USA v. Boatman et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Cornelius Anthony McDade,
Defendant.
Case No. 24-cr-252(3) (JMB/DLM)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Defendant Cornelius McDade has moved the Court to dismiss this matter with
prejudice for violation of the Speedy Trial Act. (Doc. 236.) According to Mr. McDade, this
matter should be dismissed because more 70 days—by his calculation, as many as 215
days—have elapsed since his initial appearance and he has yet to face trial. The government
opposes Mr. McDade’s motion, arguing that there is no violation because any delay has
been or should be accounted for under one or more of the Speedy Trial Act’s several
exclusions. But, says the government, if the Court concludes there has been a violation,
then this matter should be dismissed without prejudice. This case has been referred to the
undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and District of Minnesota Local Rule 72.1. For the reasons stated below,
the Court recommends that Mr. McDade’s Motion to Dismiss for Violation of the Speedy
Trial Act (Doc. 236) be granted but that the matter be dismissed without prejudice.
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BACKGROUND
The following factual background is taken from this case’s docket, and, in part,
from the parties’ briefing on Mr. McDade’s motion.
Initial Appearance to No-Motions Letter
On September 19, 2024, Mr. McDade1 was charged by multi-count indictment with
Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1339 and 1344 (Count 1),
Bank Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1344 (Count 4), and Aggravated Identity
Theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1) (Count 8). (Doc. 1 at 5, 6, 8.) He was arrested
on the indictment on September 30, 2024, in the Western District of Wisconsin. (Doc. 13.)
Mr. McDade initially appeared and was arraigned in the District of Minnesota on October
8, 2024; the Court the conditionally released Mr. McDade on his own recognizance. (Docs.
14 (Initial Appearance), 15 (Conditional Release Order) 18 (Arraignment).) The same day,
the Court issued its Arraignment Order, setting an October 29, 2024 deadline for pretrial
motions, a December 12, 2024 motion hearing date, and informing the parties that the trial
date would be set by separate order. (Doc. 19.) On October 15, the government filed a
Motion for Discovery. (Doc. 22.)
1 Mr. McDade was charged along with Defendants Malik Boatman, Jordan Williams, and
Jacobi Martin. (See generally Doc. 1.) Defendants Boatman, Williams, and Martin, have
all pleaded guilty in this matter. (Docs. 178 (Boatman Change of Plea Hearing Minutes),
227 (Boatman Plea Agreement), 95 (Williams Change of Plea Hearing Minutes), 115 (Plea
Agreement), 140 (Martin Change of Plea Hearing Minutes), 141 (Plea Agreement).)
Defendants Williams and Martin have been sentenced (Docs. 158 (Williams Sentencing
Hearing Minutes), 162 (Williams Amended Sentencing Judgment), 217 (Martin
Sentencing Hearing Minutes), 219 (Martin Sentencing Judgment).) Defendant Boatman
awaits sentencing.
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On October 25, 2024, Mr. McDade filed his first Motion for Continuance of the
Pretrial Motions Deadline to extend the pretrial motions deadline by 45 days and exclude
those days from Speedy Trial Act. (Doc. 29.) The Court granted Mr. McDade’s motion on
October 28, extending the pretrial motions filing deadline until December 13, 2024, and
excluding the time from October 29, 2024, the prior motions deadline, to December 13,
2024, the new motions deadline, from the Speedy Trial Act computations under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(7)(A). However, a new Defendant appeared in the case on December 6, 2024,
and so the Court issued a Second Amended Arraignment Order further extending the
pretrial motions deadline to December 30, 2024. (Doc. 45.)
On December 29, 2024, the Defendants jointly moved to Continue Pretrial
Proceedings and to Exclude Period of Continuance from the Speedy Trial Act, requesting
a six-week extension of the pretrial motion filing deadline. (Doc. 59.) The Court granted
the motion, reset the filing deadline to February 10, 2025, and excluded the time from
December 30, 2024, the prior motions deadline, to February 10, 2025, the new motions
deadline from Speedy Trial Act computations, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). (Doc. 61.)
