Frankina #368746 v. Schroeder et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
TONY FRANKINA,
Plaintiff,
v.
SARAH SCHROEDER et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 2:25-cv-265
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a separate
order, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss
any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept
Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
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Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at Ionia Correctional Facility in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan.1 The events about which he
complains occurred at Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette County,
Michigan. In this action, Plaintiff sues the following MBP staff: Warden Sarah Schroeder,
Corrections Officer (CO) Unknown Milnthorn, CO Unknown Bray, CO Unknown Party #1, CO
Unknown Party #2, Sergeant Unknown Party #3, Sergeant Unknown Party #4, and CO Unknown
Party #5. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3–4.) All Defendants are sued in their personal capacities.
(Id., PageID.5.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by an inmate on November 10, 2024. (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.5.) The assault took place “out on the yard by one inmate, Montague.”2 (Id.) Then,
Plaintiff claims that another prisoner, Mitchell, “had enough time and opportunity to join in on the
assault and produce a weapon and stabbed Plaintiff fifteen times in the head and facial area.” (Id).
As a result of being stabbed, Plaintiff alleges he was “rushed to the hospital and receiv[ed]
stitches.” (Id.) Plaintiff “still to this day suffer[s] from migraine headaches, post-traumatic stress,
and anxiety” resulting from the assault. (Id., PageID.6.)
Plaintiff attributes the attack by the second prisoner, Mitchell, “to the lack of response from
any correctional officers.” (Id., PageID.5.) Plaintiff claims that “[i]f corrections officers would
have been diligent, the stabbing would not have occurred.” (Id.) Further, Plaintiff claims that, “[i]f
1 See https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/OTIS2/Search (enter “368746” for the “Offender Number” and
select “Search”) (last visited June 22, 2026).
2 In this opinion, the Court corrects the punctuation, spelling, and abbreviations in quotations from
Plaintiff’s filings.
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the observation tower corrections officer would have [taken] action, and the yard correctional
officers would have been paying attention to the yard’s close[d] circuit camera monitors, the
second [prisoner], Mitchell, wouldn’t have [had] the time to join in the confrontation.” (Id.,
PageID.5–6.)
Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff avers that Defendants violated his rights under
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id., PageID.6.) Plaintiff also claims that
Defendants violated state law. (Id., PageID.6–7.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief as well as
monetary damages. (Id., PageID.7–8.)
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
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(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
A. 	Failure to Name Defendants Schroeder, Milnthorn, Bray, Unknown Party #1,
Unknown Party #2, Unknown Party #3, and Unknown Party #4 in the Body of
the Complaint
Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts showing how Defendants Schroeder, Milnthorn,
Bray, Unknown Party #1, Unknown Party #2, Unknown Party #3, and Unknown Party #4 were
personally involved in the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. (See generally Compl.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.5–7.)
It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular
defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–61 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff
must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is
named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to
dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to
allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan,
41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not
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allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in
or responsible for each alleged violation of rights).
Here, Plaintiff does not name any individuals in the body of his complaint. (See Compl.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.5–7.) Plaintiff instead refers to “all correctional officers,” “yard correctional
officers,” and “all defendants.”3 (Id.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit “has
consistently held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations
of constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant
did to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d 556,
564 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008)). And,
“[s]ummary reference to a single, five-headed ‘Defendants’ [or officers] does not support a
reasonable inference that each Defendant is liable . . . .” Boxill v. O’Grady, 935 F.3d 510, 518 (6th
Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s references to “correctional officers” and “all defendants,”
(see Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5–7), are insufficient to show that Defendants Schroeder,
Milnthorn, Bray, Unknown Party #1, Unknown Party #2, Unknown Party #3, or Unknown Party
#4 were personally involved in the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. And,
Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are subject to dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)
(requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
3 Plaintiff’s complaint refers to an “observation tower corrections officer,” (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.5), which corresponds to Plaintiff’s description of Defendant Unknown Party #5, named
as “John Doe #5, observation tower corrections officer” in his complaint. (Id., PageID.4.) The
Court will therefore construe allegations against the “observation tower corrections officer” in
Plaintiff’s complaint as allegations against Defendant Unknown Party #5 and will address those
claims below in Section II.B.1.
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Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants Schroeder, Defendant
Unknown Party #3, and Defendant Unknown Party #4 liable due to their supervisory positions,
government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates
under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (2009); Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir.
2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior.
Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th
Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based
upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis,
368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because
a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained
in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly summarized the minimum required to constitute active
conduct by a supervisory official:
“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending
individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee,
199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have
interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that
the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in
the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”
Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300);
see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995
F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendants Schroeder, Defendant
Unknown Party #3, or Defendant Unknown Party #4 encouraged or condoned the conduct of their
subordinates, or authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in their conduct.
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Accordingly, for these reasons alone, Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendants Schroeder,
Milnthorn, Bray, Unknown Party #1, Unknown Party #2, Unknown Party #3, and Unknown Party
#4 is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s complaint suffers
from additional defects, which the Court discusses below.
B. 	Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect Claims
Inmates have a constitutionally protected right to personal safety grounded in the Eighth
Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Thus, prison staff are obliged “to take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” in their care. Hudson v. Palmer, 468
U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984). In particular, because officials have “stripped [prisoners] of virtually
every means of self-protection[,]” “officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the
hands of other prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. A prisoner does not need to prove that he has
been the victim of an actual attack to bring a personal safety claim; however, he must at least show
that he reasonably fears such an attack. Thompson v. Cnty. of Medina, 29 F.3d 238, 242–43 (6th
Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff has the minimal burden of “showing a sufficient inferential
connection” between the alleged violation and inmate violence to “justify a reasonable fear for
personal safety”).
