Caffey #742995 v. Schroeder et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
BRANDO CAFFEY #742995, 	Case No. 	2:24-cv-00183
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Jane M. Beckering
U.S. District Judge
v.
SARAH SCHROEDER, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses Defendant Racine’s
motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 26, and Defendants Perry and Greenwald’s
motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 27. 	Plaintiff has not responded.
State Prisoner Brando Caffey filed an unverified complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging that Defendants failed to remove and evacuate him from his prison
cell in Marquette Branch Prison during a fire. 	Plaintiff says that he had trouble
breathing due to the smoke. 	The remaining Defendants are Sergeant (Sgt.) Perry,
Lieutenant (Lt.) Greenwald, and Nurse Racine. 	The Court summarized Plaintiff’s
remaining Eighth Amendment claim in the screening opinion:
Under the Eighth Amendment “[p]risoners have the right not to be
subjected to the unreasonable threat of injury or death by fire and need
not wait until actual casualties occur in order to obtain relief from such
conditions.” Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 784 (9th Cir.1985); see
also Johnson v. Tex. Bd. of Criminal Justice, 281 F. App’x 319, 321 (5th
Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting that “[t]he Eighth Amendment requires
that prison officials provide adequate fire safety to inmates”). As set
forth above, Plaintiff alleges that on March 13, 2024, several fires broke
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out in his housing unit, and those fires “accumulated a large amount of
smoke.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) According to Plaintiff, he and
other inmates asked Defendants Racine, Perry, and Greenwald to
evacuate them from the building, but Defendants Racine, Perry, and
Greenwald “just walk[ed] past . . . like [they] just [did not] have a care
in the world.” (Id.) Plaintiff had to lie on the floor to try to escape the
smoke, and alleges that he began to experience “burning sensations” in
his chest and rib cage area afterwards. (Id.) Although Plaintiff has by
no means proven deliberate indifference, taking his allegations as true,
as the Court must at this stage of proceedings, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s 	Eighth 	Amendment 	personal 	capacity 	claims 	against
Defendants Racine, Perry, and Greenwald premised upon their failure
to evacuate Plaintiff on March 13, 2024, cannot be dismissed on initial
review.
ECF No. 4, PageID.37 (screening opinion).
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting that no genuine
issue of material facts exists on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims. 	For the
reasons set forth below, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment and dismiss this case.
II. 	Affidavits
It is undisputed that Defendants were involved with several fires and other
issues with prisoners in the Marquette Branch Prison segregation cells on March 13,
2024. 	Plaintiff was housed in segregation as a Level V prisoner in D Unit on the
first level (base gallery). 	ECF No. 1, PageID.3. 	For background, Marquette Branch
Prison housed Level V prisoners in two separate housing units. 	ECF No. 28-2,
PageID.234 (Affidavit of Assistant Deputy Warden Hoult). 	At the time of this
incident, D Unit and E Unit housed segregation prisoners. 	Id. 	Level V prisoners
can only leave their cells wearing restraints and with a staff escort. 	Id. 	Also, there
were several vacant housing units for segregation prisoners including B, C, and F
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Units. 	Id. 	Each unit consists of three floors with the ground floor called the base
gallery, the second floor called first gallery, and the third floor called second gallery.
Id.
Sgt. Perry explained what occurred after he first learned that a prisoner had
started a fire in an E Unit cell. 	Sgt. Perry responded to the fire and observed a
mattress and other items burning in the cell. 	ECF No. 28-7, PageID.247 (Perry
affidavit). 	He extinguished the fire with a fire extinguisher. 	Id. 	The prisoner was
restrained and removed from his cell. 	Id. 	He then began directing staff to remove
prisoners from E Unit to prison yard modules. 	Id. 	He assisted with one prisoner
who resisted the escort and needed to be restrained. 	Id. 	While working in E Unit,
he received a call that a fire was started in D Unit on the second galley. 	Id. 	When
Perry arrived at the D Unit cell, staff was attempting to put out the fire, and he
retrieved a fire extinguisher to assist. 	Id. 	After the fire was extinguished, Perry
assisted in restraining the prisoner and removing him from the cell. 	The prisoner
resisted and additional restraints were used. 	Id., PageID.248. 	Sgt. Perry directed
staff to evacuate second galley D Unit prisoners from cells near the fire and to take
them to F Unit. 	Id.
Sgt. Perry then was called to E Unit to assist with a prisoner who had removed
a temporary plug from the in-cell fire suppression system. 	The prisoner was in the
process of being removed from the Unit when Sgt. Perry was informed that the plug
was repaired and the prisoner could be returned to his cell. 	Id. 	That prisoner,
however, resisted by pulling away from the escort and additional restraints were
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applied to the prisoner. 	Id. 	Then, Sgt. Perry was called to the first floor of D Unit
because another prisoner had started a fire. 	Id. 	Sgt. Perry responded as part of a
team that removed and escorted that prisoner from D Unit to C Unit. 	Id.