On February 5, 2025, the Defendants filed another Joint Motion to Continue Pretrial
Deadlines, asking the Court to continue the pretrial motion filing deadline by 30 days and
exclude that time from the Speedy Trial Act computation. (Doc. 67.) The Court granted
the motion, reset the motion filing deadline to March 12, 2025, and excluded the time
between February 10 and March 12, 2025, from Speedy Trial Act computations under 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). (Doc. 68.) Then on February 26, 2025, Defendant Martin moved
for a 30-day extension of the motion filing deadline. (Doc. 84.) Although only Defendant
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Martin moved for an extension, the Court granted the motion as to each of the Defendants
under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6) (allowing “reasonable period of delay hen the defendant is
joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion
for severance has been granted”), reset the motions filing deadline to April 11, 2025, and
excluded the intervening time from Speedy Trial Act calculations under 18 U.S.C. §
3161(h)(7)(A). (Doc. 86.)
On April 10, 2025, counsel for Mr. McDade filed a letter with the Court stating that
he would be filing no pretrial motions on Mr. McDade’s behalf. (Doc. 107.) The letter also
informed the Court that the parties would contact the district court’s chambers to schedule
a change of plea hearing once a plea agreement was finalized. (Id.) The next day, the Court
issued a text-only Order stating that because it had received notice from all Defendants that
no pretrial motions would be filed, and no motion hearing was required, the May 14, 2025
motion hearing was cancelled. (Doc. 108.) The Court also directed the parties to
immediately contact the district judge’s chambers to schedule future proceedings. (Id.)
Meanwhile, the government’s Motion for Discovery (Doc. 22) remained pending.
No-Motions Letter to Motion to Dismiss
On April 28, 2025, Defendant Boatman moved to Exclude Time Under the Speedy
Trial Act, seeking to exclude the time between April 28, and May 28, 2025, from Speedy
Trial Act calculations. (Doc. 112.) The District Judge granted the motion on the same day,
excluding the time between April 28, 2025, and May 28, 2025, from the Speedy Trial Act
computations under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). (Doc. 114.)
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On July 11, 2025, a Petition for pretrial release violation was filed against Mr.
McDade by U.S. Probation and Pretrial Services, and the Court granted it. (Doc. 166.) Mr.
McDade was arrested in the Northern District of Illinois on July 15, 2025 (Doc. 169), and
then brought to the District of Minnesota where he initially appeared for his Revocation of
Pretrial Release on July 25, 2025. (Doc. 175). During Mr. McDade’s initial appearance,
the government moved for a detention hearing. (Id.) The Court held a detention hearing on
July 31, 2025, where Mr. McDade was ordered detained until he could secure a bed at a
halfway house and complete a substance use assessment. (Doc. 184.)
On August 12, 2025, Mr. McDade filed a Motion for Release from Custody. (Doc.
188.) The Court denied that motion on August 20, 2025. (Doc. 193.) Soon after, Mr.
McDade himself filed a pro se Motion for Release from Halfway House (Doc. 195), and a
pro se Motion for Removal of Lawyer (Doc. 196). The Court denied both motions on
September 13, 2025. (Doc. 203.)
Mr. McDade filed his next motion on October 6, 2025, seeking to modify the
conditions of his release. (Doc. 214.) The Court granted the motion the next day, on
October 7, 2025. (Doc. 215.) He filed a Third Motion to Modify Conditions of Release on
November 13, 2025. (Doc. 228.) The Court granted the motion the next day by text-only
Order. (Doc. 229.) On December 11, 2025, the government filed a superseding indictment
charging Mr. McDade with the same offenses alleged in the original indictment:
Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349 (Count 1);
Bank Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1344 (Count 2); and Aggravated Identity Theft,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1) (Count 3). (Compare Doc. 1 with Doc. 233.)
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On December 16, 2025, Mr. McDade moved to dismiss this matter with prejudice
based on a violation of the Speedy Trial Act. (Doc. 236.) Mr. McDade alleges that up to
215 days have elapsed since his initial appearance, and thus such a flagrant violation of the
Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day cutoff to commence trial warrants dismissal of this matter with
prejudice. The government disagrees that a violation has occurred in the first instance,
arguing that through a series of proposed retroactive continuances, exactly 70 days have
gone by since Mr. McDade’s initial appearance. But, says the government, if the Court
concludes there has been a Speedy Trial Act violation, this matter should be dismissed
without prejudice.
ANALYSIS
I. THIS MATTER SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE TO A VIOLATION OF
THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT.
