Delaney #671563 v. Schroeder et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
______
BRASHARD DELANEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
SARAH SCHROEDER et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 2:25-cv-133
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave
to proceed in forma pauperis.
Under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may at any time, with or
without motion, add or drop a party for misjoinder or nonjoinder. Applying this standard regarding
joinder, the Court will drop as misjoined Defendants Velmer, Zampese, and Perry. The Court will
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the misjoined Defendants without prejudice.
Further, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if
the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A;
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
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Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint against properly
joined Defendant Washington for failure to state a claim as detailed below. Additionally, the Court
will dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendants
Taylor, Fionti, Arsenault, and Schroeder. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims for damages
against Defendants Taylor, Fionti, Arsenault, and Schroeder in their respective personal capacities
remain in the case.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Marquette Branch Prison (MBP) in Marquette, Marquette County, Michigan. The events
about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues the following MDOC personnel:
MDOC Director Heidi Washington; MBP Warden Sarah Schroeder; MBP Lieutenant Unknown
Arsenault; MBP Sergeants Unknown Taylor and Unknown Perry; and MBP Corrections Officers
Unknown Fionti, Unknown Velmer, and Unknown Zampese.
Plaintiff alleges that during the morning of May 2, 2025, Defendant Taylor and Fionti
entered his cell following an incident with non-party Corrections Officer Mowery. (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.4.) Defendant Taylor handcuffed Plaintiff and placed him in a restraint chair. (Id.)
Defendants Fionti and Taylor took Plaintiff to Q-Block. (Id.) Defendant Fionti strip-searched
Plaintiff. (Id.) Defendant Fionti instructed Plaintiff to “spread his cheeks.” (Id.) Defendant Fionti
put his fingers in Plaintiff’s mouth. (Id.) Plaintiff felt degraded and humiliated. (Id.)
Defendants Taylor and Fionti then partially hog-tied Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff’s hands were
chained at his waist, he was belly-chained, and his ankles were chained. (Id.) Plaintiff reports that
the chains cut his flesh like a knife. (Id.) When Plaintiff complained, Defendant Taylor informed
him that Plaintiff “should have thought of that before he dressed out a C/O,” presumably
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Corrections Officer Mowery. (Id.) Defendant Fionti then brushed his hand across Plaintiff’s “butt
crack.” (Id.) Plaintiff was so afraid he fell to the floor on his stomach. (Id.)
Plaintiff remained in that chained position for more than a day. (Id., PageID.6.) He reports
that the cell was dirty, dusty, and smelled of urine. (Id., PageID.4.) Defendant Arsenault entered
the cell to review a misconduct ticket with Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff complained that he could not
move. (Id., PageID.5.) Defendant Arsenault advised Plaintiff, “that’s the point, we’re going to
break all the fight out of you.” (Id.)
On May 3, 2025, Defendant Schroeder entered the cell Plaintiff occupied. (Id., PageID.6.)
Plaintiff told Defendant Schroeder he could not move. (Id.) She informed him that he could move.
(Id.) He advised her he could not get any water and that he felt dehydrated. (Id.) She advised him
to drink some water and again told him that he was able to move. (Id.) She also told Plaintiff that
she might have him cut loose that shift or the next shift. (Id.)
Defendant Arsenault entered Plaintiff’s cell at 11:30 p.m. on May 3. (Id.) He told Plaintiff
that his “food loafs” had been spit in and that Arsenault intended to spray mace in the ventilation
to aggravate Plaintiff’s asthma. (Id.)
Plaintiff reports that non-party Corrections Officer Basinski packed up Plaintiff’s property.
(Id.) A few days later the property was sent to the property room. (Id.) Plaintiff reports that his
television was broken, his legal mail was ransacked, his legal books were destroyed, and his
evidence thrown away. (Id.)
Plaintiff wanted to request preservation of Defendant Taylor’s body cam video. (Id.,
PageID.7.) Plaintiff asked non-party Prison Counselor Nebel for the form. (Id.) Defendant Nebel
did not provide the form. (Id.)
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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Washington is aware of the MBP staff custom of abuse
with hog ties. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that “over six prisoners in unit E-Block have been hog-tied.
