USA v. De Dios Artechi et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
United States of America, 	No. 18-CR-33 (SRN/HB)
Plaintiff,
v. 	ORDER ON MOTION FOR
COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
Sergio Tomas De Dios Artechi,
Defendant/Petitioner
Katharine T. Buzicky, Office of the U.S. Attorney, 316 N. Robert St., Ste. 404, Saint Paul,
MN 55101, for Plaintiff United States of America
Sergio Tomas De Dios Artechi, Reg. No. 33255-171, FCI Thomson, P.O. Box. 1002,
Thomson, IL 61285, Pro Se Defendant/Petitioner
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON, United States District Judge
Before the Court is the Pro Se Motion to Reduce Sentence (“Compassionate Release
Motion”) [Doc. No. 271] filed by Defendant/Petitioner Sergio Tomas De Dios Artechi.
Mr. Artechi seeks a sentence reduction, and the Government opposes his motion. (Gov’t’s
Opp’n [Doc. No. 278] at 5–11). 	Based on a review of the file, record, and proceedings
herein, and for the following reasons, the Court denies the motion without prejudice.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Mr. Artechi is serving a sentence of 120 months, the mandatory statutory minimum
sentence, following his guilty plea and conviction for aiding and abetting the distribution
of methamphetamine. 	(Sentencing Hr’g Tr. [Doc. No. 208] at 3–5, 9.) 	Mr. Artechi’s
guideline range was 121 to 151 months. (Id. at 7.) At sentencing, the Court noted that the
offense was Mr. Artechi’s third drug conviction, and that despite his lack of legal status
in the United States, he had returned on multiple occasions. 	(Id. at 12.) 	However, the
Court also identified mitigating circumstances, including Mr. Artechi’s brief involvement
in the drug conspiracy, his substance abuse history, and his impoverished background.
(Id. at 13.)
Mr. Artechi is serving his sentence at FCI Thomson in Thomson, Illinois, and has a
projected release date of January 3, 2027. See Find an inmate, Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2026).
In the instant motion, Mr. Artechi seeks “a sentence reduction under the Sentencing
Guidelines outside of the record in conjunction with the 2025 amendments” “to reduce
sentence concerning meth and cocaine offenses.” (Def.’s Mot. at 1.) The Court construes
his motion as a request for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). In particular,
Mr. Artechi appears to rely on Amendment 833 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which
aimed to “encourage broader use” of the mitigating role adjustment in drug trafficking
cases, and which became effective on November 1, 2025. 	See U.S. Sent. Comm’n,
Amendment 833, https://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/ 	amendment/833. 	In addition, Mr.
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Artechi argues that prison overcrowding “can be a justified reasons to grant this 3582
sentence reduction base[d] on 3553(a) factors.” (Def.’s Mot. at 4.)
In opposition, the Government argues that Mr. Artechi’s Compassionate Release
Motion 	should 	be 	denied 	without 	prejudice 	because 	he 	has 	failed 	to 	exhaust 	his
administrative remedies. 	(Gov’t’s Opp’n at 5–6.) 	Even if the Court considers his
arguments on the merits, assuming that he seeks relief under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) for
receiving an “unusually long sentence,” the Government asks the Court to reserve its ruling
pending resolution of this issue before the Supreme Court, which is considering the issue
in two cases on appeal. (Id. at 6) (citing Carter v. United States, No. 24-860; Rutherford v.
United States, No. 24-820). 	If the Court declines to reserve its ruling, the Government
requests that the Court declare § 1B1.13(b)(6) invalid. (Id. at 7.) In any event, if the Court
declines to reserve its ruling or find § 1B1.13(b)(6) invalid, the Government contends that
Mr. Artechi is ineligible for relief under § 1B1.13(b)(6). 	(Id. at 8–9.) 	Finally, the
Government asserts that consideration of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553
disfavors release and that Mr. Artechi poses a danger to the community. (Id. at 8–10.)
II. 	DISCUSSION
“[A] court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed” except
pursuant to statute. United States v. Marcussen, 15 F.4th 855, 858 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)). The compassionate release provision, as amended by the First Step
Act, is such a statutory exception. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A court may reduce a
defendant’s term of imprisonment if: 	(1) “after considering the factors set forth in §
3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable”; (2) the court finds that “extraordinary and
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compelling reasons warrant such a reduction”; and (3) “such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id.