The Speedy Trial Act mandates a that defendant be brought to trial “within 70 days
of his indictment or first appearance, whichever is later.” United States v. Montoya-
Salazar, No. 23-cr-881(NEB/DJF), 2023 WL 4456880, at *2 (D. Minn. July 11, 2023)
(quoting United States v. Suarez-Perez, 484 F.3d 537, 540 (8th Cir. 2007); see also 18
U.S.C. §3161(c)(1). Certain exceptions warrant a delay, including “delay resulting from
any pretrial motion,” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D), and up to 30 days’ worth of delay when
“any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the court,” id.
§ 3161(h)(1)(H). When there is a violation of the Act’s 70-day time limit, dismissal of the
indictment is mandatory, on the defendant’s motion. Id. § 3162(a)(2). The district court
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retains discretion to dismiss with or without prejudice. United States v. Koory, 20 F.3d 844,
846 (8th Cir. 1994) (further citations omitted).
Here, based on its review of the record, the Court concludes that the Speedy Trial
Act has been violated. The parties agree that the statutory speedy trial clock began to run
on October 8, 2024, when Mr. McDade initially appeared in the District of Minnesota.
(Doc. 14); see 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The parties also agree that from October 8, no
exclusion to the Speedy Trial Act stopped the clock from running until the government
filed its Motion for Discovery on October 15, 2024. The parties’ analysis comports with
the Court’s review of the record. The speedy clock began on October 8, when Mr. McDade
first appeared and continued running until the government filed its Motion for Discovery
on October 15, 2024, when the clock stopped due to the pending pretrial motion. See 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D).
Mr. McDade does not appear to contest that the government’s pending discovery
motion stopped the speedy clock from October 15, 2024, until April 11, 2025. See 18
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D).2 But in Mr. McDade’s view, the speedy clock restarted on April
11, 2025, because as he sees it, the discovery motion was no longer “under advisement by
the court,” see id. § 3161(h)(1)(H), after the Court issued its text-only Order in response
2 There has been some question about whether the government’s discovery motion may
stop the clock at all. This is because a defendant’s discovery obligations are not reliant on
a motion; they exist as reciprocal disclosure obligations and are triggered by the
government’s request. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(b). So, the argument goes, filing a motion
is unnecessary and should not result in any time being excluded. However, the text of the
Speedy Trial Act makes clear that it excludes time for any pending pretrial motions,
whether that motion turned out to be necessary or not. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D).
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the Defendants’ no-motions letters, cancelling the motion hearing and directing Defendants
to contact the district judge’s chambers to schedule future proceedings. The government
takes a different perspective, arguing that the discovery motion was still “under advisement
by the court” for another 30 days after the Court issued its text-only Order. (Doc. 255 at
5.) The Court agrees with Mr. McDade’s position on this point. Because the Court no
longer considered the government’s discovery motion “actually under advisement” after
receiving Defendants’ no-motions letters, the Court concludes that the speedy clock began
to run again on April 11, 2025.
The speedy clock then continued to run without exclusion until Defendant Boatman
filed his Motion to Exclude Time Under the Speedy Trial Act, seeking to exclude the time
between April 28, and May 28, 2025, from Speedy Trial Act calculations. (Doc. 112.) As
of April 28, 2025, 24 non-excluded days had elapsed since Mr. McDade’s initial
appearance. Mr. McDade contends that because Defendant Boatman filed this motion on
his behalf alone and no co-defendants explicitly joined in the motion, it applied only to and
thus excluded time only from Defendant Boatman’s speedy trial clock. The government
counters that because time was excluded for Defendant Boatman it also applied to Mr.
McDade, and therefore Mr. McDade’s speedy clock stopped when the district court granted
Defendant Boatman’s Motion to Exclude Time Under the Speedy Trial Act on April 28,
2025. (Doc. 114.) The Court agrees with the government on this point, since “any time
periods excluded from the speedy trial calculations for one defendant will be applicable to
the other defendants.” United States v. Lightfoot, 483 F.3d 876, 886 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing
United States v. Patterson, 140 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 1998)). The Court therefore
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concludes that the District Court’s Order on Defendant Boatman’s Motion to Exclude Time
Under the Speedy Trial Act stopped Mr. McDade’s speedy trial clock from April 28, 2025,
until May 28, 2025.