(Id.)
Three weeks after the incident with Defendants Taylor and Fionti, Defendant Zampese
entered Plaintiff’s cell for a shakedown. (Id., PageID.8.) Defendant Zampese informed Plaintiff he
would be placed in cell 13 during the shakedown. (Id.) Plaintiff complained because the cell
smelled of feces. (Id.) Later that day, Plaintiff asked Defendant Perry for a form to request
Defendant Zampese’s body cam video. (Id.) Defendant Perry did not bring a form. (Id.)
Plaintiff reports that Defendant Zampese walks around with razor blades in his pocket and
threatens to plant weapons on prisoners. (Id.)
Plaintiff makes no factual allegations regarding Defendant Velmer.
Plaintiff seeks $1 million in damages to compensate for his pain, suffering and mental
torment.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants Schroeder, Taylor, Arsenault, Fionti, Washington, and
Zampese violated the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. He
claims that Defendant Taylor and Fionti used excessive force. Plaintiff claims that Defendant
Velmer intentionally destroyed Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Washington
failed to supervise. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Zampese is liable for retaliation. And, finally,
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Perry violated Plaintiff’s due process rights.
II. 	Misjoinder
A. Joinder
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a) limits the joinder of parties in a single lawsuit,
whereas Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) limits the joinder of claims. Rule 20(a)(2) governs
when multiple defendants may be joined in one action:
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[p]ersons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is
asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
arise in the action.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). Rule 18(a) states: “A party asserting a claim . . . may join, as independent
or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
Courts have recognized that, where multiple parties are named, as in this case, the analysis
under Rule 20 precedes that under Rule 18:
Rule 20 deals solely with joinder of parties and becomes relevant only when there
is more than one party on one or both sides of the action. It is not concerned with
joinder of claims, which is governed by Rule 18. Therefore, in actions involving
multiple defendants Rule 20 operates independently of Rule 18. . . .
Despite the broad language of Rule 18(a), plaintiff may join multiple defendants in
a single action only if plaintiff asserts at least one claim to relief against each of
them that arises out of the same transaction or occurrence and presents questions of
law or fact common to all.
7 Charles Allen Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1655 (3d ed. 2001),
quoted in Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2009), and Garcia v. Munoz,
No. 08-1648, 2008 WL 2064476, at *3 (D.N.J. May 14, 2008); see also United States v.
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 142–43 (1965) (explaining that joinder of defendants is permitted by
Rule 20 if both commonality and same transaction requirements are satisfied).
Therefore, “a civil plaintiff may not name more than one defendant in his original or
amended complaint unless one claim against each additional defendant is transactionally related
to the claim against the first defendant and involves a common question of law or fact.” Proctor,
661 F. Supp. 2d at 778 (internal quotation marks omitted). When determining if civil rights claims
arise from the same transaction or occurrence, a court may consider a variety of factors, including,
“the time period during which the alleged acts occurred; whether the acts . . . are related; whether
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more than one act . . . is alleged; whether the same supervisors were involved, and whether the
defendants were at different geographical locations.” Id. (citation omitted).
The Seventh Circuit has explained that a prisoner like plaintiff may not join in one
complaint all of the defendants against whom he may have a claim, unless the prisoner satisfies
the dual requirements of Rule 20(a)(2):
Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A against
Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.
Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to
prevent the sort of morass that [a multi]-claim, [multi]-defendant suit produce[s]
but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees—for the Prison
Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any
prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) . . . .
A buckshot complaint that would be rejected if filed by a free person—say, a suit
complaining that A defrauded the plaintiff, B defamed him, C punched him, D
failed to pay a debt, and E infringed his copyright, all in different transactions—
should be rejected if filed by a prisoner.
George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Brown v. Blaine, 185 F. App’x 166,
168–69 (3d Cir. 2006) (allowing an inmate to assert unrelated claims against new defendants based
on actions taken after the filing of his original complaint would have defeated the purpose of the
three strikes provision of PLRA).
Under these circumstances, to allow Plaintiff to proceed with improperly joined claims and
Defendants in a single action would permit him to circumvent the PLRA’s filing fee provisions
and allow him to avoid having to incur a “strike” for purposes of § 1915(g), should any of his
claims be dismissed as frivolous or for failure to state a claim. Courts are therefore obligated to
reject misjoined claims like Plaintiff’s. See Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011).
