as the “Anderson Search.”
The decision to transport Mr. Lewis to the Hennepin County Jail required Officer
Anderson to bring Mr. Lewis’s property, including his backpack, to the Bloomington
Police Department substation, where it was to be kept, before returning to transport Mr.
Lewis to the Hennepin County Jail.2 While Officer Anderson brought the backpack to the
substation, Officer Hanson went to the East Operations Room to notify Mr. Lewis that he
was going to be transported by Officer Anderson to the Hennepin County Jail because of
the active warrants for his arrest. (Id. at 34:17–35:2.)
After apprising Mr. Lewis that he would be brought to the Hennepin County Jail,
Officer Hanson returned to the Bloomington Police substation to document the incident.
At that time, because Officer Anderson was preparing to bring Mr. Lewis to the Hennepin
County Jail, Officer Hanson conducted what he described as an “inventory search” of the
backpack, during which he found the 9mm handgun that is the subject of this motion. (Id.
at 36:7–15.) He said that even though Officer Anderson had already searched the bag, he
did an additional search because he was responsible for documenting the incident. (Id. at
42:15–22.) The Court refers to this search as the “Hanson Search.” After finding the
handgun, Officer Hanson contacted Officer Anderson and told him to return Mr. Lewis to
2 Officer Hanson indicated at the hearing that the Hennepin County Jail does not accept
detainees’ property when they are transferred to its custody, so Mr. Lewis’s property,
including his backpack, was to be held by the Bloomington Police. (See Hr’g Tr. 36:10–
15.)
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the Bloomington City Jail because there would be “local charges for having the gun in his
possession.” (Id. at 41:17–25.)
B. Legal Standards
The Fourth Amendment provides that:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend IV. The Fourth Amendment proscribes only “unreasonable” searches
and seizures. When a search is conducted without the authority of a judicially authorized
search warrant, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the search falls into one of
several well-recognized exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause. Arizona v.
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
“When the government seeks to introduce evidence that was seized during a warrantless
search, it bears the burden of showing the need for an exemption from the warrant
requirement and that its conduct fell within the bounds of the exception.” United States v.
Riedesel, 987 F.2d 1383, 1388 (8th Cir. 1993). “The exclusionary rule generally prohibits
admission of evidence seized during an unlawful search,” United States v. Escudero, 100
F.4th 964, 968 (8th Cir. 2024).
One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is an inventory search,
which “allows law enforcement to inventory the contents of a lawfully impounded vehicle
without a warrant or probable cause.” United States v. Taylor, 636 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir.
2011). The police inventory the contents of vehicles for three reasons: To protect the
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contents from loss, to protect the police from unfounded allegations that the contents have
been lost or stolen, and to protect the public from potential danger. United States v. Smith,
715 F.3d 1110, 1117 (8th Cir. 2013). An inventory search is not a search for evidence, but
evidence that is found while the contents of the vehicle are being catalogued is not subject
to suppression if the inventory is conducted according to the policy of the law enforcement
agency whose personnel conduct the search. United States v. Harris, 795 F.3d 820, 822
(8th Cir. 2015). “The central question in evaluating the propriety of an inventory search is
whether, in the totality of the circumstances, the search was reasonable.” United States v.
Kennedy, 427 F.3d 1136, 1143 (8th Cir. 2005). Generally, inventory searches that are
“conducted according to standardized police procedures” are reasonable. Id. While the first
cases on inventory searches involved motor vehicles, the doctrine allowing inventorying
of property that is in police custody has now extended beyond vehicles, and now
specifically includes bags recovered from arrestees. See, e.g. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.
367, 372 (1987); United States v. Smith, 715 F.3d 1110, 1116–18 (8th Cir. 2013).
“[F]ailure to follow standard procedures does not always render an inventory search
unreasonable.” United States v. Morris, 995 F.3d 665, 669 (8th Cir. 2021), because
“inventory searches need not be conducted in a totally mechanical, all or nothing fashion.”
United States v. Smith, 715 F.3d 1110, 1117 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v.
Garreau, 658 F.3d 864 858 (8th Cir. 2011)). “Even when law enforcement fails to conduct
a search according to standardized procedures, this does not mandate the suppression of
the evidence discovered as a result of the search.” United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774,
780 (8th Cir. 2003). “There must be something else; something to suggest the police raised
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‘the inventory-search banner in an after-the-fact attempt to justify’ a simple investigatory
search for incriminating evidence.” Id. (quoting United States v. Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171,
1173 (8th Cir. 1993)). That the police had an investigatory motive in carrying out an
inventory search will not invalidate the inventory search, so long as it is otherwise valid.
United States v. Evans, 781 F. 3d 433, 437 (8th Cir. 2015) (“If an impoundment is otherwise
valid, an investigatory motive does not prevent police from towing a vehicle and
conducting an inventory search ... An investigatory motive does not render an inventory
search invalid unless that motive is the officers’ sole motivation in carrying out the
search.”); United States v. Garner, 181 F. 3d 988, 991-92 (8th Cir. 1999) (same; collecting
cases).