The Sentencing Commission has provided guidance about compassionate release in
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, § 1B1.13 (2024). 	It has identified certain extraordinary
and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, including: (1) the medical circumstances
of 	the 	defendant; 	(2) 	the 	defendant’s 	advanced 	age; 	(3) 	the 	defendant’s 	family
circumstances; or (4) the defendant being a victim of sexual abuse perpetrated by BOP
staff. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1)–(4). In addition, a catch-all provision for “other reasons”
permits courts to consider “any other circumstance or combination of circumstances that,
when considered by themselves or together with any of the reasons described in paragraphs
(1) through (4) [noted above]” that “are similar in gravity to those described in paragraphs
(1) through (4).” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(5).
Also, the Sentencing Commission has addressed the impact of changes in the law
on defendants who have received “unusually long sentence[s],” finding that this may also
constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction:
(6) Unusually Long Sentence.—If a defendant received an unusually long
sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a
change in the law (other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that
has not been made retroactive) may be considered in determining whether
the defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only
where such change would produce a gross disparity between the sentence
being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is
filed, 	and 	after 	full 	consideration 	of 	the 	defendant’s 	individualized
circumstances.
Id. § 1B1.13(b)(6). 	The unusually long sentence provision is subject to the following
limitation:
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Except as provided in subsection (b)(6), a change in the law (including an
amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive)
shall not be considered for purposes of determining whether an extraordinary
and compelling reason exists under this policy statement. However, if a
defendant otherwise establishes that extraordinary and compelling reasons
warrant a sentence reduction under this policy statement, a change in the law
(including an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been made
retroactive) may be considered for purposes of determining the extent of any
such reduction.
Id. § 1B1.13(c).
A defendant seeking compassionate release “bears the burden to establish he is
eligible for a sentence reduction.” United States v. Demikh, No. 15-CR-1132 (MJD/HB),
2022 WL 2643903, at *1 (D. Minn. July 8, 2022) (citing United States v. Jones, 836 F.3d
896, 899 (8th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ocanas, 516 F. Supp. 3d 936, 938 (D. Minn. Feb.
2, 2021)).
A. Administrative Exhaustion
As an initial matter, Mr. Artechi bears the burden of demonstrating that before he
brought his Compassionate Release Motion, he first exhausted his administrative remedies
with the BOP. 	He may do so in either of two ways—by presenting evidence of a direct
denial of his request for compassionate release, or by the lapse of 30 days without a reply
from the BOP. 	See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 	Mr. Artechi has failed to submit any
documentation of an administrative request. 	Moreover, while it is not the Government’s
burden to do so, the Government attempted to independently locate documentation of Mr.
Artechi’s administrative exhaustion of his claim for compassionate release, but did not find
any such documentation. (Gov’t’s Opp’n at 5–6.)
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While the Court liberally construes pro se filings, see United States v. Sellner, 773
F.3d 927, 932 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), a pro se
movant must still comply with the applicable statutory requirements underlying their §
3582(c) motion, and must offer evidence of such compliance sufficient to meet their burden
of proof. 	See Ocanas, 516 F. Supp.3d at 938 n.2 (finding that initially “there was no
evidence in the record demonstrating that Ocanas had exhausted his administrative rights”
but that he later “provided evidence that he petitioned the warden for compassionate
release” without reply and that, “[t]herefore, the motion [was] properly before the Court.”).
On the record before the Court, Mr. Artechi has not met his burden to demonstrate
administrative 	exhaustion. 	Therefore, 	the 	Court 	denies 	without 	prejudice 	his
Compassionate Release Motion for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies.
B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Even if Mr. Artechi had met his burden to demonstrate administrative exhaustion,
his Compassionate Release Motion would still fail on the merits.
1. Unusually Long Sentence
By invoking a change in the law (Def.’s Mot. at 1–3), Mr. Artechi indirectly invokes
Sentencing Guideline § 1B1.13(b)(6), which is among the enumerated “[e]xtraordinary
and compelling reasons” that may warrant compassionate release. Section 1B1.13(b)(6)
applies to defendants who have received unusually long sentences, who have served at
least 10 years of imprisonment, and for whom a change in the law (other than an
amendment to the Guidelines that has not been made retroactive) “would produce a gross
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disparity between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed at the
time the motion is filed.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6).
