Smith #267009 v. Michigan Department of Corrections, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
DERRICK LEE SMITH,
Petitioner,
v.
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 2:26-cv-85
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Petitioner Derrick Lee Smith purports to bring this action on his own behalf and on behalf of
another “128 innocent men incarcerated by Detective Patricia Penman Detective for Wayne
County Prosecutor Kym L. Worthy on false rape charges and convictions.” (Pet., ECF No. 1, Page
ID.1.)
I. 	Petitioner Smith is not authorized to proceed on behalf of other prisoners
Under Rule 2(c)(5) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, the petition must be signed by
the petitioner or by a person authorized to sign the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2242. Section 2242
further provides that a habeas petition must be signed by “the person for whose relief it is intended
or by someone acting on his behalf,” commonly referred to as a “next friend.”
A “next friend” does not himself become a party to the habeas corpus action in which he
participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the real
party in interest. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1989). Next friend status, therefore, is
an exception to section 1654 of Title 28 which states: “In all courts of the United States the parties
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may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts,
respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct cases therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
To act on a prisoner’s behalf, a putative next friend must demonstrate that the prisoner is
unable to prosecute the case on his own behalf due to “inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or
other disability” and that the next friend is “truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on
whose behalf he seeks to litigate.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64; see also West v. Bell, 242 F.3d
338, 341 (6th Cir. 2001); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir. 1998). The burden is on
the next friend “clearly to establish the propriety of his status and thereby justify the jurisdiction
of the court.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164.
Standing to proceed as next friend on behalf of a prisoner “is by no means granted
automatically to whomever seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Id. at 163. “A next
friend may not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a detainee if the detainee
himself could file the petition.” Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Weber
v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1978)). The putative next friend must clearly and specifically
set forth facts sufficient to satisfy the Article III standing requirements because “[a] federal court
is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of
standing.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155–56. Most significantly, “when the application for habeas
corpus filed by a would be ‘next friend’ does not set forth an adequate reason or explanation of the
necessity for resort to the ‘next friend’ device, the court is without jurisdiction to consider the
petition.” Weber, 570 F.2d at 514 (cited with approval in Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163).
The Court concludes that the petition, at least to the extent that it purports to raise claims
on behalf of other prisoners, does not satisfy these requirements. Petitioner Smith is not, and was
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not, authorized to proceed on behalf of any other prisoner. Accordingly, the Court construes the
petition to raise claims only on behalf of Petitioner Smith.
II. 	Petitioner Smith’s claims are duplicative and frivolous
Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a
preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the
petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be
summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (discussing
that a district court has the duty to “screen out” petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal
under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those
containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke, 178 F.3d 434,
436–37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that
the petition must be dismissed because it is duplicative and frivolous.
Petitioner Derrick Lee Smith is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Alger Correctional Facility (LMF) in Munising, Alger County, Michigan. He has
filed dozens of habeas petitions in this Court and the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan, including multiple previous iterations of the present petition. Of particular
interest is a petition Petitioner Smith filed raising the same issues on January 12, 2026. See
Souelliard v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:26-cv-125 (W.D. Mich.). While that petition was
pending, Petitioner Smith filed multiple additional petitions—including this one—raising the same
issues he had included in Case No. 1:26-cv-125. Each of those petitions necessarily duplicated the
claims Petitioner Smith raised in Case No. 1:26-cv-125.
“Federal courts do . . . retain broad powers to prevent duplicative or unnecessary litigation.”
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Parties generally have “no right to maintain two
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separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against
the same defendants.” Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977). Accordingly, as part
of its inherent power to administer its docket, a district court may dismiss a suit that is duplicative
of another federal court suit. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 817 (1976); Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Serv., 487 F.3d 684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007); Missouri
v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 259 F.3d 949, 953-54 (8th Cir. 2001); Curtis v. Citibank,
N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2000); Smith v. SEC, 129 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 1997). The
power to dismiss a duplicative lawsuit is meant to foster judicial economy and the “comprehensive
disposition of litigation,” Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952),
and protect parties from “the vexation of concurrent litigation over the same subject matter.” Adam
v. Jacobs, 950 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1991).
An action is duplicative and subject to dismissal if the claims, parties and available relief
do not significantly differ from an earlier-filed action. See Serlin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 3 F.3d
221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993). Although actions may not “significantly differ,” they need not be
identical. Courts focus on the substance of the complaint, or in this case the petition. See, e.g.
Bailey, 846 F.2d at 1021 (holding that a complaint was duplicative although different defendants
were named because it “repeat[ed] the same factual allegations” asserted in the earlier case).
Considering the substantial identity between the legal claims, factual allegations, temporal
circumstances and relief sought in the present petition on behalf of Petitioner Smith and in
Souelliard v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:26-cv-125 (W.D. Mich.), the Court concludes that
the present action is duplicative. Therefore, pursuant to the Court’s inherent power, upon the
review required by Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, this action will be dismissed on the
grounds that, when it was filed, it was duplicative and frivolous.
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Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a
“substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a
certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine
whether a certificate is warranted. Id. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth
by the Supreme Court in Slack, 529 U.S. at 473. Murphy, 263 F.3d at 467. Consequently, this
Court has examined Petitioner’s claims under the Slack standard. Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, to
warrant a grant of the certificate, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would
find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. “A
petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists of reason could conclude the
issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits
review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of
Petitioner’s claims. Id.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not conclude that this Court’s dismissal of
Petitioner’s claims was debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner a certificate
of appealability. Moreover, for the same reasons that the action is properly dismissed, the Court
concludes that any issue Petitioner might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
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Conclusion
The Court will enter a judgment dismissing the petition as well as an order denying a
certificate of appealability.
Dated: 	June 25, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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