USA v. Stately

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Garrett S. Fields and Rachel Lynn Kraker, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE, 300 South Fourth Street, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55415, for
Plaintiff.
Paul C. Engh, 150 South Fifth Street, Suite 2860, Minneapolis, MN 55402,
for Defendant.
Defendant 	Jennifer 	Marie 	Stately 	objects 	to 	parts 	of 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation (“R. & R.”) of United States Magistrate Judge Leo I. Brisbois issued on
August 7, 2025. 	Specifically, Stately objects to the denial of her Motion to Suppress
Statements (Docket No. 41) and Motion to Suppress Searches and Seizures (Docket No.
42). Because the statements Stately seeks to suppress were not the product of custodial
interrogation and therefore not subject to Miranda, because Stately’s stop and the
subsequent inventory search of her vehicle were lawful, and because each of the four
search warrants were supported by probable cause or alternatively fall within the Leon
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff,
v.
JENNIFER MARIE STATELY,
Defendant.
Crim. No. 24-118 (JRT/LIB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ADOPTING REPORT &
RECOMMENDATION
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good-faith exception, the Court will overrule Stately’s objections, adopt the Magistrate
Judge’s R. & R. in full, and deny Stately’s Motions to Suppress.
BACKGROUND
I. 	FACTS
In May 2024, a grand jury indicted Stately on various counts of murder, arson, and
child neglect.1 	(Indictment, May 1, 2024, Docket No. 9.) 	The following account of the
events leading to Stately’s arrest is drawn from: (1) testimony given at an October 23,
2024 motion hearing by Todd County Sheriff’s Deputy, Tyler Winkels (Tr. of Mots. Hr’g
(“Tr.”), Nov. 11, 2024, Docket No. 52); (2) affidavits submitted by the United States in
support of multiple search warrants (Gov’t’s Exs. 3, 4, 5, 6); (3) video footage obtained
from Deputy Winkels’s body and squad car cameras (Gov’t’s Exs. 1, 2); and (4) the parties’
memoranda of law (Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Suppress (“Def.’s Mem.), Nov. 26, 2024,
Docket No. 55; Gov’t’s Mem. Opp. Mot. Suppress (“Gov’t’s Mem.”), Dec. 17, 2024, Docket
No. 60.)
1 Count 1: Premeditated Murder as to Minors A and B, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a);
Count 2: Murder in the Course of Committing Child Abuse as to Minors A and B, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1111(a); Count 3: Murder in the Course of Committing Arson as to Minor B, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a); Count 4: Arson, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 81; Count 5: Felony Child Neglect
as to Minor C, in violation of U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153(a), and 1153(b) and Minn. Stat. § 609.378,
subd. 1(a)(1).
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A. 	Events of March 15, 2024
On March 15, 2024, at approximately 2:39 p.m., the Red Lake Tribal Police
Department received a 911 call reporting a house fire at 14320 Circle Pines Road, Red
Lake, Minnesota, which is located within the Red Lake Indian Reservation. (Gov’t’s Ex. 3
(“Ex. 3”) ¶ 1.) 	The caller stated that they witnessed Stately leaving the residence in a
Chevy Equinox bearing Red Lake registration number 33509. (Id. ¶ 2.) The Red Lake Police
Department and Red Lake Fire Department arrived at the residence and witnessed smoke
coming out of the house. (Id. ¶ 3.) A firefighter entered the home, discovered a deceased
body, and immediately notified Red Lake Criminal Investigator Stephen Dow. (Id. ¶¶ 3–
4.) 	Investigator Dow arrived, entered the home, and discovered the bodies of two
deceased children (“Minor Victim 1” and “Minor Victim 2”) that he believed to be males
between the ages of three and five years old. (Id. ¶ 5.) Minor Victim 1 was found face
down wearing a blue shirt. 	(Id. ¶ 6.) 	Minor Victim 2 was found on his back on top of
Minor Victim 1 with his arms stretched above him. 	(Id. ¶ 7.) 	Minor Victim 2 was not
wearing a shirt, and Investigator Dow observed a laceration in the middle of his chest
consistent with a stab wound. 	(Id.) 	Investigator Dow observed that both victims had
blood exiting their nose and mouth. (Id. ¶¶ 6–7.) Red Lake Criminal Investigator Geoffrey
Pierre photographed the inside of the residence to document the scene. (Id. ¶ 8.) Later,
the Red Lake Fire Department discovered a can of lighter fluid on a concrete platform
extending from the back of the house. (Id. ¶ 9.)
