USA v. Funchess et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
United States of America, 	No. 23-CR-120(01) (SRN/DLM)
Plaintiff,
v. 	ORDER ON MOTION FOR
COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
Jamal Timothy Funchess,
Defendant/Petitioner
Katharine T. Buzicky, Office of the U.S. Attorney, 316 N. Robert St., Ste. 404, Saint Paul,
MN 55101, for Plaintiff United States of America
Jamal Timothy Funchess, Reg. No. 49011-510, FCI Sandstone, P.O. Box. 1000, Sandstone,
MN 55072, Pro Se Defendant/Petitioner
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
Before the Court is the Pro Se Motion Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (“Compassionate
Release Motion”) [Doc. No. 83] filed by Defendant/Petitioner Jamal Timothy Funchess.
Mr. Funchess seeks a sentence reduction to “a range of 60 to 77 months.” (Comp. Release
Mot. at 5.) 	The Government opposes his motion. (Gov’t’s Opp’n [Doc. No. 86] at 2–7.)
Based on a review of the file, record, and proceedings herein, and for the following reasons,
the Court denies the motion without prejudice.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Mr. Funchess is serving a sentence of 100 months, following his guilty plea for
aiding and abetting carjacking. 	(Sentencing Hr’g Tr. [Doc. No. 80] at 3–5, 9.) 	Mr.
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Funchess’s guideline range was 108 to 135 months. (Id. at 5.) He is serving his sentence
at FCI Sandstone in Sandstone, Minnesota, and has a projected release date of April 14,
2030. See Find an inmate, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last
visited Oct. 9, 2026).
In the instant motion, Mr. Funchess contends that his rehabilitation and Amendment
829 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines constitute “extraordinary and compelling” reasons
for a reduction in sentence. 	(Pet’r’s Mot. at 1–3.) 	Amendment 829 revised guidance to
sentencing courts regarding the defendant’s age as a sentencing consideration. 	See U.S.
Sentencing Comm’n, Amendment 829, https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendment/829.
Mr. Funchess also references the effect of another Guidelines Amendment, Amendment
821, that provided for a two-level reduction in the offense score of defendants with zero
criminal 	history 	points. 	See 	U.S. 	Sentencing 	Comm’n, 	Amendment 	821, 	Part 	B,
https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/amendment/821. 	He states, “It would appear that had a
lesser sentence been available to either the government or the Court, [I] would have been
privy to such a sentence.” (Pet’r’s Mot. at 3.)
In opposition, the Government asserts that Mr. Funchess has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, and even if he had, he has failed to meet the standard for a
reduction in sentence. (Gov’t’s Opp’n at 5–7.)
II. 	DISCUSSION
“[A] court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed” except
pursuant to statute. United States v. Marcussen, 15 F.4th 855, 858 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)). The compassionate release provision, as amended by the First Step
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Act, is such a statutory exception. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A court may reduce a
defendant’s term of imprisonment if: 	(1) “after considering the factors set forth in §
3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable”; (2) the court finds that “extraordinary and
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction”; and (3) “such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id.
The Supreme Court has recently made clear that claims regarding the length of a
sentence or the validity of a conviction are not proper bases for compassionate release.
Rutherford v. United States, 608 U.S. 454, 146 S. Ct. 1320, 1330–35 (2026); Fernandez v.
United States, 608 U.S. 411, 146 S. Ct. 1292, 1307 (2026). 	In addition, a defendant’s
rehabilitation, by itself, does not serve as a basis for compassionate release. 28 U.S.C. §
994(t).
A defendant seeking compassionate release “bears the burden to establish he is
eligible for a sentence reduction.” United States v. Demikh, No. 15-CR-1132 (MJD/HB),
2022 WL 2643903, at *1 (D. Minn. July 8, 2022) (citing United States v. Jones, 836 F.3d
896, 899 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ocanas, 516 F. Supp. 3d 936, 938 (D. Minn. Feb.
2, 2021)).
A. No Evidence of Administrative Exhaustion
As an initial matter, Mr. Funchess bears the burden of demonstrating that before he
brought his Compassionate Release Motion, he first exhausted his administrative remedies
with the BOP. 	He may do so in either of two ways—by presenting evidence of a direct
denial of his request for compassionate release, or by the lapse of 30 days without a reply
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from the BOP. 	See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 	Mr. Funchess has failed to submit any
documentation of an administrative request.
While the Court liberally construes pro se filings, see United States v. Sellner, 773
F.3d 927, 932 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), a pro se
movant must still comply with the applicable statutory requirements underlying their §
3582(c) motion, and must offer evidence of such compliance sufficient to meet their burden
of proof. 	See Ocanas, 516 F. Supp.3d at 938 n.2 (finding that initially “there was no
evidence in the record demonstrating that Ocanas had exhausted his administrative rights”
but that he later “provided evidence that he petitioned the warden for compassionate
release” without reply and that, “[t]herefore, the motion [was] properly before the Court.”).
On the record before the Court, Mr. Funchess has not met his burden to demonstrate
administrative 	exhaustion. 	Therefore, 	the 	Court 	denies 	without 	prejudice 	his
Compassionate Release Motion for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
B. No Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Even if Mr. Funchess had exhausted his administrative remedies, his motion would
still fail, as Fernandez, 146 S. Ct. at 1307, and Rutherford, 146 S. Ct. 1330–35, have
foreclosed claims like Petitioner’s as cognizable bases for compassionate release. Prior to
Fernandez and Rutherford, his motion would have failed because he did not meet the
length-of-sentence requirements of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6), which required defendants to
have served at least 10 years of an “unusually long” sentence and to show that a change in
the law, other than a non-retroactive Guidelines amendment, would have resulted in a lower
prison term if the defendant were sentenced today.
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To the extent Mr. Funchess relies on Amendment 829, that amendment does not
have retroactive effect. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d) (listing retroactive amendments).
In addition, although he did not expressly identify Amendment 821 by name, and
relief under that amendment is subject to a separate motion, his reference to a two-level
decrease in his offense level based on his lack of criminal history points appears to
reference Amendment 821. 	Such a motion is not properly before the Court as part of a
compassionate release motion, and, in any event, relief under Amendment 821 is not
available to zero-point offenders who possessed a firearm in connection with the offense,
which appears to be the case here. See U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1; (Plea Agmt. [Doc. No. 47] ¶ 2).
Finally, while the Court commends Mr. Funchess’s rehabilitative accomplishments,
rehabilitation alone does not serve as a basis for compassionate release. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).
Accordingly, for these additional reasons, the Court denies Petitioner’s Motion for
Compassionate Release without prejudice.
III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the foregoing and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein it is HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. 	The Pro Se Motion to Reduce Sentence/for Compassionate Release [Doc. No.
83] filed by Defendant/Petitioner Jamal Timothy Funchess is DENIED without
prejudice.
Dated: October 13, 2026
s/Susan Richard Nelson
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Judge
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