C. Discussion
Mr. Lewis argues that both the Anderson Search, which was conducted in the
presence of Mr. Lewis in the East Operations Room, and the Hanson Search, which was
conducted at the Bloomington Police Department substation, fail to meet the standards of
any recognized exception to the warrant requirement and therefore, the fruits of the search
of the backpack (namely, the 9mm handgun) must be suppressed.
1. 	The Anderson Search and Seizure
As a preliminary matter, because the Anderson Search turned up nothing there is
nothing capable of being suppressed. The backpack and its contents were taken into
Bloomington Police custody incident to Mr. Lewis’s arrest and anticipated transportation
to the Hennepin County Jail, the lawfulness of which Mr. Lewis does not and cannot
challenge. He interacted with police, who learned that there were active warrants for his
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arrest in Dakota and Ramsey Counties. Those warrants, which are also unchallenged by
Mr. Lewis, provided probable cause for Mr. Lewis’s arrest.
The Court concludes that, while Mr. Lewis’s backpack was ‘seized’ by the officers,
as that word is used colloquially, “the warrantless removal of the [backpack] into protective
custody cannot be typified as a ‘seizure’ for Fourth Amendment purposes.” United States
v. Lacey, 530 F.2d 821, 823 (8th Cir. 1976). In Lacey, the Eighth Circuit held that currency
found in the warranted search of an apartment was lawfully taken into police custody for
safekeeping where the apartment could not be locked as a result of the execution of the
search warrant. Here, as in Lacey, the evidence clearly established that Mr. Lewis’s
backpack was not held by the officers for evidentiary purposes or as contraband, but for
the sole purpose of safekeeping because there was nowhere else immediately available to
safely store it. See id.
Even if the decision to hold Mr. Lewis’s backpack was a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes, Officers Anderson and Hansen followed Bloomington Police
Department policy and their shared understanding of Hennepin County Jail policy in
deciding to take Mr. Lewis’s backpack from the East Control Room at the Mall. At the
hearing, Officer Anderson stated that it was Bloomington Police Department policy to
seize, search, and inventory the property of a person arrested at the Mall, and that he had
followed the same procedure in previous instances where a person was taken into custody
at the Mall. (See Hr’g Tr. 19:20–20:14.) He also testified that the actions he and Officer
Hanson took on April 28, 2024 were in alignment with that policy. (Id. at 20:13–14.)
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Officer Anderson also testified that it was the policy of the Hennepin County Jail
not to accept large bags or backpacks, and that, if the Bloomington Police Department had
not preemptively seized the backpack and kept it in its custody, the Hennepin County Jail
would have refused to take the bag and sent it back to the Bloomington Police Department.
(Id. at 20:15–20.) The understanding of Officers Anderson and Hanson that the backpack
could not travel with Mr. Lewis to the Hennepin County Jail, pursuant to Hennepin County
Jail policy, meant that seizure of the backpack for safekeeping was the only reasonable
option available to them. Accordingly, Officer Anderson’s seizure of the backpack, in the
totality of the circumstances, was reasonable. United States v. Kennedy, 427 F.3d 1136,
1143 (8th Cir. 2005).
The Court need not further analyze the Anderson Search because Officer Anderson
did not find the handgun. Concluding (though incorrectly) that the backpack contained
nothing of evidentiary value, Officer Anderson correctly sent the backpack to the
Bloomington Police substation, where it would be held for safekeeping, pursuant to
Bloomington Police Department Policy. (See Bloomington Police Dep’t Manual, Pol’y
#129: Prop. and Evid. Pol’y, Gov. Ex. 5 (Dkt. No. 75-1).
2. 	The Hanson Search
The United States contends that the Hanson Search, conducted at the Bloomington
Police substation by Officer Hanson, is a valid inventory search and a valid search incident
to arrest, two widely recognized exceptions to the general presumption that unwarranted
searches are unreasonable. Mr. Lewis argues that the United States cannot meet the
requirements of these two standards, resulting in a conclusion that the search was
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unreasonable and that the handgun must be suppressed. Because the Court concludes that
the search was a valid inventory search, the Court declines the parties’ invitation to analyze
the search as one incident to arrest because that analysis is unnecessary.