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The Red Lake Police Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension deduced through investigation that Stately
likely had a three-year-old male (“Minor Victim 3”) in her custody. (Id. ¶ 10.) Because
law enforcement was concerned about the well-being of Minor Victim 3, law enforcement
issued an Amber Alert indicating that officials were searching for Minor Victim 3 and
Stately and that Stately was last seen driving an Equinox with registration number 33509.
(Id. ¶ 12.)
B. 	Stately’s Stop and Arrest on March 15, 2024
That same day, around 9:00 p.m., Deputy Winkels received the Amber Alert. (Tr.
at 20–21.) Soon after, Deputy Winkels was informed that a citizen had made a 911 call
stating that they believed they saw the Equinox described in the Amber Alert. (Tr. at 21.)
The caller stated that they had witnessed the Equinox at a gas station, and told the
dispatcher that they would follow the vehicle and keep the dispatcher apprised of its
location. (Id. at 22.) Deputy Winkels began pursuit of the Equinox while receiving location
updates from the dispatcher, and ultimately located the Equinox driving near Lake
Charlotte, between the cities of Long Prairie and Sauk Centre. (Id. at 24.) Deputy Winkels
began driving behind the vehicle and identified that its license plate matched the one
described in the Amber Alert. (Id. at 25.) The vehicle pulled over. (Id.)
Long Prairie Police Officer Trevor Larson, who was also pursuing the Equinox,
pulled his car in front of Stately’s, thereby “boxing that vehicle in.” (Id. at 28.) Officer
Larson stepped out with his gun drawn, which prompted Deputy Winkels to also approach
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Stately’s vehicle with his firearm drawn. (Id. ) Deputy Winkels observed Stately in the
front seat and ordered Stately out of the vehicle at gunpoint. 	(Id. at 28.) 	The officers
observed that Minor Victim 3 was in the back seat of the Equinox. (Id. at 29.) Deputy
Winkels recalled that Minor Victim 3 had blisters on his hands and face. 	(Id. at 32.)
Deputy Winkels could also smell a strong scent of body odor coming from Minor Victim
3, and the child seemed to have not been bathed for some time. 	(Id. at 32.) 	Stately
followed Deputy Winkels’s instructions, stepped out of the vehicle, and laid down on the
ground. (Id. at 28.) Stately was detained with handcuffs and placed in the back of Deputy
Winkels’s squad car. (Id. at 31.) By this time, several other law enforcement officers from
Todd County, Long Prairie Police, Stearns County, and the State Patrol were also on the
scene. (Id. 22–24.)
Deputy Winkels and other officers searched the Equniox, and did not find any
weapons or any evidence of a crime in the vehicle. (Id. at 31–33.) Officers subsequently
towed and impounded the Equinox. (Ex. 3 ¶ 16.)
While Stately was in Deputy Winkels’s squad car, Officer Larson approached the
vehicle and asked, “what happened tonight?” (Def.’s Mem. at 3; Tr. at 41–42.) Stately
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responded, and Officer Larson left the vehicle.2 Some time later,3 a part-time Long Prairie
Officer, Cody Vail, approached the vehicle and informed Stately that “at the request of . . .
the FBI . . . we’re going to have to keep you and your son separated for now.” (Ex. 1.) This
statement initiated a dialogue lasting approximately three minutes, in which Stately
expressed her objection to Minor Victim 3 being placed in a foster home, and Officer Vail
explained that the officers had no choice but to separate Stately and Minor Victim 3
because Stately was being taken to jail. (Ex. 1.)
Deputy Winkels then transported Stately to the Todd County Jail. 	(Tr. 35.) 	The
drive took between 15 and 20 minutes. (Id.) Once they arrived at the jail, Stately began
speaking to Deputy Winkels. (Ex. 2.) Deputy Winkels states he did not ask Stately any
questions to prompt her statements and immediately turned on his body camera to
document the exchange. 	(Tr. at 36.) 	Stately told Deputy Winkels that “last night,
someone broke into my house after they were bouncing a basketball around my whole
house, and I don’t know what else they were doing out there . . . .” (Ex. 2.) Deputy Winkels
responded, “and that was up in Red Lake? And last night?” (Id.) Stately indicated her
agreement and continued, “last night . . . I was trying to stay awake for as long as I could
2 Because the United States conceded that they would not use Stately’s statements made
in response to the question “What happened tonight?” in its case-in-chief, the Magistrate Judge
determined that the Defendant’s motion to suppress as to those statements was moot. (R. & R.
at 15 n.16, Aug. 7, 2025, Docket No. 73.) Stately did not object to that conclusion.