After removing that prisoner, Sgt. Perry returned to E Unit to account for all
the equipment. 	Id. 	The smoke had been cleared from the Unit, and he directed
staff to begin escorting prisoners back to E Unit. 	Id. 	While in E Unit, Sgt. Perry
learned that another prisoner had broken a sprinkler in his cell. 	Id. 	When he
arrived at the cell, he observed that the prisoner had tied a sheet with a noose around
the cell fire suppression system. 	Id. 	Sgt. Perry ordered the prisoner to place the
noose on the ground. 	Id., PageID.249. 	Instead, the prisoner placed the noose
around his neck. 	Id. 	Sgt. Perry then responded with other officers to remove the
prisoner from his cell and to take the prisoner to healthcare. 	Id.
Sgt. Perry attests that he does not recall speaking with Plaintiff Caffey or
hearing him yell at him on March 13, 2024. 	Id. 	He further attests that:
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Id.
Lt. Greenwald was not scheduled to work on March 13, 2024, but was called to
work due to the various incidents occurring in the segregation units. 	ECF No. 28-8,
PageID.254 (affidavit of Lt. Greenwald). 	After reporting to work, he was assigned
to watch the outdoor yard modules outside of E and F Units. 	Id. 	He then escorted
prisoners from F Unit back to the second gallery of D Unit. 	Id. 	He does not recall
being in first gallery D Unit or prisoner Caffey speaking to him or yelling at him on
March 13, 2024. 	Id., PageID.255.
Nurse Racine says that she does not have any authority to remove prisoners
from cells or to initiate evacuation procedures or prisoner movement. 	ECF No. 26-
3, PageID.204 (affidavit of Nurse Racine).
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II. 	Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). The standard for determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” 	State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan,
421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251-52 (1986)). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir.
2005).
When, as here, the non-movant fails to respond to a motion for summary
judgment, the Court must “examine the movant’s motion for summary judgment to
ensure that he has discharged his initial burden.” Stough v. Mayville Cmty. Sch., 138
F.3d 612, 614 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir.
1991)).
III. 	Eighth Amendment
Caffey’s remaining claim is that Defendants should have removed him from
his cell so that he was not exposed to the smoke from the fires started by other
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prisoners near his cell on March 13, 2024. 	Inmates have a constitutionally protected
right to personal safety grounded in the Eighth Amendment. 	Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). 	Thus, prison staff are obliged “to take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” in their care. 	Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984). 	To establish liability under the Eighth Amendment for
a claim based on a failure to prevent harm to a prisoner, a plaintiff must show that
the prison official acted with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of serious
harm facing the plaintiff. 	Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25, 32 (1993); Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766–67 (6th Cir. 2011); Curry v. Scott,
249 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2001); Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir.
1997); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. Mich.
Dep’t of Corr. 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1995). 	Deliberate indifference is a higher
standard than negligence and requires that “the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference.” 	Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Bishop, 636
F.3d at 766–67.
The deliberate-indifference standard includes both objective and subjective
components. 	Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling, 509 U.S. at 35–37. 	To satisfy the
objective prong, an inmate must show “that he is incarcerated under conditions
posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” 	Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 	Under the
subjective prong, an official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to
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inmate health or safety.” 	Id. at 837. 	“[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed
to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” 	Id. at 842. 	“It
is, indeed, fair to say that acting or failing to act with deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly
disregarding that risk.” 	Id. at 836. 	“[P]rison officials who actually knew of a
substantial risk to inmate health or safety may be found free from liability if they
responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” 	Id.
at 844.
Defendants argue that Caffey cannot support either the subjective or objective
components of an Eighth Amendment claim. 	Caffey says that the prisoner in the
gallery right above his cell started throwing things that were on fire down to the
gallery where Caffey was housed. 	ECF No. 26-2, PageID.170 (Deposition of Caffey).
Caffey says that two books landed on his gallery level. 	Id., PageID.171. 	Once the
“smoke and debris came up”, his neighbor started coughing and wheezing. 	Id.
Caffey says that he had to put a rag over his mouth to stop him from coughing. 	Id.
Caffey says that on the gallery above his cell, books, blankets, and clothes were on
fire. 	Id., PageID.172. 	Caffey estimated that it was “about a good ten minutes
before they even noticed what was going on” when the officers put the fires out with
a fire extinguisher. 	Id., PageID.173-174.