Here, Defendant Taylor is the first Defendant named in the factual allegations in the
complaint. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Plaintiff alleges that on May 2, 2025, Defendant
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Taylor—along with Defendant Fionti—entered Plaintiff’s cell, restrained him, moved him to
segregation, strip-searched him, hog tied him, and left him in a dirty, dusty, smelly cell.
Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Fionti are quite obviously transactionally related
to 	Plaintiff’s 	allegations 	against 	Defendant 	Taylor. 	Moreover, 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against
Defendants Arsenault and Schroeder are also transactionally related in that those Defendants
permitted the allegedly improper conditions created by Defendants Taylor and Fionti to continue.
Finally, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Washington is liable for the conditions imposed on
Plaintiff because she was “aware” of hog-tie incidents but failed to properly supervise, is also
related, although more remotely, to his claims against Defendants Taylor, Fionti, Arsenault, and
Schroeder.
Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Zampese and Perry,1 however, stem from other
discrete events that occurred during Plaintiff’s incarceration at MBP. It appears that Plaintiff
believes that all of the events set forth in the complaint are related simply because they occurred
during his incarceration at MBP and because he subjectively views all of the events as part of a
vast conspiracy against him. However, Plaintiff’s subjective belief and interpretation of events
does not transform separate events regarding Plaintiff’s excessive restraint on May 2 and 3, and
his placement in a different cell during a shakedown three weeks later, into events that arise out of
the same transaction or occurrence.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Taylor, Fionti,
Arsenault, Schroeder, and Washington are properly joined. However, Plaintiff has improperly
joined Defendants Velmer, Zampese, and Perry.
1 Because Plaintiff makes no factual allegations against Defendant Velmer, there is no possible
relationship between that claim and the claims against Defendants Taylor, Fionti, Arsenault,
Schroeder, and Washington.
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B. Remedy
Because the Court has concluded that Plaintiff has improperly joined Defendants Velmer,
Zampese, and Perry to this action, the Court must determine an appropriate remedy. Under Rule
21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[m]isjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissing
an action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. Instead, Rule 21 provides two remedial options: (1) misjoined
parties may be dropped on such terms as are just; or (2) any claims against misjoined parties may
be severed and proceeded with separately. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S.
567, 572–73 (2004) (“By now, ‘it is well settled that Rule 21 invests district courts with authority
to allow a dispensable nondiverse party to be dropped at any time . . . .’” (citation omitted));
DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 845 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust
Co., N.A., 848 F.2d 674, 682 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[D]ismissal of claims against misjoined parties is
appropriate.”). “Because a district court’s decision to remedy misjoinder by dropping and
dismissing a party, rather than severing the relevant claim, may have important and potentially
adverse statute-of-limitations consequences, the discretion delegated to the trial judge to dismiss
under Rule 21 is restricted to what is ‘just.’” DirecTV, 467 F.3d at 845.
At least three judicial circuits have interpreted “on such terms as are just” to mean without
“gratuitous harm to the parties.” Strandlund v. Hawley, 532 F.3d 741, 745 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000)); see also DirecTV, 467 F.3d at 845.
Such gratuitous harm exists if the dismissed parties lose the ability to prosecute an otherwise timely
claim, such as where the applicable statute of limitations has lapsed, or the dismissal is with
prejudice. Strandlund, 532 F.3d at 746; DirecTV, 467 F.3d at 846–47.
For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years.
See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2); Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per
curiam); Stafford v. Vaughn, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). The
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statute of limitations begins to run when the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the
injury that is the basis of his action. Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996). Here,
Plaintiff’s complaint involves events that occurred in 2024 and 2025. (See generally Compl., ECF
No. 1.) Plaintiff’s complaint provides no indication that the statute of limitations has or will run
on Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Velmer, Zampese, and Perry, and Plaintiff has provided
no basis for this Court to conclude that he would suffer gratuitous harm if his claims against these
Defendants are dismissed without prejudice.