3 It is unclear from the evidence available to the Court how much time elapsed between
Stately’s exchange with Officer Larson and Officer Vail.
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so they didn’t break in. And I got scared and I was like, okay, it’s just me and my kids here,
there’s nothing that like . . . I don’t know who this is . . . .” (Id.) At that point, two other
officers entered the room, and Stately stopped speaking. (Id.)
C. 	Search Warrant Applications
1. 	The Equinox
Following Stately’s arrest, the Equinox remained in the custody of the Todd County
Sheriff’s Office. (Ex. 3 ¶ 16.) On March 16, 2024, Special Agent Ryan Nilson of the FBI
applied for a search warrant to search the Equinox. (Id. at 4.) The warrant was supported
by an affidavit by Special Agent Nilson setting forth the facts of Stately’s arrest and law
enforcement’s investigation to that point. (Id. ¶¶ 1–16.) United States Magistrate Judge
Elizabeth Cowan Wright issued the search warrant later that day. (Id. at 4.)
2. 	Cell Phones and DVR Device
On March 17, 2024, FBI Special Agent Bradley Klag applied for a search warrant to
search four cell phones and a digital video recorder (“DVR”) security device found in
Defendant’s home. (Ex. 4 ¶ 6.) Special Agent Klag submitted an affidavit detailing the
facts relating to the investigation obtained to that point, and he further stated that based
on his training, experience, and investigation, “agents believe each of the devices . . . will
contain evidence of harms committed against” the Minor Victims. 	(Id. ¶ 16.) 	Judge
Wright signed the search warrant later that day. (Id. at 14.)
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3. 	Facebook and Facebook Messenger
When law enforcement searched Stately’s cell phone, they discovered that she had
an active Facebook Messenger account. (Ex. 5 ¶ 22.) On March 20, 2024, Special Agent
Klag applied for an additional search warrant to access Stately’s Facebook and Facebook
Messenger accounts. (Id. at 1.) 	Klag’s supporting affidavit stated, “from my training and
experience, I know that Facebook communications and postings tend to demonstrate the
individual’s day-to-day movements, patterns of life, and mental and emotional state.”
(Ex. 5. ¶ 24.) Special Agent Klag also stated he knew from “training and experience that
Facebook 	Messenger 	is 	a 	common 	alternative 	to 	text 	message 	communication,
particularly where cell phone reception may be inconsistent such as on the Red Lake
Indian Reservation.” (Ex. 5 ¶ 23.) United States Magistrate Judge Jon T. Huseby signed
the search warrant that day. (Ex. 5 at 16.)
4. 	Cell Phone Tower Data
On April 15, 2024, FBI Special Agent Nicole Lopez applied for a search warrant for
cell phone tower data for the towers next to Stately’s residence, from March 14, 2024, at
12:00 a.m. through March 15, 2024, at 6:00 p.m. (Ex. 6., Attach. A.) Special Agent Lopez
submitted an affidavit to support the warrant describing the investigation and stating that
based on Lopez’s “training and experience . . . information obtained from cellular service
providers . . . can be used to show that the device was in the general vicinity of the cell
tower at the time the communication occurred. 	Thus, the records [sought] . . . 	will
identify the cellular devices that were in the vicinity of the relevant location(s) at the times
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the crimes occurred.” (Ex. 6 ¶ 31.) Judge Huseby signed the warrant that day. (Ex. 6 at
12.)
II. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The parties filed various pretrial discovery motions,4 and Magistrate Judge Leo I.
Brisbois issued an R. & R. (R. & R., Aug. 7, 2025, Docket No. 73.) As relevant here, the R.
& R. recommended denying Stately’s motion to suppress her statements made in the back
of Deputy Winkels’s squad car and at the Todd County Jail (Def.’s Mot. Suppress
Statements, Sept. 30, 2024, Docket No. 41), and Stately’s motion to suppress the fruits of
her arrest and the subsequent search of her vehicle, as well as the fruits of the four search
warrants (Def.’s Mot. Suppress Searches and Seizures, Sept. 30, 2024, Docket No. 42).
Stately timely objected to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation on these two
motions. (Def.’s Objs., Aug. 21, 2025, Docket No. 74.) Stately did not object to any other
recommendations in the R. & R.