In order for an inventory search to be valid, the search must have been reasonable,
viewed in the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Kennedy, 427 F.3d 1136, 1143
(8th 	Cir. 	2005). 	Generally, 	inventory 	searches 	that 	are 	“conducted 	according 	to
standardized police procedures” are reasonable. Id. The Court finds that the Hanson Search
was a proper and reasonable inventory search because it complied with the Bloomington
Police Department Manual, Policy #129: Property and Evidence Policy, submitted by the
United States as Government Exhibit 5 (Dkt. No. 75-1).3 Generally, Officer Hanson
testified 	that 	he 	followed 	the 	standard 	Bloomington 	Police 	Department 	inventory
procedures in his search of the backpack. (Hr’g Tr. 36:7–23.) This testimony, which the
3 The United States did not provide the Court or Mr. Lewis with this policy until filing its
post-hearing briefing. This procedure was not good practice and should not be repeated in
the future. If the United States plans to argue that a challenged search was lawful under the
inventory search exception, and plans to rely on the written policy, even in part, to buttress
its argument (as opposed to relying solely on officer testimony about the policy) the policy
should be provided to defendants before the hearing and submitted as an exhibit at the
hearing. This failure to timely provide the policy did not substantially prejudice Mr. Lewis
because the Court finds that the policy was followed here. In closer cases, however, there
is potential for significant prejudice if defendants and their counsel do not have fair notice
of the relevant inventory policies. Nor is the Court persuaded that the sting of this late
disclosure was drawn because the inventory policy is publicly available. Inventory search
is an exception to the general rule that searches must be conducted pursuant to warrant, so
the burden is on the prosecution to establish that an inventory search that complied with
policy took place. It is not the responsibility of defense counsel to locate and scour public
records seeking potential justifications for law enforcement’s acts.
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Court finds to be credible, is sufficient for the Court to conclude that the policies were
followed. See United States v. Petty, 367 F.3d 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2004).
Officer Hanson’s testimony is bolstered by the Policy itself, which states “[p]roperty
which 	has 	been 	discovered, 	gathered, 	received, 	or 	collected 	in 	connection 	with
departmental 	responsibilities 	will 	be 	processed 	in 	accordance 	with 	established
departmental procedures.” (Gov. Ex. 5 at 3, Dkt. No. 75-1.) The backpack and its contents
were collected in connection with departmental responsibilities, as they were seized
incident to Mr. Lewis’s arrest at the Mall of America pursuant to active arrest warrants, as
discussed above. According to the policy, because Officer Hanson had lawfully seized the
backpack, he was required to “complete … an examination to verify [its] description,
quantity, and location.” (Id. at 2.) 	This inventory was necessary because “[a]ll property
must be inventoried and placed in secure storage prior to the employee going off-duty,”
(id. at 3), and “[e]vidence should never be left unsecured or unattended and officers should
not maintain evidence outside the property room overnight….” (id. at 7.)
Finally, even absent an inventory policy shown to have been followed by the
searching officer, there must be “something else…to suggest the police raised the
inventory-search banner in an after-the-fact attempt to justify a simple investigatory search
for incriminating evidence.” See United States v. Lund, No. 24-CR-317 (MJD/JFD), 2025
WL 2324586, at *4 (D. Minn. May 22, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025
WL 2058140 (D. Minn. July 23, 2025). Here, that “something else” simply does not exist.
Mr. Lewis does not allege, nor can the Court conclude from this record, that an inventory
search was a post hoc rationale for an unscrupulous rummaging through Mr. Lewis’s
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belongings. All of the testimony indicates that Mr. Lewis was never under suspicion of
carrying a firearm until after the Hanson Search and that the backpack was taken into
custody solely for safekeeping while Mr. Lewis was transferred to the Hennepin County
Jail to be processed for his outstanding warrants. A review of the record shows that Officer
Hanson was conducting a routine inventory search, pursuant to Bloomington Police
Department policy, when he found the handgun. That discovery substantially changed the
officers’ plans for Mr. Lewis’s future detention and the state level firearms charges brought
against him.
In sum, Officer Anderson lawfully seized Mr. Lewis’s backpack after the decision
was made to detain him and transport him to the Hennepin County Jail. Because the officers
concluded that the Hennepin County Jail would not accept Mr. Lewis’s backpack upon his
transfer to Hennepin County custody, the officers lawfully retained that backpack in
Bloomington Police Department custody. Bloomington Police Department policy requires
that any property held in its custody requires an inventory search to adequately document
the held property’s contents. In conducting that search, pursuant to Bloomington Police
Department policy, Officer Hansen lawfully discovered the 9mm handgun in Mr. Lewis’s
backpack. Accordingly, that evidence need not be suppressed in the case against Mr. Lewis
for unlawful possession of a firearm.
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ORDER
Accordingly, based on all the files, records, and proceedings herein, 	IT IS
ORDERED THAT:
1. 	Mr. Lewis’s Motion for Disclosure of the Government’s Intent to use Residual
Hearsay 	Exception 	(Dkt. 	No. 	56) 	is 	DENIED 	without 	prejudice 	as
procedurally improper;
2. 	Mr. Lewis’s Motion to Strike Enhanced Penalty (Dkt. No. 58) is DENIED
without prejudice as procedurally improper; and
3. 	Mr. Lewis’s Motion for Disclosure of the Government’s Compliance with Petite
Policy (Dkt. No. 59) is DENIED.
RECOMMENDATION
Based 	on 	all 	the 	files, 	records, 	and 	proceedings 	herein, 	IT 	IS 	HEREBY
RECOMMENDED that Mr. Lewis’s Motion to Suppress Evidence (Dkt. No. 57) be
DENIED.
Dated: December 9, 2025
NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written
s/ John F. Docherty
JOHN F. DOCHERTY
United States Magistrate Judge
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objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed finding and recommendations within 14 days
after being served a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.
A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the
objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the
word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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