In order for a prisoner to state an Eighth Amendment claim, he must show that he faced a
sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that the defendant official acted with “‘deliberate
indifference’ to [his] health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2010)
(citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). This
standard includes both objective and subjective components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling,
509 U.S. at 35–37. To satisfy the objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated
under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the
subjective prong, an official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or
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safety.” Id. at 837. Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence and requires that
“the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.; see also Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757,
766–67 (6th Cir. 2011).
1. 	Defendant Unknown Party #5
Plaintiff claims his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when he was stabbed due to a
“lack of response from any correctional officers,” following an inmate assault. (See Compl., ECF.
1, PageID.5.) While Plaintiff’s claims are focused on “any correctional officers” and “all
defendants,” (see id., PageID.5–6), Plaintiff does makes a specific claim against Defendant
Unknown Party #5: “If the observation tower corrections officer [Defendant Unknown Party #5]
would have [taken] action . . . the second [prisoner] Mitchell wouldn’t have [had] the time to join
in the confrontation.” (Id., PageID.6.) For the reasons detailed below, Plaintiff fails to state a claim
against Defendant Unknown Party #5.
A constitutional violation may exist if injuries are caused “by another prisoner where
officials simply stood by and permitted the attack to proceed.” Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344,
348 (1986); see also Winfield v. Bass, 106 F.3d 525, 532 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[O]fficials may be liable
[under the Eighth Amendment] for completely failing to take any action to avert an attack by one
prisoner on another.”) However, “a prison officer’s duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure
‘reasonable safety,’ which is a standard that incorporates due regard for a prison official’s
unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in safe custody under humane conditions.” Patmon v.
Parker, 3 F. App’x 337, 338 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844–45). A defendant
who acts reasonably cannot be found liable; the defendant must know and disregard the substantial
risk of serious harm to the prisoner. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
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Here, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to show that Defendant Unknown Party #5 acted with
deliberate indifference. In a conclusory assertion, Plaintiff claims that he would not have been
assaulted by a second inmate and sustained serious injuries if Defendant Unknown Party #5
“would have [taken] action.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) The complaint neither describes the
observation tower’s potential view of the yard nor does it describe lengths of time from which to
draw any conclusions about the lack of “action” or the timing of the assaults. Plaintiff alleges no
facts asserting that Defendant Unknown Party #5 saw the fight with the first inmate and
deliberately failed to respond, or that he disregarded a substantial risk of harm posed to Plaintiff.
In short, Plaintiff appears to ask the Court to fabricate plausibility to his claims from mere
ambiguity; however, ambiguity does not support a claim. Under these circumstances, Plaintiff fails
to state an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendant Unknown Party #5.
2. 	Defendants Schroeder, Milnthorn, Bray, Unknown Party #1, Unknown
Party #2, Unknown Party #3, and Unknown Party #4
Plaintiff alleges that “[a]ll defendants violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights.”
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) Even if Defendants Schroeder, Milnthorn, Bray, Unknown Party
#1, Unknown Party #2, Unknown Party #3, and Unknown Party #4 were not already subject to
dismissal, see supra Section II.A, Plaintiff’s complaint still fails to state a failure to protect claim
against these defendants. Plaintiff summarily claims that “[i]f corrections officers would have been
diligent, the stabbing would not have occurred.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5). Plaintiff later
concludes that if “the yard correctional officers would have been paying attention to the yard’s
close[d] circuit camera monitors,” he would not have been stabbed. (Id., PageID.6.) However,
Plaintiff’s allegations suggest, at most, negligent action, but allegations of negligence do not state
a claim for a constitutional violation. Bishop, 636 F.3d at 766–67.
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Plaintiff fails to plead any facts to show that Defendants Schroeder, Milnthorn, Bray,
Unknown Party #1, Unknown Party #2, Unknown Party #3, and Unknown Party #4 knew that
Plaintiff was assaulted and that they consciously disregarded the risk of further harm by failing to
intervene. For example, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts about the duration of time between the
first inmate’s assault and the second inmate’s assault and whether the melee remained ongoing
between these two events. The Court does not minimize Plaintiff’s experience; however, Plaintiff
fails to show that Defendants Schroeder, Milnthorn, Bray, Unknown Party #1, Unknown Party #2,
Unknown Party #3, and Unknown Party #4 were deliberately indifferent. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against them will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim.
State Law Claims
When setting forth his claims for relief, Plaintiff states that, “[a]ll defendants are liable to
Plaintiff for [the] state law tort [of] gross negligence,” and “for the state law tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.6–7).
As an initial matter, claims under § 1983 can only be brought for “deprivations of rights
secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 924 (1982). Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state law. Pyles v.
Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants violated state law fails to state a claim under
§ 1983.
Furthermore, in determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims, “[a] district court should consider the interests of judicial economy and the avoidance of
multiplicity of litigation and balance those interests against needlessly deciding state law issues.”
Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993). Dismissal, however,
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remains “purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)). Here, Plaintiff’s federal claims against all the Defendants will be
dismissed, and the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
claims against Defendants.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s
complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an
appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court
concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue
Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445
(1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: 	June 23, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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