4 (Def.’s Mot. Disc., Sept. 30, 2024, Docket No. 36; Def.’s Mot. Compel, Sept. 30, 2024,
Docket No. 37; Def.’s Mot. Retain Rough Notes, Sept. 30, 2024, Docket No. 38; Def.’s Mot.
Disclosure of Rule 404(b) Evid., Sept. 30, 2024, Docket No. 39; Def.’s Mot. Disclosure, Sept. 30,
2024, Docket No. 40; Def.’s Mot. Suppress Statements, Sept. 30, 2024, Docket No. 41; Def.’s Mot.
Suppress Searches and Seizures, Sept. 30, 2024, Docket No. 42; Gov’t’s Mot. Disc., Sept. 30, 2024,
Docket No. 44.)
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DISCUSSION
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Upon the filing of a report and recommendation by a magistrate judge, “[a] party
may 	serve 	and 	file 	specific 	written 	objections 	to 	the 	proposed 	findings 	and
recommendations.” D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(1). “The objections should specify the portions
of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation to which objections are made and
provide a basis for those objections.” 	Mayer v. Walvatne, No. 07–1958, 2008 WL
4527774, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2008). For dispositive motions, the Court reviews de
novo “properly objected to” portions of an R. & R.5 D. Minn. LR 72.2(b)(3); see also 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(c). 	Because Stately’s motions to suppress are
dispositive, the Court will review the Magistrate Judge’s determinations de novo. See D.
Minn. LR 72.1(a)(3)(A).
II. 	ANALYSIS
The Court now turns to Stately’s objections to the denial of her motions to
suppress. 	Although the Fourth and Fifth Amendments contain no provisions excluding
the use of evidence obtained in violation of their commands, decisions of the U.S.
5 In civil cases, “[o]bjections which are not specific but merely repeat arguments
presented to and considered by a magistrate judge are not entitled to de novo review, but rather
are reviewed for clear error.” Montgomery v. Compass Airlines, LLC, 98 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1017
(D. Minn. 2015). It is unclear whether this rule applies in the criminal context. See United States
v. Chopra, No. 19-305, 2021 WL 347415, at *1 (D. Minn. Feb. 2, 2021). Because the Eighth Circuit
has not weighed in on the proper standard of review and because Stately’s objections would fail
under either standard, the Court will review the R. & R. de novo.
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Supreme Court have “establish[ed] an exclusionary rule that, when applicable, forbids the
use of improperly obtained evidence at trial.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139
(2009). Here, Stately seeks to suppress evidence she alleges was obtained in violation of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Court will address each of Stately’s suppression
arguments in turn.
A. 	Stately’s Motion to Suppress Statements
First, the Court considers Stately’s motion to suppress two sets of statements
made on the day of her arrest.
The Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause provides that “[n]o person . . .
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” 	U.S. Const.
amend. V. 	In Miranda v. Arizona the Supreme Court “concluded that the coercion
inherent in custodial interrogation blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary
statements, and thus heightens the risk that an individual will not be ‘accorded his
privilege under the Fifth Amendment . . . not to be compelled to incriminate himself.’”
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000) (alteration in original) (quoting
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439)). 	The Supreme Court therefore laid down the now-familiar
“concrete 	constitutional 	guidelines” 	necessary 	to 	protect 	“basic” 	and 	“precious”
constitutional rights, such as the right against self-incrimination: A court may not admit
into evidence any statement given during a custodial interrogation of a suspect unless law
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enforcement first provided the suspect with the now well-known Miranda warnings. 384
U.S. 436, 442 (1966).
Miranda’s protections are in effect “whenever a suspect is (1) interrogated (2)
while in custody.” 	United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1347 (8th Cir. 1990). 	But
statements “given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences” are not
subject to Miranda—and are therefore admissible, even if made while in custody—
because the “fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not
whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and counsel,
but whether he can be interrogated.” 	Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478 (emphasis added).
“Interrogation” in the Miranda context encompasses “express questioning . . . [and] any
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).
1. 	Squad Car Statements
As described above, after Stately was arrested officers escorted her to the backseat
of Deputy Winkels’s squad car. Officer Vail then approached the vehicle to inform Stately
that “at the request of . . . the FBI . . . we’re going to have to keep you and your son
separated for now.” (Ex. 1.) This statement initiated a back-and-forth in which Stately
expressed her objection to Minor Victim 3 being placed in a foster home, and Officer Vail
explained that Stately would be “going to be going to jail, and there’s no way that your
son is going to be with you in jail.” (Ex. 1.)