The Court’s review of the record shows that Mr. McDade’s speedy trial clock
restarted on May 29, 2025, and no exclusions to the Speedy Trial Act stopped the clock
until Probation and Pretrial Services filed a Petition for Pretrial Release Violation against
Mr. McDade on July 11, 2025.3 (Doc. 166.) The government argues that the speedy trial
clock stopped on July 11, when the petition was filed, and did not restart until after July
31, 2025, when the Court finally disposed of the petition at Mr. McDade’s detention
hearing. Mr. McDade, by contrast, argues that the clock did not stop until July 15, 2025,
when he was arrested in the Northern District of Illinois, and then restarted on July 25,
2025, when he was transferred to the District of Minnesota for his initial appearance on the
petition. The Court concludes that “because pretrial services’ petition is the functional
equivalent of a motion to revoke pretrial detention, . . . the time from the date the petition
was filed until its final disposition at the end of the hearing is excluded for purposes of the
Speedy Trial Act.” United States v. Hohn, 8 F.3d 1301, 1305 (8th Cir. 1993). The Court
3 The government believes the Court should retroactively exclude the period from June 10,
2025, to July 11, 2025, because despite there being no motion on the record from the period,
there were “active plea negotiations ongoing at that time,” and because Mr. McDade sought
new counsel. (Doc. 255 at 6, 8.) The Court declines the government’s invitation to grant
motions that do not exist to retroactively exclude time from Mr. McDade’s speedy trial
clock. “The Speedy Trial Act does not provide for retroactive continuances.” United States
v. Suarez-Perez, 484 F.3d 537, 542 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d
537, 545 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding a “continuance itself must be granted before the period
sought to be excluded begins to run. Since the Act does not provide for retroactive
continuances a judge could not grant an ‘ends of justice’ continuance” after the fact)).
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finds therefore that Mr. McDade’s speedy trial clock stopped on July 11, 2025, when
pretrial services filed its petition. At Mr. McDade’s initial appearance on July 25, the
government moved for a detention hearing on his pretrial release violation. The
government’s motion remained pending until July 31, when the Court held a detention
hearing and ordered Mr. McDade released. The speedy clock therefore resumed running
the next day, August 1, 2025. The Court finds that, when the clock stopped on July 11,
2025, 68 non-excludable days had elapsed under the Speedy Trial Act since Mr. McDade’s
October 8, 2024, initial appearance on the original indictment.
Mr. McDade’s speedy trial clock then continued to run without exclusion until
August 12, 2025, when he filed a Motion for Release from Custody. (Doc. 188.) As of
August 12, 2025, the Court finds that 80 non-excluded days had elapsed under the Speedy
Trial Act since Mr. McDade’s October 8, 2024 initial appearance. Mr. McDade’s pending
motion stopped the speedy trial clock, until the Court issued its Order on August 20, 2025.
(Doc. 193.) The speedy trial clock resumed the next day and continued to run until August
29, 2025, when Mr. McDade filed two pro se motions—a Motion for Release from Halfway
House (Doc. 195), and Motion for Removal of Lawyer (Doc. 196). As of August 29, 2025,
89 non-excluded days had passed under the Speedy Trial Act. The motions remained under
advisement, and thus the speedy trial clock remained paused, until September 15, 2025,
when the Court issued its Bench Ruling on both pro se motions. (Doc. 203.) The speedy
clock therefore resumed on September 16, 2025.
The speedy clock restarted and no exclusions to the Speedy Trial Act stopped the
clock until October 6, 2025, when Mr. McDade filed a Motion to Modify Conditions of
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Release. (Doc. 214.) A total of 110 non-excluded days had elapsed under the Speedy Trial
Act since Mr. McDade’s initial appearance at this point. The Court granted the motion the
next day (Doc. 215), and so the speedy trial clock resumed on October 8, 2025. The clock
continued to run without pause until November 13, 2025, when Mr. McDade filed his Third
Motion to Modify Conditions of Release.4 (Doc. 228.) By November 13, a total of 147
non-excluded days had elapsed under the Speedy Trial Act since Mr. McDade’s initial
appearance. The Court granted the motion the next day on November 14, 2025 (Doc. 229)
resuming the speedy trial clock.