Accordingly, the Court will exercise its discretion under Rule 21 and drop Defendants
Velmer, Zampese, and Perry because they are misjoined. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
against these Defendants without prejudice.2
III. 	Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
2 Plaintiff is cautioned that he must limit all future actions to Defendants and claims that are
transactionally related to one another. The Court may, in its discretion and without further warning,
dismiss any future complaint, or part thereof, filed by Plaintiff that contains claims that are
misjoined.
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defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994). With regard to the remaining Defendants, Plaintiff claims they have violated his Eighth
Amendment rights.
IV. 	Discussion
The Eighth Amendment imposes a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to
punish those convicted of crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous” nor may it contravene
society’s “evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981). The
Eighth Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the “unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged must result in the denial of the
“minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v.
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Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600–01 (6th Cir. 1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with
“deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for
prison confinement.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every
unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954.
In order for a prisoner to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, the prisoner must show
that he faced a sufficiently serious risk to his health or safety and that defendants acted with
“‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 479–80
(6th Cir. 2010) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)); see also Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993) (applying deliberate indifference standard to conditions of
confinement claims). The deliberate-indifference standard includes both objective and subjective
components. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling, 509 U.S. at 35–37. To satisfy the objective prong,
an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Under the subjective prong, an official must “know[] of and
disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. “[P]rison officials who actually
knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they
responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id. at 844.
A. 	Defendant Washington
Plaintiff lists MDOC Director Washington as a Defendant, but he fails to allege any facts
showing how Defendant Washington was personally involved in the violation of his constitutional
rights. Instead, Plaintiff mentions Defendant Washington’s supervisory position, and notes—
without any underlying factual allegations--that Defendant Washington was aware of other
instances where prisoners were hogtied at MBP.
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It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular
defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–61 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff
must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is
named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to
dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to
allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan,
41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not
allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in
or responsible for each alleged violation of rights).
Here, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendant Washington do not go beyond identifying
her supervisory position and then stating she failed to supervise. Plaintiff’s allegations against
Defendant Washington fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and are subject to dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Washington liable due to her
supervisory position, government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct
of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 676; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484,
495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional
behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d
889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory
liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899;
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Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed
simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon
information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).
The Sixth Circuit has summarized the minimum required to constitute active conduct by a
supervisory official:
“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending
individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee,
199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have
interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that
the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in
the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”
Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300);
see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995)); Walton v. City of Southfield,
995 F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendant Washington encouraged or
condoned the conduct of the other Defendants, or authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced
in their conduct. Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Washington
will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B. 	Defendants Taylor, Fionti, Arsenault, and Schroeder
1. 	Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants in their official as well as personal capacities.
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2–3.) A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is
equivalent to a suit against the governmental entity; in this case, the MDOC. See Will v. Mich.
Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir.
1994). The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in
the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity, or Congress has expressly abrogated
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Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24
F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment
immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has
not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir.
1986).
Moreover, Plaintiff seeks only monetary damages. But the State of Michigan (acting
through the MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66); Harrison, 722
F.3d at 771. Similarly, Plaintiff may not seek monetary damages against Defendants in their
official capacities. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in
their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”). Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
official capacity claims for money damages for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.
2. 	Personal Capacity
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court must take Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true.
Under these circumstances, at this time, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
claims for damages against Defendants Taylor, Fionti, Arsenault, and Schroeder in their personal
capacities because Plaintiff alleges that each 	Defendant knew about Plaintiff’s allegedly
unbearable conditions of confinement and, despite that knowledge, continued Plaintiff’s placement
in those conditions.
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Conclusion
The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Further, the Court will
drop Defendants Velmer, Zampese, and Perry as misjoined pursuant to Rule 21 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants
without prejudice.
Additionally, having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court will dismiss
Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Washington under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), because Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted .
Under those statutory sections, the Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff’s
official capacity claims against Defendants Taylor, Fionti, Arsenault, and Schroeder. Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claims for damages against Defendants Taylor, Fionti, Arsenault, and
Schroeder in their respective personal capacities remain in the case.
An order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: March 30, 2026 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 2:25-cv-00133-HYJ-MV ECF No. 4, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/30/26 Page 15
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