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Stately seeks to suppress her statements made during this dialogue. Specifically,
she seeks to suppress any statements that could be interpreted as placing her at the crime
scene in Red Lake. 	(Def.’s Objs. at 7.) 	Stately argues that she “was responding to an
earlier question,” by Officer Larson, who had asked her “what happened tonight,” after
officers executed the traffic stop of Stately’s car. 	(Id.) 	Stately argues that her later
statements to Officer Vail were therefore the product of custodial interrogation without
the requisite warnings.
It is undisputed that Officer Vail did not provide Stately with Miranda warnings
before their conversation and that Stately was in custody during that time. 	The
admissibility of Stately’s statements thus turns on whether they were the product of
“interrogation,” or whether her statements were “voluntary,” and thus admissible
despite the lack of prior Miranda warnings.
After carefully reviewing the video footage of the exchange between Stately and
Officer Vail (see Ex. 1), the Court concludes that Stately’s statements in the squad car
were the product of neither express questioning nor actions by Officer Vail that were
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 	It is well-settled that “custodial
statements made on the suspect’s own initiative are not subject to the safeguards of
Miranda,” Butzin v. Wood, 886 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 1989), and that “[v]olunteered
statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment,” Miranda, 384 U.S. at
478. Although Stately was in police custody, which is an inherently coercive environment,
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interrogation “must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in
custody itself.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 300. While it is true that Officer Larson had asked Stately
a question earlier, Stately’s interaction with Officer Larson had ended.6 When Officer Vail
approached Stately and informed her of Minor Victim 3’s location, he asked no questions
and made no statements that would be reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from Stately. 	The camera footage reveals that Officer Vail’s statements
throughout the exchange were limited solely to the topic of where Minor Victim 3 would
be taken, and Officer Vail never asked Stately any questions concerning the evening’s
events.
The Court finds no evidence that Officer Vail engaged in conduct reasonably likely
to elicit incriminating responses from Stately. 	Stately’s statements were therefore not
the product of custodial interrogation and thus fall outside of Miranda’s protections.
Accordingly, the Court will deny Stately’s Motion to Suppress the statements made in the
back of Deputy Winkels’s squad car.
2. 	Statements at Todd County Jail
Stately also moves to suppress her statements to Deputy Winkel at the Todd
County Jail. 	Specifically, she seeks to suppress any statements relating to “basketballs
6 Seeming to concede that Officer Larson’s question to Stately constituted custodial
interrogation without prior Miranda warnings, the United States has indicated they will not be
utilizing any statements made by Stately in response to the question “what happened tonight?”
in its case-in-chief.
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bouncing outside her house, and her efforts at securing help from the Bemidji and Red
Lake Police Departments.” (Def.’s Mem. at 10.) Stately does not point to any action or
statement by Deputy Winkels at the jail that elicited these statements from Stately.
Rather, Stately—relying on the case Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004)—argues that
“law enforcement, acting collectively, did not ‘punctuate’ the first interrogation of Ms.
Stately, which began with ‘what happened tonight,’ with her disclosures at the jail of what
did.” (Def.’s Mem. at 10.)
Seibert involved officers engaging in a concerted “technique of interrogating in
successive, unwarned and warned phases”—one officer, without providing Miranda
warnings, would aggressively interrogate the suspect, and then another officer, after
providing warnings, would utilize their knowledge of the suspect’s unwarned statements
to elicit incriminating responses that would then be admissible in court. Seibert, 542 U.S.
610. 	The Supreme Court held that “Miranda warnings . . . inserted in the midst of
coordinated and continuing interrogation” are “likely to mislead and ‘deprive a defendant
of knowledge essential to [their] ability to understand the nature of his rights and the
consequences of abandoning them.’” Id. at 613–14 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 424 (1986)).
This case is vastly different than Seibert. 	Stately’s conversation with Deputy
Winkels at the Todd County Jail began with her own voluntary statements and was not
initiated through police questioning. (See Ex. 2.) By the time the exchange took place,
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her brief interactions with Officer Larson and Officer Vail had long since concluded, and
Stately presents no evidence of any coordination or communication between the three
officers. The Court rejects the contention that these separate exchanges constituted one
continuous interrogation process intended to circumvent Miranda. See Seibert, 542 U.S.
at 613.7
The Court therefore will deny Stately’s motion to suppress her statements at Todd
County Jail.