Caffey cannot support his claim that he needed to be evacuated from his cell
with any medical evidence because the medical evidence does not indicate that he
had any issues due to the smoke. 	Caffey made requests for medical care due to
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breathing problems caused by the fire. 	ECF No. 28-10, PageID.267-270. 	When
healthcare visited or scheduled healthcare, Caffey refused the visit by responding
that his symptoms had resolved or that: “I’m straight”, or he did not show up for
scheduled visits. 	Id., PageID.260-266. 	There exists no evidence that could support
Caffey’s claim that he suffered from a serious medical need due to the fires or smoke,
or that he was in danger of injury or death due to the fires in the segregation unit.
Accordingly, 	Caffey 	failed 	to 	support 	the 	objective 	component 	of 	an 	Eighth
Amendment claim.
Similarly, Caffey cannot establish the subjective component of an Eighth
Amendment claim. 	It is undisputed Sgt. Perry, Lt. Greenwald, and Nurse Racine
each responded to multiple fires and other issues that were rapidly occurring in the
segregation units at the prison on March 13, 2024.
First, it is undisputed that Nurse Racine did not have the authority or ability
to evacuate Plaintiff from his prison cell. 	Nurse Racine worked in both E and D
Units after the fires were extinguished assessing medical conditions of prisoners.
ECF No. 28-12, PageID.274.
Second, as set forth above, Sgt. Perry was responding to multiple incidents in
the segregation units that did not involve Plaintiff.
Third, Lt. Greenwald was working outside the segregation units, in the prison
yard, watching over the prisoners that had been removed from their cells. There
exists no evidence that Defendants were aware of a serious risk of injury to Plaintiff
and that they ignored that risk. 	Rather, the evidence is undisputed that each
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Defendant responded to the evolving challenges that occurred in the segregation
units during their shifts on March 13, 2024.
Moreover, Captain Sebaly went to both E Unit and D Unit “to access the
amount of smoke in the units and the need for further evacuation.” 	ECF No. 28-13,
PageID.276. 	He determined that no further evacuation of prisoners was needed.
Id. 	Accordingly, Caffey failed to support the subjective component of an Eighth
Amendment claim. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, no genuine issue of material
fact exists entitling Defendants to summary judgment.
IV. 	Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, Defendants Sgt. Perry and Lt. Greenwald argue that they are
entitled to dismissal of the complaint against him based upon qualified immunity.
“Under 	the 	doctrine 	of 	qualified 	immunity, 	‘government 	officials 	performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.’” 	Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d
531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
Once a defendant raises the qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant officer violated a right so clearly
established “that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he [was]
doing violate[d] that right.’” 	Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 	The analysis entails a two-step
inquiry. 	Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013).
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First, the court must “determine if the facts alleged make out a violation of a
constitutional right.” 	Id. 	(citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (1982)).
Second, the court asks if the right at issue was “‘clearly established’ when the event
occurred such that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated
it.” 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). 	A court may address these steps in any
order. 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). 	A government official is entitled to
qualified immunity if either step of the analysis is not satisfied. 	See Citizens in
Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir. 2016).
In applying the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must
identify “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed” and determine whether
a violation occurred. 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 	The court
considers the state of the law at the second step. 	As the Supreme Court has
observed, “this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to
be clearly established, [but] existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” 	White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)
(internal quotation marks and original brackets omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). 	As explained by the Supreme Court:
To 	be 	clearly 	established, 	a 	legal 	principle 	must 	have 	a
sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must
be “settled law,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116
L.Ed.2d 	589 	(1991) 	(per 	curiam), 	which 	means 	it 	is 	dictated 	by
“controlling authority” or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive
authority,’ ” al–Kidd, supra, at 741–742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Wilson
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). It
is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The
precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official would
interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.
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See Reichle, 566 U.S., at 666, 132 S.Ct. 2088. Otherwise, the rule is not
one that “every reasonable official” would know. Id., at 664, 132 S.Ct.
2088 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle
clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances
before him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is “clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This requires a high “degree of specificity.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)
(per curiam). We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not “define
clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
the 	crucial 	question 	whether 	the 	official 	acted 	reasonably 	in 	the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, supra, at 2023
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A rule is too general if
the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct “does not follow immediately
from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Anderson,
supra, at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In the context of a warrantless arrest, the
rule must obviously resolve “whether ‘the circumstances with which [the
particular officer] was confronted ... constitute[d] probable cause.’”
Mullenix, supra, at 309 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 640–641, 107 S.Ct.
3034; some alterations in original).
D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63-64 (2018).
In the opinion of the undersigned, Defendants Sgt. Perry and Lt. Greenwald
are entitled to qualified immunity from liability because they did not violate Caffey’s
clearly established Eighth Amendment rights.
V. 	Recommendation
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendants’
motions for summary judgment and dismiss this case.
NOTICE TO PARTIES: 	Objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen
(14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
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constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Dated: 	May 8, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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