The speedy trial clock continued to run, without exclusion, from November 15,
2025, until December 16, 2025, until Mr. McDade filed the present Motion to Dismiss for
a Violation of the Speedy Trial Act. (Doc. 236.) The Court concludes, taking into account
days properly excluded from the Speedy Trial Act, that as of December 16, 2025, a total
of 179 non-excluded days had elapsed under the Speedy Trial Act since Mr. McDade’s
October 8, 2024 initial appearance. This is far beyond the 70 days contemplated by the
Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The matter must therefore be dismissed. See
id. § 3162(a)(2).
This is true even though a superseding indictment was filed. Where, as here, a
superseding indictment charges the defendant with the same offense as the original
4 The government again argues that the Court should retroactively exclude time while Mr.
McDade’s case was reassigned and the “district court worked with counsel to schedule a
trial date” after Mr. McDade rejected a final plea offer. (Doc. 255 at 11.) But as the
government acknowledges, “the Court did not grant an ‘ends of justice’ continuance during
this period[.]” (Id.) This Court cannot and will not retroactively exclude time now. Suarez-
Perez, 484 F.3d at 542.
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indictment, “any violation of the original is imputed to it,” so the later indictment must be
dismissed if the speedy trial clock on the original indictment has expired. United States v.
Sachakov, 812 F. Supp. 2d 198, 207 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting United States v.
Gambino, 59 F.3d 353, 362 (2d Cir.1995)). Both the original indictment and superseding
indictment charge Mr. McDade with Conspiracy to Commit Bank Fraud 18 U.S.C. § 1349;
Bank Fraud 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1344; and Aggravated Identity Theft, 18 U.S.C.
§1028(A)(c)(5). (Compare Doc. 1 with Doc. 233.) As a result, the charges in the
superseding indictment inherited the speedy trial clock of the original indictment. See id.
Because the 70-day speedy clock had already expired when the superseding indictment
was filed on December 11, 2025, there was no time remaining to carry over from the
original indictment to the superseding indictment. The speedy trial time on the three
charges against Mr. McDade in both the original indictment and the superseding indictment
has thus run out, and so both should be dismissed.
II. DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE IS APPROPRIATE.
Having concluded that this matter should be dismissed as a result of a Speedy Trial
Act violation, the Court must next determine whether dismissal with or without prejudice
is appropriate. Mr. McDade seeks dismissal with prejudice but advances no substantive
argument in support of his position. The government, for its part, asks any dismissal be
without prejudice.
In deciding whether to dismiss a case with or without prejudice, the Speedy Trial
Act requires courts to consider “among others, each of the following factors: the
seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the
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dismissal; and the impact of a re-prosecution on the administration of this chapter and on
the administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). Each factor weighs in favor of
dismissal without prejudice here. First, the alleged offenses are serious; the conspiracy and
bank fraud charges carry sentences of up to 30 years in prison, and the offense conduct is
alleged to have continued over the course of four years and resulted in approximately
$450,000 in stolen money. Second, the facts and circumstances surrounding the delays
leading to dismissal do not evidence bad faith or any attempt to gain a tactical advantage
by the government. The way the Court sees it, after Mr. McDade filed his no-motions letter,
neither party was diligent in ensuring the Speedy Trial clock was appropriately stopped for
the purposes of plea negotiations or for Mr. McDade to find new counsel. Finally, there is
no evidence that re-prosecution will adversely impact the administration of the Speedy
Trial Act or the administration of justice. Mr. McDade is out of custody, and has neither
demonstrated nor argued prejudice to him because of re-prosecution. For these reasons, the
Court finds that dismissal without prejudice is appropriate here.
RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, based on all the files, records, and proceedings in this case, IT IS
RECOMMENDED that:
1. Mr. McDade’s Motion to Dismiss for Violation of the Speedy Trial Act (Doc.
236) be GRANTED; and
2. This matter be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Date: April 10, 2026 s/Douglas L. Micko
DOUGLAS L. MICKO
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE
Filing Objections: This Report and Recommendation is not an order or judgment of the
District Court and is therefore not appealable directly to the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1), “a party may file and serve specific written
objections to a magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations within 14 days
after being served with a copy” of the Report and Recommendation.
A party may respond to those objections within 14 days after being served a copy of the
objections. See Local Rule 72.2(b)(2). All objections and responses must comply with the
word or line limits set forth in Local Rule 72.2(c).
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