B. 	Stately’s Motion to Suppress Searches and Seizures
1. 	Traffic Stop and Search of Stately’s Vehicle
The Court now turns to Stately’s motion to suppress the fruits of various searches.
Stately first moves to suppress evidence stemming from her arrest by challenging the
traffic stop following the Amber Alert, and the ensuing inventory search of the Equinox,
as unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), guarantees “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
7 Considering Stately’s statements at the Todd County Jail independently, the Court
further concludes that Stately’s remarks were beyond the protections of Miranda because
“Miranda does not protect an accused from a spontaneous admission made under circumstances
not induced by the investigating officers or during a conversation not initiated by the officers.”
Wood, 886 F.2d at 1018 (quoting United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019, 1032 (4th Cir. 1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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and seizures.” 	U.S. Const. amend. IV. 	“If officers possess a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, they may briefly detain a suspect to investigate the possible criminal
activity, even though there is no probable cause for an actual arrest.” 	United States v.
Hernandez–Hernandez, 327 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
22 (1968)). 	“The officer's suspicion is reasonable if the officer knows particularized,
objective facts that lead to a rational inference that a crime is being or has been
committed.” 	Id. 	“Whether the particular facts known to the officer amount to an
objective and particularized basis for a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is
determined in light of the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Garcia, 23 F.3d
1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1994).
The Court concludes that the officers who stopped Stately had a reasonable,
articulable suspicion sufficient to support the stop. The officers had received an Amber
Alert identifying Stately as a suspect in a double homicide and an ongoing child abduction
and stating that she was driving a black Chevy Equniox bearing the license plate number
33509. (Ex. 7.) While Stately argues that “no driving violation was observed that could
ordinarily justify her felony arrest,” (Def.’s Objs. at 4), the Supreme Court has held that
an officer’s reasonable suspicion of a completed felony can support a Terry stop. 	See
United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (“[I]f police have a reasonable
suspicion, grounded in specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter was
involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony, then a Terry stop may be
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made to investigate that suspicion.”). When the officers found Stately’s Equniox on the
road, they possessed a reasonable articulable suspicion not only that Stately was in the
process of committing a crime, but had committed a completed crime.
Turning to the inventory search of the Equniox following Stately’s arrest, the Court
first emphasizes that it does not appear that the United States obtained any evidence
from this search that would be suppressed even if the Court were to determine the search
is unlawful. But even if there were, the inventory search was lawful.
“As 	with 	any 	warrantless 	search, 	the 	Government 	bears 	the 	burden 	of
demonstrating the need for an exemption from the warrant requirement and that its
conduct fell within the bounds of the exception.” 	United States v. Kennedy, 427 F .3d
1136, 1144 (8th Cir. 2005). 	Here, the search was supported by the inventory search
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, which “permits law
enforcement to inventory the contents of a vehicle that is lawfully taken into custody,
even without a warrant or probable cause to search.” United States v. Garreau, 658 F.3d
854, 857 (8 th Cir. 2011.) 	Because law enforcement lawfully took Stately’s vehicle into
custody after her arrest, the accompanying inventory search was also lawful. 8
8 The Court again emphasizes that it appears the United States is not seeking to admit any
evidence resulting from this inventory search.
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2. 	Search Warrants
Stately also moves to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to four search warrants
issued in March and April 2024. 	These search warrants were for: (1) Stately’s Chevy
Equniox (see Ex. 3); (2) four cell phones and a DVR security device found in Stately’s home
(see Ex. 4); (3) Stately’s Facebook and Facebook Messenger accounts (see Ex. 5); and (4)
cell tower records for the cell towers nearest to Stately’s home (see Ex. 6).
The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants be supported by probable
cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The existence of probable cause is based on whether, given
all the circumstances set forth in the warrant application, “there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The issuing judge therefore must consider the totality of the
circumstances. 	Walden v. Carmack, 156 F.3d 861, 870 (8th Cir. 1998). 	When a search
warrant is based solely on an affidavit, courts may consider only “information which is
found within the four corners of the affidavit” to determine the existence of probable
cause. United States v. Solomon, 432 F.3d 824, 827 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “The
affidavit 	‘should 	be 	examined 	under 	a 	common 	sense 	approach 	and 	not 	in 	a
hypertechnical fashion.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir.