As noted, the Government asks the Court to stay its ruling on this claim pending
resolution of the matters before the Supreme Court in Carter and Rutherford. The Court
declines to reserve its ruling because it is able to rule on the instant motion even assuming
the validity of § 1B1.13(b)(6).1 Even assuming § 1B1.13(b)(6)’s validity, Mr. Artechi is
ineligible for relief on the merits. See United States v. Dunn, No. 17-cr-168 (SRN/KMM),
2025 WL 1364166, at *4 (D. Minn. May 12, 2025) (finding defendant ineligible for relief,
even assuming the validity of § 1B1.13(b)(6)); United States v. Reese, 735 F. Supp. 3d
1094, 1099 (D. Minn. 2024) (noting “an ongoing debate among the circuit courts
regarding the validity and application of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6),” and resolving the
defendant’s compassionate release motion on other grounds); see also United States v.
Salazar, No. 23-cr-247(1) (DWF/DTS), 2025 WL 1207589, at *1 (D. Minn. Apr. 25,
2025) (acknowledging “ongoing debate,” and declining to address the section’s validity
or to stay the case because defendant’s argument failed on the merits).
Mr. Artechi fails to meet the criteria for relief under § 1B1.13(b)(6) for several
reasons. 	First, he has not served “at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment,” as his
total prison term is for 120 months, i.e., 10 years. Second, he has not identified any change
in the sentencing laws that would create a “gross disparity” between his sentence and a
1 Moreover, the Court is concerned about the potential for additional delay. 	While the
Supreme Court heard oral argument in Carter and Rutherford in November 2025, the cases
remain under advisement.
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sentence that the Court would likely impose today. 	He was subject to a mandatory
minimum and received a sentence that was actually one month less than the lowest end of
the guidelines range.
Finally, Amendment 833 has not been made retroactively applicable to defendants
seeking a reduction in sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 (listing amendments for which a
reduction in sentence may apply retroactively, and not listing Amendment 833). The
Sentencing Commission’s policy statement provides that “an amendment to the Guidelines
Manual that has not been made retroactive [ ] shall not be considered for purposes of
determining whether an extraordinary and compelling reason exists under this policy
statement.” 	U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c). While a non-retroactive change may not serve as an
independent basis for relief, if a defendant otherwise establishes extraordinary and
compelling reasons for a sentence reduction, courts may take into consideration a non-
retroactive amendment, but only to determine the extent of any such reduction. While Mr.
Artechi identifies prison overcrowding as an additional basis for a reduction in sentence,
the Court does not find this allegation sufficient on its own, or in combination with
Amendment 833, to constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduction in
sentence.
For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Mr. Artechi’s claim for relief would
fail on the merits, even if he had exhausted his administrative remedies.
D. Factors Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
Pursuant to the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement, a court may reduce a
term of imprisonment for an eligible defendant only after considering the sentencing
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factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),2 if applicable, and if the court determines that
“the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(2).
The 	Court 	has 	found 	that 	no 	extraordinary 	or 	compelling 	reasons 	warrant
compassionate release, moreover, consideration of the § 3553(a) factors does not weigh
in favor of relief. 	Mr. Artechi’s sentence reflects the seriousness of his conduct, as the
offense of conviction was his third federal drug-trafficking conviction, and he would pose
a danger to the public if released. 	His sentence appropriately provides just punishment
for his offenses and affords adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. 	18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(2)(A)–(B).
III. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, based on the foregoing and on all the files, records, and proceedings
herein it is HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
2 Pursuant to § 3553(a), and as relevant here, the sentencing court shall consider—
(1) 	the 	nature 	and 	circumstances 	of 	the 	offense 	and 	the 	history 	and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed-- (A)
to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence
to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of
sentence and the sentencing range established for-- (A) the applicable
category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set
forth in the guidelines.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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1. 	The Pro Se Motion to Reduce Sentence/for Compassionate Release [Doc. No.
271] filed by Defendant/Petitioner Sergio Tomas De Dios Artechi is DENIED
without prejudice.
Dated: April 1, 2026
s/Susan Richard Nelson
SUSAN RICHARD NELSON
United States District Judge
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