Henny v. United States of America et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
Kimberly Ann Henny,
Plaintiff,
v.
United States of America,
Defendant.
Civ. No. 23-2773 (PAM/DJF)
ORDER
Plaintiff Kimberly Ann Henny filed this action in 2023 alleging, among other things,
that officials of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) caused her to be exposed to
secondhand synthetic cannabinoid smoke and thereby endangered her health and violated
the law. The bulk of Henny’s claims were dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A shortly
after filing, though one claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) was permitted
to go forward. Eventually, that FTCA claim was also dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.
Henny did not appeal from the dismissal. Now, though, nearly two years after judgment
was entered in this matter, Henny has filed a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant
to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (See Docket No. 53.)
The Motion is denied. 	As an initial matter, Henny attempts to rely in part upon
Rule 60(b)(2), which permits a court to relieve a party from the final judgment in the
manner upon an adequate presentation of “newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).”
Henny provides evidence that she suffered a heart attack in 2024 following the dismissal
CASE 0:23-cv-02773-PAM-DJF Doc. 57 Filed 05/06/26 Page 1 of 4

2
of this matter, and she cites that evidence as a basis for revisiting the judgment pursuant to
Rule 60(b)(2). But under Rule 60(c)(1), “[a] motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within
a reasonable time—and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of
the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” 	Henny is seeking relief well more
than one year after judgment was entered in this matter. She cannot rely upon Rule 60(b)(2)
as a basis for doing so.
Still more importantly, though, Henny’s new evidence would not change anything
about the outcome of this case. 	This matter was not dismissed because Henny lacked
evidence to back up her claims; it was dismissed because the Court lacked jurisdiction over
Henny’s FTCA claim, (see Docket No. 50), and because Henny had not adequately pleaded
a claim pursuant to Bivens1 with respect to any individual defendant named to this action
(see Docket No. 20). 	Nothing has changed in that regard. 	Henny has not submitted a
proposed amended complaint, and her earlier pleading would still have all the same
problems today that it did two years ago.
There are two additional hurdles. 	First, Rule 60(c)(1) does not place a firm time
limit on motions for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), the other basis upon which Henny seeks to
revisit the judgment in this matter. Rule 60(c)(1) does, however, require that relief under
be sought under Rule 60(b)(6) “within a reasonable time.” 	The evidentiary basis for
Henny’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion has been known to her for approximately 18 months. The
1 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 US 388 (1971).
CASE 0:23-cv-02773-PAM-DJF Doc. 57 Filed 05/06/26 Page 2 of 4

3
Court cannot say, under the circumstances, that Henny has acted with the kind of diligence
expected under Rule 60(c)(1).
Second, Henny seeks to relitigate claims under Bivens, arguing that the new
evidence demonstrates that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to her medical
needs. 	Extension of Bivens beyond the context in which remedies under Bivens have
already been recognized is strongly disfavored. See, e.g., Farah v. Weyker, 926 F.3d 492
(8th Cir. 2019) (declining to extend Bivens to any context not previously recognized by
the Supreme Court); Ahmed v. Weyker, 984 F.3d 564, 567–71 (8th Cir. 2020) (refusing to
extend a Bivens claim for any fact pattern that does not mirror the facts and legal issues
identified by the Supreme Court). Henny points to Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980),
as matching the deliberate-indifference claim that she seeks to assert, but Henny does not
suggest that prison officials failed to provide her with medical care or provided her with
medical care that was so substandard that it amounted to a violation of her constitutional
rights. Instead, Henny claims that BOP officials ignored prison conditions that ultimately
contributed to health problems (which, in turn, were adequately treated). This kind of claim
would amount to an extension of Bivens and would thus be doubtful, even if Henny had
identified a specific individual against whom she could bring a plausible claim for relief,
which she has not.
CASE 0:23-cv-02773-PAM-DJF Doc. 57 Filed 05/06/26 Page 3 of 4

4
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Kimberly Henny’s
Motion for relief under Rule 60(b) (Docket No. 53) is DENIED.
Dated: May 5, 2026 	s/ Paul A. Magnuson
Paul A. Magnuson
United States District Court Judge
CASE 0:23-cv-02773-PAM-DJF Doc. 57 Filed 05/06/26 Page 4 of 4