1993)). 	Although the Court reviews the R. & R. de novo, the Court must afford “great
deference” to the probable cause finding of the judge who issued the warrant. 	United
States v. Butler, 594 F.3d 955, 962 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 236). The Court
must uphold the probable cause determination if the issuing judge had a substantial basis
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for the initial probable cause finding. 	United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 785 (8th Cir.
1999).
(i) 	Warrant to Search Vehicle
First, Stately argues that the affidavit supporting the search warrant for the
Equinox did not establish probable cause that evidence of a crime could be discovered in
the vehicle. The Court disagrees.
A valid search warrant must provide evidence of a “nexus between a particular
location and [illegal activity],” which must be “determined by the nature of the crime and
the reasonable, logical likelihood of finding useful evidence.” 	United States v. Colbert,
828 F.3d 718, 726 (8th Cir. 2016). 	The Court concludes that Special Agent Nilson’s
supporting affidavit provided sufficient factual details to connect the Equinox to the
alleged crimes. 	(See Ex. 3.) 	The affidavit recounted that Stately was seen leaving her
burning residence in the Equinox on the afternoon of March 15, 2024 (Id. ¶¶ 2–3), and
that upon arriving at the home, law enforcement confirmed that the house was on fire
and found two deceased children inside the home, with wounds consistent with a
possible homicide (Id. ¶¶ 5–7). 	When the Equniox was ultimately stopped, officers
observed Stately and Minor Victim 3, who appeared to have a swollen face and red stains
on his clothing resembling blood, in the vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 13–15.)
Because the affidavit supporting the search warrant provided weighty evidence of
the vehicle’s connection to the alleged crimes—particularly the observed presence of
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Minor Victim 3 in the vehicle with potential wounds and blood stains at the time of the
traffic stop—the Court concludes that the issuing judge had a substantial basis for
concluding that there was a fair probability the Equinox contained evidence of a crime.
The Court will therefore deny Stately’s motion to suppress.
(ii) 	Warrant for Electronic Devices
Stately next moves to suppress the fruits of the search and seizure warrant for four
cell phones and a DVR security device, all of which were found in Stately’s home. Stately
argues that the supporting affidavit lacked evidence to prove that these devices would
contain any evidence of the alleged crimes. Specifically, Stately argues that the United
States provided no facts showing that these devices were used in connection with the
harms committed against Minor Victims 1, 2, or 3. (Def.’s Objs. at 10–11.)
The Court will again deny Stately’s motion to suppress. 	A search warrant
application need only provide evidence of a “nexus between a particular location and
[illegal activity],” as “determined by the nature of the crime and the reasonable, logical
likelihood of finding useful evidence” in the place to be searched. Etheridge, 165 F.3d at
657. The affidavit supporting the search warrant stated that the five devices were found
inside Stately’s fire-damaged home, in which Minor Victim 1 and Minor Victim 2 were
found deceased. (Ex. 4 ¶¶ 5–9, 17.) Given Special Agent Klag’s experience, he attested
in his supporting affidavit that it was likely the devices would contain evidence of harms
committed against the victims. (Ex. 4 ¶ 16.) While a closer question, the Court concludes
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that the presence of the cell phones and the recording device in the home where these
crimes occurred provided the issuing judge with a substantial basis to conclude that
probable cause existed to support the search.
But even if the Court were to find that the search warrant was not supported by
probable cause, the Court would nevertheless deny Stately’s motion to suppress because
the officers’ actions fell within the Leon good-faith exception. See United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984).
The good-faith exception bars application of the exclusionary rule “when an officer
acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate
and acted within its scope.” 	United States v. Fiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 345 (8th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920). In other words, “[i]n cases of good faith, the evidence,
although seized pursuant to a warrant that lacked probable cause, nonetheless is
admissible at trial.” Id. In such cases, evidence is only excluded: (1) when the affidavit
supporting the search warrant contains a knowing or reckless falsity; (2) when the issuing
magistrate judge wholly abandoned his or her judicial role; (3) when the affidavit is so
lacking 	in 	indicia 	of 	probable 	cause 	that 	a 	belief 	in 	its 	existence 	is 	objectively
unreasonable; or (4) when the warrant is so facially deficient that it cannot reasonably be
presumed valid. 	United States v. Puckett, 466 F.3d 626, 630 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Leon
468 U.S. at 923).
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This case does not fall within any of those categories. 	If the Court were to
determine that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, the warrant
was not lacking such that the officers’ reliance on it was objectively unreasonable—nor
does Stately allege that the warrant contained “falsit[ies]” or that the issuing judge
“wholly abandoned” their judicial role. 	See Leon, 468 U.S. at 914–923. 	For all these
reasons, Stately’s motion to suppress will be denied.
(iii) 	Warrant for Facebook and Facebook Messenger Accounts
Stately further moves to suppress the fruits of the warrant authorizing the search
of her Facebook and Facebook Messenger accounts. Like the warrant for the electronic
devices, Stately argues that this warrant was unsupported by any specific facts tying her
alleged criminal activity to the Facebook accounts. 	Stately argues that Special Agent
Klag’s statement that individuals living on the Red Lake Reservation use Facebook
Messenger for day-to-day communication due to the lack of cell reception “could be used
to search anyone’s account, because Facebook Messenger is used by the innocent to
communicate, and may show the remnants of a lived life.” (Def.’s Objs. at 12.)
The Facebook warrant presents a closer question than the previous warrants. But
regardless of the Court’s conclusion on the question of probable cause, this warrant too
falls within the scope of the Leon good-faith exception. Stately has presented no evidence
that the officers involved acted with anything but objective good faith in obtaining the
search warrant for the Facebook accounts. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 920. Nor is there any
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allegation that the supporting affidavit contained falsities. Id. at 923. Given the factual
narrative recounted in the search warrant application, the Court finds that the issuing
judge did not abandon their judicial role in authorizing the search, and finds that the
affidavit was not “so lacking in indicia of probable cause” that law enforcement could not
have reasonably believed that probable cause existed. 	Id. 	Nor was the warrant “so
facially deficient” that officers could not have reasonably presumed it to be valid. Id. The
Court will therefore deny Stately’s motion to suppress.
(iv) 	Cell Tower Data
Finally, Stately moves to suppress the fruits of the warrant authorizing law
enforcement to obtain cell tower data from the night of Stately’s arrest, arguing that
“[t]he evidence secured by this warrant is premised . . . upon the seizure of . . . Stately’s
phones from her person. Our claim is one of taint from that initial search and seizure.”
(Def.’s Objs. at 12.)
First, the Court reiterates its conclusions above that the stop and arrest of Stately,
the inventory search of Stately’s vehicle, and the execution of the warrant for the five
electronic devices in Stately’s home were lawful. Second, the Court concludes that the
search warrant for cell tower data was supported by probable cause. The Eighth Circuit
has held that when there is “‘a fair probability’ that records from nearby [cell] towers
[will] reveal incriminating evidence,” a search warrant for such records is supported by
probable cause. United States v. James, 3 F.4th 1102, 1105 (8 th Cir. 2021). Special Agent
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Lopez’s supporting affidavit stated: that an individual had called 911 on the day the
alleged crimes occurred to report that they saw Stately leaving her home (Ex. 6. ¶¶ 5–6);
that a “Chevy Equniox matching the description of Stately’s vehicle was captured on a
neighbor’s home surveillance camera” that afternoon (id.¶ 7); that the Equinox was seen
returning to Stately’s home once first responders had arrived, but that the vehicle
“quickly drove away before anyone could speak with her” (id. ¶ 9); and that Stately was
ultimately arrested after being stopped in the Equinox, with Minor Victim 3 in the
backseat (id. ¶ 20).
The Court concludes that these facts, which represent only a part of the evidence
contained in the affidavit supporting the search warrant, provided the issuing judge with
a substantial basis to conclude that there was probable cause the cell towers contained
evidence of the alleged crimes. And even if this warrant lacked probable cause, the Court
concludes that this warrant would also be within the scope of the Leon good faith
exception. Accordingly, the Court will deny Stately’s motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
The Court will deny Stately’s Motion to Suppress Statements and Motion to
Suppress Searches and Seizures. 	After reviewing Stately’s objections to the R. & R. de
novo, the Court concludes that the two sets of challenged statements were not the
product of custodial interrogation, and therefore were outside the scope of Miranda, and
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concludes that none of the searches or seizures challenged by Stately violated the Fourth
Amendment.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. 	Defendant Jennifer Marie Stately’s objections to the Report and
Recommendation [Docket No. 74] are OVERRULED;
2. 	The Report and Recommendation [Docket No. 73] is ADOPTED; and
3. 	Defendant Jennifer Marie Stately’s Motion to Suppress Statements [Docket
No. 41] and Motion to Suppress Searches and Seizures [Docket No. 42] are
DENIED.
DATED: October 29, 2025
at Minneapolis, Minnesota. 	JOHN R. TUNHEIM
United States District Judge
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